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INTRODUCTION 
The Fourth Pacific Trade and Development Conference was held 
in Ottawa, Canada, on October 7 to 10, 1971. The Conference program was 
outlined in the late summer of 1970, but it proved particularly topical in the 
wake of the currency and trade crisis following August 15, 1971. 
Although the realignment of currencies agreed in December has 
eased international monetary relationships, trade problems remain. Especial-
ly in the Pacific area, the potential of trade as an engine of economic growth 
and as a basis for constructive political relationships is difficult to over-
emphasize. The mutuality of interests in international trade between the 
developed countries of the region is well known. Of increasing importance is 
the export potential and performance of developing countries in South and 
East Asia. The future record of industrially advanced countries in reduction 
or control of barriers to trade affecting developing countries' exports will 
test the sincerity of many who have professed to favour the liberalization of 
trade as a stimulus to development. The willingness and ability of developed 
countries to adjust their industrial structure will be the major theme of the 
Fifth Trade and Development Conference scheduled for Tokyo in January, 
1973. 
The Canadian host committee of the Fourth Conference in 
releasing the proceedings of the Conference wish to express appreciation to 
all those who have made possible the success of the Conference and the 
preparation of this volume. In particular, we wish to thank the public and 
private financial supporters in Australia, Canada, Japan, and the United States 
whose assistance has been essential. We also wish to thank those students, 
faculty, and staff members at Carleton who helped with local arrangements 
and the editing and preparation of the proceedings. The main responsibility 
for the latter task rested on Tom Burlington, who has recently gone to Japan 
to take up employment with the International Development Center of Japan. 
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H.E. English 
Keith A. J. Hay 
A. E. Safarian 
COMMUN IQUE 
The Fourth Pacific Trade and Development Conference met at 
Carleton University, Ottawa, Canada, from October 7th to 10th to examine 
the considerable obstacles to trade and development that still exist among 
Pacific nations, and to suggest to policy makers how the trading relationships 
of this region can be improved. Previous conferences in this series have been 
held in Tokyo, Honolulu, and Sydney. 
Participants from Japan, Australia, Singapore, Hong Kong, the 
United States and Canada, and from the International Bank for Reconstruc-
tion and Development and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development, engaged in an active discussion. 
The conference was opened on October 7th with an address by the 
Hon. Jean-Luc Pepin, Minister of Industry, Trade and Commerce of the 
Government of Canada. Mr. Pepin asked participants to help governments to 
avoid the sacrifice of the long-term health of trading relationship in the pur-
suit of measures designed to deal with balance of payments problems. 
Participants were well aware of the great timeliness of their meeting. 
They expressed deep concern about the implications of recent U.S. policy 
changes for the prospects of trade among countries of the Pacific rim. 
Separate consideration was given to trade obstacles affecting the 
products of agriculture, the processed natural products (especially of the 
developing countries) and manufactures. In the discussion of trade in agri-
cultural products it was emphasized that the agricultural policies of the 
United States, Europe and Japan impose important barriers to the exports 
from the countries of the Pacific region which can be efficient suppliers of 
grain and livestock products. The conference singled out U.S . policies to 
subsidize dairy products and thus meat products indirectly, and Japanese 
supports for rice and livestock production. It was pointed out that these 
practices distort allocation of resources in the agricultural sector, raise costs 
to other sectors of the economy, and significantly reduce the flow of trade 
in agricultural products. 
The effect of trade and other policies upon the location of process-
ing industries and the pattern of trade in processed products was also reviewed. 
The structure of tariffs which imposes much higher rates upon more processed 
forms of such products was criticized. These practices together with elaborate 
intergovernmental and intercorporate relationships make it difficult to esti-
mate accurately the advantages which would be likely to accrue to developing 
countries if such institutional arrangements did not dominate trade. This 
applies particularly to sugar, petroleum, and some other products. In other 
cases, such as tropical wood products, it is more apparent that trade restric-
tions limit industrial expansion. 
In the manufacturing sector, the countries of the Pacific rim face 
important trade obstacles . Three of the main developed countries of the 
region (Japan, Australia, and Canada) still retain higher tariffs on manufac-
tures than most other developed countries. The conference discussed in some 
detail the major non-tariff barriers, in particular the scope and effects of 
voluntary export restraints, the long-term cotton textile agreements, 
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administrative barriers and government purchasing practices. The impact of 
the first two practices was covered in papers prepared by participants from 
Hong Kong and Singapore. The discussion brought out the serious implica-
tions for the future of exports of the developing countries of the restraints 
that penalise major sectors of manufacturing where successful development 
has occurred. Administrative and other non-tariff barriers, some outside the 
scope of GATT, were reviewed and found to have important effects on 
particular transactions. However, the conference found it difficult to assess 
their overall importance relative to remaining tariff barriers. Both in Japan 
and in the federal states, such as the United States, Canada, and Australia, 
the extent and effects of non-tariff barriers have proven difficult to deter-
mine. It was felt that further examination of specific non-tariff barriers was 
necessary and that new techniques would be required to keep such practices 
in check and to ensure that their impact would not seriously distort the 
country or product pattern of trade. 
Participants were particularly concerned about the current policy 
environment including the lack of European interest in outward-looking 
trade policies, the growing protectionism in the U.S. reflected both in private 
groups and now in the actions of government, and the substantial levels of 
protection retained by other Pacific countries. Furthermore, the developed 
countries have shown only limited interest in providing access to their mar-
kets for the products of the developing countries. 
The Conference Participants were troubled about the apparent 
inadequacy of the existing institutional framework; or at least the lack of 
positive initiative on the part of the governments operating within that frame-
work. What appear particularly necessary are initiatives toward regional 
cooperation in the Pacific area in at least two directions. 
(1) an effort on the part of developed nations to reduce and 
equalize trade barriers, so that Pacific nations among others can gain more 
of the advantages of specialization and exchange. In such circumstances, 
both they and the Europeans might be more willing to participate in new 
multilateral efforts toward trade liberalization. 
(2) an effort to achieve more cooperation and integration among 
developing countries of the Pacific and a parallel effort by the developed 
countries of the region to provide better access for the products of the 
developing countries to their markets, so as to enlarge the flow of trade of 
these countries. 
To this end the Conference favoured the establishment of a new 
intergovernmental institution including representatives from developed and 
less developed countries of the Pacific area, to study and promote practical 
means of achieving the foregoing objectives and to give particular attention 
to methods of monitoring barriers to trade and their effects. Further, such 
an agency should give particular attention to the study and promotion of 
effective and parallel adjustment assistance policies in the Paricif area 
countries. 
The Conference applauded the purposes underlying the recent 
efforts of the United States Government and others to bring about re-
alignment of currency values. Action is long overdue and is essential to 
achievement of more meaningful trade patterns. However, the Conference 
was deeply concerned about the method employed. In the first place it 
questioned the use of the surcharge as an element in the policy adopted , 
since these surcharges appear merely to postpone the realization of 
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meaningful currency relationships. Furthermore, the continuation of the 
surcharge for any substantial period seemed to the participants very likely 
to endanger the close trade relationships between the United States and its 
Pacific trading partners, and perhaps to have important political consequences 
as well . 
Conference proceedings, consisting of papers submitted and a 
summary of points made in discussion, will be published shortly in order 
that the far-reaching issues debated may be available to all interested in the 
emerging patterns of trade and development in the Pacific region in the 1970s. 
The Steering Committee of the conference will later announce a venue and 
theme for the Fifth Pacific Trade and Development Conference. 
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Summary Policy Paper 
SUMMARY: BARRIERS TO TRADE IN THE PACIFIC REGION * 
THOMAS BURLINGTON 
1. Introduction 
Distortions and restrictions of international commodity trade 
continually impose serious losses of real income on Pacific area countries. 
Many of these distortions are unnecessary, and particularly biased against 
the less-developed countries of the region. These nations should be assisted 
rather than hindered by the policies of the developed countries . Most 
distortions arise from the policies of the Pacific nations themselves, but some 
are caused by the policies of outside countries , particularly those of Western 
Europe . While there are some possibilities of approaching the correction of 
these distortions on a global scale, most participants in the Fourth Pacific 
Trade and Development Conference felt that a promising approach - within 
the current world trading environment - is through regional initiatives and 
regional cooperation and negotiations. 
This paper is a summary of the Conference participants ' ideas 
and views on the most troublesome problems hindering freer trade and devel-
opment in the area and suggestions for improving the situation. These prob-
lems have many facets and do not fit into a simple framework. The Conference 
was broadly concerned with the need for cooperation in trade liberalization 
and economic development of the Pacific Basin . The earlier working sessions 
were concerned with the following: 
i trade in agricultural products - especially trade in grains and dairy and 
meat products ; 
ii factors influencing the location of processing industries in tropical coun-
tries , particularly factors related to trade barriers and industrial structures; 
iii trade in manufactured products - the effects of voluntary export restraints 
on trade in textile products, the non-tariff barriers of Japan, and the govern-
ment procurement policies of the United States were discussed . 
Section 2 of this paper summarizes the attitudes in various coun-
tries of the region toward trade barriers, trade liberalization , and adjustment 
assistance programs for sectors subject to rapid and debilitating structural 
changes. A number of factors affecting the trade relations of the less-
developed countries are also discussed . Section 3 of the paper discusses 
specific economic policies and obstructions to trade with regard to particular 
countries and commodities. This section grows out of the working sessions 
as described above . Section 4 briefly summarizes the main policy proposals 
brought forth at the Conference to enhance trade relations and economic 
development in the Pacific region. 
*This was separately published as an "Occasional Paper" by the School of International 
Affairs, Carleton University . 
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2. Attitudes and Factors Affecting Trade in the Pacific Area 
The European Economic Community, the United States, and Japan 
are the most important trading entities in the world and have a major impact 
on trade relations among all countries in the Pacific region. 
2.1. The Impact of the European Economic Community 
The sheer size of the European Economic Community (EEC) bloc 
will increase considerably in the near future. Some of Britain's trade barriers 
will be increased, especially as a consequence of the Common Agricultural 
Policy (CAP). British entry will involve the end of Commonwealth Prefer-
ences, requiring adjustments in the Commonwealth countries. The wider 
application of the Common Agricultural Policy will lead to increasing self-
sufficiency, especially in cereals and dairy products, and to increases in 
surpluses which will disrupt export markets around the world. 
Arrangements will also be made with the European Free Trade 
Area (EFTA) countries for freer trade, especially in industrial products. 
Considering these arrangements and the special preferential arrangements the 
EEC has with the weaker Mediterranean and African countries, the voting 
bloc of the Community in international institutions will grow, perhaps to 
forty or fifty nations. Trade patterns in the Pacific region will be significantly 
affected by the policies of an enlarged EEC. In particular, the Community's 
propensity to disturb existing export patterns, its lack of interest in the prob-
lems of trading relations outside of Europe (two-thirds of European trade 
takes place within the bloc), and its determination to discriminate especially 
against the importation of the labour-intensive goods of East Asia are all 
major elements of the "policy environment." 
2.2. Protectionist Trends and Adjustment 
Assistance in the United States 
Many of the Conference participants felt quite pessimistic about 
the strong resurgence of protectionism in the United States recently. As 
Malmgren noted, this manifests itself in ad hoc trade restrictions, usually in 
the form of so-called "voluntary" import quotas, the inability to obtain 
authority from Congress for trade negotiations, and the near passage of 
generally restrictive trade legislation on more than one occasion since the 
end of the Kennedy-Round in 1967. The two major groups that had previous-
ly supported the move towards trade liberalization - the executive of the 
government and the labour unions - and which had helped hold the line 
against the very protectionist legislatures, have now begun to encourage the 
protectionist forces. While the executive has been searching for ways to 
adjust the U.S. economy to international trade, it also has political commit-
ments, especially to the textile workers in the southern United States where 
government programs are in decline. The American labour movement has 
shifted from its traditional support of liberal trade policies to a new, quite 
intransigent, position favouring controls on both imports and direct invest-
ment outflows, particularly with regard to East Asia. This new emphasis has 
caused a major change, some participants called it a frightening change, in 
the direction of protectionism. 
The Conference learned of the adverse attitudes of various 
American groups toward domestic adjustment assistance programs for 
depressed agricultural a'nd relatively inefficient, often labour-intensive 
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industrial sectors. Such opposition is regrettable because carefully planned 
adjustment programs are usually the least-cost way of mitigating the effects 
of structural change and competition on less competitive industries. These 
programs can promote the reallocation of resources into more competitive 
and efficient channels. 
Adjustment assistance programs in the United States are opposed 
on ideological grounds. Business is reluctant to support legislation for adjust-
ment assistance because it is viewed as government interference with the free 
market. Paradoxically, tariffs and quotas are popular with businessmen. 
Government officialdom is reluctant because of the high budgetary cost of 
adjustment programs, although cost-benefit studies have not been carried 
out. The labour movement is opposed to the development of policies such as 
a comprehensive manpower program. It was emphasized that the adjustment 
assistance process will be an extremely difficult central issue of policy in the 
1970s. Those industrial countries which handle it in the best way are the ones 
that will emerge from the process least strained. 
Neo-mercantilist tendencies have been building up for a number 
of years, and have recently been aimed especially at goods from East Asia. 
Beginning with agitation for textile import quotas in the early 1960s, the 
pressure has spread to other labour-intensive products and has intensified. 
Frustrations with EEC policies, growing competition from Japan, the weak 
state of the domestic economy, and the chronic balance of payments deficits 
have added to the political frustrations over the Vietnam War and the unequal 
distribution of the economic burden of defence among Western countries. 
This turning inwards has left in abeyance a number of initiatives of the United 
States on various aspects of foreign aid and development expenditures and 
the implementation of general tariff preferences. 
The American participants agreed that it is necessary for measures 
and action to be taken immediately to counteract this neo-mercantilist trend 
but they were pessimistic that such action would be generated inside the 
United States. The Guam Doctrine embodying a substantial shift in the 
American role in Asia leaves an important external pressure point open in 
the form of "supporting the initiatives of other nations." This has been 
interpreted more in terms of initiatives in a security sense. Some participants 
suggested, however, that serious ecnnomic initiatives fostering methods or 
institutions for greater regional cooperation, especially if taken by Japan, 
would be very helpful in trying to shift the United States out of its present 
mode of behaviour. 
2.3. Japan 
2.3.1 Japanese Attitudes toward Trade Barriers 
Conference delegates felt that attitudes of important Japanese 
organizations toward liberalization of trade and development relations in the 
Pacific were more difficult to characterize than the attitudes of the EEC or 
the United States. The level of trade barriers still remains unquestionably 
high in Japan. Non-tariff barriers such as state-trading, residual import restric-
tions or quotas contravening GATT agreements are very important in agri-
culture. In the manufacturing sector, barriers are also high, but the relative 
importance of tariff and non-tariff barriers is more difficult to determine, 
principally because of a lack of data. On the other hand, the trend towards 
removing trade barriers which contravene the GA TT agreements has been 
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rapid in recent years, due to the growing balance of payments surpluses since 
1968, the continuing advance of Japanese consumer prices, and external 
political pressures especially from the United States. 
A leading Japanese participant argued that the most important 
factor speeding Japanese trade liberalization was anxiety over the growing 
protectionist tendencies in the United States. Before the Japanese-American 
textile negotiations and the plethora of anti-dumping cases during 1969 and 
1970 against imports from Japan, both the Japanese government and the 
general public did not really recognize that the very existence of the Japanese 
economy depends upon relatively free, multinational trade. Up until then, 
Japanese government officials and leading businessmen paid lip service to 
free international trade, but there simultaneously prevailed a belief that free 
trade mainly benefitted the most advanced, most "powerful" countries, 
e.g., England in the nineteenth century or the United States today. It was 
hardly surprising that Japan got into a frame of mind of strictly regulating 
imports. Furthermore, Japan first entered export markets in the 1920s and 
1930s, and soon faced very high import barriers imposed by the developed 
nations and their colonies, which were designed to divert the main thrust 
of Japanese trade. This situation was not an insignificant factor in provoking 
Japanese entry into the Second World War. 
However, now that the United States has begun to turn toward 
protectionism, many Japanese for the first time realize that Japan does 
benefit a great deal from free world trade. Given this realization, Japanese 
leaders are faced with the problem that it is not only difficult to dismantle 
trade barriers, it is also difficult to dismantle a protectionist frame of mind 
which has become counter-productive for Japan. 
An American participant noted that a major element in the 1970-
71 American policies on trade was a collision with Japan, both officially and 
on the level of private business activities in the Pacific. A mood of hostility 
and protectionism in the United States has grown rapidly among certain 
important segments of the American political and economic system. In a 
similar vein, concern was expressed about the degree of conflict between 
reality and image concerning Japanese administrative guidance. Japan has 
acquired an image in the United States of "Japan, Inc." This idea grows from 
the notion that government-business cooperation is so universal that a special 
set of rules are necessary for dealing with Japan. Quantitatively, there seem 
to be many individual stories about these difficulties with Japan, and while 
they may be relatively few or of small importance, the issue has been greatly 
magnified. Conference delegates argued that hard data is needed to evaluate 
these stories, to confirm or dispel this image. A variety of other factors 
related to both Japan and other East and South East Asia countries was 
mentioned as giving rise to this mood of hostility: 
i The export successes of Japan, Korea, Taiwan, and Hong Kong have 
generated strong policital reactions in importing countries. 
ii Some American companies have built processing or assembly facilities in 
this area, to bring in products formerly produced in the United States. The 
major examples are in the electrical and electronics industry. · 
iii American manufacturers discovered that European countries have main-
tained a number of formal and informal controls on imports from Eastern 
Asia on what is essentially a discriminating basis. This is interpreted as a 
major cause of the concentration on the United States and Canadian mar-
kets for the exports of manufactures from Eastern Asia. 
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2.3.2. Adjustment Assistance in Japan 
An important element in the trade and development policies of the 
developed countries is their attitude toward adjustment assistance programs 
to smooth out the process of structural change. This is particularly important 
to Japan with its very high rates of growth and structural change. It was noted 
that Japan has an effective industrial policy that shifts resources out of ineffi-
cient sectors and pushes them into industries that have high future produc-
tivity . By contrast, the United States claims that it does not have an industrial 
policy, and th~t structural change is simply th~ sum of. ~arket forces . In 
reality, the Umted States does have such a pohcy, but it is made up of a num-
ber of ad hoc measures which end up protecting inefficient industry. The 
United States does not favour Japan's approach, claiming there is too much 
government interference with and direction of industry. 
A Japanese participant carefully explained the structural difficulties 
besetting the Japanese agricultural sector and sketched why it was necessary 
to have an explicit policy to deal with them. He argued that Japan should 
abolish agricultural protection to the benefit not only of exporting countries, 
but also, in the long run, of Japan. There is a real problem of rural poverty 
in Japan. The poorest farmers, who number one-quarter of the farm popula-
tion, cannot be moved for i>easons of age and opportunity . This is a particu-
larly awkward problem since the Ministry of Agriculture apparently does not 
have an articulate , consistent adjustment policy and in fact general agricul-
tural policy in Japan is virtually moribund. 
A number of proposals were made at the Conference to improve 
trade and development relationships in the Pacific . These will be discussed 
later, but it is important to note here that all participants hoped that Japan 
would play a cooperative role and take significant initiatives in these 
respects. The Japanese are pessimistic about the possibilities for global liber-
alization; only an enlarged EEC is visible on the horizon . The Japanese 
government will take neither a "going ahead" nor a "falling behind others" 
stance in trade policy . But in that kind of "trade policy in disguise," the 
Japanese government may actually pursue a measure of regional integration 
with Australia and the South East Asian countries. Canada would be welcome 
to join in. Also, the Japanese government will favour a set of policies for the 
internal restructuring of the economy so that the economy would not be in 
a disadvantageous position if there were a swing toward global free trade 
around 1980. Japan wishes to go along with the United States ultimately, 
but at present the United States is too big and too tough, so that moves 
toward a modest Pacific integration appear to be a good strategy . 
2.4. The Less-Developed Countries 
2.4.1. The Bias of Trade Barriers 
It is well known that the trade policies of the developed countries 
are biased against the less-developed countries and particularly against the 
countries of East and South East Asia . Balassa's calculations, given in 
Vandendriessche's paper,1 of pre- and post-Kennedy-Round effective tariff 
rates show that not only are rates biased against the LDCs, but also tariff 
reductions brought about by the Kennedy-Round were proportionately lower 
1 "Factors that Influence the Location of Processing Industries in Tropical Countries," 
Henri Vandendriessche . 
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on products of interest to LDCs than on ;rp.ore a<;Ivanced ma?ufactu!es. No?~ 
t ariff barriers such as quotas, " voluntary restramts, and pnce-subs1dy pohc1es 
are also very important. On the other hand, the recent U.S. surcharge was 
thought not to affect the expor~s of the less-de".'eloped countries very much. 
Most of their exports to the Umted States are either regulated by quotas or 
incorporate a small amount of value added in the country by American-
owned subsidiaries. The surcharge does not apply to goods regulated by 
quotas and has only a small effect on the latter category of exports. 
2.4.2 The Competitiveness of the Less-Developed Countries 
It was mentioned above that the competitiveness and energy of 
most East Asian countries have stimulated U.S. protectionist moves especial-
ly towards more labour-intensive products, as well as giving rise to particular-
ly discriminatory barriers in Europe. One participant observed that it is not 
Japan that the United States need be worried about in future ; rather it is the 
six or seven "Japans" coming up . As well as the traditional labour-intensive 
products like toys and textiles, imports into the United States from LDCs 
now include steel, hydroelectric generators, and complicated electronics 
circuitry. It is commodities of this sort that will dismay developed countries 
by their range and sophistication. Products from countries like Argentina, 
Columbia, and Brazil as well as the East Asian countries are able to penetrate 
developed markets despite tariff barriers . For example, Hong Kong and 
Singapore have a comparative advantage over the developed countries in a 
number of important products. In these industries they have a technology 
which is similar to or more advanced than that in the developed countries, 
good management, experienced labour and commercial services, and low 
wage levels. Consequently, in items in which value-added is significant, they 
can jumb over any tariff barriers that the developed countries can reasonably 
put up . This is an important reason why the developed countries have moved 
from tariff barriers to quantitative restrictions . The cut-off point when 
quantitative restrictions are thrown up seems to occur when penetration 
reaches 5 percent of the developed country's market for a general range of 
products and 20 percent for specific products . When potentially big econo-
mies such as India and Brazil get moving, these saturation levels will be 
approached very swiftly , resulting in strong measures to limit imports at that 
level by a proliferation of voluntary restraint agreements . 
2.4.3. The Need for Adjustment Assistance 
in Developed Countries 
Thus, if the developing countries as a whole are going to be able 
to trade with the developed nations on an effective scale, there must be a 
new stress on adjustment assistance in the developed countries to allow such 
changes to take place. The marginal productivity of workers in Hong Kong 
and Singapore is higher today than the marginal productivity of workers in 
parts of the United States, Australia, Canada, and many European countries. 
It is easier to retain the Singapore and Hong Kong workers who are on the 
whole better educated than, for example , the workers who will be displaced 
in the garment industry in the southern United States. Therefore , adjustment 
assistance needs to be a broader policy than the training of a few thousand 
workers here or there , so that in fifteen years time when this question becomes 
acute there will be a new basis for world trade rather than the economic con-
frontation that could lead to very serious political consequences . 
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2.4.4 Protectionism in Less-Developed Countries 
Another aspect of the trade barrier problem that the LDCs face is 
due to what was called the postwar reaction to the prewar division of labour, 
which led to import substitution policies and very high tariffs among the 
LDCs themselves. Many inefficient production units have been established 
behind these trade barriers, making it difficult for each country to specialize 
and trade with its neighbours. 
The problem is further accentuated in those countries that have 
large labour forces employed in weak, protected sectors. In rich countries · 
with good social security at a period of rapid growth, the problems are not 
too great. However, in countries with huge employment problems, low 
standards of living, high rates of population growth, and low rates of econo-
mic growth, the problems are enormous. Tariff barriers must be dismantled, 
but it is much more difficult for many LDCs than for advanced countries. 
2.4.5. The Effects of Generalized Tariff Preference Schemes 
The EEC, Japan, and Australia have implemented generalized 
tariff preference schemes, and the U.S. scheme has been proposed. Malmgren2 
was very pessimistic about the effects of these schemes on liberalizing trade 
with the developing countries. He noted that the U.S. scheme has not even 
been sent up to Congress in the form of proposed legislation because the 
Executive rightly fears transformation of any trade legislation into protec-
tionist legislation of a different character altogether. If implemented, the 
U.S. scheme would have safeguards against market disruption in the form of 
exceptions made for "sensitive" labour-intensive products and an escape 
clause procedure. The latter escape procedure would probably be sought by 
U.S. manufacturers and workers fairly frequently; and the Tariff Commission, 
if it followed its other recent practices, would probably often support snap-
backs to the MFN rate. The uncertainty generated would be high. 
The Community general preference scheme offers certain theoreti-
cal advantages over the American scheme, looking at the whole of the devel-
oping world together. The Community would first of all not invoke a safe-
guard (snap-back to MFN rates) unless imports from preferred countries had 
reached a certain trigger level. The trigger would be observable, in theory, 
and therefore countries could plan more effectively. Second, the Community 
would place imports of a certain product from a given country back into the 
MFN category if that country's exports of the item exceeded one-half of the 
total volume allowed under the ceiling or trigger level. This would mean that 
countries which became relatively strong competitors would be moved into 
normal competition with the developed countries, making room for the lesser 
developed countries to use preferences to develop a capability to export. The 
Community began to implement the scheme in the summer of 1971, but it is 
not all that it seems. Based upon analysis of the specific mechanics, R. N. 
Cooper has concluded that the Community scheme as now implemented will 
offer almost no additional incentive to developing countries to export. The 
tariff quotas have been set on a base of 1968, with a low add-on allowance. 
The rate of growth of successful exporters is such that they will end up 
exceeding the tariff quotas in the initial period. Moreover, Vendendreissche 
pointed out that the preferences mostly apply to all the manufactured goods 
but not to the agricultural processed goods which are important to Asian 
2"Trade Liberalization and the Economic Development of the Pacific Basin: The Need 
for Cooperation," Harald B. Malmgren. 
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countries. There were also some major exceptions in the manufactured goods 
category, such as textiles and labour-intensive processed goods like handi-
crafts, so that for commodities which the preferences might have assisted, 
they were not instituted. 
Under the Japanese scheme, preferences affect only 4 percent of 
imports to some unspecified extent. In Australia, the preferences are purely 
nominal, affecting much less than 1 percent of imports with a margin of 
perhaps 1 to 2 percentage points on tariff levels around 40 percent. 
The actual mechanics of these schemes will effectively block access 
to developed markets for a majority of East Asian products. As a result, the 
LDCs could be expected to be somewhat bitter about this type of program. 
Many of them have already discounted preference schemes as a means to 
export expansion. 
2.4.6. Unemployment and the Green Revolution 
There are a number of important influences on current and forth-
coming Asian trade patterns, such as the unemployment situation, the effects 
of the green revolution, and the withdrawal of the United States from 
Vietnam and the end of the war. It was argued that the rapidly growing unem-
ployment problem in LDC Asian economies is reaching a critical stage . This 
phenomenon is not stressed nearly enough and will overshadow many of the 
trade topics discussed by the Conference. Unemployment has been widely 
ignored either because data are lacking or because quantified information on 
employment is misleading . As a first step, great efforts are needed to generate 
more and better data. With this at hand, questions of the impact of unem-
ployment on trade policy and the ways in which trade policy can ease the 
situation could be carefully considered . 
Malmgren suggested that the hybrid seeds of the Green Revolution 
and technological progress generally have enabled South Asia and parts of 
South East and East Asia to become nutritionally self-sufficient and have 
somewhat deceptively allowed hopes of export potential to rise . Furthermore 
Japan as a developed nation is self-sufficient in rice with large surpluses that 
can be dumped as food aid . Japan has very high agricultural support prices, 
as do many of the developing countries themselves, and in both cases such 
policies have contributed to recent expansions in production. Thus, because 
of the tendency toward widespread self-sufficiency and for other reasons, 
the future of export markets in food grains looks bleak, and hopes for the 
evolution of South East Asia as the "rice bowl" for the rest of Asia are 
probably misguided. This applied also to South Vietnam in the postwar 
period. The Green Revolution will also likely exacerbate the unemployment 
problems in these countries, thus slowing down the adoption of new agri-
cultural techniques. The real potential of this area in agricultural trade, so 
far as there is one, is higher up the protein ladder, first in feed supplies and 
eventually, as incomes grow, in the production of meat. 
2.5. Canada and Australia : Protectionist Attitudes 
and Structural Problems 
Finally, the situation in the other developed countries of the 
Pacific region is of interest. While Canada and New Zealand were not 
mentioned much during the Conference, it seems that in Canada at least 
protectionist sentiments are not on the wane and if anything are increasing, 
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partly in reaction to Canada's relationships to the United States. Canada, 
Australia, and Japan are among the countries with the highest trade barriers 
in the world, especially in processing and manufacturing. A number of com-
mentators pointed out that Australia is among the countries with the most 
experience in raising protective trade barriers . Now that even wool is subsi-
dized, there is almost nothing that Australia hasn't tried to protect. However, 
the paper written by the Australians, Crawford and Board, 3 stood out at the 
Conference as one which made some concrete, negotiable proposals, especially 
with respect to trade negotiations with Japan and possibly including other 
Pacific countries. They were particularly interested in the reduction of barriers 
to Australia's agricultural exports in return for the formulation of a mineral 
resources policy and reductions in very high tariff rates. There was a note of 
caution when they stated that the political climate in Australia at present is 
much more favourable for alterations in tariff rates than in the past. However, 
the balance of forces in Australia is such that considerable gains would have 
to be in sight before any significant action outside the long process of Tariff 
Board review could be contemplated. 
Of course Canada and Australia, like all developed countries, have 
important structural problems to face in the agricultural sector. Drysdale 
summarized the main message of the Crawford-Board paper: agriculture plays 
a vital role in the Australian economy and trade, so that the decline in farm 
incomes due to falling export prices for agricultural products and substitution 
of synthetics for wool has caused great structural difficulties to which adjust-
ments must be made. But the extent, pace, and cost of these adjustments 
will depend importantly on Australia's assessment of the world farm trade 
outlook and her ability through negotiation to gain increased access to trade 
outlets. However, commenting on the paper, Drysdale also noted the far more 
difficult situation in the developing countries and also that, in a quiet way, 
Australia has become a very big surplus country along with Japan and West 
Germany during 1970-71. Therefore, it seems quite within Australia's means 
to help her own farmers by reducing tariffs across the board or by other 
means. 
Canadian commentators noted that Canada has similar structural 
problems to Australia and mentioned some of the thorny political problems 
impeding adjustment. Dealing with adjustment assistance and non-tariff 
barriers in countries with a federal structure is particularly cumbersome. 
Adjustment assistance in Canada is usually a question of regional develop-
ment involving heavy capital and labour subsidies, but these subsidies may be 
just a new form of protection. While they are one-time subsidies, they are so 
large that they may produce continuing problems, particularly since the 
beneficiary firms are often members of industries into which the developing 
countries will want to move in the next decade. Concern was expressed that 
what is intended to be an adjustment assistance program can be transformed 
by businessmen into a new protective program within a few years. Related 
to this, it was suggested that many non-tariff barriers (NTBs) come under 
provincial or state powers and have a direct regional impact. Many such items 
subject to NTBs are connected with political patronage for particular groups. 
Because regional development, subsidies, state and provincial procurement 
involve deals that are much more amenable to political patronage than tariffs, 
they are consequently more difficult to eliminate than tariffs. 
3 "Japan's Trade Policy and Trade in Temperate Zone Agricultural Products," J. G. 
Crawford and G. H. Board: Professor Peter Drysdale of Australian National University 
opened the discussion on this paper. 
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2.6. Policies to Facilitate Trade Negotiations and 
Economic Cooperation in the Pacific Region 
A wide variety of policies have been suggested in recent years at 
these conferences and in many other forums for promoting greater world 
trade liberalization and regional cooperation in both trade and other matters 
in the Pacific area. Richardson and Baldwin4 pointed out that the present 
state of exchange-rate flexibility and the contemplated future state of 
exchange-rate realignment provide an ideal opportunity, if not an invitation, 
for all countries to eliminate non-tariff barriers. Their views are explained in 
the final section of this paper. 
By adoption of broadly-conceived adjustment assistance programs 
by the developed countries is essential in soothing the severe strains and 
stresses that may be inflicted by rapid structural changes in the economic 
systems of these countries . It is essential for the developed countries to 
reduce trade barriers on either a general or a preferential basis, both to ease 
hindrances to the development of the less-developed countries and to achieve 
a better allocation of world resources. The less-developed countries must 
also reduce trade barriers among themselves . The developing countries must 
adopt better methods of conferring and coordinating their policies and 
actions vis-a-vis the developed countries, for much of the discrimination 
practised by the developed against the less-developed countries has been 
achieved partly because of a lack of collaboration among the less-developed 
countries. 
While most of the participants were quite pessimistic about the 
potential for global trade liberalization negotiations at least in the inter-
mediate term, there was much emphasis on the need for dareloping a regional 
framework within which inter-governmental discussions and negotiations 
could take place . A Pacific Area Free Trade Agreement, such as suggested by 
Professor Kojima in recent years, appears to be somewhat premature con-
sidering the many problems in its path . However, in view of the current 
atmosphere surrounding trade relations and the current attempts to estab-
lish revised international monetary mechanisms, the participants at the 
Conference agreed that the next year was propitious for the establishment 
of a regional institution along the lines of OECD to provide the government-
to-government consultations. Crawford and Board mentioned that, although 
this is already a function of OECD, Japan, Australia, the United States, and 
Canada are the only non-European nations out of a total OECD membership 
of twenty-three. Thus there would appear to be considerable advantage in 
having a smaller-scale regional organization to deal with problems of a more 
regional nature that may well be frustrated in OECD, or even in GATT, in 
which European interests tend to impede world-wide progress. 
4 "Government Purchasing Policies, Other NTBs, and the International Monetary Crisis," 
R. E. Baldwin and J. D. Richardson. 
5K. Kojima, "Japan's Interest in the Pacific Trade Expansion, "Papers and Proceedings 
of the First Conference on Pacific Trade and Development, Tokyo, Japan Economic 
Research Center, 1968. 
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Agricultural Trade 
JAPAN'S TRADE POLICY AND TRADE IN TEMPERATE 
ZONE AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS1 
by 
J. G. CRAWFORD and G. H. BOARD 
This paper examines Japan's agricultural trade policy from the point of view of 
Australia, a large and efficient agricultural exporter, and one whose comparative advan-
tage has been frustrated by protectionist agricultural trade policies throughout the world. 
First, the critical state of agriculture in Australia is discussed to highlight Australia's 
concern about agricultural protectionism and her desire to gain increased access to over-
seas markets. Next the importance of Japan as an importer of farm products is stressed 
and the background to, and current position of her restrictive commercial policies toward 
agricultural trade are examined. The interests of the other three major farm product 
exporters in the Pacific area, the United States, Canada and New Zealand, in the Japanese 
market are then examined. It emerges that Japan's agricultural trade has a big role to play 
in forcing the pace against protectionism generally, and especially in the Pacific region. 
1. Australian Agriculture and Trade 
1.1 The Critical State of Australian Agriculture 
At the beginning of the seventies Australian agriculture is in a criti-
cal state. Aggregate farm income in 1970-71, at $A891 million, was the 
second lowest since 1949-50 and well below the $Al,431 million earned in 
1963-64.2 
Despite a fall in the number of farm operators, especially over the 
past few years, average income per farm operator (owner, lessee or share-
farmer) in 1970-71 had declined to about $A4,500 and in real terms was 45 
per cent below the 1963-64 level. Projections of aggregate farm income in 
1974-75 show a further fall to $A860 million.3 By contrast, non-farm real 
incomes have risen steadily, and are expected to continue this trend.4 
The figure, average income per operator, conceals considerable 
variation, both between farms and different rural industries. Data from sur-
veys of some rural industries carried out by the Commonwealth Bureau of 
Agricultural Economics, show that, in the mid-sixties, apart from the wheat 
industry, at least 20 per cent of producers in the sheep, beef, dairy and fruit 
industries had net farm incomes less than $A2,000.5 In a number of these 
1 The authors would like to thank Mrs. P. Brown for her considerable efforts in the 
preparation of this paper. 
2 Aggregate farm income is equal to the gross value of rural production minus total farm 
costs. Appendix 1 contains definitions of these terms together with data from 1960-61 
to 1970-71. 
3 'A Projection of the Rural Sector, 1974-75', contained in Bureau of Agricultural 
Economics, Debt Reconstruction and Farm Adjustment, Canberra, February 1971. 
4 Between 1963-64 and 1970-71 average weekly earnings per employed male in Australia 
increased by 26 per cent in real terms. See Commonwealth Bureau of Census and 
Statistics, Monthly Review of Business Statistics, June 1971. 
5 Net farm income is defined as gross returns less cash costs and allowances for unpaid 
family labour (not including the operator) and depreciation. The residual provides the 
return to the owner-operator for his labour and management and also for the capital 
employed, including funds needed for the servicing of debt. 
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industries the percentage was much higher, for example, in the dairy industry 
it was 56 per cent.6 For the rural sector as a whole it was e~timated that in 
the early part of the sixties .about so,oqo, or around. one third of the total 
number of farms in Australia were earnmg net farm mcomes less than 
$A2,000.7 This yardstick i~ by no m~ai:s high; it compares with the legal 
minimum adult male wage m Australia m 1967 of $Al,990, and average 
employed male earnings in that year of $A3,160, and indicates that large 
numbers of farmers were living on depreciation and thus eroding their capital 
base. Since that estimate was made, average greasy wool auction prices have 
fallen by over 60 per cent and prices for most other farm products have 
remained static or declined. 
Perhaps the only bright spot in the Australian rural sector at the 
present time is the buoyant price of beef. In striking contrast to most other 
rural products beef prices in 1970-71 were about 38 per cent above the levels 
ruling ten years earlier. Many farmers in livestock-grain areas, adversely af-
fected by the price falls in wheat and wool and the quota restrictions on 
wheat have already begun to diversify into alternative crops such as feed-
grains and oilseeds, and the grazing of beef cattle . Unfortunately many 
farmers are in areas where alternative enterprises to wool are not feasible, 
and many more in all industries are in such a poor financial position and so 
heavily in debt that they are unable to carry on, let alone borrow to invest 
in land use changes.8 
This dramatic decline in farm incomes can be attributed to a num-
ber of factors. Farm incomes in Australia have been under considerable 
pressure from rising costs on the one hand and static or declining returns on 
the other. This 'cost/price' squeeze has intensified over recent years. (See 
index of the ratio of prices received to prices paid in Appendix 2). 
Over the last decade aggregate farm costs have risen at about 5 per 
cent per year. About half of this increase was due to greater input usage, 
brought about in large measure by efforts of farmers to increase productivi-
ty. The remainder is attributable to increases in the price of inputs. The cost 
increases have been brought about mainly by the inflationary pressures of 
growth in a full-employment economy and in part by the effects of generous 
tariff protection of domestic industry . Australia's protection of domestic 
manufacturing industry has a direct effect on farm costs, and further, it 
contributes to inflation by enabling industries sheltering under the tariff wall 
to pass on cost increases such as higher wages. Although the rise in unit costs 
over the last decade has been, on average, a little over 2 per cent per annum, 
which is not high by international standards, the fall in prices over recent 
years, especially for wool, has been such that farmers have been unable to 
offset the dual effect of rising costs and falling prices by their traditional 
means of increasing productivity . 
While farmers are able to influence domestic prices of certain prod-
ucts such as sugar, wheat and butter, to some extent, the domestic market is 
growing so slowly and such a large proportion of Australian rural output is 
exported, that prices on overseas markets have a heavy influence on overall 
6 See Debt Reconstruction and Farm Adjustment, op. cit., p. 182. 
7 D. H. McKay, 'The Small Farm Problem in Australia', Australian Journal of Agricultural 
Economics, Vol. 11, No. 2, December, 1967. 
8 Total rural debt outstanding to major institutional lenders has more than doubled over 
the past decade, and at $A2,095 million in 1970, was over twice the level of aggregate 
farm income. See 'The Australian Farm Situation 1970-71 ',Quarterly Review of 
Agricultural Economics, Vol. XXIV, No. 1, January 1971. 
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farm returns. (See Appendix 2) !'lo~mally over half of Au~tralia's total rural 
output is exported but the relative importance of domestic and export mar-
kets varies between commodities. For example, over 95 per cent of wool 
produced is exported, and for some other products the proportions are, 
wheat 7 4 per cent, sugar 70 per cent, beef 46 per cent and butter 42 per 
cent.9 
A number of influences have been at work which have contributed 
to the erosion of farm prices. The advance of technology, and in particular 
the development of substitutes for rural products, has had a severe effect on 
Australia through the inroads made into the wool market by synthetic fibres. 
In addition, technological and managerial advances have had a considerable 
impact on the levels of agricultural productivity and production throughout 
the world. Further, in most developed countries incomes and consumption 
of agricultural products are already at relatively high levels and overall mar-
ket growth is slow. But from the point of view of efficient agricultural 
exporters, the most blatant and to them unnecessary hindrance to market 
growth is the highly protectionist commercial policies that are pursued by 
advanced industrial countries. 
1.2 Protectionism in the EEC, UK and Japan 
The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) of the European Economic 
Community is the most comprehensive and effective of all systems of agricul-
tural protection, and from the point of view of exporters in the United 
States, Canada, New Zealand and Australia the situation will be greatly ag-
gravated by the entry of Britain into the EEC. 
The CAP includes a common external tariff on most agricultural 
products, a system of variable levies on many products to insure against 
competition over the tariff barriers, and also quantitative restrictions. 10 In 
addition, the export of surplus production generated by the lavish price 
incentives, is encouraged by export subsidies, known as 'restitution pay-
ments', which are sometimes greater than the ruling world prices.11 The CAP 
covers about 90 per cent of EEC agricultural production and included under 
its protectionist umbrella are wheat, coarse grains, rice, sugar, diary products, 
beef, eggs, and fresh fruit which are all important Australian exports, espe-
cially important now because of the collapse of wool prices. Some idea of the 
absurdly high levels of protection granted under the CAP can be gained from 
Appendix 3 which shows the overallvalue of the variable levies charged as a 
percentage of the average c.i.f. import price in 1968-69 for a number of 
important commodities. These figures indicate that for cereals the sizes of the 
variable levies range up to 98 per cent of the average c.i.f. import prices, 
while for sugar and butter the percentages are 230 and 403 respectively. It is 
clear that the CAP is designed to allow imports only to the extent that EEC 
production fails to reach the quantity demanded at the prices fixed to main-
tain agricultural incomes. 
The value of Australian farm exports to the EEC in 1969-70, 
$A336 millions, was the same as in 1963-64, but the total value of farm 
exports excluding wool and skins, which account for over 80 per cent of 
9 ibid. 
10See Brian Fernon, Issues In World Farm Trade: Chaos or Cooperation, Atlantic Trade 
Study, Trade Policy Research Centre, London 1970, pp. 43-44. 
11 Harald B. Malmgren, Trade Wars or Trade Negotiations: Nontariff Barriers and 
Economic Peacekeeping, The Atlantic Council of the United States, 1970, p. 42. 
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these exports, declined by almost 24 per cent over the same period. The 
importance of the EEC market for Australian farm exports has diminished 
year by year, and from taking one quarter of farm exports in the mid-
fifties its share was down to about 11 per cent or $A245 million in 1970-71 
$A91 million below the 1969-70 level. (See Appendix 4). This fall in the ' 
value of Australian agricultural exports to the EEC over the last year was due 
entirely to the sharp decline in wool prices. 
An even more striking decline in importance as an overall market 
for Australia's agricultural output has occurred with the United Kingdom, 
which for so long was Australia's premier market. During most of the fifties 
about one third of Australia's rural exports was shipped to the United 
Kingdom but over recent years its share has only been 14-15 per cent. The 
fall of over $Al00 million in farm sales to the United Kingdom is almost 
wholly due to a drop of 50 per cent in quantity of wool exported and a fall 
of over 40 per cent in its price. But in post-war years the United Kingdom 
has also adopted agricultural policies aimed at greater self-sufficiency in 
farm produce. In recent years it has amended its methods of protection, 
moving them closer to the methods adopted in Europe. Higher output of 
beef and cereals is being encouraged and since the early sixties measures such 
as import quotas, voluntary import restraints, and minimum import price 
schemes have been introduced for all major temperate zone foodstuffs except 
mutton and lamb, and these now attract a duty.12 As a result of rising 
domestic production, slow growth in total demand, and import curbs, 
Britain's food imports have been virtually static over the past decade. The 
strong likelihood of Britain's entry into the EEC and its adoption of the CAP 
will mean increased domestic production and a greater part of Britain's 
imports of some products such as soft wheat, sugar, and butter will be sup-
plied by the enlarged EEC and its associate members.13 The diversion of 
continental surpluses to the United Kingdom, particularly dairy products, 
and wheat, will temporarily ease the pressure of EEC exports in other world 
markets. However the potential for increased production in an enlarged EEC 
under the generous incentives of the CAP is so great that this respite is likely 
to be temporary . 
In the face of the highly protectionist policies in Europe, the stag-
nation of the British market and the impending entry of the United Kingdom 
into the protectionist camp, there has been a remarkable transformation in 
the direction of Australia's agricultural trade, especially over the last decade. 
(See Appendix 4). 
Japan and North America, particularly the United States which 
imports large quantities of Australian beef and sugar, have taken the places 
of Europe and the United Kingdom as major export markets. Japan has 
emerged in recent years as Australia's major export market, accounting for 
over 20 per cent of agricultural exports and 27 per cent of total exports, and 
is a principal market for wool, mutton, cheese, wheat and sugar. (See 
Appendix 5). However, a highly protected domestic agriculture is not the 
preserve of Europe. Australian (and other countries') exports of beef, 
mutton, most dairy products, and sugar to the United States are limited by 
quotas, while wool attracts a tariff of 25 cents per pound (compared with 
12 G. M. Sanders, 'Recent Trends in United Kingdom Agricultural Policy', Quarterly 
Review of Agricultural Economics, Vol. XXIII, No. 2, April 1970. 
13 Denmark, Norway, and Ireland have also applied to join the EEC. 
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current average auction prices of 29 cents). Similarly, Japan maintains strict 
controls over the import of a number of major temperate zone agricultural 
products. 
Despite this re-orientation of Australian agricultural trade, a num-
ber of important Australian rural exports are still heavily dependent on the 
dwindling United Kingdom market. Not only does the United Kingdom 
account for a significant proportion of Australian exports of butter, cheese, 
wheat, sugar, fruits, mutton and lamb, these exports to the United Kingdom 
are in a number of cases, a significant proportion of total Australian produc-
tio~. (See Appendix 6). The seriousness of the situation is heightened by the 
fact that the production of dairy products, sugar and fruits is concentrated 
in a number of areas where the incomes of large numbers of people are direct-
ly dependent on the continuing health of these industries.14 Even though 
Japan has taken increasing quantities of Australian wheat, sugar, cheese, beef 
and mutton, exports of these products together with butter, fruits and a 
number of other commodities all run up against significant trade barriers in 
that market. 
1.3 The Outlook for Australian Rural Exports 
The bleak outlook for rural exports would not be so serious were 
it not for the fact that rural exports play such a vital role in the Australian 
economy. In terms of the proportion of the total workforce employed, (8.1 
per cent in 1969-70)15 and its contribution to the Gross National Product, 
(5.8 per cent in 1970-71, down from 10.4 per cent in 1966-67)16 agriculture 
plays only a minor role in the economy. However, the agricultural sector 
still accounts for 50 per cent, or $A2 billion of Australia's overseas earnings. 
Australia's concern with agricultural protectionism throughout the 
world is heightened by the declining importance of wool in her exports. The 
severe price fall for wool has meant that Australian rural exports are 
becoming increasingly dependent on products such as wheat and grains, 
sugar, dairy products and meat and it is in precisely these areas that 
Australia's comparative advantage is most frustrated by the restrictive com-
mercial policies of her trading partners. 
In addition, the extent and seriousness of the current rural crisis 
has created a large welfare problem, not only among farmers but in the rural 
communities and industries which depend on a healthy agriculture. Although 
adjustment has been occurring continuously in Australian agriculture, unfor-
tunately the pace of adjustment has not been fast enough. The recent sharp 
falls in farm incomes underline the urgent need for a faster flow of labour 
out of agriculture and the reorganisation of uneconomic units. Moves to 
assist this process have begun. This adjustment inevitably carries with it the 
need to develop policies of planned decentralisation to assist the adjustment 
of affected rural towns. 
Australia's future economic growth depends on healthy inter-
national accounts. A real rate of growth in Australia's G.N.P. of 5-6 per cent 
in future years will require rising imports of goods and services and without 
14 Australian sugar production has already been limited by quota restrictions to ensure the 
viability of the International Sugar Agreement. The EEC is not a signatory to this 
agreement. 
15Commonwealth Bureau of Census and Statistics, The Labour Force 1970, Canberra. 
16 Commonwealth of Australia, National Income and Expenditure 1970-71, Budget Papers, 
August 1971. 
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the strong base provided by farm export earnings, such a rate of economic 
growth will be difficult to sustain without a sharply increased further depen-
dence on the inflow of foreign capital.17 Some observers are uneasy about 
such a prospect. 
There is no question that some further structural adjustments must 
take place in Australian agriculture, but the extent, pace, and cost of these 
adjustments will depend on Australia 's assessment of the overall world farm 
trade outlook and on her ability to gain increased access to overseas markets. 
This of course is a function of the negotiating willingness of Europe, Japan, 
and North America as well as Australia's own ability and willingness to 
negotiate. 
As far as most of the developing countries are concerned, food 
consumption is low, but then so are incomes, and while the potential for 
increased demand for farm products is large, the scope for imports is limited 
due to the scarcity of foreign exchange . In addition, technological advance 
has already made an impact on imports in these countries and it is in their 
interests to encourage domestic food production leaving scarce foreign 
exchange for imports that are vital for development. No one can seriously 
criticize India, Pakistan and other less developed countries for seeking ways 
and means of raising their agricultural productivity and output .18 
The one country that is not so neatly categorised and which has 
emerged as a major market for agricultural exporters increasingly frustrated 
by the protectionist excesses of Europe and the United States, is Japan. A 
developed, highly industrialised country where incomes are growing at a 
rapid rate and yet where food consumption is still relatively low, Japan has 
a huge potential as a market for farm products and thus has a vital role to 
play in any expansion in agricultural trade. 
2. Japan's Agriculture and Trade Policy 19 
2.1 Inefficiency and Price Supports in Japanese Agricu lture 
Although Japan is about 80 per cent self-sufficient in food produc-
tion, her agriculture, which produces a wide range of products, has suffered 
over the years from the fragmented nature and very small size of farms . Aver-
age farm size today is about 2 .7 acres or a little over one hectare . This 
situation has persisted despite a massive exodus of labour from the farm 
sector over recent decades. A major reason for this has been a desire of 
farmers that land remain within the family even though members may work 
outside agriculture . In 1969, 80 per cent of Japanese farmers were part-time 
farmers earning about 58 per cent of their income from off-farm jobs.2° 
17 See J . G. Crawford 'Economic Prospects for Australia and its Neighbours', paper given 
at the Cook Bi-Centenary Symposium, Sydney, May 1970, paras. 8-9 . 
18See Sir John Crawford, Agriculture in Development: The Australian Case and Some 
Contrasts with Developing Countries, National Bank of Egypt, Fiftieth Anniversary 
Commemoration Lectures, Cairo 1971, Lecture IL 
19Monetary values in this section have been converted to United States dollars at the rate 
of $US1 = 360 Yen. 
20 Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, Statistical Report, 1969-70, Tokyo (in Japanese). 
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Between 1955 and 1970 the proportion of the workforce engaged in agricul-
ture declined from 40.2 per cent to 18.2 per cent and it is expected to fall to 
around 12 per cent by 1975_21 
Since the mid-fifties Japan's overall agricultural production has 
increased by about 60 per cent, mainly due to increases in rice and livestock 
products (see Appendix 8) but the scarcity of farming land and minute farm 
size have prevented farmers from taking full advantage of modern equipment 
and technology. In contrast to land productivity, labour productivity in 
Japanese agriculture is very low. In 1969, although employing almost one 
fifth of the workforce, agriculture accounted for only 6.5 per cent of net 
domestic product. 22 
The dominant product of Japanese agriculture is rice. In 1969, it 
accounted for over 40 per cent of the total value of agricultural produc-
tion.2a While about 70 per cent of Japanese agriculture requires either direct 
or indirect subsidy, the price support program for rice is by far the most 
extensive and costly of all the subsidisation schemes. It is important because 
it highlights the apparent attitude of the authorities in Japan toward domes-
tic agriculture. 
Originally a wartime measure, the Food Control Law (1942) 
empowered the government to exercise strict control over the supply and 
demand for food, in particular, rice. The Food Agency of the Ministry of 
Agriculture and Forestry purchases rice at a price sufficient to cover the cost 
of production and Jlrovide labour with an income comparable with that of 
non-farm workers. Thus the producer price for rice has been raised each 
year in step with the rises in prices and non-farm incomes and it doubled 
between 1960 and 1969. This policy stimulated production to over 14 mil-
lion tons per annum and in conjunction with a decline in consumption of 
rice, a stockpile accumulated, amounting to over 7 million tons in 1969, an 
amount greater than total world trade in rice in that year . The annual sur-
pluses at that time were running at about 2 million tons. 
In 1969 the deficit in the Foodstuff Control Account attributable 
to rice dealings was almost $US1.0 billion.25 To combat this heavy drain on 
finances the government recently embarked on a program to cut the rice 
stock and reduce the annual output of rice to levels more in line with con-
sumption. To this end the producer price of rice was held constant in 1969 
and 1970 and an incentive payments scheme has been adopted to divert land 
from rice production. This has met with some success, and in 1970 the area 
planted to rice was reduced by about 10 per cent, and rice output fell by 
1.3 million tons to 12.7 million tons. 26 But due to the dramatic decline in 
consumption (down from 118.3 kg. per head in 1962 to 96 .9 kg . per head 
in 1969) even this reduced harvest has added to the stockpile. 
21 Japan Economic Research Centre, Japan's Economy in 1975, Tokyo, March 1970. This 
proportion is still high compared 'Yith other developed country levels, eg: In 1965,Canada 
9%; U .S.A., 6%; U.K., 4%; Australia, 10%; N. Z., 12%; Germany, 8%; France, 16%; see 
22 F.A.O., The State of Food and Agriculture, 1970, Rome. 
23
Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, op. cit. 
ibid. 
24 Kenzo Hemmi, Japanese Agriculture, 1968, Department of Agricultural Economics, 
University of Tokyo, 1968. 25 Food Agency, Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, Foodstuff Control Statistical Year 
Book, Tokyo, 1970. 26 Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, op. cit. 
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In a further move to reduce the stockpile, some rice that has dete-
riorated in quality is being used as animal feed. More importantly, not only 
has Japan now ceased to be a major importer of rice, she has entered the rice 
trade as a large exporter. In 1970 Japan's exports of rice were 600,000 tons 
valued at $US164 millions.27 The bulk of these exports were on credit terms 
to South Korea ($US110 million), Pakistan ($US26 million), and Indonesia 
($US22 million). Thus in 1970 Japan's rice exports were running at half the 
level of Thailand, an important South East Asian rice exporter and a country 
with a growing trade deficit and which is dependent for 7 5 per cent of its 
export income on agricultural commodities. In 1969, Thailand's rice exports 
fell by 4 per cent to 1.026 million tons, well below their forecast level, and 
in addition, the value of these sales was down about 20 per cent due to a 
decline in prices.28 
Price support schemes are also operated for a number of other 
crops including wheat, barley , soybeans, potatoes, rapeseed, sugar beet, silk, 
and tobacco. 
In 1961 a Livestock Price Stabilisation Law became effective, and 
now buffer stock schemes are operated for livestock products. Subsidies are 
granted to milk and egg producers via systems of guaranteed prices. 
None of the above support programs is on as large a scale or as 
costly as that for rice but an indication of the degree to which producer 
prices are supported in Japan is given in Table 1. 
TABLE 1 
PRODUCER PRICES OF AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS IN MAJOR COUNTRIES, 
1968-69 
$US per 100 kg. 
West 
Japan France Germany Italy U .K. U.S.A. Australia 
Wheat 15.40 8.76 9 .76 10.76 6.43 4.56 5.10 
Ricea 29.40 13.06 10.78 6.30 
Barley 12.40 8.02 9.24 9 .58 5.93 4.13 4.74 
Cattleb 112.90 65.85 62.88 70.48 44.35 51.59 36.13 
Pigsb 77.00 73.41 62.53 62.08 45.19 41.01 39.83 
Poultryb 57 .30 75.17 48.00 139.21 38.58 31.53 n.a. 
Eggs 52.20 59.06 75.75 70.29 57.44 49.83 66.34 
Fluid milk 12.90 8.42 10.10 10.82 8.56 11.57 7.18 
aunhulled; 
bliveweight; 
n.a. not available 
Source : Economic Planning Agency, Economic Survey of Japan, 1969-70, Tokyo, 1970, 
p. 87. The Austra1ian figures have been calculated from data published by the 
Commonwealth Bureau of Census and Statistics and the Bureau of Agricultural 
Economics, Canberra. 
27 It is interesting that it was only in 1965 that her rice imports were valued at $US145 
millions. 28 United States Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service, The Agricultural 
Situation in the Far East and Oceania: Review of 1969 and Outlook for 1970, 
Washington, p . 33. 
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Despite the high prices paid for wheat and barley , production has 
declined quite significantly over the past decade . In most other cases 
however, the high support prices have given rise to increased production, but 
the small size of farms resulting in low labour productivity and high costs, 
despite very high yields per acre, necessitate the continual upgrading of 
support prices to prevent the differential between farm and non-farm 
incomes from widening too far . 29 In addition to the high budgetary costs of 
agriculture the costs borne by co~sum~rs in the form of h~gher prices are . 
considerable . In 1968 the domestic price of wheat was twice the average c.l.f. 
import price and the average ratios for some other products were rice (1967) 
2.0; soybeans, 1.6; beef, 2.4; and butter 2 .7 .3o 
2.2 Japanese Imports 
Although the volume of agricultural production in Japan increased 
by almost 40 per cent between 1960 and 1969, imports of agricultural com-
modities also rose strongly throughout this period, from $US1.7 billions in 
1960 to $US4.2 billions in 1970. The value of imports of foodstuffs (includ-
ing feedgrains) grew at about 16 per cent per annum, compared with 10 per 
cent for agricultural imports as a whole . The biggest increases among the 
foodstuffs have been in meats, imports of which have increased tenfold from 
$US14.2 millions to $US145 .2 millions, fruits and vegetables up from 
$US33.3 millions to $US309.3 millions and cereals $US291.1 millions to 
$US1,048.9 millions (see Table 2). Although the composition of farm 
imports has changed quite noticeably over the last decade with foodstuffs 
now accounting for 53 per cent of the total compared with only 32 per cent 
in 1960, the market shares held by the major suppliers have remained fairly 
steady (Table3). 
The United States is still by far the biggest supplier of farm prod-
ucts to the Japanese market . Imports from the United States in 1970 
amounted to $US1.4 billions or 32.3 per cent of the total , a slightly larger 
share than in 1960. The United States is the major supplier of wheat, maize, 
sorghum, lemons, dried vine fruit, pork and oilseeds and a leading source of 
cotton and a multitude of other minor commodities.31 
The second biggest individual supplier of farm products to Japan 
is Australia, although her share of the market fell slightly from around 15 per 
cent in 1960 to 13 per cent in 1970 . This fall was due to the decline in wool 
prices throughout the sixties . The value of Japan 's imports of agricultural 
products from Australia, excluding wool, doubled between 1964 and 1970. 
Australia is the leading source of Japan's greasy wool imports accounting for 
over 80 per cent of their total value . In addition Australia accounts for 80 per 
cent of Japan's beef imports and is a major supplier of wheat, barley, mutton 
and lamb, cheese, egg pulp, and sugar. 
Imports from Asian countries in 1970 were $US808 millions and 
although double their level of a decade earlier have not grown as fast as total 
29 Labour accounts for about 50 per cent of the cost of production of rice . This intensive 
use of labour has a dramatic effect on costs especially in view of the fact that good 
farm labour is now very scarce due to the movement of large numbers of young people 
30 
out of aiµ-iculture . 
31 Economic Planning Agency, op. cit. , p. 88. Appendix 9 shows the leading suppliers of a number of major commodities, for selected 
years. 
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TABLE 2 
COMPOSITION OF JAPAN'S AGRICULTURAL IMPORTSa 
1960 1970 
SITC Group $USm % $USm % 
00 Live animals 0.5 0.0 16.4 0.4 
01 Meat and meat preparations 14.2 0 .8 145.2 3.4 
02 Dairy products and eggs 17.2 0.9 49.4 1.2 
04 Cereals and cereal preparations 291.1 16 .5 1,048.9 24.7 
05 Fruit and vegetables 33.3 1.9 309.3 7 .3 
06 Sugar and sugar preparations 121.2 6.9 346.3 8 .2 
07 Coffee, Cocoa, Tea, etc. 24.0 1.4 153.3 3 .6 
08 Animal feedstuffs 17.8 1.0 136.2 3.2 
09 Miscellaneous foodstuffs 2.5 0.1 3.9 0.1 
11 Beverages (ex . distilled alcoholic) 13.6 0.8 65 .5 1.5 
121 Unmanufactured tobacco 13.6 0 .8 65 .5 1.5 
21 Hides and skins 41.4 2.4 102.3 2.4 
22 Oilseeds, nuts, and kernels 187.4 10.6 542.1 12.8 
231.1 Natural rubber 143.0 8.1 129 .5 3.0 
261-265 Natural fibres 757.3 43.0 957 .0 22.6 
29 Crude animal and vegetable materials 22.6 1.3 90 .5 2.1 
4 Oils and fats 38.0 2.2 78 .3 1.9 
555 .1,599.5 Essential oils, casein, 
albumen, etc. 32.3 1.8 49.2 1.2 
Total 1,762.9 100.0 4,239 .7 100.0 
a c.i.f., calendar years. 
Source: Ministry of Finance, Japan Exports and Imports: Commodity by Country, 
Tokyo, 1961 and 1971. 
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TABLE 3 
JAPAN'S AGRICULTURAL IMPORTS BY MAJ OR SOURCES OF SUPPLYab 
1960 
$USm % 
United States 545.1 30 .9 
Canada 121.0 6.9 
Asiac 401.3 22.8 
Australia 266.9 15.1 
New Zealand 22.2 1.3 
Latin America 244.8 13.9 
EEC 17.0 1.0 
Other 144.6 8.1 
Total Agricultural Imports 1,762.9 100.0 
Agricultural I~orts as 
Percentage of otal Imports 39.2 
a For composition of agricultural imports see Table 2. 
bc.i.f., calendar years. 
1965 1970 
$USm % $USm % 
973.4 34.3 1,367 .7 32.3 
147 .1 5.2 224 .5 5.3 
694.1 24.5 808.8 19.1 
387.6 13.7 541.2 12.8 
48.9 1.7 99 .5 2.3 
362.1 12.8 593.7 14.0 
37 .0 1.3 88.7 2.1 
185.3 6.5 515.6 12.2 
2,835.5 100.0 4,239 . 7 100.0 
34.7 22.5 
c Includes India, Pakistan and Middle East to the east of the Suez Canal in addition to 
South East Asia including China. 
Source: Ministry of Finance, Japan Exports and Imports, Tokyo (various issues). 
agricultural imports. Thailand is a large supplier of maize ; Taiwan, pork, 
bananas, and sugar; the Ryukyus, sugar; China, soybeans. 
As a group the Latin American countries have a share of 14 per 
cent in the Japanese market. Argentina is a leading supplier of maize and 
sorghum; Brazil, Nicaragua and Mexico, cotton and Ecuador dominates the 
large market for bananas. 
The major products supplied by Canada are wheat, barley and oil-
seeds. Although imports from Canada doubled over the decade , her share of 
the overall farm product market fell to 5.3 per cent . 
Both New Zealand and the EEC still only hold a small share of the 
market, but imports from both sources have expanded quite rapidly over 
recent years, with New Zealand being a major supplier of wool, mutton and 
dairy products, and the EEC having a significant impact with its subsidised 
exports on the barley and dairy products markets. 
2.3 Japan's Import Restrictions 
Even though agricultural imports have grown, the rate of growth 
has been held in check by the Japanese government which maintains a com-
prehensive system of import restrictions, including quantitative controls, 
state trading operations, tariffs and 'administrative guidance ' . It is, of course, 
within the framework of these restrictions that Japan administers her agricul-
tural policies. 
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By 1965 import restrictions not consistent_ with the_provisions of 
GATT had been removed on nearly all major no~-agncultural itel'Il:s and on 
some important agricultural prod':lcts such as maize~ ~oybeans, gram sorghum, 
and hides and skins. However, ~gn~ult~ral commo?it:es are among t~e ~ost 
important still subject to quantitat~ve import re~tn~t10ns. ~t ~he begmnmg 
of 1971, 123 items were ~ither subject to quantit_ati"'.e restn~ti~n or st~te 
trading. Of this gro~p 80 items were ~nder quantitative restnct10ns which 
were inconsistent with the GATT articles. By June 1971 the number had 
been reduced to 60 and it is anticipated that by the end of the year (1971) 
only 40 items will remain under residual import restriction.32 This latter 
group still includes 28 agricultural items, the major ones being,, beef and veal, 
ham and bacon, processed cheese, flour, fresh oranges and fruit juices. 
At present there are 43 items, whose import is restricted, but for 
which the Japanese government claims sanction under GATT Articles, XVII, 
(State Trading) and XX, XXI, (General and Security Exceptions). The agri-
cultural products whose importation is controlled completely by the state 
trading organisations are rice, wheat, barley, tobacco and most dairy prod-
ucts including butter and condensed and powdered skim and wholemilk. 
Unprocessed cheese, casein and lactose are not quantitatively restricted. 
In addition to the quota restriction on beef and veal, imports 
attract a tariff of 25 per cent and an additional levy of up to 10 cents per 
pound. Imports of pork incur a tariff of 10 per cent, whilst mutton and lamb 
imports, although not quantitatively restricted, attract a tariff of 7 .5 per cent. 
Tariff rates on agricultural items are not generally very high. Raw 
materials such as wool, hides and skins are free, as are grain sorghums and 
meat and fish meal for animal feed. In general the higher the degree of pro-
cessing, the higher the tariff. For example tariffs on canned fruits range up 
to 55 per cent. Howe\ter, for processed cheese, butter, beef and veal, wheat, 
and a number of other items the protective effect is due to the quantitative 
restriction and tariffs are not an important barrier. 
In the case of sugar, imports are controlled by the Sugar 
Corporation, and all imports are subject to a levy to bring the price up to 
the minimum import price, then a surcharge to raise it to the target price . On 
top of this a tariff is collected and a heavy consumption tax is placed on 
refined sugar. 33 
Administrative guidance which is an important technique of trade 
regulation, is used in Japan as an additional weapon to control the flow of 
imports of particular commodities that may be causing discomfort to 
domestic producers. For example, in 1968 imports of eggs (mainly frozen 
pulp) were voluntarily restricted by importers at the suggestion of the 
Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry which was under considerable political 
pressure from domestic egg interests. The effective use of this technique 
removes the grounds for the implementation of more visible protective mea-
sures such as increased tariffs or quotas, and to that extent lessens the 
prospect of retaliation although the protective effect may be equally severe. 
32Ministry of International Trade and Industry, Bulletin No. 6260, Japan, September, 
1970. 
33The tariff on imported raw sugar is $US104 per metric ton. This compares with an 
average c.i.f. import price of $US105 per metric ton in 1970. The consumption tax on 
refined sugar is $US48 per metric ton. 
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2.4 Changing Consumption Patterns and Food Prices in Japan 
Despite these protectionist policies Japanese agricultural imports 
have risen strongly over the last decade. Half of these imports now consist of 
foodstuffs and animal feeds, and underlying this import growth is a signifi-
cant change in the level and structure of demand for foodstuffs in Japan. 
The structural transformation of the Japanese economy, bringing 
with it rapidly increasing per capita incomes has resulted in quite radical 
changes in the food consumption patterns of the people. As incomes and 
living patterns have changed there has been a substantial improvement in the 
variety and nutritional value of the food intake (see Appendix 10). From the 
mid-fifties to 1969, per capita consumption of rice, barley, and potatoes 
decreased significantly, while per capita intake of meat, eggs, dairy products, 
fruit, vegetables, sugar and fish all increased. These changes resulted in the 
average daily calorie intake increasing from 2240 in 1955 to 244 7 in 1969. 
Over this period the contribution of starchy foods to total daily calorie 
intake fell from 7 4 per cent to 56 per cent while that of livestock products 
increased from 6 to 12 per cent, and fruit and vegetables from 4 to 6 per 
cent. Also in 1969 the average daily per capita intake of protein was 75.1 
grams, an increase of 9 .0 grams over the 1955 level. Significantly this 
increase was made up wholly of animal protein. 
However, despite this substantial improvement in diet, the per 
capita protein and calorie intake is still well below the levels in other devel-
oped countries as well as some less developed countries (see Appendix 11). 
In view of the fact that national income per capita in Japan in 1970 was equal 
to that of the United Kingdom, and growing rapidly, it can be argued that a 
good deal of the explanation for the relatively low level of nutrition in Japan 
can be found in the extremely high food prices that prevail. This is reinforced 
by the fact that the saturation rates for such consumer durables as washing 
machines, radios, and colour television, are among the highest in the world . 
Not only are food prices in Japan very high, they are rising at a 
rapid rate. Between 1965 and 1969 price rises for foodstuffs on average 
accounted for 42 per cent of the annual increase in consumer prices of 4.9 
per cent (see Appendix 12). The largest rate of increase in prices over this 
period occurred with foodstuffs under state trading (e .g. rice , wheat, dairy 
products) which rose at an annual average rate of 7 .1 per cent. Interestingly 
the rate of increase in the prices of non-liberalized food items was only 
slightly greater, at 4.9 per cent, than that of liberalised food items, 4 .6 per 
cent, indicating the degree to which import quotas have been raised each year 
to keep prices down. Imports of beef, which are restricted by quota, 
increased from 6,200 tons in 1964 to 23,227 tons in 1970. Similarly the 
flow of imports of pork is varied in order to contain domestic price rises. 
In 1970 the consumer price index rose 7 .7 per cent, the sharpest 
yearly rise since the Korean war. Contributing to this overall price increase 
were price rises in vegetables 33.2 per cent, fruits, 22.1 per cent, and fish 
20.6 per cent.34 Similar price rises in these commodities occurred in the 
previous year, and the effects can be seen clearly in Appendix 10; per capita 
consumption of fruit_, vegetables, and fish , the major sources of protein in the 
Japanese diet, fell significantly after a sustained increase since the mid-fifties. 
34Statistical Bureau, Prime Minister's Office, Tokyo. 
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2.5 Trends in Japanese Consumption, 
Production and Imports 
In Japan in 1969 80 per cent of actual food consumption was 
home produced. This level was slightly below the levels ruling earlier in the 
decade and has been declared the desired target ratio.35 In keeping with this 
attitude the Japanese Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry recently prepared 
some projections of supply and demand of agricultural products in 1977. 36 
These projections imply the continuation of the present policies toward agri-
culture in Japan, and indicate that the ratio of domestic production to 
consumption for most products in 1977 will be similar to 1969 levels 
(see Appendix 13). 
One of the most potentially significant declines in the ratio of 
home production to consumption has occurred in meats . As a whole the 
ratio declined from 94.6 in 1963 to 82 .9 in 1969, while for pork and chicken 
the ratios fell from 100.0 in 1963 to 93.6 and 95 .5 respectively in 1969, and 
that of beef was down from 97 .5 to 92 .7 . The lower overall ratio was brought 
about in large measure by the increased consumption of mutton which is 
almost wholly imported. 
The projections indicate a continuation of the trend away from the 
consumption of starchy foods towards a higher per capita intake of animal 
products, vegetables and fruits . In order to maintain the overall 80 per cent 
self-sufficiency ratio in the face of such dietary changes, changes in the 
emphasis of domestic production will be required . Under government encour-
agement the focus of domestic production will be shifted away from rice 
toward the increased production of meats, dairy products, eggs, vegetables 
and fruits. To this end , an acreage diversion program for rice has been 
introduced, and increased production of meats and dairy products is being 
assisted by such measures as legislative action to achieve larger farm size, land 
and stock improvement schemes, and price support policies maintained with-
in the comprehensive framework of import restrictions. 
The table below compares the projected 1977 per capita consump-
tion and production of a number of food groups with their 1969 levels . 
The most significant changes in per capita consumption levels are 
expected to occur in fruits and livestock products which are expected to 
increase by over 60 per cent compared to their levels in 1969. However, due 
to the influence of population growth, estimated at 1.2 per cent per annum, 
total consumption will increase at a faster rate. In order to maintain the 
desired levels of self-sufficiency, production will have to increase at the same 
rate as total consumption and these increases are shown in the above table. 
Some idea of the extent of the required increases in production can be 
gauged from the past growth rates. For example, over the eight years 1962 
to 1969, beef production increased by 67 per cent, pork by 81 per cent, and 
milk by 85 per cent. Clearly, to achieve the 1977 target levels of production 
these rates of growth will have to be maintained over the next eight years. 
But owing to the acute shortage of land , labour, and the very small size of 
farms such production increases will only be achieved at a very high cost, 
adding further to the already severe inflationary pressures in the economy. 
35Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, Annual Report on Trends in Agriculture, Parts I 
and II, Tokyo, 1970 (in Japanese). 
36Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, Long Term Projection of Supply and Demand for 
Agricultural Products, Tokyo, 1968 (in Japanese). 
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TABLE 4 
PRODUCTION AND CONSUMPTION OF SELECTED FOOD GROUPS: JAPAN 
ConsumEtion Production 
(Kg. Per Capita Per Annum) (Thousand Metric Tons) 
Percentage Percentage 
1969 1977 Change 1969 1977 Change 
Rice 96.9 91.6 -5.5 14,003 12,442 -11.1 
Wheat 31.3 32.9 +5.1 758 795 +4.9 
Barley 2.2 1.4 - 36.4 812 902 +11.1 
Soybeans0 5.6 5.8 +3 .6 136 121 -11.0 
Vegetables 120.1 127.5 +6.2 15,507 17,447 +12.5 
Fruits 36.6 62.0 +69.4 5,162 9,725 +88.4 
Dairy products 47.3 78.3 +65 .5 4,574 8,099 +77.0 
Meatsb 10.9 18.4 +68.8 1,190 2,300 +93.3 
Eggs 12.6 14.8 +17 .5 1,523 1,907 +25.2 
0 Per capita figure refers to use as food only. 
bExcluding whale meat. 
Source: Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, Food Balance Sheet, 1969, Tokyo; Ministry of 
Agriculture and Forestry, Long Term Projections of Supply and Demand for Agri-
cultural Products, Tokyo, 1968, (in Japanese). 
Even if this projected growth in farm production is attained, 
imports of these commodities will have to grow at the same rates. In addition, 
imports of animal feedstuffs such as feedgrains and supplements will have to 
grow enormously to sustain the projected growth in domestic production of 
livestock products. For example, Japan's imports of feedgrains increased 
from 4.7 million tons in 1964 to 10.7 million tons in 1970 in order to sus-
tain the increase in domestic meat production over that period . 
At these projected production , consumption, and import levels in 
1977, per capita calorie intake in Japan should be 2,664 , with a total protein 
intake of 85.8 grams of which 39.5 would be of animal origin. Thus the 
projections suggest that despite the increases in production and imports, the 
average level of nutrition in Japan, although improved , would still be below 
all other developed countries and this would be at a time when Japanese 
G .N .P. per capita is expected to be among the highest in the world . 37 
The picture that emerges is one of an inefficient agriculture by 
world standards in terms of cost per unit of output, already under consider-
able pressure from growing demand brought about by the rapid growth in 
incomes. Even if the current import restrictions remain, imports are likely to 
grow quite substantially and if liberalisation proceeds, imports of products 
such as meats and dairy products with high income elasticities, as well as 
animal feedgrains, will increase at an even faster rate. 
37Projections indicate that by 1985 Japan 's GNP per capita will exceed that of the United 
States and Sweden and be the highest in the world; Japan Economic Research Centre, 
The Japanese Economy in 1985, Tokyo, 1971 (in Japanese). 
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There is considerable pressure, from both internal and external 
sources, for further liberalisation of import restrictions. Not only are many 
of the import restrictions inconsistent with the GATT articles, the scope for 
imports to reduce the severe inflationary pressures in the economy is recog-
nised by the forces against agricultural protectionism led by the urban 
consumers and big business which produces for the international market. In 
addition, the issue of agricultural protectionism is already important and 
likely to become more so as Japan's need to secure her exports market grows. 
The combination of an inefficient domestic agriculture requiring 
heavy price support and substantial protection from imports, coupled with 
a large population with a relatively low level of nutrition, yet with high and 
rapidly growing incomes, has given rise to strong demand pressures that 
scarce domestic resources are unable to satisfy. As in the past, these pressures 
could be expected to limit the scope of protectionist forces and thereby 
give rise to further increases in food imports. In the absence of any liberal-
isation of residual import restrictions such import growth would come about 
through further relaxation of import quota limits and a more liberal attitude 
on the part of state trading authorities. Failing relaxation some inflation of 
prices of available supplies must be expected . 
3. The United States, Canada and New Zealand and the 
Japanese Market 
3.1 Exports to Japan 
The United States, Canada and New Zealand share Australia 's 
interest in the growth of the Japanese market because all are being adversely 
affected by those factors governing world trade in agricultural products 
which have already been outlined in respect of Australia. 
Japan is an important market for the agricultural products of the 
United States, Canada and New Zealand as well as for raw materials and 
manufactured goods (Appendix 14). In 1969, United States agricultural 
exports of $US1,300 millions to the whole of the Common Market 
accounted for 21 per cent of her total agricultural exports. Outside the EEC, 
the largest market for United States' farm products was Japan. In 1969, the 
United States exported agricultural produce worth almost $US1 billion to 
the Japanese market, with the major products being soyabeans ($US200.3 
millions), maize ($US190.6 millions), wheat ($US119.3 millions) and other 
feed grain, mostly sorghum $US88.4 millions). Other significant United 
States agricultural exports to Japan were cattle hides, cotton, tobacco, 
lucerne (alfalfa) meal, inedible tallow, pork, lemons and limes, plus a host 
of other smaller items (Appendix 15 ). Apart from sales to the EEC and 
Japan, the United States also exports large quantities of farm products to 
Canada, United Kingdom, 'Other Asian' countries38 and Latin America. 
Between 1965 and 1969, United States exports to Japan increased by about 
$US50 millions and to Canada by $US93 millions whereas over the same 
period, the value of her exports to the EEC and the United Kingdom 
declined. 39 
38 About three quarters United States total agricultural exports to 'Other Asian' countries 
1954-55 to 1967-68 was under specified government programs. 
39 In 1970 United States agricultural exports $US1,559 million to the EEC reached record 
levels mainly because exports of oilseeds, which are not subject to variable levies, rose 
by $US155 millions from the 1969 total of $US500 millions. (US D. of A. Foreign 
Agricultural Trade of the United States, March 1971). 
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Japan is the third largest individual market for Canadian agricul-
tural products, and in 1969 Canada's farm exports to Japan, at $US137 
millions, accounted for 12 per cent of her total agricultural exports which 
had declined by 20 per cent between 1965 and 1969 to $US1.2 billions . 
Canada's major exports to Japan in 1969 were wheat ($US70.5 millions), 
and oilseeds ($US39.8 millions) . 
New Zealand's agricultural exports to Japan in 1969 were valued 
at $US79 millions, up from $US44 millions in 1965 . Japan ranked as the 
fourth largest New Zealand market for agricultural products, after the 
United Kingdom, United States and the EEC. In 1969, the United Kingdom 
and EEC together accounted for three fifths of New Zealand 's agricultural 
exports. New Zealand's main exports to Japan are meat, dairy products 
and wool. 
As with Australia and the United States, agricultural exports from 
Canada and New Zealand to the United Kingdom and the EEC declined 
between 1965 and 1969. In the case of Canada the decline was from $US512 
millions to $US381 millions and of New Zealand from $US619 millions to 
$US605 millions. 
The interests of these agricultural exporters in the Japanese mar-
ket differ significantly. They depend not only on actual sales to Japan but 
also on the importance of agriculture in each economy40 and on the impor-
tance of agricultural exports for that economy (Appendix 16). 
In 1969, exports of agricultural products from the United States 
accounted for 16 per cent of total merchandise exports, down from 23 per 
cent in 1965. Although agriculture provides a small and declining share of 
the United States gross domestic product and there have been spectacular 
decreases in both numbers of farms and numbers employed in farming in 
recent years, the United States still has a farm employment of about 4 .5 
million41 (about 4 per cent of employment) on 3 million farms . Agriculture 
remains a significant source of regional employment and farmers are united 
in well run organisations which the government cannot disregard. 
Canada has a rapidly growing domestic market for agricultural 
products which takes a greater share of production than the export market, 
even of wheat and oilseeds.42 Agricultural exports accounted for 18 per cent 
of total exports in 1965 and only 8 per cent in 1969 but in 1968 agriculture 
employed 546,000 on 430,500 farms.43 
In New Zealand where in spite of successfull efforts at diversifica-
tion44 agricultural products still account for about 85 per cent of total 
40Percentage GDP originating in agriculture (IBRD) 
US Canada New Zealand 
1965 3.4 6.5 15.3 
1968 2.9 5.9 15.4 41 US Government Printing Office, Economic Report of the President, together with the 
Annual Report of the Council of Economic Advisers, p. 293, (Washington, 1971). 42T. S. Rackham, World Agricultural Trade and Merchandising Opportunities in the 1970s 
in Canadian Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 18, No. 1, Feb./Mar. 1970. 43 Canada, Dominion Bureau of Statistics, Yearbook 1969 Statistics Canada Canadian 
Statistical Review, August 1971 gives an average monthly employment for 1970 of 
511,000 and a labour force of 524,000. 
44 New Zealand exports of timber and timber products and of manufactured goods 
increased rapidly in the 1960s. A. R . Frampton, Reconstruction and the Use of 
Financial Incentives in New Zealand Rural Industries; paper given at 43rd ANZAAS 
Congress, Brisbane, May 1971, Table 2. 
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exports, the position is quite different . In 1968 there were 66,866 farms. 
Farming now employs about 11 per cent of the workforce45 (about 126,000). 
Moreover, the interest of these agricultural exporters is related not 
only to their present but also to their potential sales to Japan . As with 
Australia all could produce economically and without difficulty more of the 
major items they now sell to Japan. Both Canada and the United States have 
severely restricted acreages of grains and other field crops. In 1969, New 
Zealand one of the most efficient producers of dairy products in the world 
introduced a dairy beef diversion scheme46 to encourage farmers to change 
over to meat production. 
3.2 Effects of the Entry of the U.K. into the EEC 
Despite the contraction of the United Kingdom market throughout 
the sixties, agricultural exports of all three countries to this destination were 
still large in 1969. The United States exported agricultural products valued 
at $US376 millions, Canada and New Zealand accounted for $US239 mil-
lions and $US461 millions respectively. The entry of the United Kingdom 
into the Common Market must therefore greatly influence the future trade 
policies of all three countries. 
For Canada, as for Australia, not only loss of British preferences 
but adjustment to British entry into the EEC must be faced immediately . 
In 1969, wheat made up about one third of total Canadian agricultural sales 
to the United Kingdom. Prospects for Canadian wheat are uncertain but the 
British market for Canadian cheese and tobacco are at considerable risk. 
Canadian reliance on the three major markets of the United States, United 
Kingdom and EEC which together took 70 per cent Canadian agricultural 
exports in 1969, must create problems of adjustment , bearing in mind the 
potential production of an enlarged EEC offering higher prices to British 
farmers and continuing incentives to those engaged in farming within the 
present Common Market. 
Although the United States has large sales to the Common Market 
these are increasingly concentrated in non-variabl.e levy items such as oilseeds 
and animal feeds other than grains. In 1969, United States sales of foodstuffs 
to the United Kingdom were about the same as Canada's ($US160 millions) 
though sales of agricultural raw materials including tobacco were more than 
twice Canada's. Since it is food items which the EEC's variable levy system 
mainly affects, United States exporters of grains, dairy products and meats 
must share Canadian concern about exports of these items. Restrictions on 
imports of fruits and vegetables, the inclusion of tobacco in the CAP and the 
fact that over 90 per cent of EEC farm production47 is now covered by CAP, 
together increase these anxieties. 
The trade displacement which must result from United Kingdom 
entry will affect New Zealand gradually and New Zealand 's eventual trading 
alignment may well depend on how difficult she finds it to obtain alternative 
markets in the Pacific . New Zealand may find that higher prices are no com-
pensation for reduced quantities sold to an enlarged EEC and that the EEC 
4 5 ANZ Bank Quarterly Survey, July 1971, pp. 22-3. 
46 Discontinued in 1970 at the request of Dairy Board on the grounds that drought had 
seriously affected milk supplies. 
47 J . van Lierde, Internal Aspects of EEC Agricultural Policies in Proceedings of a 
Conference on Problems and Prospects in Atlantic and Continental Agricultural Trade , 
(University of Guelph, Ontario, 27 September 1970). 
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undertaking to seek international agreement on dairy products may prove 
unproductive. Then, because of her need to export agricultural products, 
New Zealand may have to press (and pay) for closer trading relations with 
both Australia and Japan. Some agricultural exports to Australia could 
expand in return for concessions within the framework of the Australia-New 
Zealand Free Trade Agreement.48 New Zealand has widened her range of ' 
agricultural products to include processed foods and made efforts to expand 
her agricultural exports to other markets but in Asian, Pacific Islands and 
Latin American markets there is strong competition from other efficient 
exporters in the region. 
There is good reason to expect that with the continuance of the 
CAP in an enlarged EEC, competition for all available markets for temperate 
zone agricultural products will intensify. 
3.3 Competition for the Japanese Market 
Similar competition exists in the rapidly growing Japanese market 
(Appendix 15). Moreover, the EEC, itself a major importer of agricultural 
products, has since 1968 been competing strongly in the Japanese market 
with sales of wheat, barley, butter, dried milk and dried peas. The Canadians 
had to reduce barley prices to regain a share in the Japanese market after 
EEC sales of surplus barley in 1968 and 1969. The EEC also competes 
directly with the United States in items such as essential oils and lard though 
the United States has apparently regained its Japanese market for chickens 
at the cost of losing a market in Greece and Switzerland to the EEC.49 
The United States, New Zealand and Canada all sell meats, dairy 
products, animal feeding stuffs, hides and skins and animal oils and fats to 
Japan. The United States and Canada are both prominent in the markets 
for cereals and oilseeds. 
Competition within some broad commodity groups is limited. For 
example, Canada and the United States sell pork to Japan, New Zealand and 
Australia lamb and mutton. The United States supplies soyabeans and saf-
flower, Canada linseed, mustard seed and rapeseed. 
Competition is also limited in specialised items of processed food-
stuffs. Here the market is dominated by a single supplier and the United 
States which has supplied a very large range of export goods to the Japanese 
market since the 1950's has a strong position. 
The interests of the three major Pacific area exporters overlap those 
of Australia in areas such as wool, wheat, sorghum, oilseeds and lucerne meal 
in the Japanese market, and, in addition, there are commodities such as 
cheese, tobacco, casein and linseed in which the three exporters do not com-
pete in the Japanese market but do so in the major markets of the EEC and 
United Kingdom (Appendix 5). These supplies could, if diverted to the 
Japanese market, increase competition there. 
There are also items such as Canadian butter which are occasional 
exports and which could, as the EEC exports of surplus barley have shown, 
affect market prices. There is no doubt of the competition among suppliers 
48 Dnder the Australia-New Zealand Free Trade Agreement New Zealand exports of agri-
cultural products to Australia doubled in value between 1965/66 and 1969/70 and her 
trading position with respect to Australia improved. In 1970/71 the excess of imports 
49
from Australia increaseii but there was a general increase in New Zealand imports. 
European Community 7-8, July-August 1971, p. 8. 
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of a large number of products on the Japanese market and this seems certain 
to increase, even without deliberate action50 on the part of those countries 
concerned, as possibilities of substitution increase with advances in food 
technology. 
3.4 Agricultural Support Programmes 
All three countries face the problem of decline in farm incomes 
compared with those in other sections of the community. All have taken 
steps to maintain and increase efficient production and marketing but their 
approaches have been different. In all the cost of agricultural support 
programs both direct and indirect rose steeply in the 1960s. 
All three countries operate schemes of tariff protection for 
domestic agricultural production although in some cases there are seasonal 
duties.51 In addition New Zealand has a complex system of import licensing 
introduced mainly for balance of payments reasons . The United States oper-
ates quotas under the Agricultural Adjustment Act to protect price support 
programs and under PL88-482 when meat imports are excessive. Canada 
requires import permits for some dairy products and licences for wheat, 
barley, oats and their milled products. 
New Zealand has not needed to provide direct export subsidies for 
her agricultural products and her marketing schemes have operated success-
fully52 with very little government assistance beyond provision of overdraft 
facilities by the Reserve Bank. The estimated cost of direct assistance to 
farmers in 1970-71 was $US39.2 millions and total government expenditure 
on agriculture was estimated at $US99.5 millions.53 
Canada has used export subsidies sparingly (there is an export 
equalisation fund to cover exports of surplus dairy products) and supports 
prices both home and export through deficiency payments and purchase 
programs. 54 Canada seems to have solved the problem of temporary price 
supports by her scheme of mandatory support of a basic price which was 
originally 80 per cent of the average in a 10 year period. For the 10 year 
period to 1968, 22 products received support through the Agricultural 
Stabilisation Board at a cost of $US616.7 millions. These included meat, 
dairy products and grain originally scheduled and vegetables, fruit and 
poultry .55 
Australia's expenditure on agricultural support and adjustment has 
risen rapidly. Estimated expenditure in the 1971-72 Budget was $US308 mil-
lions56 as against actual expenditure in 1968-69 of $US193 millions. Two 
thirds of the increase and one quarter of the total was budgeted for assis-
tance to the wool industry. 
50 United States in the Agricultural Act of 1970 abandoned grain acreage control. Grain 
acreages in US increased in 1971. EEC farmers sowed more oilseeds 51 Imports of fruits and vegetables to Canada and United States. 52The New Zealand Dairy Board to distribute $US6 .7 millions to farmers in 1971. 
Reserve Bank of New Zealand Bulletin, June 1971. 
53 Frampton op. cit. pp. 9, 10. For 1969-70 actual expenditure was $US13 .3 millions and 
$US66.3 millions respectively. 54B. Fernon. Atlantic Trade Study, Issues in World Farm Trade (Trade Policy Research 
Centre, 1970) p. 41. 
55Canada Yearbook 1969 op. cit. 56 In addition to assistance with fertilisers and petroleum products ($US82 millions), 
reconstruction schemes accounted for $US58 millions, stabilisation funds and bounties 
$US82 millions. Commonwealth of Australia Budget Papers Budget Speech 1971-72, 
and Statements attached to the Speech, (Canberra, 1971 ). 
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The United States has subsidisez agricultural exports extensively. 
The cost of direct export subsidies was $US162.9 millions in 1969-70 (in 
1963-64 it was $US821.7 millions)57 and domestic prices are also subsidised 
(wool to 0.72 cents a lb.) . An estimated outlay of $US5,262 millions in fis-
cal 1971 for agricultural and rural development and $US5,804 millions in 
fiscal 1972 was allowed for in the US Budget.58 
The extent and direction of subsidisation of production will be 
important negotiating issues among the Pacific agricultural exporters them-
selves. Collectively they have a strong common interest in negotiations with 
Japan. With Australia, both the United States and Canada are divided on the 
issue of free trade in agricultural commodities and New Zealand is working 
out the implications of its special position vis-a-vis the EEC. But all three 
countries, mindful of the importance of agricultural interests and in the face 
of rising production in the EEC, view a growing Japanese market as a solution 
to some of their problems and along with Australia they will continue to 
press for further liberalisation of Japan's agricultural trade policy. 
4. Trade Policy Options 
4.1 A Campaign Against Agricultural Protectionism 
The case for a concerted attack on the problem of agricultural 
protectionism by industrial countries has perhaps never been more pressing. 
The entry of the United Kingdom into the EEC threatens to extend and 
strengthen European agricultural protectionism. The delicate balance of 
politico-economic forces in the United States, the agricultural interests in 
Canada, and the crucial role of agricultural exports in Australia and New 
Zealand provide the rationale for special initiatives from Pacific countries 
against the forces of agricultural protectionism. It is not in the interests of 
agricultural exporters to have agricultural trade excluded from the attempts, 
represented in the articles of GATT, to evolve rules for freer trade. They 
wish to negotiate and naturally look to Japan. 
The success of any such initiatives must largely depend on the 
stance taken by Japan. The high rates of economic growth sustained in Japan 
and the scarcity of domestic agricultural resources have resulted in a strong 
growth in Japanese imports of foodstuffs and animal feeds over the past 
decade. This import growth is likely to continue, but as in the past, the rate 
of growth of food imports will be limited by the protectionist stance of the 
Japanese authorities toward a domestic agriculture that is inefficient by 
world standards. Pacific agricultural exporters, including the United States, 
have a strong interest in the Japanese import market. Here then is an area 
where a Japanese government can still offer substantial concessions in inter-
national negotiation, where it can involve the United States in a significant 
retreat from protectionism, and where it can demonstrate new leadership in 
trade policy m contrast to the inward-looking European Economic 
Community. 
~7US D. of A. Foreign Agricultural Trade of the United States, February 1971, p. 10. 
8 US Executive Office of the President, Office of Management and Budget, The US 
Budget in Brief, Fiscal Year 1972 (Washington, 1971) p. 36. 
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There are two levels on which the campaign against agricultural 
protectionism can be pressed. In the longer term, there is some prospect that 
ground can be gained, even against Europe, within GATT and other world 
forums. The special initiatives within GATT and the OECD Study Group on 
problems in agric_ultural trade sh~ul~ lead to a cl~arer specification of. the 
magnitude of agricultural protect10msm and the mcentives to reduce it. 
These are worthwhile endeavours but they are unlikely to produce concrete 
results soon enough. 
In the intermediate term, there is some promise of gaining ground 
in bilateral negotiations or regional negotiations among directly interested 
parties. Concessions on agricultural protectionism will have to be recipro-
cated with concessions elsewhere . 
There is certainly scope for the negotiation of a new and major 
economic agreement involving Japan and Australia. 
4.2 Factors in the Removal of Trade Barriers 
Since 1957, when Australia and Japan signed an 'Agreement on 
Commerce', trade between the two countries has grown considerably. In 
1970-71, Japan was Australia's largest export market and accounted for 
27 .1 per cent of total exports. Japan supplied 13.8 per cent of total 
Australian imports and was third largest supplier after the United States 
and United Kingdom. In 1970, Australia supplied 8 .0 per cent of Japan's 
total import requirements and was her fifth largest export market after the 
United States, South Korea, Taiwan and Hong Kong, accounting for 3.1 per 
cent of total exports . 
The Australia-Japan Agreement on Commerce was re-negotiated in 
1963 and the full rights of GATT are reciprocated under this Agreement. 
Although trade between the two countries has grown markedly throughout 
the past decade or more and prospects for further growth within the current 
trading framework are bright, the potential gains from trade between Japan 
and Australia will not be fully realised without further mutual trading con-
cessions. Any new economic agreement between the two countries would 
have to be consistent with the GATT articles. The prospect of costly 
retaliation by affected parties, consequent on a flouting of basic GATT 
principles, would be far too great a risk for both nations in comparison to the 
gains that would be made . This rules out any suggestion of a unilateral offer 
of tariff preferences confined to Japanese goods . 
On the Australian side the flow of exports from Japan is inhibited 
by Australia's protective tariff . Almost one third of Australia 's imports from 
Japan in 1969-70 attracted duties of greater than 30 per cent .59 Perhaps this 
is an indication of Japan's competitive vigour; nevertheless, there is room for 
tariff cuts. More importantly , there is now no need to give preference to 
Britain on goods not produced in Australia and this preference could safely 
be removed on By-Law items and probably on most items with MFN rates 
of 10 per cent or less. The wider question of preference is touched on below. 
Progress in the direction of scaling down these tariff barriers has 
been slow but recent years have witnessed a strengthening in the forces for 
change. For a number of years Australia was able to maintain a very low rate 
of unemployment whilst at the same time contain the rate of inflation. 
59 Commonwealth Bureau of Census and Statistics, Customs Clearances at Specified Rates 
of Duty: Australia, 1969-70, Canberra, November, 1970. 
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Recently, however, the rate of inflation has accelerated and the role of 
Australia's tariff policy in this process has increasingly come under attack 
from agricultural interests, other industries producing for the world market, 
as well as urban consumers. The Australian Tariff Board has begun to review 
the role of the tariff in the Australian economy and reassess the very high 
levels of protection granted to some industries. . 
This process of review may prove rather slow. Moreover, the bal" 
ance of political forces is such that significant modification of Australia 's 
tariff is unlikely unless concessions are reciprocated by the major trading 
partners. This applies especially to the preferential tariff. 
If Britain enters the EEC and even if she does not, Australia will 
need to restructure her preferential tariff system. At present under her trade 
treaty with Britain, Australia grants tariff preferences to British exports in 
the Australian market in exchange for preferred access to the British market. 
Jn this area three options are open to Australia; she could raise British 
Preferential Tariff (BPT) rates to the Most Favoured Nation (MFN) level, 
reduce MFN rates to the BPT level, either across the board , or selectively on 
commodities of particular interest to Japan and other trading partners pre-
pared to negotiate . Alternatively compromise could be made with movements 
in both BPT and MFN rates on a selective basis. 
It should be emphasised that there can be no presumption that 
Australia will make a unilateral tariff reduction. Although the political cli-
mate in Australia, at present, is much more favourable for an alteration in 
the tariff than in the past, such actions are internationally negotiable and the 
balance of forces in Australia is such that considerable gains would have to 
be in sight before any significant action outside the long process of Tariff 
Board review could be contemplated. 
The rapidly growing Australian mineral industry , which is destined 
to play a key role in Australia's future economic growth, already has close 
ties with Japan; the bulk of Australian iron ore contracts for example are 
with Japanese firms . While Australian suppliers have real advantages in terms 
of quality, price and stability of supply, the adoption by Australia of a firm 
mineral development policy embracing both foreign investment in mineral 
exploitation and processing could go a long way toward reducing any uncer-
tainties and make for a closer understanding between the two nations. 
Progress toward more joint ventures in mineral processing in Australia, for 
example, would be welcomed by both Japan and Australia. Certainly, any 
new economic agreement involving Japan and Australia would have to 
encompass both countries' interests in foreign investment and resources 
development. In addition, it is imperative that both countries keep in mind 
the position of mineral exporters in the less developed countries, and press 
for the development of processing industries in these countries . 
On the Japanese side, Japan 's protective policies toward her agri-
culture are a major bone of contention with Australian producers, now under 
considerable pressure from rising costs and falling world prices for traditional 
lines of specialisation. New lines of agricultural specialisation appear profit-
able, but readjustment is costly. If expansion is limited by severe protection-
ism in importing countries, the necessary investment for new land uses may 
well be discouraged . Many of Japan's protective policies are residual import 
restrictions which are quite inconsistent with the articles of GATT and 
Australia, along with other countries, will continue to press for their uni-
lateral removal. The remaining barriers in the Japanese market are state 
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trading policies which have the same effect as quantitative restrictions, and 
although the state trading authorities do not necessarily discriminate betw~en 
suppliers on other than normal commercial grounds, these practices, by their 
secretive nature, encourage accusations of discriminatory treatment. 
Australian producers are not averse to competing on a fair basis in 
any open farm product market in Japan, but Australia has no desire to grant 
concessions for easier Japanese entry into the Australian market in exchange 
for improved access to the Japanese market, only to have these gains elimi-
nated by the dumping of surpluses by an enlarged EEC for example. Those 
sentiments apply equally well to the United States, Canada and New Zealand 
the first two of which have already felt the damaging effects of EEC tactics ' 
in disposing of large quantities of surplus barley on the Japanese market in 
1969. Any agreement involving Japan and Australia would have to include 
clear understandings on this issue. 
Beyond agriculture, Australia also has an interest in access to 
Japanese markets for semi-processed and processed non-agricultural com-
modities. In this regard, clearer specification of Japanese policies towards 
investment links and import competition in the intermediate goods industries 
is required. 
Since Pacific exporters of temperate zone agricultural products 
share Australia's interest in the Japanese market, the possibilities for broader 
negotiations in such a situation are not likely to be lost on Japan . Although 
Australia is an important market for Japanese exports, any gains Japan may 
make in terms of improved access to the Australian market alone will 
probably not be sufficient for her to dismantle or significantly lower her 
barriers on agricultural trade to advantage of third countries in the Pacific 
area. It is in Japan's interests to engage all Pacific exporters of farm products 
in negotiations for increased access to her market. Similarly, it is in 
Australia's (and others') interests to engage Japan in negotiations over agri-
cultural trade not only to increase direct access to that market, but also in an 
attempt to prevent closer Japanese links with the EEC without adequate safe-
guards on agricultural trade. 
4.3 Trade Liberalization - Bilateral and Regional 
The interests of all Pacific farm product exporters in the growing 
Japanese market and the relationships between these countries and the less 
developed areas in the region, together with their mutual interests in factors 
affecting world trade more generally, suggest the need for a broader arena 
for trade negotiations . Japan could offer greater liberalisation of her import 
barriers to agricultural trade, the more widely concessions could be won for 
her exports. This suggests the interesting possibility of some negotiation 
which is multilateral in character although confined to Japan and the prin-
pal exporters of temperate zone agricultural products.60 There are of course 
other reasons for looking for the exploitation of a more effective regional 
framework than any now available.61 
60 Any concessions made would be open to GATT partners and it might be expected that 
Argentina might seek to be associated. 
61 See Peter Drysdale, 'Pacific Economic Integration, An Australian View'; Kiyoshi 
Kojima, 'Japan's Interest in The Pacific Trade Expansion', in Kiyoshi Kojima, ed., 
Pacific Trade and Development, Japan Economic Research Centre, February, 1968; 
H. W. Arndt, 'PAFTA: An Australian Assessment', and a reply by Kiyoshi Kojima, 'A 
Pacific Free Trade Area: Reconsidered', in H. W. Arndt, A small Rich Industrial 
Country; Studies in Australian Development, Aid, and Trade, Melbourne, 1968; Brian 
Fernon, Issues in World Farm Trade: Chaos or Co-operation, op. cit. 
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Accordingly, while Australia and Japan should continue to exploit 
their bilateral relations in the direction of further trade investment and 
economic co-operation, the regional possibilities should be further explored. 
The importance of the Japanese market to other Pacific countries; the need 
for Japan to secure growing export markets and import supplies; and the 
concern of all countries with political stability in the Asian-Pacific area, all 
oint to the importance of greater regional co-operation, not only in trade 
~atters but also in investment, tourism, economic stabilisation policies, and 
development aid. 
One idea that has been floated in recent years is that Japan, 
Australia, New Zealand and possibly North America might establish a free 
trade area and offer associate membership to interested less developed coun-
tries. This proposal establishes a useful focus but is premature.62 Moreover, 
the opportunities for pushing trade liberalisation on a most favoured nation 
basis are still promising and would be less damaging to global trading 
arrangements. 
The lack of enthusiasm for a free trade area in the Pacific should 
not however, be allowed to cloud the prospects for a further substantial 
fre~ing of trade and greater economic co-operation within the region. 
Already there is a disparate collection of joint endeavours at a business-to-
business and government-to-government level within the region. Although 
there are undoubtedly close relations between the Japanese delegations and 
their Government, the same is far less apparent in respect to other delega-
tions. In any case their meetings are no substitute for inter-governmental 
relations. Recently a Japan-Australia Joint Consultative Committee has been 
established. This is to be welcomed. There have long been regular consulta-
tions on economic and other matters between the Japanese and American 
governments. 
The interests of all Pacific countries would be better served by a 
more effectively co-ordinated approach to regional trade and economic 
problems. The suggestion that bilateral government-to-government consulta-
tions and negotiations within the framework of an Organisation for Pacific 
Trade Aid and Development would appear sound. OPT AD could be devel-
oped along similar lines to OECD, that is, not as a regulatory agency but as 
a place where government-to-government consultations could take place. 
Although this is already a function of OECD, Japan, Australia, the United 
States and Canada, the four leading nations of the Pacific area, are the only 
non-European nations out of a total OECD membership of 23 and thus there 
would appear to be considerable advantages in having a smaller scale regional 
organisation to deal with problems of a more regional nature that may well 
be frustrated in OECD, or even in GATT, in which European interests tend 
to frustrate world-wide progress. 
OPT AD should in no way be thought of as some sort of a substi-
tute for OECD or GATT but a complementary organisation to facilitate the 
discussion and speed the resolution of regional problems. Such an organisa-
tion would also play a useful role in broadening the area of trade negotiations 
and lessening the danger that important bilateral talks such as those between 
62 See J. G. Crawford, Introduction to, Brian Fernon, op. cit.; Kiyoshi Kojima, 'A Pacific 
Free Trade Area: A New Design For World Trade Expansion', Hitotsubashi Journal of 
Economics, Vol. 12, No. 1, June, 1971. 
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Japan and the United States over textiles, for example, could be held with 
such scant regard for the welfare of the other affected parties.63 
In addition, OPT AD could act as a stimulant to joint aid and 
investment programs in the region and, in general provide a framework with-
in which negotiations and discussions for furthering the economic develop-
ment of the Asian area could take place. 
Further, OPTAD could provide a more secure framework of 
economic alliance from within which participant countries could play a less 
suspect and more useful role of conciliation toward China. 
In terms of further liberalisation of trade, the importance of the 
Japanese market to the major Pacific exporters is such that it is in Japan's 
interests to engage all the farm product exporters of the Pacific area, in a 
bargaining round. At present this could only be done via a series of bilateral 
exchanges between interested parties. Only then would Japan be likely to 
gain sufficient benefits to compensate her for the significant liberalisation 
that she is being called on to give all four Pacific exporters. 
This partial collective approach to the problems of Japanese 
access to the developed markets in the Pacific and access to Japanese markets 
by the agricultural exporters is to be preferred by Australia, New Zealand and 
Canada to a situation in which they and the world must await the dubious 
results of a major bilateral trade war between the United States and Japan. 
Such a trade war could really produce difficult questions for Australia if the 
United States became very restrictionist towards Japan. Japan might then 
offer Australia concessions which would be denied to the United States, 
GATT or no GATT. Australia might, for the sake of her agriculture, have to 
choose Japan and risk retaliation from the United States. The prospect is not 
inviting and may serve as a spur towards greater regional efforts to resolve the 
present difficulties between the two leading trading partners in the Pacific. 
63These comments are substantially in agreement with those of Professor Kojima, the 
original publicist of the Pacific Free Trade Area approach, who has indicated recently 
that OPT AD does offer scope for a more practical approach to problems of economic 
co-operation in the Pacific area. See Kiyoshi Kojima, 'A Pacific Free Trade Area : A 
New Design For World Trade Expansion', op. cit. 
40 
. Year 
1960·61 
1961-62 
1962-63 
1963-64 
1964-65 
1965-66 
1966-67 
1967-68 
1968-69 
1969-70 
1970-71 e 
APPENDIX 1 
Gross Value of Farm Production, Farm Cost, Farm Income, and 
Index of Volume of Farm Output; Australia; 1960-61 to 1970-71 
41.dex of 
Volume of Gross Value of Farm 
Farm Output0 Farm Productionb Costsc 
$Am $Am 
152 2,745 1,728 
155 2,734 1,792 
166 3,013 1,875 
174 3,425 1,994 
181 3,451 2,137 
166 3,347 2,286 
198 3,828 2,456 
175 3,345 2,524 
215 3,956 2,711 
207 3,773 2,741 
198 3,631 2,740 
0 Base: average 1936-37 to 1938-39 = 100. 
Farm 
Incomed 
$Am 
1,017 
942 
1,138 
1,431 
1,314 
1,061 
1,372 
821 
1,245 
1,032 
891 
bproduction of the various commodities is valued at the wholesale prices realised in 
the principal markets and includes subsidies, etc. 
c Total costs are cash costs such as wages, rent, interest, marketing costs, etc., and 
depreciation. 
dGross value of farm production less total farm costs. 
e Estimated by the Bureau of Agricultural Economics. 
Source: Trends in Australia's Rural Production and Exports, Bureau of Agricultural 
Economics, Canberra (various issues). 
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APPENDIX 2 
Indexes of Prices Paid by Australian Farmers and Prices 
Received on Domestic and Export Markets 
Base: Average 1960-61to1962-63 = 100 
Prices Received 
Year Prices Paid Domestic Export All Markets 
1960-61 99 107 97 103 
1961-62 100 95 99 97 
1962-63 101 98 104 101 
1963-64 101 101 121 109 
1964-65 105 107 104 106 
1965-66 111 116 107 111 
1966-67 114 117 105 110 
1967-68 118 119 95 107 
1968-69 120 117 98 106 
1969-70 121 118 92 101 
1970-71a 126 119 83 98 
a Estimated by Bureau of Agricultural Economics. 
Source: Bureau of Agricultural Economics, Canberra. 
42 
Ratio of 
Prices Received 
to Prices Paid 
104 
97 
100 
108 
101 
100 
96 
91 
88 
83 
78 
APPENDIX 3 
Levies in the EEC Expressed as a Proportion of World Prices for 
Selected Commodities 
1968-69a 
Commodities Percentage 
Grainsb 
Soft wheat 
Hard wheat 
Rye 
Barley 
Oats 
Maize 
Sugar 
Raw Sugar 
Dairy Productsc 
Butter 
Cattled 
82 
63 
78 
98 
81 
74 
230 
403 
Calves and young fattening stock 18 
Fat cattle 59 
Slaughter cows 37 
aMeasures an arithmetic average of monthly levies charged during 1968-69 as a 
proportion of actual average c.i.f. import prices for the year. 
b For grains the import prices used are the arithmetic averages of the most commonly 
imported grades. 
c Average c.i.f. price of imports from all non-members. 
dFor cattle the levies include calculated ad valorem tariffs. 
Figures obtained from Directeur General de !'Agriculture, Marches Agricoles Prix, 
Brussels (various issues); OECD, Trade by Commoaities: Market Summaries: Imports, 
Paris (various issues). 
Source: A. C. Byrne, 'The Common Agricultural Policy of the EEC', Quarterly 
Review of Agricultural Economics, Vol. XXIV, No. 2, April 1971, p. 87. 
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APPENDIX 9 
Japan 's Imports of Major Agricultural Commodities 
by Principal Source: Selected Yearsa 
1964 1966 1969 
$USm $USm $USm 
262.0 278.8 297.0 
120.l 149 .4 133.0 
106.4 104 .1 75.8 
33.7 25 .3 83 .2 
29.3 30 .7 34.4 
5.0 9.3 2.6 
7 .4 3 .1 9.0 
22.2 
16.8 18.4 0.5 
208.7 243.3 331.9 
101.3 153.2 207.2 
45.2 50 .2 26 .5 
41.5 41.2 
0 .7 1.2 10.8 
61.2 13 3.1 161.5 
48 .0 117.7 108.5 
12.9 10.7 47 .6 
0 .2 0 .9 0 .2 
3.7 10.6 15.8 
3.1 7.1 12.2 
0.4 2 .2 2 .6 
0.4 
Mutton and Lamb 22 .7 39.0 47 .0 
New Zealand 13.4 21.1 31.1 
Australia 9.2 17.9 15.9 
Pork 3.1 51.7 
us 2.9 35.0 
Taiwan 7.8 
Canada 3 .2 
Australia 4.4 
Butter 0 .1 6 .5 0.2 
Australia 0 .1 2.4 0.2 
New Zealand 3.2 
EEC 0 .5 
55 
1970 
$USm 
318.4 
173.7 
87.2 
57.5 
41.6 
30.0 
6.3 
5.4 
406 .9 
292.8 
37.0 
27 .9 
29 .0 
1.3 
235.2 
134.5 
78.9 
16.7 
22.3 
18 .1 
2.5 
1.4 
49 .9 
28.5 
21.3 
20.9 
8 .9 
5.1 
4 .6 
0.8 
0.7 
0 .5 
0.1 
0 .1 
(Cont 'd on p . 56) 
APPENDIX 9 (cont'd) 
1964 1966 1969 1970 
$USm $USm $USm $USm 
Cheese 5.2 12.4 17.3 20.0 
Australia 1.4 3.8 5.2 6.0 
New Zealand 1.0 2.0 3.3 3.6 
Norway 1.2 2.8 4.1 4.2 
EEC 1.3 2.4 2.6 3.4 
Denmark 0.2 0.6 1.2 1.3 
Skim Milk Powder 13.0 12 .5 5 .6 2.8 
(School Lunch Program) 
New Zealand 0.7 3.5 3.0 2.4 
us 12.3 6.4 0 .8 0.4 
EEC 1.8 
Skim Milk Powder 0.7 3.4 5.1 8.3 
(Feed) 
EEC 2.4 1.6 4 .6 
New Zealand 0.7 2.5 2.3 
Australia 0.1 0.4 0.5 
Canada 0 .5 0.6 
Eggs 0 .1 1.4 10.2 14.0 
Australia 1.0 4.1 6 .3 
UK 0.1 2.9 2.2 
South Africa 1.5 1.4 
Bananas 55 .2 65 .1 116.5 144.1 
Ecuador 22.3 10.7 41.9 80.9 
Taiwan 32.3 53.4 56.9 36.3 
Honduras 12.4 1.2 
Lemons 5.4 9 .0 19 .7 24.1 
us 5.4 9.0 19.7 24.l 
Dried Vine Fruit 7.4 6.7 7.2 7 .3 
us 6 .3 5.5 6 .5 6.8 
Australia 0 .6 0.4 0.4 0 .2 
Greasy Wool 365.5 402.9 369.7 322.8 
Australia 311.1 317 .3 312.4 274.3 
New Zealand 19.5 39.8 16.7 13.0 
South Africa 21.0 26.2
1 
26.8 23.7 
Cotton 432.0 413.9 414.2 461.4 
Mexico 113.5 115.3 106.8 77 .0 
us 141.5 110.3 59.0 76.7 
(Cont'd on p. 57) 
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APPENDIX 9 (cont'd) 
1964 1966 1969 1970 
$USm $USm $USm $USm 
Brazil 13 .1 13.3 37 .1 43.3 
Nicaragua 23.6 36.6 31.4 25.8 
UAR 17 .2 13.6 27.1 25.6 
India 20 .3 14.3 17 .2 19.3 
Pakistan 14.2 13.0 7.6 9.1 
Australia 2 .5 2.6 
Sugar (raw) 241.6 123.6 196.9 280.1 
Cuba 53.3 20 .0 64.0 106.3 
Ryukyu 33.6 42.3 46.7 45 .8 
Australia 51.3 30.l 41.3 51.6 
South Africa 29 .1 8.8 25 .0 37.1 
Taiwan 61.1 19.3 9 .9 10.3 
Soybeans 184.5 272.0 281.0 365.8 
us 153.9 222.3 238.7 329.6 
China 30 .5 49 .2 42 .3 36.0 
Rapeseed 9.2 25.0 28 .1 41.4 
Canada 9.0 21.5 25.2 39.6 
China 3.5 0.2 
Linseed 12.5 14.4 16.9 17.3 
Canada 12.3 14.4 16.5 16.9 
Australia 0.4 0.3 
Hides and Skins 48.6 91.5 96.7 93.0 
us 32 .1 54 .8 61.7 64 .3 
Australia 7.2 15.3 13.4 10.9 
EEC n .a. 3.1 5.1 4 .3 
Canada 1.9 6.5 4 .2 3.1 
New Zealand 0.7 2.0 2.8 3.0 
a Calendar years, c .i.f. 
Source : Ministry of Finance, Japan Exports and Imports , Tokyo (various issues). 
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APPENDIX 11 
Daily per Capita Calorie and Protein Intake: 
Selected Countries 
Total Animal 
Calories Protein Protein 
grams grams 
New Zealand 3290 107.3 74.3 
us 3240 96.1 69.6 
France 3180 99.8 60 .3 
Canada 3180 95.4 64 .l 
UK 3180 88.0 54 .0 
USSR 3150 91.5 35 .8 
Hungary 3140 97.0 41.3 
Poland 3110 93.2 42.6 
Australia 3110 91.6 62.0 
West Germany 2960 80 .5 51.6 
United Arab Republic 2960 76.3 10.7 
Italy 2940 87.2 37 .8 
Greece 2900 98.9 43.0 
Mexico 2600 66.8 15.1 
Japan 2459 75.7 29.5 
Pakistan 2230 50.6 10.1 
Philippines 2010 51.9 19.9 
Source : FAO, The State of Food and Agriculture 1970, Rome, 1970. 
Data is for 1968 except for USSR and Poland which are average figures 
1964-66. 
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APPENDIX 12 
Consumer Price Index: Composition and Rate of Increase, 
1965-1969 
1965-69 (Annual Rate) 
Rate of Increase, % % Contribution 
General 4 .9 100 ---
Commodities 4 .5 63 
Foods 5.2 42 
Liberalised items 4.6 17 
Items under Import 
Restriction 4.9 13 
Governmental trade items 7 .1 12 
Other Commodities 3.6 21 
Liberalised items 3 .5 19 
Items under Import 
Restriction 3.7 1 
Governmental trade items 4.4 1 
Services 5.8 37 
Source: Economic Planning Agency, Economic Survey of Japan, 1969-70, Tokyo , 
p. 142. 
APPENDIX 13 
Ratio of Domestic Production to Consumption: Japan 
(per cent) 
1977 
1963 1969 Projection 
Rice 99.3 117.0 100.0 
Wheat 38.2 14.5 13.7 
Barley 87.3 47.5 44.5 
Soybeans 21.0 4.7 2 .9 
Vegetables 100 .l 99 .4 100.5 
Fruits 100.6 84.7 86 .5 
Dairy Products 82.2 91.4 91.4 
Meats (ex whale) 94.6 82.9 88 .3 
Eggs 100.8 98.0 98 .5 
Sugar and products 45.6 45 .0 n .a. 
Fish and shell fish 108.0 100.4 n.a. 
Other cereals (mainly feed) 11.9 1.7 n.a. 
Source: Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, Food Balance Sheets (1963, 1969); 
Long Term Projection of Supply and Demand for Agricultural Products, 
Tokyo, 1968 (in Japanese) 
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APPENDIX 14 
Exports of Agricultural Products1 of United States, Canada 
and New Zealand, 1965 and 19693 
($US millions) 
Agricultural United States Canada New Zealand 
Exports f.o.b . to 19652 19692 1965 1969 1965 1969 
United States 271.8 297.2 117 .2 171.7 
Canada 629.3 722 .5 10.2 37 .5 
Latin America 436.3 447.9 79 .0 63 .0 6 .7 6.4 
EEC 1,475.0 1,302 .2 201.5 142.0 150.5 144.2 
United Kingdom 407 .6 376 .2 310.9 238.8 468.5 461.2 
Australia 40.3 36.6 2.1 4.1 10.8 16 .3 
New Zealand 6.7 6.6 0.3 0 .4 
Pacific Islands 4 .8 7.7 7.2 10.6 
Japan 884 .5 936.9 132.7 136.5 44.3 78 .5 
'Other Asia' 1,056 .2 1,101.5 40.2 55 .0 31.8 33.1 
Middle East 306.0 183.1 21.0 8.6 3 .3 3.1 
Communist countries 101.5 88.1 360.7 119.0 12.5 23.5 
Other destinations 948.8 819.5 84.8 87.1 59.l 45.6 
Total Agricultural 
Exports 6,297 6,029 1,495 1,151 922 1,032 
Total Exports 27 ,003 37 ,444 8,107 13,754 979 1,182 
Total Exports to 
Japan 2 ,042 3,462 293 579 50 108 
Percentage Agricultural 
of Total Exports 23 16 18 8 94 87 
Percentage Agricultural 
Exports to Japan of 
Total Exports to Japan 43 27 45 24 89 73 
1 Includes processed oils and fats . 
2 Includes re-exports valued at $US80 millions in both 1965 and 1969. In 1969 Canada 
received $US5lm; Latin America $US5m; EEC $US7m; UK $US5m ; 'Other Asia ' 
$US6m; Japan $US0.7m in re-exports. 
3In 1969 United States exports were affected by a Iongshoremen's strike . Total exports 
in 1970 were $US42,028m and agricultural exports $US7,174m. Exports to both EEC 
and Japan were a record. The increase in exports to EEC to $US1,559m was mainly due 
to an increase of $US155m sales of oilseeds (not subject to variable levy). 
Source: Compiled from UN Commodity Trade Statistics 1965, and 1969. 
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APPENDIX 16 
Agricultural Exports of United States1 , Canada, New Zealand 
and Australia to All Destinations, 1969 
SITC Group 
or United New 
$US millions Sub-Group States Canada Zealand Australia 
Live animals 00 46.7 47.4 4.2 6.6 
Meat and preparations 01 199.4 78 .7 399.0 396.6 
Beef and veal OlLl 17 .8 29.l 152 .1 28 3.9 
Lamb and mutton 01L2 LO 2.1 215.7 70.7 
Pork 011.3 5L8 24.9 0.7 4.6 
Poultry 01L4 38 .5 0.4 Ll 
Dairy products and eggs 02 130.9 33 .9 218.1 96.6 
Milk and cream dry 022.2 76 .3 17 .0 28.5 19.5 
Butter 023 14.6 135.0 46.6 
Cheese 024 4.4 13.3 50.8 18.7 
Eggs 025 14.0 2 .1 7 .5 
Cereals and preparations 04 2,127 .2 552.0 4 .6 460.7 
Wheat, unmilled 041 725.9 437.3 2.7 360.4 
Corn, unmilled 044 726.0 LO 0 .1 
Other cereals, unmilled 045 138.7 8 .5 16.l 
Fruit and vegetables 05 539.3 74 .5 2L3 95 .8 
Fruit, nuts, fresh 051 195.8 19 .6 9.3 32.8 
Oranges, etc . 05Ll 53 .8 3.6 
Lemons, limes, etc. 05L2 39.7 0.2 
Apples 05L4 9 .2 13.0 8 .0 23.4 
Nuts 05L7 34.6 L2 
Dried fruit 052 50 .5 0 .2 18.6 
Fruit, prepared, preserved 053 123.4 8 .5 2 .6 39.5 
Vegetables 054 136.8 33 .2 8.4 3.7 
Potatoes 054.1 8 .1 11.5 0 .5 1.4 
Dried legumes 054.2 52.9 7 .3 4.7 0 .6 
Sugar and honey 06 22.8 13.5 2.7 134.3 
Coffee, tea, spices 07 35.9 15.5 1.4 2.7 
Animal feeding stuff 081 405 .5 57.5 4.7 12.7 
Miscellaneous foods 09 139.1 5.5 1.4 3.5 
Margarine, shortening 091 4L9 0.1 0 .1 0 .3 
Beverages Ex 111 5.3 4 .6 0.5 4 .9 
Tobacco, unmanufactured 121 539 .6 54.5 0.2 
Hides, skins and furs 21 209 .5 54.8 65 .0 99.4 
Hides and skins 211 152.4 23 .3 62.4 96.1 
Oilseeds, nuts, etc. 221 87L7 87.4 1.6 
Soya beans 221.4 822 .3 2.0 
Linseed 22L5 24.0 48 .5 0.4 
Oilseeds nes 221 .8 7.0 37 .0 
Natural rubber and gums 23Ll 8.1 
(Cont'd on p . 65) 
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APPENDIX 16 (cont'd) 
SITC Group 
or United New 
Sub-Group States Canada Zealand Australia 
Textile fibres Ex 26 298.0 2.0 246.2 872.3 
Raw wool 262.1, .2 0.3 1.0 246 .2 866.8 
Raw cotton and !inters 263 .1, .2 285.7 5.4 
Crude animal and 
vegetable materials 29 85.5 45.0 24.4 13.6 
Crude animal materials 291 21.6 21.2 19 .9 9 .8 
Seeds for planting 292.5 30.9 11 .8 4.4 1.6 
Animal and vegetable 
oils and fats 4 307 .6 16.3 9.6 21.3 
Inedible tallow 411.3 131.6 9.7 9 .1 19.7 
Processed oils and fats 431 19.3 0.5 0 .4 0 .8 
Essential oils 555.1 30.l 0.7 0 .6 
Casein etc. 599.5 27.1 7.5 28.5 19.2 
Total Agricultural 
Exports 6,029.3 1,151.3 " 1,031.6 2,242.6 
lThe totals for the United States include re-exports. US Department of Agriculture gives 
value of 1969 agricultural exports at $US5,936.4m. (Foreign Agricultural Trade of the 
United States, February 1971). 
Source: UN Commodity Trade Statistics 1969 (NY, 1970) and UN 1969 World Trade 
Annual (Walker & Co., NY, 1970). 
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COMMENTS BY PROFESSOR 
K. A. HAY 
It is striking that in many places in this paper one could erase 
'Australia' and write in 'Canada'. The Australian problem of falling farm 
incomes exists in many countries with an extensive agricultural base; for 
example, Japan has imposed severe import controls because of the income 
problem in the agricultural sector. One important aspect of this is that a 
country 's comparative advantage changes over time. It is now a mistake to 
say that Canada has a comparative advantage in wheat, for although Canada 
produces Manito_ba n1:1ml;>e~ 1 wheat better thai:i 3:n~one else , she d:i3:rges high 
prices and thus fmds it difficult to sell. Australia is m the same position for 
some agricultural products, especially wool. In feedstuffs both Canada and 
Australia now have a comparative advantage. To solve the problems of falling 
farm incomes and changes in world demand for some fairly staple products 
like wool or wheat, we must take a longer view of the situation than simply 
looking for new markets. Development of new agricultural markets may 
stave off the immediate problem of adjustment but it is not a solution for 
the essential problem which requires a change in the industrial structure of 
the country, moving away from dependence on agricultural exports and 
products toward dependence on other sectors. The costs of this shift will be 
reflected in a greater exodus of people from the rural areas. 
Governments are not very keen on assisting this structural change 
because of the real political factors involved. They get a good deal of political 
support from the agricultural sector and in turn they support the agricultural 
sector far beyond what can be justified on economic grounds. Agriculture 
obviously has a strategic value and in 10 to 15 years the agricultural sector 
may be revitalized (possibly in a different form); however, it is most probable 
that the future of agriculture is not bright and countries such as Australia and 
Canada must emphasize other industries. In the Canadian west, especially with 
respect to trade with Japan, the sale of non-renewable resources has taken the 
place of declining sales of agricultural products and Australia also will likely 
find itself becoming more and more dependent on this source of income. 
In the paper by Sir John Crawford and Professor Board, the 
Australian rate of growth was estimated at about 5 per cent per year to 1975. 
This would imply a rising share of imports and along with their concern that 
Australia's export base is shrinking, they were worried that Australia will 
become more dependent on foreign capital. However, other alternatives are 
that Australia could settle for a lower rate of growth or perhaps in the 
medium term the Australian dollar is overvalued . Australia, faced with con-
tractions in external demand due to the Common Agricultural Policy, the 
United Kingdom's entry into the European Economic Community and the 
Green Revolution, is looking for new and expanding markets. Canada is in a 
similar position, but the Canadian government is placing high hopes on 
expanded agricultural sales to China; however it is obvious that Canada will 
not have unique access to China for long. 
The other major potential growth market is Japan. Recent events 
have caught the Japanese growth rate at a lower level than before - I expect 
it will be roughly 10.8 per cent per year in real terms in the medium term 
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future. This implies a demand for meat consumption growing at a rate of 14 
to 15 per cent per year, using an income elasticity of 1.4. These calculations 
suggest a substantial potential market even without major changes in 
Japanese policy. In Japan there are two conflicting factors: on one hand the 
government wants to protect farm incomes; on the other, the government is 
worried that the farm sector has contributed substantially to the rate of rise 
in consumer prices. This problem of maintaining farm income while trying 
to pursue other economic objectives is replicated in Australia, New Zealand 
and Canada. Of course the way to suppress these inflationary forces is to 
open up the economy to more agricultural imports, or, in the case of Japan 
at least, the revaluation of the yen will lower the price of agricultural imports 
giving an even better competitive edge than before. Thus revaluation will hav~ 
some effect on inflationary pressures but it will aggravate the problem of 
farm incomes, unless Japan re-imposes strict import controls. This is unlikely, 
however, since the trend in Japan is to put more emphasis on the quality of 
life and this means, among other things, higher nutritional levels. Thus, my 
guess is that as Japan moves from a quantitative view of growth to a more 
qualitative view, she will allow increases in nutritional levels. If, for example, 
import controls on beef imports were relaxed, it is apparent from the esti-
mates of price elasticities of demand in Professor D. G. Johnson's paper that 
the consequent reductions in the price of beef would result in very rapid 
increases in beef consumption, aside from the income effects. 
In relation to the longer range question of restructuring the 
Japanese agricultural sector, Sir John Crawford and Professor Board mention 
the Japanese Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry projections to 1977. The 
Ministry made what seems to be fairly strong assumption about the per cent 
of food procuded domestically - about 80 to 90 per cent. If import controls 
based on administrative guidance take this into account, then it is implicit 
that Japan will import a great deal of feed grain but will suppress imports of 
meat. However, if a somewhat lower per cent of food produced at home is 
decided on, then this changes the whole range of possibilities for imports 
from the Pacific area. There is a tremendous potential for the growth in 
consumption of food in Japan, a potential which may be met from either of 
two polar positions - importing feed for cattle or importing carcasses. I 
suspect that Japan, starting off closer to the first position, will gradually 
move toward the second, that is, will import more and more meat. 
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1. Introduction 
TRADE IN GRAINS AND OTHER CROPS 
OF EXTENSIVE AGRICULTURE 
by 
KENZO HEMMI 
University of Tokyo 
The word "extensive agriculture" means types of farming which 
occur in regions where the man / land ratio is low. Among various types of 
extensive agriculture, two groups are important in the world: primitive or 
subsistence agriculture such as nomadism or shifting cultivation; types of 
farming undertaken in countries of recent settlement. 
Countries of recent settlement consist of two groups; developed 
and less developed countries. Latin American countries were recently settled 
but are still less developed. Trade in crops produced by primitive extensive 
agriculture has no importance in the world setting, and we can neglect it in 
this paper. Crops produced in the recently settled less developed countries 
such as coffee, cocoa, rubber, cotton and so on are usually called tropical 
crops, and trade in these crops is worthy of consideration. However, since the 
cultivation or harvesting of these crops is labour intensive, and since the 
nature of trade in these crops is quite different from that of grains and other 
crops, it is better to exclude consideration of trade in these crops from this 
paper. Agricultural products from the recently settled developed countries 
are wheat, coarse grains and oil seeds (soybean and rapeseed) . Sugar, cotton, 
tobacco, citrus and other fruits , rice and certain other crops are produced 
and exported from the recently settled developed countries too . However, 
these are mainly produced in tropical countries and the products of rather 
labour intensive agriculture, and we can neglect these in this paper. Crops to 
be considered in this paper are, therefore, wheat, coarse grains and oil seeds 
(soybean and rapeseed 1 ) . 
The economic characteristics of these crops are three . First, the 
production of these crops is the most efficient in world agricultural produc-
tion. The marketing of these crops is highly efficient too. Efficient animal 
husbandry has developed upon this efficient economy both in countries that 
export and import these crops. The share of exports from the United States 
and Canada of the total world feed grains' exports was more than half in 
1951-53 and 1963-65. Western Europe and Japan took 70 percent of the 
total world feed grains ' imports in 1951-53, and 80 percent in 1963-65. 
Animal industry in these countries is most efficient in the world . Second, the 
economy of these crops is quite dynamic. The increase in yields per hectare 
and in labour productivity in producing these crops has increased very rapidly . 
The development of the soybean industry in the United States which did not 
exist before World War II has been like that of a mushroom. Japan imported 
only 1.0 million metric tons of feed grains in 1955. Her imports of feed 
grains have increased very rapidly since then and she imported 5.6 million 
metric tons in 1965. Government intervention in the economy of these crops 
1 It is true that oilseeds are produced in tropical countries too, but soybean and rapeseed 
are mainly produced in the recently settled developed countries. 
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has been significant both in production and trade. The best examples are the 
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) of the European Economic Community 
the state trading in wheat, barley and rice in Japan, and the United States ' 
grain program. 2 Because of these characteristics, only slight changes in 
government agricultural programs exert a far-reaching effect upon the wel-
fare of populations both of developed and developing countries. 
The purpose of this paper is to examine briefly the nature of trade 
and trade policy regarding these crops with special reference to trade among 
Pacific countries. In examining these two fields, the author hopes to suggest 
something useful in improving trade policies for these crops in Pacific 
countries. 
2. The Background of Pacific Trade with Special Reference 
to Agricultural Trade 
The assertion that an expansion of agricultural trade is needed for 
a balanced expansion in the world economy can hardly be denied, and the 
postwar expansion of agricultural trade has been pursued mainly by GATT 
operations. But during the 1950s it became clear that West European coun-
tries were unlikely to open their doors to the agricultural exports from the 
recently settled countries. Even the United States made it clear that quan-
titative restriction on imports of dairy products into the United States was 
necessary. Moreover, the development of the CAP strengthened the protect-
ive nature of the agricultural policies of the six countries. It was evident in 
the late 1950s that the expansion of world trade in agricultural products 
through GATT negotiations would be extremely difficult .3 
Governments of importing countries are reluctant to reduce their 
trade barriers to agricultural products for four reasons. First, the basic 
structure of peasant-type farming in Western Europe and Japan is extremely 
deficient when competing with producers in the newly settled countries. 
Second, in these importing countries, the improvement of the basic structure 
of production will take many years and huge amounts of government expen-
diture. Third, farmer's organizations in these importing countries are politic-
ally influential. Fourth, not only import barriers into importing countries, 
but also export subsidies are distorting world trade in agricultural products, 
and the removal of these export subsidies is also necessary for a reasonable 
allocation of agricultural resources of the world. 
The last point needs further explanation. There are various kinds 
of measures for agricultural protection. First are measures which restrict 
imports. These measures are import duties, quantitative restrictions, state 
trading, multiple exchange rates, state control of the ratio of the mix of 
domestically produced raw materials with imported materials in processing, 
commercial agreements with exporting countries and so on . Second are 
measures which promote exports artificially. Measures under this category 
are export subsidies, multiple exchange rates, state trading and so on. There 
is a group of measures which do not interfere with imports or exports direct-
2 The general nature of the agricultural programs of these countries is neatly summarized 
by Mr. Brian Fernon. See Brian Fernon, Issues in World Farm Trade : Chaos or 
Co-operation ?, London, 1968, Chap . 4 . 
3 Gerard Curzon, Multilateral Commercial Diplomacy: the general agreement on tariffs 
and trade and its impact on national commercial policies and techniques, Geneva 1965, 
Chap. VIL 
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ly but promote domestic production artificially. Measures under this cate-
gdry are direct payment to producers, tax exemption, subsidies on fertilizer, 
seeds, machines and/or other inputs, and extremely favourable terms of 
farm loans. These make GATT negotiations in the field of agricultural prod-
ucts extremely difficult and complex. Even after the Kennedy Round, high 
officials in both the United States and the EEC explained that one of the 
most important results of the negotiations was that they realized the pro-
blems to be solved in improving the world agricultural trade situation.4 In 
conclusion, rapid expansion of agricultural trade through GATT operations 
is not bright. 
Among various government measures which distort world trade in 
crops of extensive agriculture, food aid is worthy of special consideration. 
This is a kind of subsidized export of food from developed countries to 
developing countries. (Of course, food aid was given to Western Europe and 
Japan immediately after World War II.) There are two differences between 
the usual type of subsidized food exports and food aid. First, food aid is 
given to developing countries which are permanently or temporally short of 
food because of foreign exchange shortages. This means that food aid must 
be an additional import of food into a receiving developing country, and not 
a substitute for ordinary food imports. In this sense food aid is not a dis-
torting factor of trade in foods. Second, the terms of sale of food aid com-
modities are concessional, and are not commercial. The terms are sales with a 
favourable loan rate , sales for local currency and/or gift. 
The world total of food aid in 1965 was 1,504. 7 million dollars 
worth of which 1,463.0 million dollars was from the United States, 31.4 
million dollars from Canada and 9 .9 million dollars from Australia. About 
32 percent of the total economic aid of the United States in 1965 was food 
aid, and about 20 percent of the total economic aid of the OECD/DAC 
countries in the same year was food aid.5 This was really a huge amount. 
Since the main recipients of food aid were Asian countries, and since a large 
part of food aid has been food grains, including rice, the share of Asian 
imports in total world food grain imports has increased very much. 6 Especial-
ly in the years when India and Pakistan had bad crops, wheat exports under 
concessional terms from the United States increased very much. For exam-
ple, in 1966 the United States exported 371 million bushels of wheat under 
concessional terms. U.S. wheat exports for dollars in the same year was 371 
million bushels too . There is no doubt that food aid was an important ele-
ment in making the world food grain market dynamic. 
Crop failures in the Soviet Union in 1963 and in the Indian sub-
continent in 1965-67 made the future of the world food situation dark . 
Already in the early 1960s the future looked less bright since rates of 
population growth were reaching very high levels. Food grain exporting 
countries, especially Australia and Canada, increased their acreage under 
wheat. At the same time both developed and developing countries have 
concentrated their development assistance and developmental efforts on 
increasing food grain production in developing countries. The result of these 
4 Ernest H. Preeg, Traders and Diplomats: An analysis of the Kennedy Round of Negotia-
5 tions under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade , Washington, D .C., 1970, p . 158. 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, The Food Problem of 
Developing Countries, Paris, 1967, p . 53: - , Aid to Agriculture in Developing Countries, 
Paris 1968, pp. 12-13. 
6 Of course, it should be considered that Japanese imports of wheat has increased very 
rapidly . Some years ago, China (Mainland) imported huge amount of wheat too. 
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efforts is the so-called "green revolution" in Asia. Wheat production in India 
increased from 10.4 million tons in 1966 to 18.6 million tons in 1969, and 
rice production increased from 45. 7 million tons to 61.6 million tons in the 
same period. Indian cereal imports decreased from 793.0 million dollars 
worth in 1966 to 376.2 million dollars in 1969. The same was true in 
Pakistan. Her cereal imports declined from 124.2 million dollars worth in 
1965-67 to only 29.5 million dollars in 1969.7 Since the EEC is becoming 
more self-sufficient in food grains, Asian countries have been the only 
increasing importers of food grains in the world. The impact of the "green 
revolution" on some food grain exporting countries is significant. Australia 
and Canada reduced their acreage under wheat drastically. The United States 
reduced her acreage under rice significantly . The future of the world food 
grain market will be influenced significantly by the future spread of the 
" green revolution" in developing countries.8 
There are two types of "green revolution" in Asia. The first is that 
of India, Pakistan and others. This type of "green revolution" is aiming at 
self-sufficiency in food grains by various kinds of protective measures, or by 
import substitution policies. This type of "green revolution" is somewhat 
questionable if we view it from the point of reasonable allocation of world 
agricultural resources. The other type is increasing corn production in 
Thailand. This is a dynamic factor in grain trade in the Pacific. 
Another dynamic element in world trade in the crops of extensive 
agriculture is increased imports of these crops into densely populated indus-
trialized areas in the Far East. The geography of Japan severely limits the 
land area for cultivation of the crops of extensive agriculture . Acreages under 
wheat, course grains, soybean and rapeseed have been declining in Japan in 
recent years. Japan highly protects her agriculture. However, there is no 
trade barrier to the import of feed grains in Japan since the Japanese govern-
ment realizes the difficulty of cultivating crops of extensive agriculture. 
Trade barriers to the imports of oilseeds into Japan are rather nominal. Wheat 
imports into Japan are under state control. But, compared to protection of 
rice, Japanese wheat protection has been rather slight. Japanese imports of 
corn for feed increased by 152 percent between 1960 and 1965, by 25 per-
cent between 1965 and 1969, and by 20 percent in last year. Her soybean 
imports increased by 110 percent between 1960 and 1965, by 24 percent 
between 1965 and 1969, and by 31 percent in the last year. Her rapeseed 
imports have been increasing more rapidly than her soybean imports . Her 
wheat imports have been increasing slowly in comparison with the imports of 
the above crops, but wheat imports into the United Kingdom have been 
stagnant and the EEC's wheat imports have been declining. In Hong Kong 
and Singapore there is almost no agriculture , and increases in their domestic 
consumption of grains and oilseeds are completely met by increases in 
imports. Taiwan and Korea 's situations9 are becoming similar to Japan 's. 
7 These figures are taken from Economic Research Service, U.S . Department of Agricul-
ture, ERS-Foreign 267 , The 1970 Agricultural Data Book for the Far East and Oceania, 
November 1970. 
8 For the possible impact of green revolution on the world wheat market , see J. Houck, 
"The Green Revolution: Its Impact on Trade and Agricultural Policy in Developed 
Nations", a mimeographed paper presented at a Conference on Agriculture and 
Economic Development, September 6-10, 1971, Tokyo and Hakone. 
9 For the Korean situation, see Economic Research Service, U .S. Department of Agricul-
ture, ERS-Foreign 306, Changing Food Consumption Patterns in the Republic of Korea, 
December, 1970 . 
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In conclusion, we can point out four background facts. First, the 
future of a rapid expansion of agricultural trade by thorough GATT 
operations is not bright. Second, the export of food as food aid was an 
important element in making the world food grain market dynamic, and 
food aid is much more important in the Pacific than in the Atlantic. Third, 
the future of the "green revolution" is crucial in considering future grain 
trade in the Pacific. Fourth, increase in imports of the crops of extensive 
agriculture into the densely populated industrialized areas in the Far East 
is an important dynamic element in the Pacific. 
3. Random Elements in Agricu ltural Policy Decisions 
In 1942-43, Dr. Joseph Davis of Stanford University and high 
officials of the U.S . Department of Agriculture underestimated the post-war 
relief needs for wheat, and the department launched a wheat-for-feed 
program. As a result, and with bad weather in Europe in 1945, the United 
States faced a very serious problem of feeding the world's peoples without 
sufficient stocks of wheat. The U.S. government therefore encouraged 
domestic wheat production. In May 1946, the United States Department of 
Agriculture informed their farmers that the government would pay 30 cents 
a bushel bonus under the wheat emergency program. In doing so, the U.S. 
government encouraged wheat production.10 The United States had already 
faced a wheat surplus in 1933, and she faced again a more serious wheat 
surplus problem in the 1950s, and finally launched PL 480. This was an 
unhappy story, and the main cause was a failure to project future demands 
for and supplies of wheat. 
Japan has now a huge amount of rice surplus and is putting serious 
pressure both on the world rice market and on the world feed grain market. 
According to a government source, about a million tons of rice will be used 
for feed every year for the coming 4-5 years. This is quite unfortunate both 
for Japan and traditional exporters of rice and feed grains. The story was 
that in 1961 when the Agricultural Act of 1961 was enacted, the Japanese 
government intended to adjust Japanese food production to a changing 
national consumption; that is, we thought that we did not need to produce 
more rice and that Japan had to produce more vegetables, fruits, milk, meats 
and so on. However, for political reasons, a bad crop in 1965, and other 
reasons, the government launched a rice production promotion program in 
the same year. In launching this program, the government underestimated the 
declining trend of per capita rice consumption. There is no doubt that this 
was a mistake , and that the government wasted 10 years in getting its agri-
cultural program going in the right direction. 
We are living in a world in which we can not project future demand 
and supply exactly. A failure in projecting future situations and/or a bad crop 
directs the government's agricultural policy in a wrong direction. Generally 
speaking, we were seriously worried about world surpluses of agricultural 
products in 1950s, and in the early 1960s we were seriously worried about a 
world shortage of food. The bad crops in the Soviet Union in 1963 and in 
India in 1965-67 were one of the two main reasons for the pessimism in 
early 1960s. The other reason was that rates of population growth in less 
developed countries were made clear in the early 1960s. Once a government 
adopted a misdirected agricultural policy , its effect on the world market lasts 
many years since change in agricultural policy is a political affair. 
10 Don F. Hadwiger, Federal Wheat Commodity Programs, Ames, Iowa 1970 , Chap. 2. 
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Another random element in agricultural policy is the CAP. The 
CAP was not originally designed as a highly protectionist system. However, 
as Professor Josling pointed out, "the long-term viability of the EEC's com-
mon agricultural policy was subordinated to the aim of establishing a Com-
mon Policy. " 11 Especially when the EEC reached internal agreement on 
common price levels in a series of marathon sessions during the Kennedy 
Round negotiations, the common price levels of individual commodities 
tended to approach the highest individual country level. 12 The CAP owed 
little to economic practicability and much to political compromise. The 
result was that the EEC succeeded in solving its internal tensions by making 
the CAP highly protective. 
In examining the future of trade in crops of extensive agriculture 
in the Pacific, two elements should be considered rather carefully. The one 
is the problem of projecting future demand for and supply of the crops con-
cerned. There is the "green revolution" in Asia. But we have only insuffi-
cient information about the future of the "green revolution" . The author 
hopes that policy-makers in countries of the Pacific are wise enough to 
distinguish between short-run fluctuations in production and long-run trends 
in consumption and production, and that we can project future demand for 
and supply of the crops more exactly. 
The other element is political influence. In five developed coun-
tries around the Pacific, agriculture is a declining sector of the economy. 
There is a tendency for the agricultural sector to exert its influence upon 
their national economic policy-making in a political rather than an 
economic way . In integrating developed economies around the Pacific , agri-
cultural policy should not be subordinated to political compromise among 
the countries. They should consider their international responsibility rather 
seriously , especially their responsibility to the less developed world. 13 
4. Notes on Crops 
Feed Grains 
As shown in Tables 1-1 and 1-2, feed grain trade is mainly among 
developed countries. The only exception is the export from Latin America 
(Argentina) of 1.4 million tons in 1951-53 and 4.8 million tons in 1963-65. 
The United States is the world largest exporter. Moreover, her 
exports increased by 235 percent between 1951-53 and 1963-65, and her 
exports were almost 4 7 percent of total world exports. The acreage harvested 
for major feed grains declined from more than 130 million acres before 
1955 to less than 100 million acres after 1964. In spite of this declining 
in acreage the trend of United states production was upward at a rate of 
3.2 million metric tons per year between 1951 and 1969. Therefore, the 
United States has had a problem of finding a market for her feed grains.14 
llT. E. Josling, Agriculture and Britain's Trade Policy Dilemma, Trade Policy Research 
Centre, London, 1970, p . 2 . 
12H. B. Malmgren and D. L . Schlechty, "Technology and Neo-Mercantilism in Internation-
al Agricultural Trade" , in American Journal of Agricultural Economics, December, 
1969, p . 1327. 
13 While demanding that Japan take down its barriers to agricultural products, the devel-
oped countries which export agricultural products should very seriously take into 
consideration the needs of the Southeast Asian less developed countries. 
14It is interesting to note that an authoritative study about grain yields in the United 
States done in 1962 did not expect such an increase in United States productive 
capacity. See D. Gale Johnson and Robert L . Gustafson, Grain Yields and the American 
Food Supply: An Analysis of Yield Changes and Possibilities, Chicago, 1962. 
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There has been a vast idle capacity of feed grain production in the United 
States. Australia and Thailand have expanded their exports rapidly too. 
Their exports are expected to increase in future since J apan has 
planned to diversify her source of feed grain imports, and since there is 
capacity to increase feed grains production in both countries. In 1951-53 
Canada was the second largest exporter of feed grains, but her exports 
declined by 56.5 percent in the following 12 years . Nearly all of the decrease 
resulted from lower exports to the United States. In 1951-53 about 50 per-
cent of Canadian exports went to the United States, but in 1963-65 it was 
only 10 percent. 
The EEC is the world largest importing region for feed grains fol-
lowed by Japan, the United Kingdom and the rest of Western Europe. 
Japanese imports increased most rapidly, and her feed grain imports in 
1963-65 was almost five times her imports in 1951-53 . EEC imports 
increased very much too. However, it should be noted that EEC exports 
increased tremendously. It is expected that Japan is likely to at least double 
her import of coarse grain to over 10 million tons in 1980 while the EEC is 
expected to continue importing at about the present rate of 13 million tons, 
though slight deviation from projected meat demand would cause EEC 
imports to double by 1980.15 The acreage under coarse grains has not 
changed since the early 1950s. Production, however, increased rather steadly 
as a result of increase in yields. In 1967 and 1968, production of feed grains 
was particularly high in the EEC and imports dropped . The reason for these 
changes were very large increase in yields in both years . On the consumption 
side, it is likely that non-grain feed , such as potatoes for hogs, will decline. 
However, with the rise in prices of feed grains by the CAP, EEC countries 
such as the Netherlands have increased their imports of non-grain feeds such 
as cassava meal. 16 Future feed grain imports into the EEC are quite uncer-
tain. The United Kingdom and the rest of Western Europe are the world's 
biggest importers. The United Kingdom's imports have been rather stagnant 
while the net import of feed grains by the rest of Western Europe has 
increased more rapidly than imports to the EEC. It is expected that EFT A 
and Western European nations will increase their imports by 60% over 1965, 
and will import 8 million tons of feed grains in 1980. 
There are many uncertain elements in the world coarse grain mar-
ket including the future of Communist Asian imports which have been and 
will be almost self-sufficient in coarse grains . Generally speaking, however, 
the world feed grain market has been and will be much more dynamic than 
that of wheat. The most dynamic element in the world feed grain market 
has been and will be imports into Japan. 
Wheat 
There have been considerable changes in the world wheat economy 
since the end of World War II . Moreover, there have been considerable differ-
ences both in rates of increase in production and consumption among regions 
of the world. As a result, patterns of the world wheat trade changed. 
15These figures are quoted from Foreign Agricultural Economic Report No . 63, U.S. 
Department of Agriculture, Growth in World Demand for Feed Grains Related to Meat 
and Livestock Products and Human Consumption of Grain: 1980, July 1970. 
16 See, Economic Research Service, U .S. Department of Agriculture, ERS-Foreign 287, 
The Netherlands' Mixed Feed Industry, its impact on use of grain for feed, May 1970. 
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TABLE 1-1. 
Feed Grain Imports by Importing Regions, 
Averages 1951-53 and 1963-65 
1951-53 Average 1963-65 Average 
.... .. ... .. .. .. ... . ... 1,000 m.t . ....... ............. . . 
Developed countries 
EEC 4,787 14,302 
Other Western Europe 1,923 4,808 
Japan 976 4,657 
U.K. 2,771 4,150 
Canada 154 373 
U.S. 1,678 189 
Australia, New Zealand 
and South Africa 99 2 
Total 12,389 28,487 
Centrally planned countries 
Total 740 3,368 
Less developed countries 
East Asia 308 361 
South Asia 618 143 
Southeast Asia ...... 16 
Total 1,582 2,781 
World total 14,705 34,632 
Percentage 
Change 
198.8 
150.0 
377.2 
49 .8 
14~p 
-88 .7 
-98.0 
129.9 
355.1 
17.2 
-76.9 
....... 
75.8 
135.5 
Source: Foreign Agricultural Economic Report No. 63, U.S. Department of Agriculture, 
Growth in World Demand for Feed Grains Related to Meat and Livestock Prod-
ucts and Human Consumption of Grain: 1980, July 1970, p . 4 . 
76 . 
TABLE 1-2. 
Feed Grain Exports by Major Exporters, 
Averages 1951-53 and 1963-65 
1951-53 Average 1963-65 Average 
..... .. .. . .. ...... .... 1,000 m .t . .... ....... .......... . 
Developed countries 
U.S. 4,817 16,155 
EEC 187 3,833 
Australia, New Zealand 
and South Africa 729 2,102 
Canada 3,198 1,390 
Other Western Europe 313 541 
U.K. 91 187 
Japan 33 ...... 
Total 9,369 24,208 
Centrally planned countries 
Total 2,122 3 ,601 
Less developed countries 
Southeast Asia 61 964 
South Asia ...... 79 
Total 3,218 6,822 
World total 14,709 34,631 
Percentage 
Change 
235.4 
1) 
188.3 
-56.5 
72.8 
105.5 
. .. .... .. 
158.4 
69.1 
1) 
.. ....... 
137.2 
135.5 
Source: Foreign Agricultural Economic Report No. 63, U.S. Department of Agriculture, 
Growth in World Demand for Feed Grains Related to Meat and Livestock Prod-
ucts and Human Consumption of Grain: 1980, July 1970, p. 5 
1) Base too small to compute meaningful percentage change. 
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World wheat production increased by 48 percent from 179.7 mil. 
lion tons in 1949/50-1952/53 to 266.4 million tons in 1962/63-1966/67.17 
About half of this increase was in Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Western 
Europe increased its wheat production from 31 million tons to 46 million 
tons during the same period. About two thirds of this increase occurred in 
countries that were traditional importers, and their wheat imports declined. 
Traditional exporters (North America and Australia) did not increase their 
wheat production until 1956/57-1958/59. However, their wheat production 
increased very much thereafter. From 1956/57-1958/59 to 1962/63 -
1966/67, wheat production in North and Central America increased by 9.1 
million tons, and in Australia by 5.5 million tons. These areas also increased 
their wheat exports very much during the period. 
World wheat imports increased by more than 100 percent from 
25.3 million tons in 1949/50-1952/53 to 53.3 million tons in 1962/63-
1966/67. The share of Western European wheat imports in world total 
import declined from about half to 22 percent during the same period while 
that of the centrally planned countries increased from almost none to 30 per-
cent during the period. Asia (excluding Mainland China) increased its wheat 
imports from 6.1 million tons to 15.8 million tons during the same period. 
Asian imports were mainly from the United States, and a large part was on 
concessional terms. Generally speaking, the imports of the centrally planned 
countries were not from the United States. 
In recent years both centrally planned countries and Asia have 
increased their wheat production either by new agricultural programs and/or 
the "green revolution", and the impact of these changes on world wheat 
trade is serious. Australia and Canada have much decreased their acreage 
under wheat. Future prospects for the world wheat economy seem serious 
as shown in Table 2. 
Oil Seeds 
Except for the United States, developed countries are importers of 
oilseeds and oilseed products. The United States is the world biggest export-
er of oilseeds and oilseed products. Less developed countries are, generally 
speaking, exporters of oilseeds and oilseed products. (See Table 3) 
World trade in oilseeds and oilseed products has been and will 
increase since consumption is increasing both in developed and less devel-
oped countries. In developed countries the main increase will be in oilcake 
while in less developed countries the main increase will be in vegetable oils. 
It is generally projected that oilcake prices in 1980 will be higher than in 
1963-65, while vegetable oil prices in 1980 will be lower than in 1963-65.18 
Japan will continue to increase her imports. The United States will continue 
to increase her exports. Canada will be an exporter of vegetable oils in 1980 
while she will continue to be an importer of oilcake in 1980. 
17 These and following figures are taken from P.A. Westerman, "Change in the World 
Wheat Situation and the 1967 International Grains Arrangement'', in the Quarterly 
Review of Agricultural Economics, Vol. XXI, No. 2, 1968. 
18 Since there are a great many varieties in oilseeds and vegetable oils, the author does not 
go into the details. For details see, Foreign Agricultural ReP.ort No. 71 U.S. Department 
of Agriculture, World Supply and Demand Prospects for Oilseeds and Oilseed Products 
in 1980, March 1971. 
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AGRICULTURAL PRICE POLICIES AND EFFECTS ON TRADE: 
SOME EXAMPLES FROM THE UNITED STATES 
AND WESTERN EUROPE 
by 
D. GALE JOHNSON 
University of Chicago 
Several years ago I argued that the agricultural trade policies of the 
industrial countries could be accurately described as the New Corn Laws. 
The British Corn Laws included every feature that is now included in the 
Common Agricultural Policy of the European Economic Community or in 
the restrictive trade programs of the United States except for deficiency pay-
ments. The variable levy is not the invention of the EEC; it probably came 
from some fertile British mind in the 17th century. Export subsidies or 
bounties have an even more ancient origin and they had an important role in 
the British Corn Laws. And perhaps equally striking the rationale for the 
British Corn Laws bears more than a passing ressemblance to the reasons now 
given for the need for agricultural protection in the industrial countries: 1 
"Whereas the labourers and occupiers of husbandry within this realm be daily 
grievously endangered by bringing in of corn out of other lands and parts into this 
realm, when corn of the growing of this realm is at a low price"; (no corn was to be 
imported if the prices of grain were below specified minimums). 1463 
"Forasmuch as the encouragement of tillage ought to be in an especial manner 
regarded and endeavored; and the surest and effectual means of promoting or 
advancing any trade, occupation or mystery, being by rendering it profitable to the 
users thereof; (2) and great quantities of land within this kingdom for the present 
lying in a manner waste, and yielding little, which might thereby be improved to 
considerable profit and advantage (if sufficient encouragement were given for 
laying out cost and labour on the same), and thereby much more corn produced 
great numbers of people, horses and cattle employed, and other lands also rendered 
more valuable ." 1663 
"Forasmuch as it hath been found by experience, that the exportation of corn and 
grain into foreign parts, when the price thereof is at a low rate in this kingdom, hath 
been a great advantage, not only to the owners of land, but to the trade of this 
kingdom in general . ... " 1688. (This act was probably the first act providing for 
export bounties and it is said that precautions were taken to prevent the subsidized 
corn from being reshipped back into Great Britain.) 
"Whereas a great deal of the richest and best land of this kingdom is and cannot so 
well be otherwise employed and made use of as in the feeding and fattening of 
cattle, and that the coming in of late of vast numbers of cattle already fatted, such 
lands are in many places much fallen, and likely daily to fall more in their rents and 
values, and in consequence other lands also, to the great prejudice, detriment, and 
impoverishment of this kingdom ... " 1663. (The act included provision for import 
duties to be applied seasonally - a relatively high duty when British fat cattle were 
marketed and free trade the rest of the year - and an import quota on cattle 
imported from the Isle of Man.) 
But there is a difference of degree, if not of kind, in the objectives 
of the new and old corn laws. While in the formulation of the British Corn 
Laws there was concern about the effects of low farm prices upon employ-
ment (men, horses and cattle), land rent and general prosperity, the new corn 
1Quotations from and explanatory material based on Cornelius Walford, "The Famines 
of the World: Past and Present - Part II," Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, Vol. 
XLII, March, 1879, pp. 133-38. 
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laws emphasize an incom~ ?bjec~iV:e.even though ~her~ is often considerable 
embiguity about the specific ~efi~it10n of that ob1ective. The new corn laws 
place emphasis upon the relative mcomes of the farm and nonfarm popula-
tions. 
In its highly useful summary, Agricultural Policies in 1966, the 
OECD staff states the following: 2 "The main objectives of most governments 
in their agricultural policies continue to be to support farm incomes, adjust 
production to outlets and ensure supplies at reasonable prices to consumers . 
. . . The aim of improving farm income levels is set out in legislation, or in 
official statements of policy, in the majority of countries. The income level 
aimed at is defined in various ways, often by reference to incomes in other 
sectors. Thus the aim may be to ensure for those engaged in agriculture a 
'fair' or 'proper' remuneration (as in the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, 
and the Treaty of Rome), to enable them to participate in the general 
improvement of incomes or living standards (Austria, Germany, Sweden), to 
reduce the income gap between agriculture and other sectors (Italy), or to 
ensure farm incomes comparable with those in other occupations (Finland, 
France, Iceland, Japan, Luxemberg, Norway, Switzerland)."3 
Trade restrictions and interferences for agricultural products in the 
industrial countries are only one set of means used to achieve one or more of 
the various income objectives. In fact, in most cases such restrictions and 
interferences are simply adjuncts to the price and subsidy policies that are 
supposed to increase the returns to farm resources. It is this close tie between 
domestic farm policies and trade policies for farm products that makes it so 
difficult to negotiate meaningful changes in agricultural trade restrictions. 
All too often the governments of industrial countries look upon discussion of 
their agricultural trade policies as an attempt to interfere in their domestic 
policies and politics. 
But the main point I want to make in these introductory remarks, 
before turning to an examination of certain trade effects, is that there is little 
evidence that the farm policies now being followed in the industrial countries 
have made or can make any significant contribution toward increasing the 
returns to human resources in agriculture relative to what comparable 
resources earn in the rest of the economy. Some contribution can perhaps be 
made toward reducing the disparity between the incomes of the farm and 
nonfarm populations, since the high price supports and subsidies do result in 
an increase in the return to land. But the increase in land return makes little 
long run contribution to the solution of income problems that confront farm 
people in the industrial countries. In fact, higher land values can complicate 
20ECD, Agricultural Policies in 1966 (Paris, 1967 ), p. 59. 
3The continuing discussion (ibid.) is of interest: "In several cases these income objectives 
are qualified or accompanied by references to the need for a satisfactory level of produc-
tivity in agriculture, and sometimes they relate specifically to farms meeting certain 
standards of efficiency: thus in Belgium the aim is to ensure the profitability of holdings 
which are well managed and whose existence is economically and socially justified; in 
Finland, farms with a 'satisfactory degree of rationalization' should have incomes corre-
sponding to those of other economic groups; in Sweden the size of farm to be used in 
income comparisons is laid down; in Switzerland a fair remuneration for farmers is to be 
ensured through prices covering average production costs on rationally operated farms; 
in the United States the objective is to provide opportunity for the efficient family farm-
er to earn 'parity of income from farming operat10ns' and to provide 'parity of oppor-
tunity' for all rural people, including small farmers; in some cases income comparisons 
are made with specified non-farm groups (wage-earners in comparable non-a~ncultural 
occupations in Germany, certain groups of industrial workers in low-cost livmg areas in 
Sweden, non-farm workers in rural and semi-urban districts in Switzerland)." 
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the problems of adjustments that all farm people must make to the process 
of economic growth; high land prices makes it more difficult to enlarge farms 
and induce expenditures upon resources that substitute for land . High land 
prices by inducing expenditures upon land substitutes add resources to agri-
culture when at the same time it is necessary for labor employment to 
decline unless returns to farm labor are to decline relative to the return to 
nonfarm labor of comparable skills and capacities. It is quite common for the 
agricultural programs of the industrial countries to subsidize nonlabor inputs 
in guise of improving the structure of agriculture . Both the high land 
prices and the subsidies for buildings, land consolidation and farm rationali-
zation either directly reduce the returns to farm labor through effects on 
farm prices or increase the costs of maintaining a given level of farm output 
prices. 
It is not uncommon for some of us who are of European origin to 
speak derisively of the sacred cows of India and to point out all of the bene-
fits that would flow from more rational attitudes toward this animal. With-
out attempting to discuss either the empirical validity of the presumed status 
of cows in India or the effects of changes in that status, it is unlikely that the 
cow is any more sacred in Indian life than is the dairy cow in the political 
life of Western Europe, the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada or 
Australia. Whatever the consequences of the sacredness of cows in India, it is 
all too clear what are the major consequences of its peculiar attraction for 
policy makers in the major Western industrial countries. 
In the United States the dairy cow is responsible for one of the two 
most egregious departures from liberal trade policies affecting agricultural 
products ; in Australia that must export farm products in order to survive the 
dairy cow has resulted in a series of trade interfering devices and in the EEC 
the dairy cow has induced otherwise frugal politicians to expend almost a 
billion dollars annually in recent years. And as so often happens in our efforts 
to protect our gods, or more accurately, our goddesses, we take measures that 
will eventually destroy them. In the case of several industrial countries butter 
has already been priced into eventual virtual extinction; if present trends 
continue by the end of this century butter will no longer be a common 
consumer item. 
The sacred role of the dairy cow not only pollutes the relations 
among nations because of the restrictions on and interferences with trade in 
dairy products, but also through the effects on trade in beef. If the United 
States did not go to such lengths to protect its dairy industry, it would hard-
ly be concerned with either voluntary or mandatory controls on beef and 
veal imports. Similarly in the EEC and other Western European countries, if 
dairy product prices were not so high - and so much beef and veal produced 
as a by-product - beef imports would be substantially greater. 
There is another sacred object in most of the industrial countries 
though it is not certain whether it is worshipped openly and knowingly or is 
so subtle in its effects on man's mind that its sacred position is reflected sole-
ly in subconscious behavior. I refer to farm land. In the long run almost all 
of the net benefits of the very costly farm programs of the industrial coun-
tries are absorbed through higher land prices. A sacred object that can induce 
governments to commit their citizens to annual expenditures of about $40 
billion must have great attractions and powers. And it is a sacred object that 
a few economists are not going to be able to displace from its position easily. 
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In this paper the emphasis will be upon ~rade and ag~icu~tur.al 
products that affect livestock products. In fact, pnmar~ atter:t10n is given to 
dairy products and beef and veal .since th~se are the maJor animal products 
seriously affected by t~ade restraints and mterfer~nc_es . Poultry m~a~ -
especially broilers - might have been added to this list. However, it is of 
primary concern to only one country in the Pacific area and the major trade 
restraints occur in Western Europe and thus it has been touched upon only 
in passing. 
Dairy Products 
With the exception of New Zealand, all of the high income coun-
tries of the world interfere with the market prices of dairy products and 
even New Zealand isn't above a little tinkering in the name of price stabili-
zation. In addition to New Zealand, three other countries in the Pacific 
Region and Western Europe have moderately reasonable dairy product prices 
in the range of $6-8 per 100 kilograms - Denmark, Ireland and Australia. In 
the general range of $8-10, one finds the United Kingdom, Austria, France, 
Belgium, Canada, and the Netherlands; between $10-12 are Germany, Italy, 
Sweden, Switzerland, and the United States. Japan and Norway have produc-
er prices for milk in excess of $12 per 100 kiligrams. 
The high prices for dairy products have three main effects upon 
international trade: (1) Reduces imports of dairy products due to effects on 
domestic consumption and production; (2) Results in a substantial flow of 
heavily subsidized exports of dairy products from the high cost countries; 
and (3) Increases the supply of beef and thus reduces the amount and value 
of international trade in beef that is based on an economically rational allo-
cation of resources. The third of these effects will be considered in the next 
section of this paper. 
The OECD countries produced 186 million tons of milk in 1968. 
To one degree or another all of this milk production involved some subsidy 
or trade protection; about 9 million tons - the production in Denmark and 
Ireland - was produced with what could be called a moderate degree of 
nominal protection. The milk output in New Zealand in 1968 was approxi-
mately 6 million tons - the only milk produced in the OECD plus Ocearia 
that has no significant nominal protection. Australia produced 7 million tons 
and did so under conditions involving government subsidies and price dis-
crimination against local consumers. However, while there is validity to the 
claim made by U.S. dairy producers that imports of dairy products from 
Australia are available because of export and other subsidies, the average 
return per unit of milk produced by the Australian farmer is only a little 
more than half that received by U.S. farmers. 
Thus of the total OECD plus Oceania milk production of about 
200 million tons only a little more than 10 percent is produced without 
significant protection. In terms of estimating the effects of protection on 
consumption, one could add the United Kingdom's 13 million tons. The 
only reasonably open market for manufactured dairy products in the world 
is provided by the United Kingdom, though this is apparently about to pass 
into history along with the hula hoop and silent movies. If imported 
processed products are converted into whole milk, the United Kingdom 
imports about half of its total milk supply. In 1967 /68 the United Kingdom 
was responsible for almost two thirds of the world's imports of butter and 
about a quarter of all cheese imports. It maintains an import quota on butter 
and participates in voluntary restraints on cheese imports. But these arrange-
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ments appear to be primarily designed to protect its traditional suppliers -
New Zealand, Australia and Denmark - from the heavily subsidized exports 
from the EEC. Without these controls the British market would be flooded 
with butter and cheese produced under high cost conditions. In 1968 the 
EEC paid an export subsidy on butter exported to the UK that was about 
150 percent greater than the London market price for butter. With competi-
tion like that the traditional exporters obviously require assistance from 
some source. 
The milk producer in the United Kingdom is not without friends 
in court. Returns to producers are maintained by discriminatory pricing 
practises that result in prices paid for milk used for fluid purposes (about 
two thirds of UK production) that are about 2.5 times the price paid for 
milk for manufacturing purposes. The producer is then paid an average or 
blend price that is less than 10 percent below the average EEC producer 
price. If there is a loser, it is the consumer though he has gained from having 
the lowest prices for manufactured milk products available in any industrial 
country . 
What have been the consumption effects of the high consumer 
prices for at least 80 percent of the milk consumed in the OECD plus 
Oceania? This is not a simple question since we do not know how much 
recent prices have departed from what prices would be if there were free 
trade in dairy products. Do we assume that there would also be free trade in 
grains and feeds? Part of the high cost of dairy products in the EEC, though 
not in the United States or Canada, is due to high feed prices and high land 
prices resulting from the grain price policies of the EEC. Nor do we have very 
much reliable knowledge of the price elasticities of demand for milk products 
though Brandow's work for the United States can probably be used to give a 
lower limit for the effects of price on consumption. He has obtained the 
following estimates of price elasticities of retail demand for milk products in 
the United States: Fluid milk and cream, -0.28; butter, -0.85 ; cheese, -0.70; 
ice cream, -0.55.4 The elasticities at the farm level were substantially lower, 
averaging about a half of those indicated above . The largest use of milk is for 
fluid milk and cream and this has the lowest price elasticity. If we assume 
that the weighted price elasticity of demand at retail is -0.35, that the reduc-
tion in retail prices is one half that at the farm level, and that farm prices of 
milk products were reduced by 20 percent for 80 percent of total consump-
tion, the consumption of milk products in the OECD plus Oceanis would 
increase by about 3 percent or 6 million tons. 
The 20 percent reduction in farm prices in the present high price 
areas is an arbitrary assumption and would result in reducing average pro-
ducer prices from about $10-11per100 kilograms to about $8-9 in all the 
area outside of Oceania, Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom. Note 
that the increase in consumption, under these assumptions, is about a fourth 
of current total production in Oceania, Ireland and Denmark - the low cost 
producers. The United Kingdom is not included in this group because it has 
producer prices almost as high as those in the EEC but with much lower feed 
prices than the EEC. 
The supply effect of the protection of milk production is probably 
rather more conjectural than the consumption effect because of the greater 
4George Brandow, Interrelationships Among Demands for Farm Products and Implica· 
tions for Control of Market Supply, Pennsylvania State University, Agricultural Experi-
ment Station Bulletin 680 (1961 ), p. 13. 
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analytical and statistical problems of estimating the pr~ce elasticities of supply 
for dairy products. But ~here are a number of such esti!llates that can ~e used 
to arrive orders of magnitude, at l~a.st. Twe~ten has est~mated th.at the inter-
mediate run (two year) price elasticity of milk output m the Umted States 
to be 0.3.5 Gruen has estimate~ that th~ short rm1: (one year) p~i~e elasticity 
of milk output is 0.20 and the mtermediate run (five year) elasticity was 
0.43. 6 George Jones has made estimates of the effect of changes in various 
prices upon milk output or a proxy for milk output for the United Kingdom 
and the EEC. Jones has estimated that the long run elasticity of the number 
of cows in the United Kingdom with respect to the price of milk is between 
0.27 and 0.4 7 (short run elasticities of 0 .17 to 0.23) . 7 Since the number of 
all cows and not just dairy cows is used as the dependent variable and no 
effect of prices on milk yield per cow is included, the supply response 
estimates are on the low side as a measure of the price elasticity of milk 
output. 
Jones kindly made some unpublished estimates of milk supply 
response for the EE.C avai~a?le to me. He has obtained 8:n estimate of 0.57 
for the long run; this elasticity assumes that all other prices are constant, it 
should be noted. 
If the estimates of supply elasticities are accepted as ranging from 
0.3 to 0.5, we can indicate the effect of a 20 percent reduction in dairy prod-
uct prices (holding the price of beef and feed constant) upon production of 
milk in the OECD plus Oceania. Note that this price reduction applies to 80 
percent of the total milk output. The output reduction would range from a 
low of 10 million tons to a high of 16 million tons. The sum of the output 
and consumption effects would be approximately 16 to 22 million tons or 
from 8 to 11 percent of the current output in the regions under consideration. 
On a butterfat baMs (assuming a fat content of 3.5 percent) the reduced 
consumption plus increased production is estimated to be 580 to 770 thou-
sand tons. In 1961-63 the total of exports of all milk products, in terms of 
butterfat, from Denmark, Ireland, Australia and New Zealand was 420 thou-
sand tons.s Thus the effect of a 20 percent reduction in farm dairy product 
prices would result in a substantial expansion of unsubsidized trade in dairy 
products and a very significant increase in the prices at which dairy products 
would move in international trade. 
The trade restrictions that have been used in the OECD to buttress 
domestic price policies for dairy products have clearly reduced the flow of 
trade between low cost and high cost dairy producing areas. The high con-
sumer prices, except in the United Kingdom, have also reduced consumption 
by an amount ~h8:t .is large relative to international tra~e in dairy products. 
In addition a significant part of the total exports of dairy products from the 
OECD countries are either subsidized (EEC, Switzerland, Norway, Sweden) 
or sold on non-commercial terms (United States) . 
I will conclude this discussion of the effects of lower dairy product 
prices by a brief comment on the probable level of milk production in the 
5Luther Tweeten, Foundations of F<frm Policy (Lincoln, 1970), p . 243 . 
6F. H. Gruen, et al., Long T!!rm ;tgrzcultura.l Supply and Demand Projections, Australia, 
1965 to 1980 (Monash University, Australia, 1968), p . 178. 
7George Jones, "']~'he Influence of Price on Live~tock Popula~i<;>n Ove~ the Last Decade/' 
paper circulated m advance of the annual meeting of the British Agricultural Economics 
Society (July, 1965), p. 22 . 
BQECD, Agricultural Projections for 1975 and 1985, Europe, North America, Japan, 
Oceania (Paris, 1968 ), p. 38 . 
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United States if the price supports were removed and the import quotas 
abandoned but the existing tariffs were retained. Under these circumstances 
I believe that the United States would produce only enough milk for fluid 
consumption as milk and cream - about 25 million tons - and the amount 
of manufactured products that would be required to provide an adequate 
supply of milk for fluid consumption. Because of seasonal variations in milk 
production and year to year fluctuations because of weather conditions, the 
additional production for manufactured purposes might be 50 percent of the 
amount used for fluid purposes or about 12.5 million tons . In 1970 total 
U.S . milk production was 53 million tons. If fluid use remained constant -
it appears to be declining slowly - output would be reduced by about 
16 million tons. 
This reduction is somewhat larger than is implied by a price 
elasticity of supply of 0.3 to 0 .5, unless the reduction in producer price 
exceeds 60 percent. The reduction that I have estimated in this subjective 
way would probably occur if the prices of manufactured milk products in 
the United States fell by 20 to 25 percent from their present levels. Even 
though the relative price of milk to the price of dairy feed has increased by 
about 15 percent since 1963 and 1964, milk production declined by about 
8 percent between 1964 and 1970. Over the same period the absolute price 
of milk increased by 38 percent, though the real price increased by less than 
15 percent. Labor requirements in dairy production are simply too high in 
the United States to make the industry competitive.9 
Beef and Veal 
In 1968 or 1968/69 producer prices for beef cattle (per 100 kilo-
grams of liveweight) varied almost as much in the major producing regions 
as did milk prices. In two countries - Argentina and New Zealand -
producers got less than $30; in Australia, Denmark and Yugoslavia the price 
was between $30 and $40; in Ireland and the United Kingdom, between 
$40 and $50; in Canada, the United States, Norway and Spain, between $50 
and $60 (though the U.S. and Canadian prices were just at $50); the EEC 
and Sweden, at $60-$70 except Italy was just over $70, and the USSR 
topped the list with a farm price in excess of $130. Obviously quality differ-
entials are much more important than for milk. For example in the Chicago 
market in 1968 the average price for all steers was $61 per 100 kilograms 
compared to $38 for commercial cows, roughly the average for cows dis-
carded from dairy herds. Approximately the same difference would exist in 
Canada. On a quality adjusted basis the prices for cattle in the U.S. and 
9 The following tabulation gives labor requirements per unit of output and prices per unit 
of output, both relative to dairy products, for several farm products: 
Relative Labor Requirements Relative Farm 
1964-68 Prices, 1967 
Milk 100 100 
Beef 220 440 
Pork 150 380 
Broilers 60 270 
Corn 80 230 
Soybeans 190 520 
Source: USDA, Agricultural statistics, 1969, pp. 458 and 463-65. 
Obviously inputs other than labor are required for the production of these farm prod-
ucts, but the steady increase in the real price of labor has undoubtedly been a significant 
factor in the different output growth patterns. 
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Canada are probably lower than those in Ireland and the United Kingdom 
though above the prices in Australia and Denmark. And certainly on a basis 
adjusted for quality the beef prices paid to producers in the EEC and Sweden 
are substantially greater than in the British Isles or North America. 
World trade in beef and veal in 1966 amounted to about 4 percent 
of estimated world production.10 Most of the imports are accounted for by 
the United States, the EEC and the United Kingdom and most of the exports 
by Australia, New Zealand, Argentina and Denmark. 
Trade in beef and veal is much affected by a variety of trade, 
sanitary, and health regulations. The EEC maintains a difference of approx-
imately 50 to 70 percent between domestic and import prices of beef. The 
United States controls the importation of certain types of beef and veal 
through so-called voluntary agreements with its major suppliers, but the 
volunteerism is strongly supported by the threat of imposition of import 
quotas under the Meat Import Act of 1964. The U.S. tariff duty on fresh, 
chilled or frozen beef and veal is relatively low at 3 cents per pound or about 
6 percent. On canned beef the tariff rate is 7.5 percent; on corned beef hash 
it is 10 percent. 
How much have the import restrictions on beef reduced U.S. 
imports of beef over the past few years? Brian Fernon has concluded: 11 
"Free trade would probably have little effect on the demand for beef 
imports by either the United States or Canada, or on the border trade bet-
ween the two countries which is based largely on seasonality of supplies." 
Earlier Fernon has said: "Australia and New Zealand produce beef at 
considerable lower prices than Northern Hemisphere countries. Free trade 
would not, however, enable them swiftly to replace domestic production in 
those countries, since consumers generally prefer fresh home-grown beef to 
frozen imports from Australia and New Zealand and seem prepared to pay 
a premium for it. American restrictions, consisting of a relatively low tariff 
and an import quota covering beef, veal, mutton and goat meat, did not 
seem greatly to inhibit imports until the last years of the 1960s. Before that 
imports were not available in sufficient quantities to make the quota 
applicable." 
The first year that the import quota and the voluntary agreements 
that have been used to support it had any significant effect on imports was 
probably 1969 when imports of meats subject to the quota were almost 
identical to the quota. In 1970 such imports exceeded the quota by almost 
7 percent and I assume might have gone somewhat higher in the absence of 
the import quota. The size of the import quota increases with the growth in 
U.S. consumption of the products involved and since the base was established 
in 1964, the base grew by 37 percent by 1970. 
U.S. imports of Australian and New Zealand beef are used primari-
ly for manufacturing purposes - sausage, hamburger and TV dinners. The 
imports are thus primarily competitive with the lower grades of beef and not 
with fed beef. An important factor in the rapid expansion of such imports 
has been a significant change in the composition of U.S. cattle production 
and slaughter. In 1956 almost 31 percent of U.S. cattle slaughter was cow 
slaughter; by 1969 this percentage had dropped to 19 percent. Or looked at 
another way, the three lowest grades of beef accounted for 42 percent of 
10 Brian Fernon, Issues in World Farm Trade: Chaos or Co-operation, Trade Policy 
Research Center, London, 1970, p. 129. 
11 Ibid., p. 81. 
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total slaughter in 1956 and 19 percent in 1969. Thus beef imports have 
increased quite rapidly primarily in response to changes in the quality or 
grade composition of U.S. beef slaughter and, to some degree, the amazing 
and increasing popularity of the hamburger. 
Total exports of beef and veal from New Zealand and Australia in 
1963 were 88 percent of U.S. imports in that year; U.S. imports declined in 
1964 while the exports from Oceania remained approximately unchanged 
and their exports were 128 percent of U.S. imports. In 1965 the exports of 
the two countries rose to 167 percent of U.S. imports as U.S. imports 
declined further . U.S. imports increased in 1966 and again in 1967; the ratio 
of exports from Oceania to U.S. imports were 109 and 97 percent, respective-
ly. Between 1967 and 1969 U.S. imports increased from 382,000 tons to 
4 70,000 tons and the Oceania exports were 88 percent of U.S. imports in 
1968 and 97 percent in 1969; during the first half of 1970 the percentages 
remained unchanged at the 1969 level. The quota restrictions were without 
effect from 1963 through 1968. While not much can be inferred from the 
above comparison of Oceania exports and U.S. imports , it might be con-
cluded that the restraining effect upon exports from Oceania was relatively 
small in both 1969 and 1970. By relatively small , I mean that it was almost 
certainly less than a fourth and probably as small as a tenth or less than 
50,000 tons. 
Even if the quota has had little effect on imports, I still feel that 
the quota arrangement should be abolished. The only bright side of the 
picture is that because there is a quota the 10 percent import surcharge has 
not been applied to meats subject to the quota. 
The major element in the reduction of international trade in beef 
and veal is, without doubt, the subsidization of dairy production in Western 
Europe and North America. If U.S. dairy production declined by a third, as 
it would if there were only a moderate degree of protection, the reduction in 
beef and veal production from the 1970 level would be at least 500,000 tons 
(carcass weight); this is approximately three fourths of all U.S. imports of 
beef and veal in that year. If dairy production were not subsidized in Western 
Europe the effect on beef and veal production would be much greater. The 
reason is not the higher degree of protection in Western Europe than in the 
United States, but the much greater relative importance of the dairy herd as 
a source of beef and veal. Fernan estimates that in the United Kingdom that 
the dairy herd is responsible for about three fourths of beef and veal produc-
tion.12 It is probable that for the rest of Western Europe the dairy herd 
provides an even larger fraction of the total beef and veal supply. 
Production of beef and veal in Western Europe is now about 6 mil-
lion tons. If 80 percent of this total is a joint product with dairy, each 10 
percent reduction in milk production would reduce beef and veal production 
by 500,000 tons.13 Thus if the elimination of protection for dairy produc-
tion were to reduce milk production by 20 percent in Western Europe, meat 
production might be reduced by 1 million tons. I do not know if a 20 per-
12Fernon, op. cit. , p. 83. 
13 It should be noted that if milk production declined by 10 percent that beef and veal 
production could decrease by either more or less than the amount indicated because of 
changes in factor prices and other product prices that would occur as a result of the 
change in milk prices associated with the decline in milk output. It is probable that the 
decline in beef and veal/roduction would be somewhat less than that indicated if beef 
and veal prices remaine unchanged because of the decline in forage prices or costs. 
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cent reduction in milk production under approximate free trade conditions 
is a realistic estimate or not; it would be consistent with a long run elasticity 
of supply of 0.5 and a 40 percent reduction in the price of milk. But even if 
the reduction in milk production were only 10 percent, the decline in beef 
and veal production would be 500,000 tons. Combined with the estimated 
reduction in beef and veal in the United States, the reduction in the two 
areas might be put at 1 million tons. This compares with the 1968 total 
production of beef and veal in Australia and New Zealand of 1.25 million tons. 
A second factor in the reduction of international trade in beef and 
veal are the high consumer prices in Western Europe, except for the United 
Kingdom and Ireland. The price elasticity of demand for beef and veal is 
relatively high, at least compared to other farm products. It is probably at 
least -0.6 for the high income countries. Thus high beef prices in major 
importing countries have had a significant effect on consumption. If EEC 
retail prices of beef have been increased by a third,14 this means that con-
sumption per capita has been reduced by about 20 percent. In 1969 beef 
and veal consumption totaled 4 .5 million tons;15 at prices approximating 
those prevailing in the United Kingdom consumption would probably have 
been about 5.5 million tons. 
The high consumer prices of beef and veal in the EEC and most 
other Western European countries is apparently not due to significantly high 
rates of protection of beef production, except as beef production is a by-
product of dairy production. Put another way, if beef production were 
independent of dairy production in the EEC and other high beef price 
countries in Western Europe the rate of effective protection would not be 
very high. In fact, it may be close to zero. In the EEC the differentials 
between domestic and world prices are at least as high for the grains as for 
beef and veal. Two studies of the costs of the EEC farm programs to 
consumers and taxpayers indicate a higher degree of nominal protection for 
grains than for beef and veal. 16 While it is true that relatively little grain is 
fed to cattle to produce beef in the EEC, land prices are affected by the prices 
of grain. With no limitations on the amount of grain that can be produced in 
the EEC, other than the limitations of profitability, the rent on land used to 
produce forage must be equal at the margin to what the rent on that land 
would be if used to produce grain. While much of the land that is used for 
pasture cannot be used for producing grain, this is not true of large areas 
used for producing green forage and hay. The recent changes in farm land 
values are clearly consistent with this interpretation of the effect of high 
grain prices on land rents and values. 
The consequences of the price support policies in most of Western 
Europe are to discourage the consumption of beef because of high consumer 
prices and to increase the amount of beef that is available as a byproduct of 
the dairy industry. However, beef production as a separate enterprise is not 
being encouraged by the existing price relationships. It is true that the beef-
14Probably an underestimate; based on data in The Atlantic Institute, A Future for 
European Agriculture, The Atlantic Papers, 4, 1970, p. 63. 
15William P. Roenigk, Agriculture in the European Community and the United States, 
ERB-Foreign 307 (Washington, 1971), pp. 2 and 8. Estimate based on 1969 population 
and 1966/67 through 1968/69 per capita consumption. 
16 The Atlantic Institute, op. cit., p. 63 and G. R. Kruer and B. Bernston, "Cost of the 
Common Agricultural Policy to the European Economic Community," Foreign Agri-
cultural Trade of the United States (October, 1969), p . 12. The estimates of nominal 
protection (1967 /68 or 1968) were : Wheat, 68 and 85 percent; Barley, 65 and 42 per-
cent; Beef and veal, 59 and 75 percent. 
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milk price relationship is relatively high in the EEC - an effort is made to 
keep it at about 7 to 1 compared to about 5 to 1 in the United States and 
the United Kingdom. But for a separate beef enterprise the relevant compari-
son is with feed prices. Here the beef-barley price is 8 to 1 in the EEC com-
pared to 9 to 1 in the UK and more than 12 to 1 in the United States. Thus 
the farm product with the most rapidly growing demand - beef - is being 
adversely affected by high consumer prices, on the one hand, and a low rate 
of profitability, on the other hand. 
If the EEC as well as other Western European countries were to 
lower grain prices to near grain import costs beef production would be 
affected. It would be possible in this situation to have a significant increase 
in the amount of grain fed beef in Western Europe . If EEC farmers could 
purchase feed grains at $60-65 per ton instead of $90-95 per ton, grain feed-
ing to beef would become profitable at beef prices lower than those now 
prevailing. In any case, if there were free trade in farm products the Pacific 
countries should not assume that the beef market of Western Europe would 
be there for the taking. Undoubtedly beef imports would increase from 
recent levels but there would also be a very significant increase in local pro-
duction. Such an increase would have to occur if the expanding demand were 
to be met at prices below those now prevailing in most of Western Europe. 
While this paper is primarily concerned with the policies of North 
America and Western Europe, it is hardly possible to discuss international 
trade in beef without mentioning Japan. The third factor that has restricted 
international trade in beef is the policy of the Japanese government. Beef 
prices are very high and very little beef and veal are imported. It appears that 
current Japanese agricultural policy is to meet most of its domestic con-
sumption of beef, veal, pork and poultry by protecting livestock production 
and rapidly expanding imports of feed materials. A different policy could 
result in a substantial expansion of imports of beef and veal as well as of other 
meat products. However, it is probable that of the various meat products 
Japan would have the greatest difficulty in producing beef and veal at prices 
that were reasonably competitive with potential imports. The famous Kobe 
Beef would probably survive a substantial expansion of beef imports; since 
it is unlikely that this type of beef can be produced in large quantities it 
would only take a very small market to maintain prices at recent levels. 
What is at stake is whether there is a substantial market for fed beef 
of a different type - such as the choice grade in the United States - that 
could be produced in Japan. The major problem, I suspect, would be to 
obtain adequate numbers of young beef animals for fattening . The limited 
geographic area of Japan would mean that reliance would have to be placed 
upon imported feeder animals. Here distance from the major potential 
sources of such animals would probably serve as a major barrier to a reason-
ably low cost operation. However, one can't rule out the possibility of a 
fleet of B-747's flying from Australia or even North America to Japan loaded 
with calves weighing 50 to 100 kilograms. At one time there was a fairly 
significant movement by air of young calves from the United States to Italy . 
Japan now has a level of per capita incomes that could support a 
substantial expansion in the consumption of meat products and especially of 
beef. While tastes may be a factor in the current low level of meat consump-
tion - about a quarter of Italy's level - the major influence on the level of 
meat consumption by 1980 will be the price and trade policies followed by 
the Japanese government. Where it was possible to expand local production, 
domestic consumption of animal products increased substantially between 
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1955 and 1967 ; where domestic production did not increase , domestic 
consumption stagnated. In 1968 Japan imported $2.4 billion of agricultural 
products; of this total only $164 million consisted of meats and dairy prod-
ucts; a large fraction of the meat imports consisted of lamb and mutton, 
products not produced in Japan in significant quantity . 
The following data indicate the levels of per capita production and 
consumption for 1955 and 1967 in Japan of the major animal products: 17 
1955 1967 
(kilograms) 
Beef and veal 
Production 1.55 1.60 
Consumption 1.1 1.2 
Pork 
Production 0 .71 5.90 
Consumption 0.8 4 .6 
Poultry meat 
Production 0.37 3.05 
Consumption 0.3 2.4 
Eggs 
Production 4.04 12.50 
Consumption 3.4 10.1 
Milk 
Production 11.2 36.0 
Consumption (fluid) 6.2 22.5 
All meat 
Consumption 3.3 11.1 
Per capita beef and veal production and consumption changed hardly at all, 
while per capita production and consumption of pork each increased five or 
more times, poultry meat by seven times, and egg and milk production and 
consumption approximately trebled. In 1967 Japan imported about 13,000 
tons of beef and veal or only 0 .13 kilograms per capita. If beef consumption 
per capita had increased at the same rate as pork consumption or to about 
6 kilograms per capita and all of the increased consumption had been sup-
plied by imports, beef and veal imports would have been in excess of 
500,000 tons in 1967 instead of 13,000 tons. If beef and veal consumption 
were at the Italian level of about 21 kilograms per capita, total consumption 
would have been about 2 .1 million tons instead of 120,000 tons. There is no 
particular reason why Japan should have the same composition of meat 
consumption as Italy, where almost half of the total consumption consists 
of beef. The only reason for the comparison with Italy is the approximate 
equality of per capita national incomes and to indicate how large would be 
the increase in Japan 's consumption of beef and veal , relative to the present 
volume of world trade in beef and veal , if J apanese consumption moved to 
17 OECD, Agricultural Statistics, 1955-1968 (Paris, 1969 ). Production and consumption 
data are not strictly comparable with respect to absolute levels. 
92 
the Italian level. It is not meant as a prediction nor as an indication that the 
Japanese diet should change in this way. But these comparisons do indicate 
that future developments in Japanese beef consumption could have a major 
impact on international trade in beef and veal. Whether there is a large ex-
pansion in Japanese imports of beef and veal seems to depend primarily upon 
policy decisions rather than upon demand considerations. 
Other Animal Products 
The trade and agricultural policies of Western Europe and North 
America do not seem to have significant adverse effects upon the trade in 
other animal products that are of interest to the other Pacific countries. The 
wool policy followed by the United States has little to commend it from a 
domestic standpoint, but tariff rates were reduced by the full 50 percent in 
the Kennedy Round and are now at fairly reasonable levels. The use of 
deficiency payments means that domestic prices to consumers are also at 
reasonable levels. Wool production is declining in the United States; it fell 
by almost 40 percent during the 1960s. Imports remained about stable 
despite the decline in tariffs at the end of the decade. The continued improve-
ment in synthetic substitutes for wool seems to be the main threat to 
Australian producers, not the wool policies of the United States. 
The Pacific countries, other than the United States and Canada, 
have little interest in pork. In any case, there is little protection of pork 
production in either the United States and Canada and the effective pro-
tection of pork production in the EEC is no more than zero; it may well 
be negative. 
Concluding Comments 
It may be noted that most of the adverse effects of U.S. agricul-
tural and trade policies upon international trade in livestock products have 
been discussed above - the high price supports the dairy products, the 
deficiency payments on wool, and the mild restraints upon beef and veal 
imports. The U.S . does not have price supports on any of the animal prod-
ucts other than dairy and wool. Nor are there any direct subsidies for beef, 
pork or poultry production. During recent years very little use has been 
made of export subsidies for animal products; occasional and limited sub-
sidies have been paid on poultry meat and our recent concern for the 
British consumer has resulted in exports of butter assisted by export sub-
sidies. Through the food stamp plan and school lunch program the 
consumption of various animal products has been increased to a small 
extent. The output of livestock products may have been reduced to some 
small degree by the various land retirement or set aside programs that have 
been in operation. I do not think the effects on output have been substantial, 
but at least the programs have not encouraged expansion of livestock produc-
tion. 
Except for butter (or butter oil) and dry skim milk only limit~d 
quantities of animal products have been disposed of under P.L. 480. In 1969/ 
70 P.L. 480 shipments of animal products amounted to $91 million; of this 
90 percent consisted of dairy products. 
It is clear that there are substantial barriers to international trade 
in dairy products and beef and veal that affect the low cost producers in the 
Pacific area. In the case of dairy products governmental policies in North 
America and Western Europe expand production and restrict consumption 
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and thus deal a double edged blow to trade. In the case of beef and veal the 
high price supports for dairy products induces higher levels of production 
than would otherwise occur though encouragement of beef production as a 
separate enterprise does not seem to be of much significance. In fact, in 
Western Europe high grain prices have limited the possibilities of developing 
a beef industry relying on grain feeding. However, throughout much of 
Western Europe high beef prices have resulted in reducing the level of per 
capita consumption significantly below what might prevail under free trade. 
It is clear that Japanese policy has substantially reduced beef consumption 
without resulting in any significant expansion of domestic beef production. 
With rather modest changes in the prices and trade policies affect-
ing dairy products in North America and Western Europe and be·ef and veal 
in Western Europe and Japan the 1970s could witness a substantial growth 
in world trade in dairy products and beef and veal. For other animal products 
the possible expansion of international trade appears to be much more limited. 
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COMMENTS BY MR. J.E . GANDER 
The main conclusion in Dr. Johnson's paper was that the variety 
of substitution and trade restraining policies in the United States and Western 
Europe have probably reduced consumption and trade in dairy products and 
perhaps, to a lesser extent, in meat products. These policies have mainly had 
an impact on the trade potentials of New Zealand, Denmark and Ireland. 
However, we cannot expect very rapid changes in these policies as a result 
of Dr. Johnson's conclusions. 
Many considerations other than the traditional demand/supply 
factors mentioned in the paper affect the production, trade and marketing 
of these products. Dr. Johnson mentioned the importance of the quality 
factor , especially in North American consumption regarding fresh and frozen 
beef. It is also important in regard to fresh and fluid dairy products. The 
support policies influencing milk production are very important since the 
level of milk production also sets a floor of availability under other dairy co-
products and meat co-products. Imports into the prime consuming areas of 
North America and Europe will face these quality and support restraints for 
a long time to come. 
Since Dr. Johnson did deal with absolute price/cost comparisons, 
he might have briefly discussed the transportation and storage cost differ-
entials that significantly affect the movement of these products between 
countries. Other factors which greatly complicate any comparative , quanti-
tative attempt to analyse the factors affecting production, consumption and 
trade in these products are regional expansion policies, irrigation program-
mes, tax policies and differential rates of protection and subsidization on 
interrelated products. 
One of the most significant relationships in the paper arose between 
feed grains and livestock and poultry . Government policies, which are already 
directed toward shifting agriculture away from wheat production which has 
become less attractive in North America into feed grains, may well blossom 
to cover livestock production and consumption and overlay the already 
complex programmes. 
The impact of large technological changes in other industries or 
agriculture cannot be ignored. The rapid growth of poultry production in 
North America mentioned by Dr. Johnson is one aspect of agriculture which 
has developed assembly line techniques of production , causing prices to fall 
significantly relative to other meats. The growth of synthetic dairy products 
and, on the horizon, synthetic meats, in view of the relation between high 
prices and the gradual disappearance of products like butter and natural 
fibres, leaves the future indefinite for these products. These matters may 
force the not unusual situation that our careful economic analysis will be 
overtaken by other events before it can have any appreciable effect on policy. 
Dr. Johnson's price elasticity analysis , which of necessity assumes 
constant cost conditions, favours increased dairy production in Denmark, 
Ireland and Oceania, but I wonder whether a substantial increase in supply 
can be forthcoming , under conditions of constant unit costs, in such 
restricted areas as Denmark and Ireland. I would expect increasing land and 
feed costs, perhaps enough to change relationships quite materially , particu-
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larly in view of what should become an increasingly attractive industry in 
other parts of Europe. 
There appears to be some absorptive capacity at the intermediate 
processing levels that take? UJ? an~ reduction in ~h~ bas~c ~upply prices by an 
additional margin in the d1stnbutmg system. This is a d1ff1cult problem and 
may make the analysis of supply and demand elasticities a little more com-
plex than can be allowed for here. 
It is regrettable that the paper did not consider income elasticities 
of demand for dairy products and meats. As Professor Hay said, in many 
respects income elasticities, especially in regard to the dynamic Pacific area, 
as demonstrated by the case of Japan. 
The introduction of Dr. Johnson's paper raises one of the most 
fundamental questions in the economic analysis of agriculture, namely, to 
what extent must the analysis of prices, costs, productivity and trade 
invariably be overlaid by the Corn Law and the Sacred Cow approach? 
Dr. Johnson mentioned the problem many years ago in his first book, for the 
problem is almost as old as agriculture itself. Agriculture is a sociological 
phenomenon, a way of life rather than a way of earning a living and this of 
course gives rise to the income support policies to a very large extent. There-
fore we must ask how useful is the micro-economic analysis of agriculture 
and how much will these other considerations dominate the problems. 
Perhaps we should turn this around and ask to what degree all the other 
industries are moving toward the agricultural pattern in which the sociologic-
al and political considerations are going to override the purely economic 
questions. 
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DISCUSSION OF THE PAPERS 
by 
SIR J. A. CRAWFORD and PROFESSOR G. H. BOARD 
PROFESSOR D. G. JOHNSON, and PROFESSOR K. HEMMI 
In reply to Mr. Gander's comments, Professor D. G. Johnson said 
it was correct that the gap, due to freer trade in dairy products, between 
expected reductions in production and increases in consumption was unlikely 
to be met by increased production by the only efficient producers - Denmark, 
Ireland and New Zealand. He said if there were free trade in dairy products, 
the level of prices of those products moving in international trade would not 
be much lower (perhaps 15 to 20 percent) than they now are, except for 
reductions in feed costs in places like Western Europe since the potential for 
expansion in low cost areas is not that great. Consequently, much of the 
protection now imposed is largely not required to maintain what by most 
standards would be relatively satisfactory prices for dairy products. He said 
the same is also largely true for beef. 
Professor Johnson replied to Mr. Gander that he did not empha-
size income elasticities simply because the argument he made was that 
whatever is demanded should be produced where costs are lowest and this 
would occur under free or freer trade. Obviously, with regard to the future 
prospects of a particular commodity, income elasticities are very relevant. 
Responding to Professor Hay's comments, Professor Drysdale, who 
presented Sir Crawford and Professor Board 's paper in their absence , com-
mented that the concentration in the early phases of the paper on the farm 
income problem is due to the paper's emphasis on political strategy more 
than on economic objectives . He said Sir Crawford would also recognize and 
take into account the adjustment problems elsewhere. Professor Hay won-
dered where Australia's comparative advantage really lay, but Professor 
Drysdale replied the answer was obvious from Professor Grale Johnson's 
paper and table one on page 18 of Sir Crawford's paper. Nevertheless another 
participant commented that this table did not include Canada and New 
Zealand as alternative suppliers and that there is a lot of other evidence of 
Australia not being a particularly efficient agricultural producer. The rather 
large drop in agricultural incomes over the past 20 years of 30 to 50 percent 
was cited as good evidence of this so that more evidence than table one was 
said to be required to support these statements. 
Professor Hay urged Australia to transform its production struc-
ture. However, Professor Drysdale pointed out that Australia along with 
others is in a substantial process of transformation which has caused the 
problems emphasized in the paper. He said it was rather hypocritical to urge 
a transformation on Australia without considering the importance of the 
transformation problem in industrial countries which are importers of agri-
cultural products. He emphasized Sir Crawford's point that to isolate 
agricultural from manufactured goods trade is a tradition in industrial coun-
tries that cannot be supported by Australia and other primary producing 
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countries if there is to be serious modification of trade barriers in the 
Pacific area. 
Professor D. G. Johnson said that the Australian problem was 
simply that two of its major export earners - wheat and wool - have a bleak 
present and an even bleaker future . He did not see any very great hopes for 
freer trade or even free trade in these products solving any country 's prob-
lems more than very temporarily. Wool is being displaced by synthetics and 
wheat, except for some Manitoba No. 1 wheat, must simply become priced 
as a feed grain given the production capacities around the world and even 
assuming only modest effects of the 'green revolution ' . Professor Johnson 
said that the gloomy prospects of these two was why Sir Crawford was so 
energetic about beef and veal since they do have a bright future . 
A Japanese participant indicated that Japan would welcome 
increased exports of primary products from Australia and Canada if they 
wished and if they would compensate by relaxing barriers to Japanese exports 
of manufactured goods. This sort of vertically specialized trade is very profit-
able to both sides, but Australia and Canada always complain about wanting 
to export more highly manufactured goods. He wondered whether this course 
is economically feasible or profitable for these countries to pursue . 
The participant from Singapore criticized the lopsided approach of 
all the papers on agriculture in their concentration on the agricultural prob-
lems of the rich , industrial nations while completely ignoring the problems 
of the predominently agricultural nations of Southeast Asia. Most partici-
pants generally agreed with this criticism. One Japanese participant suggested 
Japan ought to give careful consideration to the question of preferential 
access to agricultural imports from less developed countries which are com-
petitive with those of Australia, Canada and New Zealand. An Australian 
participant said he also was distressed by the emphasis in Sir Crawford 's 
paper on Australia's rural income problem when incomparably worse poverty 
problems existed in the world . A wealthy country like Australia could solve 
its own problems and a first step would be to reduce its tariffs. He noted that 
Australia, along with Japan and Germany , has had large balance of payments 
surpluses in the past year with reserves rising by 50 percent from a very 
satisfactory level. Thus Australia could very easily reduce its tariffs across the 
board without looking to Japan for help. However, he agreed with Sir 
Crawford that there was little prospect of rapid, substantial, unilateral or 
bilateral reductions of tariffs in the next few years although the protectionist 
climate may be slowly changing. 
In response to the Singapore representative's query about Australia's 
trade policies toward products of Southeast Asia compared to the protection-
ist policies of the European Economic Community, Japan and the U.S. , an 
Australian participant said that Australia does have a preferential scheme for 
the exports of these countries. However, Australia accepted the scheme reluc-
tantly and it affects much less than one percent of imports and has very small 
preferential margins. 
The representative from Singapore mentioned the obligation of the 
advanced countries to assist the development of the poor , primarily agricul-
tural nations. The industrialized countries could do so in one important way 
by lowering their barriers to agricultural imports from these countries. A major 
topic of discussion was the fact that this would require more rapid structural 
change on the part of the developed countries in shifting resources out of 
their relatively inefficient agricultural sectors. One participant from the U .S. 
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said that Japan, by maintaining high levels of protection, and the European 
Community, by structuring world prices by the restitution system mentioned 
in Sir Crawford's paper, determine policy and price levels for every other 
country. He said that Japan and the European community must realign their 
policies if they want liberalization of other's policies and that the less devel-
oped countries trade prospects entirely on the decisions of the rich ones in 
coming to some understanding about realigning their exports. A participant 
from an international institution emphasized that, while the process of adjust-
ment assistance to agriculture and other industries will be an extremely diffi-
cult and central issue in the 1970s and the industrial countries that handle it 
best will be least strained, it is very dangerous for the developing countries to 
rest their hopes on such uncertain policies. Of course the developing countries 
should explore all the m·arkets they can and all nations should be attempting 
to free more trade, but they ought to explore more carefully the gains from 
trade with each other. 
A Japanese participant outlined the difficulties due to the decline 
of the agricultural sector in Japan - the excessive outflow of population from 
rural areas and the low farm incomes. The rapid decline in rural population 
has been leading to deteriorating public finances and thus public services and 
a serious distortion in the age composition of the remaining population. The 
young people move off the farms most easily, leaving behind the older age 
groups which are not only less productive because of age but also because 
1hey contain a relatively large proportion of women. The men often work 
temporarily or full-time in nearby labour-intensive industries to supplement 
their incomes, but in remote areas, even this alternative is not available and 
there the income problem is most serious. Thus, this participant said that 
while in the long-run Japan should abolish agricultural protectionism to the 
benefit of both Japan and exporting countries, the problems of moving 
reluctant peasants and maintaining their incomes while wages in urban areas 
are rising at 15 to 20 percent a yea:t are very difficult. The difficulties are 
compounded by the fact that he thought that the agricultural policy of the 
Ministry of Agriculture is neither articulate nor consistent and is in fact in 
(a) shambles. He suggested that policies must be devised to allow agriculture 
to die at a gradual rate. 
One U.S. participant observed in regard to the question of changing 
trade and price policies to move people out of agriculture that in all of the 
industrial countries the rate of movement of people out of agriculture with 
no assistance from government has been very rapid since the second world 
war. Moreover, he has found that, in each of the industrial countries where 
the date is at all reasonable, the total of non-farm and farm income of farm 
people has been rising as fast as overall per capita income the past 20 years 
and their wealth position has been increasing at least more rapidly than that 
of the working population of their own countries. Consequently, part of the 
farm problem that governments are trying to solve probably does not really 
exist and the important thing is the welfare of the farm people regardless of 
the source of their income. 
Another U.S. participant noted that the distortions in the age dis-
tribution in rural areas in Japan would tend to disappear in time, but if Japan 
wants free trade in manufactures, she may not have thi,s time for the rest of 
the world will press for free trade in agriculture . Then various social welfare 
policies, such as subsidized retirement, but not price supports, will be needed 
to speed up the adjustment. 
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There was some discussion of whether the shift of workers out of 
agriculture in Japan into light, labour-intensive manufacturing industries 
would hurt the interests of some manufacturing-oriented developing coun-
tries like Hong Kong, Taiwan and South Korea while helping agriculture-
oriented ones like Malaysia and Thailand. A Japanese participant thought the 
conflict of interests would be only partial since the wage rate in Japan, even 
in rural areas, is three to four times the Hong Kong rate. Another participant 
mentioned that Japan is concerned to shift labour not only off the farms but 
also out of labour-intensive industries since its comparative advantage lay in 
more sophisticated products and even now it is with these products that 
Japan is having trouble with the U.S ., textiles being a passing problem. A 
U.S. participant pointed out that not more than six or seven million people 
were left in agriculture on a full-time basis in Japan and of these not more 
than 1/4 to 1/6 lived in remote communities. Consequently, the problems of 
age distribution and the shifting of workers out of agriculture do not consti-
tute a significant trade probelm nor affect the competitiveness of Japanese 
industry, but rather they are an enormous domestic human problem. 
Unfortunately Japan is trying to solve it just like all the other industrial 
countries - by propping up farm prices - but higher farm prices do not help 
these people one bit since the level of their farm output is small. 
Finally , summing up , it was said to be vital to distinguish between 
the agricultural problem and the poverty problem in the adjustment process. 
Looking at the cash income from agricultural production rather than the 
income of people classified as rural dwellers gives a misleading picture of the 
poverty problem. There is a combination of arguments for support prices 
that reflect two quite different interests. The large efficient farmers want to 
maximize the value of their land and are claiming an income from society on 
the basis of an argument referring to poor farmers who in fact get nothing out 
of support prices. If people are marooned in a poverty pocket, policy should 
be designed to try and move them out . But it was emphasized that no govern-
ment is really going to remedy farm poverty in the sense of making farmers 
as well off as anyone else, for this type of policy only makes them a little 
better off while perpetuating their poverty. 
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Develo~ment of Processing Industries 
in Tropical Countries 
FACTORS THAT INFLUENCE THE LOCATION OF 
PROCESSING INDUSTRIES IN TROPICAL.COUNTRIES1 
Introduction 
by 
H. VANDENDREISSHE 
0.E.C.D. 
This paper is based on the premise that if the establishment of 
processing industries is to contribute in any way to the economic develop-
ment of tropical countries we must consider as processing the whole range 
of industrial transformation processes undergone by a particular commodity 
from raw material to end-products. This is justified since commodities export-
ed by LDCs are already subjected to some elementary processing, usually 
required by technical considerations, and yet their nature as raw materials 
has not changed. Given the emphasis upon industrialisation this allows us to 
view the establishment of processing industries as contributing to the vertical 
diversification of tropical economies and as offering an alternative to other 
forms and policies of industrialisation. 
Among the processed products of interest to tropical countries are 
the semi-manufactures and manufactures elaborated on the basis of tropical 
commodities, agricultural foods and raw materials, hides and skins, and 
timber. Throughout this paper we shall concern ourselves only with these 
products, to the exclusion of minerals and fuels. All these products have in 
common a high natural resource content. Consequently, the land factor can-
not be ignored in an a priori examination of locational considerations 
affecting the international distribution of processing industries. The question 
that immediately comes to mind is whether the land factor can be made the 
basis of trade in processed intermediate or end-products. 
What light can economic theory shed on this question? First we 
will contrast the teachings of locational theory in its international applica-
tions with those of trade theory . Then we shall weigh the different elements 
entering into the cost function, including an analysis of the protective barriers 
which weaken the pull of international demand. 
Location Theory vs Trade Theory 
There is much overlapping between location theory and trade 
theory in their respective attempts to explain the international pattern of 
production and trade. They both concern themselves with the factors that 
affect the cost of production i.e. natural resources, capital and labour - and 
with transportation considerations. Yet they differ in purpose. Location 
theory seeks to determine the lowest cost producer-country of a particular 
product while trade theory seeks to determine what products a country 
should specialise in.2 The former is interested in comparing absolute costs of 
1 This paper is part of a study being undertaken at the OECD Development Centre on the 
prospects of increased exports of processed tropical commodities from LDCs and the 
barriers to their trade. 
2 A noteworthy exception to the usual emphasis of location theory on alternative loca-
tional patterns for an industry is Lefeber, L . Allocation in Space: Production, Transport 
and Industrial Location, (1958). His general equilibrium approach embraces the spatial 
flows of several goods and factors and the locational (transport) problem. By maximising 
the value of all final goods shipped to different markets, optimal production locations 
are obtained. The optimal locations and the quantities produced at each location for 
different sectors are determined by several variables: market prices; the prevailing level 
(Cont'donp . 104) 
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production while the latter concerns itself with relative costs of producing 
different goods. In the traditional Ricardian example where Portugal is the 
lowest cost producer of both cloth and wine, locational theory would tell us 
that Portugal should produce cloth as well as wine while trade theory advises 
Portugal to specialise in wine and trade its surplus for English cloth . 
To the question of which factors influence the location of process-
ing industries, locational theory can at best tell us the reasons why a tropical 
country may have an absolute advantage in processed products (relative 
advantage with respect to other geographical locations), while only trade 
theory would tell us if it has a relative advantage in the industrial processing 
of its raw materials rathei; than in the manufacture of other products. 
This distinction is not always respected in the literature, where 
comparative or relative costs may refer either to one product in two coun-
tries or to two products in two countries. 
Location theory originally evolved within the analytical framework 
of the autarkic economy. It makes the basic distinction between "natural-
resource oriented" industries and "market oriented" industries. First, the 
physical characteristics of some products, such as perishability of input or 
output, or the nature of services associated with them, already determine 
whether an industry will locate at the raw material source or close to the 
consuming market. As far as costs are concerned, insofar as within a country 
differences in factor cost can be assumed away, differential costs of trans-
porting inputs from raw material source to processing unit and of outputs to 
markets loomed larger as a basic determinant of the location of processing 
industries. All processes for whose location input-output transport cost 
differentials were not the determining factor were classified under " location-
ally foot-loose " industries. For those locationally indifferent industries local 
factors, such as the sufficient availability of labour, public utilities, services, 
etc., became all important. 
Extending location theory to an international framework, where 
more than two-thirds of trade between countries is made up of intermediate 
products, makes us realise how rare are products which are purely resource-
oriented or market-oriented. Either we should think of a product at different 
stages of transformation as different products or think of processes as either 
resource-oriented, market-oriented, or foot-loose . As examples of purely 
resource-oriented processes are the elementary processing to which most 
tropical commodities are subjected. Market-oriented processes are those 
which for reasons of quality, freshness or fashion , have to be performed in 
close proximity to the consumer, i.e . processes for which short-distance and 
market information are determining factors. Most intermediate processes 
remain fundamentally foot-loose . 
Although transport costs have always played a central role in 
location theory and although they constituted a larger share of total cost in 
the nineteenth century, the international pattern of production was then 
more influenced by the unavailability of certain factors of production and 
complementary inputs in LDCs than by subtle weighings of transport vs 
factor cost differentials . Since the nineteenth century several factors have 
(Cont'd from p. 103) 
of technology ; the local factor endowment at each production point; and the parameters 
of the transport function . In Lefeber's analysis equilibrium locations are determined from 
a given set of market prices, but it fails to explain the determinants of these prices them· 
selves. In effect, Lefeber's theory is not pure location theory but a Walrasian general 
equilibrium model modified to take the existence of space into account . 
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tended to increase the relative importance of processing over transport and 
other costs: First, improvements in transportation technology have drastic-
ally reduced the economic significance of distance and time. As a result the 
share of transport costs in the value of world trade has been cut in half. 
Second, as a result of several decades of massive doses of social overhead 
investment most developing countries are now able to meet the demand for 
infra-structural services complementary to factors as inputs in the production 
process. As these services and complementary inputs become widely available 
individual firms do not have to bear a heavy cost penalty for lack of infra-
structure and meaningful international cost comparisons become possible. 
Third, technological developments are taking place which further reduce the 
locational pull of either raw material source or market. The development of 
synthetics as substitutes for natural materials has significantly lessened the 
pull of natural resource availability on the location of a few industries: e.g. 
rubber and textiles. Similarly, advanced techniques of packaging, preservation 
and refrigeration combined with a shift of consumption toward less perish-
able convenience items has the opposite result of lessening the traditional 
pull of the market: e.g. as regards processed foods and tropical beverages. 3 
Finally; for whole lines of products for which local market information used 
to be at a premium, the spread and speed of modern communications has had 
the dual effect of standardising consumer tastes and of weakening the gravita-
tional pull of a particular market on the producer. 
The net effect of all these forces is to increase the range of prod-
ucts/processes which can be categorised as locationally foot-loose. And it is 
the foot-loose industry which is most influenced by processing costs, and 
particularly by the cost of the factor it uses most. In this respect foot-loose 
industries must be factor-oriented. Inter-country differentials in factor costs 
thus become primary determinants of the location of industry. This is the 
realm of trade theory . 
Trade Theory and Natural-Resource Intensive Manufactures 
We reviewed the theory with processed agricultural raw materials 
in mind. It is not always clear whether a theoretical proposition includes or 
excludes these products. Opinions often differ as to the applicability of a 
particular theorem to a whole group of products . This seems to be the case 
with the factor proportions thesis. It warrants detailed exposition even at the 
cost of repeating some well known propositions. 
As we have argued above, trade theory does not concern itself 
directly with the geographical location of an industry. But its search for an 
efficient pattern of exchange of goods implies an international division of 
labour ideally suited to fulfill the conditions of world economic efficiency. 
If trade theory were able to prescribe which trade pattern would entirely 
fulfill these conditions it would be a simple matter to check the implied pro-
duction pattern to see which location is most suited to the establishment of 
a particular industry. As was demonstrated by Ricardo, a locational decision 
based on comparative cost grounds will always be superior to one based on 
absolute advantage. 
3 Even a product whose quality is as perishable as roasted coffee is now primarily marketed 
in vacuum-sealed cans. Abstracting from the even greater J?Otential made possible by 
instant types of coffee, there is now no reason why firms m coffee producing countries 
cannot compete on equal cost competitive grounds with traditional coffee processors. 
105 
Traditional trade theory comes close to such a prescription particu. 
larly in the form of the Heckscher-Ohlin thesis. This model assumes two 
factors (capital and labour), postulates the international identity of produc-
tion functions, and makes international differences in factor endowment the 
crucial and sole determinant of comparative advantage. Commodities can 
then be ranked in terms of the relative factor intensities embodied in their 
production. The Heckscher-Ohlin thesis states simply that this ranking will 
correspond with a country's comparatively abundant factor. If we define the 
relative abundance of a factor in terms of its relative cheapness, this theorem 
has been shown to be logically valid under the following set of conditions : 
(a) international identity of production functions, (b) constant returns to 
scale, and ( c) non-reversibility of factor-intensities such as a given commodity 
is factor x - intensive in relation to another at all relevant factor price ratios.4 
The Heckscher-Ohlin characterisation of trade has been widely 
accepted as eminently sensible. Scepticism has been voiced as to its utility 
however, as a result of two disturbing pieces of evidence. The first concerns 
Leontieff's startling results when he found that U.S. exports are labour-
intensive and its competitive imports capital intensive.5 The second concerns 
Minhas' demonstration that far from being a theoretical curiosum, the 
reversal of factor intensity is an empirical possibility within the range of 
relevant factor price ratios.6 
Minhas' results were obtained by ranking U.S. and Japanese 
industries according to capital intensity. Since the Spearman rank correlation 
coefficient is significantly different from unity it throws some doubts upon 
the existence of a direct relationship between factor endowment and trade 
pattern. It becomes quite possible for a labour (capital) abundant country to 
export its relatively capital (labour) intensive commodity, and it is not legiti-
mate to deduce a country's relative factor endowment from the relative 
factor-intensities of exports and import-substitutes. 
Minhas' results have since been questioned on the basis of the 
inclusion in the ranking test of such natural resource intensive industries as 
agriculture, processed agricultural products and processed foods. 7 Critics 
contend that the omission of these industries from the rank correlation test 
would move the Spearman coefficient within the acceptable reach of unity 
needed to validate the Heckscher-Ohlin theorem. 
The phenomenon of reversibility is made possible by differential 
rates of substitution of capital for labour between industries. This can be 
illustrated as follows on a logarithmic scale, with capital labour ratios fitted 
against the ratios of wages to capital costs. It illustrates Minhas' suggestion 
that inter-industry differences in the parameters of the production function 
are technically speaking important enough to allow for a cross-over point 
within the range of observable price ratios. From Minhas' data it would 
4 For a survey of the theoretical literature and empirical verifications, cf. Bhagwati, J. 
"The Pure Theory of International Trade" in Economic Journal, March, 1964, P. 1 - 84. 
5 Leontieff, W. "Domestic Production and Foreign Trade: the American Capital Position 
Re-examined", Economia Internazionale, vol. 7, 1954. 
6 Minhas, B. S. "An Economic Comparison of Factor Cost and Factor Use; Amsterdam, 
1963, chap. 3. 
7 See Hufbauer, G., Appendix on "Factor Intensity-Reversals" in his Synthetic Materials 
and the Theory of International Trades, (Cambridge, Mass., 1966), and Ball, D., "Factor-
Intensity Reversal in International Comparisons of Factor Costs and Factor Use", Journal 
of Political Economy, February 1966, quoted in Lary, H.B., Imports of Manufactures 
from less Developed Countries, N.B.E.R. New York 1968, p. 57 . 
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Hypothetical Illustration of Factor Intensity Reversals 
(with constant elasticity of capital-labour substitution) 
K/L 
Processed 
Agricultural 
Products. 
~Other 
~--=--...=:"--- Manufactures. 
i----------------------~w 
Southern 
Asia 
Japan Western 
Europe 
United R 
States 
appear that the phenomenon of reversibility is observable in industries which 
allow a high ratio of indirect to direct capital. Reversibility would then be 
largely associated with the possibility of substituting indirect capital for 
labour.8 Not only does this phenomenon rob the factor proportions theory 
of any predictive value, but it leads Minhas to the ominous conclusion that 
"the labour abundant, low wage rate countries would tend to hold compara-
tive advantage in those industries which have low elasticities of substitution 
between capital and labour even though those very industries happen to be 
relatively capital-intensive at the prevailing cost of labour and capital. " 9 
This function is of obvious importance to less developed countries 
since natural-resource intensive manufactures (excepting minerals and fuels) 
not only are most liable to the possibility of factor-intensity reversal but also 
offer the greatest possibilities of substituting labour for indirect capital. 
Several attempts have been made to make the Heckscher-Ohlin 
theorem more predictive by the inclusion of more factors of production: 
human capital, unskilled/skilled labour, or Rand D expenditures on new 
products. Several new models evolved from these efforts: the human skills 
account, the technological gap model and the product-cycle theory . These 
models have been reviewed elsewhere.10 Suffice it to say that they do not 
deal specifically with natural-resource intensive manufactures. Their authors 
would agree with Linder that the classical factor-endowment theory explains 
the pattern of trade in primary products, but that the land factor cannot be 
made the basis of trade in manufactures. 11 
As Haitani points out "since necessary raw materials can be 
imported, the cost advantages or disadvantages of raw materials are usually 
attributable to transport-cost differences and not to factor endowments. " 12 
8 M:inhas, B. S., op. cit., p. 40. 
9 Minhas, B. S., op. cit., p. 48-9 (his emphasis). 
lOCorden, W. M., Recent Development in the Theory of International Trade, Special papers 
in International Economics No. 7, Princeton, 1965, and Sherk, D. R. "The New Inter-
national Trade Models and their Relevance for Developing Asia'', The Malayan Econom-
ic Review, Oct. 1969, p. 1-7. 
11 Linder, An Essay in Trade and Transformation, Uppsala, 1961, p . 17. 
12Haitani Kanji , "Low wages, Production Efficiency and Comparative Advantage", 
KYKLOS, 1971, No. 1, p. 78. 
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And since cost of transport considerations are growing less important, the 
industrial processing of raw materials, like that of any other intermediate 
input, is increasingly factor cost oriented. 
The new trade models have however introduced several factors 
which added to the prescriptions of the factor-proportions theory help in 
identifying the sorts of products in which developing economies might hold 
a comparative advantage. As Donald Sherk puts it these are "products which 
are unskilled labour-intensive and possibly fixed capital intensive, which re-
quire for their production a relatively standard technology, products whose 
thresholds for economies of scale are low to moderate, and products which 
are reasonably undifferentiated ensuring hi~h price elasticity and which re-
quire no important servicing facilities ... " 1 
It would appear that this description would include a good pro-
portion of natural resource intensive products particularly at the semi-manu-
factured stage, but also at the mass-produced and marketed consumer level. 
The Differential Cost Function 
Since trade theory does not give us more than a presumption that 
tropical countries might have a comparative advantage in the processing of 
locationally foot-loose natural resource intensive industries, we have to ex-
amine item by item the different components of their cost function to de-
termine how they fare on absolute cost grounds. If we compare the delivered 
cost to the consumer from each location - one in the exporting (producing) 
country, the other in the importing (consuming) country - both functions 
have five major components to be weighed against one another: the cost of 
raw material input, the function of processing costs, the cost of transport, 
the element of fiscal protection, and marketing costs. 
Definitions: 14 per unit of output 
I - cost of raw material input 
C - cost of processing 
d - transport cost 
P - cost advantage due to 
fiscal protection 
M - marketing costs 
t - specific tariff or tax 
x - exporting (producing) country 
m - importing (consuming) country 
r - raw material 
p - processed good 
In a two-country world of free trade and perfect competition the 
raw material producing country will have an absolute advantage in processing 
for export when 
(1) Ix + Cx + dp <( Im + dr + Cm 
After introducing restrictions to trade and competition, equation (1) becomes 
(2) Ix + Cx + dp - Px + Mx <( Im + dr + Cm - Pm + Mm 
If we balance competitive advantage against competitive disadvantage, process-
ing will be performed in the exporting country when 
(3) (Im - Ix)+ (Cm - Cx) ;;;. (dp - dr) +(Pm - Px) + (Mx - Mm) 
13sherk, D.R., op. cit., p. 17. 
14This is a revised and expanded formulation of P. Kilby's model in Industrialization in 
an Open Economy: Nigeria 1945 - 1966, Cambridge, 1969, p. 169. 
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that is, when an absolute advantage in production costs outweighs the net 
effect of the different elements of protection shielding already established 
producers in consuming countries. It pits locational factors of supply against 
net obstacles in the way of international demand . 
On the costs of processing there is little we can add to what was 
discussed in the previous section. For the manufactures of interest to tropi-
cal countries the technological gap factor or the highly skilled labour factor 
are unimportant except for those products in direct competition with syn-
thetics. For most of these manufactures, especially labor-intensive ones but 
also the capital intensive ones with a high ratio of unskilled to skilled labor, 
there is a strong presumption of a potential advantage in favour of tropical 
countries. With respect to natural raw materials in competition with synthet-
ics it should be pointed out that the competitive edge gained by synthetic 
products over natural resource intensive manufactures has been made possi-
ble by their relative cost ratios as prevailing in advanced high labor cost econ-
omies. A valid comparison would use instead the relative costs of producing 
synthetic products in developed countries and natural material competing 
products in LDC. It might reveal that the latter could remain competitive 
for another generation or so. 
Although the trend of consumer demand (in high income 
countries) is undoubtedly turned towards high quality products there 
remains a vast market for the low priced average quality products in these 
countries. The relevant variable is the relationship between quality and price. 
And for most intermediate products, perhaps more important than high qual-
ity per se is the reliability and constancy of quality standards offered. 
Input Costs 
An item of cost which is often overlooked in trade literature is 
the relative cost of inputs. It is often assumed since raw material inputs are 
traded internationally at world market prices that Ix equals Im (here on an 
f.o.b . basis) In fact nothing is less certain , although evidence on this count 
is hard to come by . We have chosen to include differential input costs in our 
cost function because any difference between Ix and Im due to other than 
fiscal reasons may then be looked upon as reflecting the cost advantage per 
unit of output which accrues to processors in the raw material producing 
country . This may be due to spoilage or weight loss during transport (coffee 
and cocoa), to having local access to a higher quality input (oilseeds in some 
countries), or to the utilization of hitherto untraded raw materials (broken 
coffee beans for instance which can be treated without significant product 
quality loss) . Since we have ruled out elementary processes which are already 
performed in tropical countries, any difference that remains between Ix and 
Im will be marginal. But even a marginal difference may be a locational factor 
of prime importance for some products where input costs are a major propor-
tion of total output costs. 
One cannot leave a discussion of differential input costs without 
raising the question of the role of marketing boards and stabilisation funds . 
Leaving aside for the moment the fiscal role they play, which in practice is 
often difficult to separate from the services they provide, to what extent has 
the short-term emphasis upon increasing foreign exchange receipts effective-
ly discouraged further local processing? Even, or particularly when they 
succeed at setting a unique and "fair" price for the inputs of foreign and 
local processors alike, are they not in the process removing a major incen-
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tive to vertical integration? Vertical integration and the element of market 
power associated with it admittedly played a major role in the nineteenth 
century development of now advanced countries.15 Since, as we shall argue 
later, a certain degree of oligopolistic power is manifest among already es-
tablished market-oriented producers we cannot rule out the significance of 
a similar but countervailing power in the hands of raw material oriented 
producers. 
Transport Costs 
Among the many elements of delivered costs we have transport 
costs, or the differential costs of transporting the finished product and its 
raw material input. If the unit cost of shipping the finished product is lower 
than the cost of its raw material input a net saving will occur in favor of 
location in the exporting country. As it often happens ad valorem freight 
rates are lower for the processed product than their raw material equivalent, 
yet not low enough to compensate for the reduction in weight or volume. 
This means that although dp < ~ , dp > dr. Since the element 
Ix+ Cx Im 
of insurance in total transport costs is always ad valorem based, the relative 
difference between the two rates will be smaller than suggested by freight 
costs alone.16 
The existence of a discrepancy between dp and dr is important in 
its location effects and, as trade theory has recently pointed out, in its allo-
cation effects as well. It implies that distance constitutes an element of pro-
tection: "natural" protection as distinct from fiscal protection. This is the 
reason that leads us to treat differential transport costs as an integral part of 
protection, that'is as a wedge between the export "push" of cost factors and 
the import "pull" of international demand. 
Whether natural protection will favour one location over another 
depends upon the nature of the goods at different stages of fabrication and 
the economics of transport pricing. Natural protection is first felt at the raw 
material production stage. This stage is relevant to our analysis to the extent 
that tropical raw materials are in competition with temperate zone substi-
tutes (i.e. oilseeds, timber, sugar, etc). Domestic production of raw materials 
in developed countries will be protected by the cost of transport of the com-
peting tropical commodity. Beyond the primary stage, when transport costs 
at each stage of transformation are levied at a constant ad valorem rate, nat-
ural protection (nominal and effective) will be carried forward along succes-
sive processing stages. If transport costs were an increasing function of stage 
of transformation, natural protection would rise and be increasingly biased 
against processing in tropical countries. If, as we argued above, transport 
costs are somewhat less than proportional to value, natural protection will 
weaken with each successive increase in value added. For products on non-
competing tropical commodities a regressive structure of freight rates will be 
a positive inducement to location in the producing country. Effective natu-
15See Caves, R. E., "The Theory of the International Firm", in Economica, February 1971, 
pp. ;J.0-12. 
16 As Kilby has pointed out, there are two elements of transport savings which accrue to 
the raw material producing country: a) when the importing country re-exports part of 
its production after processing to a third country; and b), when import substitution is 
possible, savings will amount not just to dp, but to dp + dr per unit involved. Cf. Kilby, 
P., op. cit., p. 169. 
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ral protection of an intermediate process p1 in an advanced country (when 
dp1 > dr) may even be made ineffective if the finished product P2 can be 
shipped at dp 2 = dr (in dollars and cents). For the products of competing 
tropical commodities natural protection is always a handicap, although with 
a regressive freight rate structure this barrier will be relatively easier to over-
come at higher levels of transformation. 17 
To the extent that dp - dr reflects real transport cost differences 
the efficiency of world resource allocation will not be impaired. If on the 
other hand it reflects monopolistic pricing practices of shipping companies 
not only economic efficiency will be affected but, to the extent that monop-
olistic profits accrue solely to the importing country, it will entail an 
additional bias against, and real income loss for, the less developed export-
ing country. 
Fiscal Protection 
In their effects on value added transport costs have the same 
effects as differential tariff rates. In equation ( 3) above it is the net or 
combined effect of national fiscal structures in both the importing (Pm) 
and exporting (Px) countries which will influence the location of a particu-
lar industrial process.Pis equal to the total of all taxes (net of subsidies) 
imposed on the processed product p minus the total of all net taxes on its 
input r in a particular country; or 
(4) Pm - Px = (tpm - trm) - (tpx - trx) 
where (tP.m - trm) may also include transport costs (dp - dr)- In this formula 
it is simpler to think of t as referring to import taxes, either on the product 
( tp) or on its input (tr); but it can and should include the whole series of 
indirect, excise, production and consumption taxes (positive or negative) 
which are imposed on p and/or r . 
The direction of their net effect on location is obvious. In this 
formulation any positive effect will favour a market location and would 
constitute an additional obstacle to processing in the country producing the 
raw material. Recent trade theory has attempted to measure the size of this 
obstacle and in studying its implications has derived the concept of 
effective protection. 
The concept of effective protection is of particular importance to 
our purpose since it is concerned with the vertical relationship between 
tariffs and other taxes affecting each processing stage from raw material to 
end-product. The rate of effective protection is the percentage increase in 
value added per unit in an economic activity which is made possible by the 
structure of tariffs and taxes relative to a situation that would hold in their 
absence. If we assume Im = Ix and define protection in its broadest sense, 
the simplified equation (3) in terms of world value added Cx becomes 
(5) Cm - Cx ~ Pm - Px 
Cx Cx 
which as an equality yields the net (or combined) rate of effective protec-
tion on the value added by a process in one country over the other. As an 
1 7 This paragraph and the next draws freely from H. G. Johnson, "The Theory of Effective 
Protection and Preferences", Economica, May 1969, pp. 124-5, Although for our pur-
poses transport costs are here expressed in absolute terms, the analysis is essentially 
the same. 
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inequality , if country M's value added is positively protected, it shows that 
the degree to which the cost of production factors in country X will have t o 
be lower than in M in order to be competitive is an inverse function of value 
added by the process and not of output value . This is relevant to the products 
of tropical commodities since value added by processing , particularly at inter-
mediate stages, is often small in proportion to total costs . Empirical research 
has shown that calculated effective rates of up to 100% due to tariffs alone 
are not uncommon on the processing of commodities such as groundnuts, 
crude coconut oil , cocoa, etc. 18 Moreover, if one isolates the value added 
by labor (Lm or Lx ), on the grounds that since capital moves more freely , 
differences in capital costs will be relatively unimportant , a small nominal 
rate of protection may allow Lm to be a multiple of Lx without inducing 
trade. 
In addition to its locational effects another aspect brought to 
light by the concept of effective protection is its allocation effect. Since 
resources in a country will tend toward a product whose relative cost over 
other products is lower, in a trading world resources will be attracted to a 
product whose relative cost minus protection is lower relative to other 
products than in another country. In this way resources would tend to favor 
protected industries. Net protection in M will always have a locational bias 
coupled with a geographical reallocation of resources in its favor (if we 
assume fixed exchange rates and mobile resources). But it need not alter an 
economically efficient allocation of resources between products in each 
country as long as the net protective rate is the same for all products. If on 
the other hand M's net protection on a product of interest to X is greater 
than M's net average protection, resources in M will be diverted into it and 
will weaken further any comparative advantage X might have in this product . 
Then as a result of protection, not only is it possible for X to have a loca-
tional disadvantage in the processing of a product p for which it has an 
absolute advantage, but, if M's net protection of p over average is greater 
than X's comparative advantage in p over average, it is possible for X to have 
a (comparative) locational disadvantage in the processing of p even when it 
has a comparative advantage in it. That is , structures of effective protection 
may be such as to reverse the pattern of comparative advantage. 
That rates of protection in developing countries on products of 
interest to developing countries are higher than average is well known. The 
following table originally computed by Balassa shows nominal as well as 
effective rates of protection in developed countries, comparing pre-Kennedy 
with post-Kennedy Round rates. 
18See Harry G. Johnson, "The Theory of Tariff Structure with Special Reference to World 
Trade and Development" in Johnson, H. G. and Kenen, P . B., Trade and Development, 
Geneva : Droz, 1965; also his Economic Policies toward Less Developed Countries, 
Washington : Brookings, 1966, p . 91 (Table 2); UNCTAD, Tariff Structures of Selected 
Developed Countries and Their Effect on Exports of Processed Goods from Developing 
Countries, Document TD/B/C.2/9, 17 February 1966, p. 4-6 (mimeo ). 
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It can also be deduced from these figures that tariff reductions brought about 
by Kennedy negotiations are proportionately lower on products of interest to 
LDCs than on more advanced manufactures. Thus, distortions in the alloca-
tion of world resources between categories of products might have increased 
rather than decreased as a result of these negotiations. The fact that so many 
processed commodities in BTN 0-24 were excluded from the present scheme 
of generalised preferences may reinforce this process even further if and when 
it is ever fully implemented. 
To return to the concept of net effective protection of a product, 
it is useful to illustrate what it means to the parties concerned with a hypo-
thetical example . It is also more realistic to think of a product both as an 
importable and an exportable . Up to this point we have been concerned with 
a one faceted processed product: an exportable from the viewpoint of Xis 
an importable for M. If we assume the existence of a domestic market for the 
processed product in X, the same product will also be an importable for X 
and an exportable for M. They should be distinguished analytically since 
within one and the same country a given tax structure will effectively protect 
an exportable differently from the same but importable product. Short of 
dealing with elasticities, it is also necessary to introduce certain assumptions 
about price behaviour and competition. We assume M and X trading exclu-
sively with one another. The World is there on the sidelines only as a refer-
ence point to show the costs of inputs and factors without restrictions: We 
assume Ix = 200 and world value added Cx = 100 or one third of total cost. 
We set out to calculate maximum protected value added in Mand 
X for the product supplying M's market (C~ and C~) and, on the assumption 
that the supplier in Mis originally the price setter in X's market, protected 
value added in both countries for the same product importable in 
X (C~ and C~). The schedule of tariffs and taxes is given at the top of Table 
2, with specific import duties on the raw material and end-product in M 
being trm = 20 and tpm = 70 . The only tax imposed by Xis an export 
tax on the raw material input of which Xis the only supplier . Since an export 
tax is analytically the same as an import subsidy, trx = - 40 (and tpx = 0). 
Looking first at our processed product in M's market, the effective 
protection of X's exportable to M will be determined by differential taxation 
of processed export (column 5) and raw material export (col. 4). The rate of 
protection of value added of X's exportable will be 
, tpx - trx O - (-40) 40% or also C~ - Cx. 19 
Px = 
Cx 100 Cx 
Similarly protection of M's importable will be determined by differential 
domestic taxation of processed import and raw material input (cols. 1 and 2) : 
, _ tpm - trm _ 70-20 _ 503 _ C~ - Cx. 
Pm - C - 100 - - C 
x x ' 
Net protection of M's domestic market is P~ - P~ = 10% = Cm - Cx. 
Cx 
19In terms of Px in absolute terms per unit of output the effective rate of protection is, 
more accurately, P~ I Cx, but since Cx was arbitrarily chosen to equal 100, 
P~ and P~' are here rates of effective protection. One prime in X refers to an exportable 
and two primes to an importable; vice-vers(l for M. 
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This means that even if the supplier in X chose an aggressive cost and price 
cutting export policy with C~ = Cx = 100, M's domestic producer could 
match any reduction in price and get factor returns at least 10% above 
his rival. 
We switch to X's domestic market for the product. We assume that 
it was originally supplied solely by imports from M at the same price ruling 
in M. Because of its monopoly position C~ = Cdi = 150. If however X 
embarks on import substitution, it might be able to supply a small proportion 
of its domestic market at the price set by M of 410. In so doin~ X's value 
added per unit of output sold locally could reach as high as c;_ = 210, an 
effective rate of 110%.20 If as is more realistic, X's import substitution drive 
can only be achieved by undercutting imports from Mas assumed in Part B 
of Table 2, X may lower its local price to 340 with the same effective protec-
tion as for exportables (P~' = 40%) and drive M's product out of X's market. 
X's strong market position domestically is due to M's vulnerability . The same 
import tax structure which protects M's domestic market by 50 per cent , 
yields a negative protection rate on M's exports of 20 per cent 
(P~ = O - 20 = - 20% ). Net protection of X's domestic market is thus 
100 
equal to P~' - P~ = 40 - (-20) = 60%. For the given tax structure C~' 
may always be up to 60% (of Cx) above C~ irrespective of output price . 
Another consequence of treating importables and exportables differently is 
that the average rate of protection of a product in a country as measured by 
gross domestic value added by the industry minus the same value added at 
world prices will be an average of the rates of effective protection of import-
ables and exportables weighed by their respective shares in total output . 
Marketing Costs 
The possible extensions of this type of analysis are innumerable. 
Any freight rate, import duty or other internal tax differential which makes 
tp> tr will effectively protect an importable. Any tr that is not refunded or 
compensated by a subsidy on the processed export will amount to negative 
protection of the same product when viewed as an exportable. If we intro-
duce differential marketing costs as provided for in equation (3), any 
Mx > Mm per unit of output may be interpreted as providing protection of 
an importable in M. This is justifiable if these costs include the effects of 
industrial organisation as is warranted in the case of processed tropical com-
modities because of the highly organised nature of the industry . 
It is a characteristic of old established firms that they wield 
considerable oligopolistic power. The industry is often dominated by a few 
sellers, where market competition emphasizes product differentiation by 
means of expensive advertising campaigns. Prices are administered and include 
20 where e,Z' - ex is also equal to ex'.' - er:,_' + er:,_' - ex 
ex ex ex 
An interesting remark can be made in this respect. The high potential protection of value 
added on import substitution in X, particularly when it is in part due to the price setting 
power of the dominant M supplier, shows the fallacies and dangers involved m basing an 
mvestment decision on the cost competitiveness of an import substitute with the c.i.f. 
price of imports. This is just one manifestation of the fact that protection of an import-
able fosters a high cost structure which discourages exportables. 
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an oligopolistic profit proportional to the costs of entry. These costs of entry 
measure the degree of protection afforded already established producers by 
the prevailing market organisation.21 
As a variable in our cost function, Mx - Mm would thus include : 
a) distribution costs, which are likely to be the same for each supplier; b) the 
special costs or benefits associated with distance or proximity to market, such 
as information, communications, inland transportation, etc ., which will tend 
to make Mx> Mm ; and c) Mx will be inflated by the special advertising costs 
of introducing X's product on market Mand by the potential costs of a price 
war initiated by established producers to drive the new entrant out. 22 
For completeness we can further assume the possibility of import 
substitution in X. The existence of a domestic market in X for the product is 
often emphasized by theory and policy alike as a pre-requisite to the estab-
lishment of a processing industry. The essence of the argument rests on the 
importance of economies of scale and efficient size of the production unit to 
render unit costs competitive. This point undoubtedly shall never be too 
emphasized. It cannot be separated however from its sequel, namely, that 
once installed, an optimally scaled plant must be kept operating efficiently 
at high rates of capacity utilisation. 23 Only a highly motivated and capable 
managerial staff bent on overcoming one and every obstacle can fulfill this 
condition. Once this admittedly intangible factor is assumed, the size of the 
domestic market ceases to be a constraint and it becomes feasible to envisage 
the establishment of a primarily export-based industrial complex. 
Having effectively disposed of the domestic market constraint qua 
pre-requisite for an optimum production unit , we reintroduce it as a strategic 
factor of prime importance. If we think of a domestic market as an insurance 
against the possible loss of export markets, the larger the size of the domestic 
market relative to optimal plant size the lower the potential costs Mx asso-
ciated with fighting already established competitors on M's market (under c) 
above). 24 
The net result of all these considerations on marketing costs will 
still undoubtedly favour producers in M. Then Mx - Mm is likely to be 
positive and constitute an additional obstacle to the export of processed 
products from tropical countries . Any differences Mx - Mm will indeed 
accrue to processors in M in the form of higher factor returns, so that it is 
21 See Caves, R . E., "Theory of the International Firm", in Economica, February 1971, 
and Bain, J . S., Barriers to New Competition, Mass., 1956 . 
22 An UNCTAD-GATT document records such an experience : "Very cheap soluble 
Brazilian coffee appeared in the Netherlands around mid-1967. It was 60% cheaper than 
Dutch spray-dried soluble coffee . This gave rise to a veritable price war . ... For some 
months this coffee met with great success, but the two large companies ... were able 
to re-establish their positions on the market through a heavy advertising campaign" see 
International Trade Center, Industrial Coffee on Twenty-one European Markets, Geneva, 
1969 p. 75. 
23 Witness the vast literature of international organisations on the underutilisation of 
existing capacity; see also Kilby, P., op. cit. , chapter on the difficulties of the oilseed 
crushing industry in Nigeria. For a review of planning failures due to inattention to 
marketing, see Abbott, J.C., "Marketing Issues in Agricultural Development Planning", 
in Markets and Marketing in Developing Economies, edited by Moyer, R., and 
Hollander, S. C., Irwin, 1968; and Mittendorf, H.J. "Marketing Aspects in Planning 
Agricultural Processing Enterprises in Developing Economies", Monthly Bulletin of 
Agricultural Economics and Statistics, Rome, F AO, 17( 4 ), 1968. 
24More than a passing reference should be made to the importance of a local market for 
by-products although in the processing of raw materials it is not always easy to distin-
guish a product from a by-product. In any case they cannot be overlooked. 
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fully justified to view it in terms of M's value added and treat it as a form of 
market protection.25 
Conclusion 
We have sought to spell out the different forces at work influenc-
ing the international location of processing industries. Recent trends in the 
exports of semi-manufactures and manufactures from LDC's have shown the 
preponderant place occupied by natural resource intensive products within 
these exports . This was achieved in spite of a structure of protection in 
developed countries biased against these products. If one takes into account 
the overvaluation of currencies in LDC's, it is doubtful that on a net basis 
this bias would be reversed. Actual trade data can then be taken to reveal 
potential comparative advantage. 
There need not be agreement on this theoretical point to see the 
desirability of redressing imbalances which warp the allocation of world 
resources. In view of the potential effects of the impending generalised 
scheme of preferences, the primary concern of the international community 
in the seventies should go to lowering the remaining duties on the processed 
and semi-processed products which have been excluded from the scheme. 
Short of a major tariff-cutting conference , our analysis shows that 
there is a lot that individual countries, or a regional association, bent on 
action, can do. Policies may be initiated, or pressures be brought to bear, on 
almost every item of the cost function we identified. But the first stumbling 
block is our relative ignorance of the magnitude of the differential costs in-
volved . Action oriented research covering specific export products or indus-
tries can best be undertaken within a regional framework since a locational 
decision is always based on the net effect of (at least) two opposing cost and 
protective structures. 
On the cost side it was argued that differential input costs and the 
effect of institutional arrangements on them should not be overlooked. 
On the protective side greater acceptance should be granted to 
export subsidies in LDCs to compensate for the effect of all types of pro-
tective barriers shielding already established producers in advanced countries.26 
Such subsidies would be more readily tolerated if we had full knowledge of 
the extent to which protection already exists. Regional arrangements could 
also be devised to reduce the extent of differential transport costs particu-
larly when these are due to arbitrary freight rate structures. The cost of 
transporting the finished product may be at least initially brought down 
closer to its social cost. The costs of entry into a new market could be dras-
tically reduced with the cooperation of the importing country, and insurance 
might be provided against price wars. 
An industrialisation policy based at least in part on the establish-
ment of highly integrated processing industries from raw materials through 
each successive stage of fabrication to the profitable end-products would 
greatly hasten the development of local markets and provide an essential 
link between the agricultural and industrial sectors. 
25 At first, the oligopolistic profit accrues to capital, but later, as Galbraith has argued, 
labour demands its share. The resulting rise in its cost structure would seem to make 
the industry more vulnerable to outsiders; in fact, it fosters even more powerful 
protectionistic vested interests. 
26 See Streeten, P., "The Case for Export Subsidies", in Journal of Development Studies, 
July 1969. 
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COMMENTS BY PROFESSOR A. E. SAFAR IAN 
Professor Safarian was somewhat critical because of the way in 
which the paper handled the five functions or types of cost separately. This 
may have been necessary for purposes of exposition but analytically prob-
lems arise not of the interdependence of the five functions . 
A major aspect of the marketing costs function is the cost of entry 
to an oligopolistic industry at an international level. A related question, which 
is not given enough emphasis here, is the degree to which the large firms are 
internationally fully integrated. If there is a large, multinational firm that is 
importing raw material products into its home market, and if it is assumed 
that the international market for the product is not growing, then if there is 
a degree of oligopoly in the competing industry in the importing country and 
if there is a degree of fiscal or tariff protection which permits the large firms 
to operate as oligopolists, then treating fiscal protection in one function and 
market entry in another seems to underestimate the importance of the mar-
ket entry question . It is underestimated to the extent that protection permits 
oligopolistic practices or to the extent that oligopolistic power is used to 
increase or maintain fiscal protection. The policy implication is that whatever 
is done in one of these areas , such as reducing the degree of fiscal protection, 
will have a compound effect on the other terms . 
Professor Safarian thought that research and development expendi-
tures ought to be included in the cost function because in some respects they 
are a more critical input than some of the others. Research and development 
activities are deeply involved in Vernon's product cycle theory which might 
be regarded as an extension of the Heckscher-Ohlin theorem . Professor 
Safarian suggested that, while research and development expenditures were 
left out of the cost function because they are related to new goods, they 
ought to be included because of their importance and although this would 
not result in a product cycle theory it would have important implications for 
the location of processing industry which produces relatively undifferentiated 
products. 
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TRADE IN PROCESSED AGRICULTURA L PRODUCTS, 
WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO SUGAR 
by 
R.H . SNAPE 
Monash University 
This paper contains three parts. In the first, the general question of 
exporting processed agricultural products from the less developed countries is 
considered . Recent trends in exports and prices of raw and refined sugar are 
described in the second while in the third a rather shorter look is given to 
three other raw and processed agricultural products exported by tropical 
Pacific Region countries : timber, coconut and oil palm . 
1. General 
In considering processed products, one encounters a problem of 
definition: what is the activity "processing" ? An F .A.O. paper identifies it 
as occurring "at an early stage of transformation , following 'handling ' and 
preceding 'manufacture'", but states that "even early transformation stages 
are regarded as manufacture rather than processing if capital-intensive methods 
are employed and if much value is added to the primary product."1 A satisfac-
tory definition is elusive, but I would prefer a concept that does not depend 
on capital intensity. Perhaps "an early stage of transformation" is sufficient 
for present purposes - I shall regard sawing logs, pulping timber, or refining 
sugar as "processing'', but the making of furniture, books or confectionery 
as "manufacturing", even if the former are more capital-intensive than the 
latter. 
"Processing" frequently is thought of as a natural development for 
an agricultural economy, which, starting from a situation in which it exports 
agricultural products in a raw state, with the passing of time commences 
processing activities at home and then exports the processed product. The 
man in the street may argue "if we can export wool then why can't we export 
cloth"? The economist thinks "comparative advantage" and reflects that 
there is further support for the statement that the social sciences contain at 
least one proposition that is both true and non-trivial. 2 Such a pattern of 
developing comparative advantage, from raw material and into the processed 
product, could emerge in an economy, at an early stage of development, if 
the rate of capital accumulation (physical and human), per man , exceeds that 
in the importing countries, and if the early stages of processing are more labour 
intensive than alternative forms of development. 
But, of course, there are a number of barriers to such a pattern of 
development. These barriers may be to the establishment of processing activ-
ities in the countries concerned, or to exports of the processed products from 
these countries. However the two categories of barriers are not entirely 
1 F .A.O., "Trade in Agricultural Commodities in the United Nations Development Decade; 
Part III, Trade in Processed Agricultural Commodities" in Proceedings of UNCTAD, 1964, 
Vol. IV, p . 155. 
2Paul A. Samuelson, "Presidential Address: The Way of An Economist", in Paul A. 
Samuelson (ed . ), International Economic Relations, (Macmillan, London, 1969), p. 9. 
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separable - for example, if there are economies of scale then barriers to 
exporting may prevent establishment of production within the country. 
Much of the logic behind the idea "if we can export wool, why not 
cloth" relates to transport costs, and for many products the logic is correct. 
Thus raw (cane) sugar-milling is always located near cane growing for trans-
port reasons associated with both loss of weight and deterioration of the 
sugar content of cane after cutting. But while transport costs favour the 
location of many processing activities close to the raw material production, 
this is not universal. An example of an exception is in tea, where to secure the 
required blends, packing generally is undertaken near the market: in general, 
transport routes are such that it is cheaper to carry the different types to the 
maior markets and blend there, rather than to blend at one, or many, of the 
sources of supply. 
In examining the barriers to production and exports of processed 
products, the question arises as to whether early stages of processing are, in 
fact, relatively labour intensive. Hal Lary's method3 of assessing labour inten-
sity is useful for this purpose. His measure is the simple one of value added 
per employee, the intention being to catch the contribution of human and 
physical capital in one measure. By dividing value added per employee into 
two components- wages and salaries, and other - he also obtains measures 
of the contribution of human capital and physical capital for various indus-
tries. Lary found a marked similarity in the rankings of industries by value 
added per employee across countries suggesting, inter alia , that factor inten-
sity reversal is relatively unimportant, at least at the level of aggregation at 
which he was working. Thus statistics ranking factor intensity in a country 
for which statistics are readily available and of good quality, m.ay shed light 
on relative factor intensities for countries for which data do not meet the 
same standards. 
Table 1 gives indexes of value added, and its components, per 
employee for the United States for a number of activities that may be 
regarded as "processing". Table 2 sets out similar data for Australia, though 
with fewer classes of industry. In general it may be seen that processing activ-
ities vary widely in regard to the measures of "capital intensity", in relation 
to human, physical and total capital. Thus processing activities in general 
cannot be regarded as labour-intensive. Processing of fibres into yarns, of 
timber and leather may be regarded as labour intensive while cereal prepara-
tions, animal feeds, sugar refining and production of vegetable and animal 
oils are capital intensive. In general, the high capital intensities relate more 
to physical than to human capital. 
Thus not all processing activities may be regarded as being suitable 
for the factor endowments of the countries producing the raw products. (The 
same point was made, though on the basis of different data, in the F.A.O. 
paper submitted to UN CT AD I4 ). Of course if factors of production are 
mobile internationally, inappropriate factor endowments may not be so much 
of a barrier. The international corporation with industry-specific capital may 
locate processing where it is cheapest - and to some extent this will be where 
labour is cheapest . Thus high physical capital intensity may not be a barrier 
to location of processing in an agricultural exporting country though, of 
course, in such an industry there may be little benefit to the host country 
3Hal B. Lary, Imports of Manufactures from Less Developed Countries, (N.B.E.R., 
4
New York, 1~68). 
F.A.O., op. cit., pp. 190-194. 
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apart from taxation - employment created will be low and remittances 
abroad high. High human capital intensity is more likely to be a barrier, 
however, as physical capital probably is more mobile than human capital. 
It is generally accepted that tariff barriers in importing countries 
have tended to discriminate against processed goods and in favour of raw 
materials. Balassa has presented considerable evidence to support this view 
and that this discrimination will continue even after the Kennedy-Round 
reductions in tariffs have been implemented fully. 5 Some of his evidence is 
reproduced in Table 3. The almost universal pattern is that the tariff on the 
first stage of processing exceeds the tariff on the raw product, so that the 
effective rate of protection on the processing activity exceeds the nominal 
tariff on the processed product.6 In general, the tariff escalation is continued 
through the stages of processing. Balassa also finds "a negative correlation 
between the degree of erotection of processed goods and the relative share 
of these [i.e. processedJ products in imports from developing countries". 
Japan, with "by far the highest effective duties on processed goods ... 
imports the smallest proportion of primary products in processed form". 7 
Additional information relating to tariffs on other products is 
provided in Table 4. Apparent here is the fine selectivity of tariffs in protect-
ing processing and even packing - e.g. tariffs on silk and cotton yarns pre-
pared for retail sale in the E.E.C. exceed those of the same yarns not prepared 
for retail sale, while tea in retail-sized packs bears a higher duty than tea 
which is not in such packs. 
As has been emphasized in recent years - in part as a consequence 
of reductions in tariffs - there are important barriers to trade of a non-tariff 
nature.8 Whether these discriminate against processed products relative to 
non-processed is not immediately clear: one example where such a barrier 
does so discriminate is in coconut oil imports to the U.S. Duty-free imports 
of coconut oil from the Philippines and U.S. Pacific Trust Territories are 
limited by quota whereas duty-free imports of copra from the same source 
are not subject to quota. On the other hand several countries prohibit imports 
of unprocessed meat from countries in which foot and mouth disease is 
prevalent but permit imports of canned meat from the same countries. 
Baldwin's calculations9 suggest that non-tariff barriers in the U.S . and U.K. 
impinge with greater severity on imports of primary products than on imports 
of intermediate and consumer goods or capital goods, 10 but his study is rather 
too aggregated for present purposes. Walter11 presents evidence that suggests 
the non-tariff barriers discriminate against the exports of the developing 
countries. In commenting on Walter's paper, Baldwin provides an argument 
that non-tariff barriers do discriminate against the establishment of manufac-
turing (and processing) exports from developing countries: "Exporters who 
5 Bela Balassa, "The Structure of Protection in Industrial Countries and its Effects on the 
Exports of Processed Goods from Developing Countries" (Paper prepared at the World 
Bank for UNCTAD II, 1968). . 
6 0n a more aggregated basis Baldwin, who takes account of non-tariff as well as tariff 
barriers, supports Balassa's results for the U.S. (at least when non-traded imports are 
treated in Balassa's manner) but not for the U.K. (Robert E. Baldwin, Non-Tariff 
Distortions of International Trade (Brookings and Allen and Unwin, 1971 ), Chapter 7). 
7 Balassa, op. cit., Chapter II, paras. 27 and 29. 
8 In particular see Baldwin, op. cit. and Ingo Walter, "Non-Tariff Barriers and the Export 
Performance of Developing Economies", American Economic Review, Papers and 
Proceedings, May 1971, pp. 195-205. 
9 Baldwin, op. cit., Tables 5 and 7. 
lOAn exception is capital goods in the U .K. in 1954. 
11 0p. cit. 
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wish to sell their products in markets protected by non-tariff barriers general-
ly are forced to incur considerably greater cost outlays in finding out what 
the exact nature of the barriers are than if the protection takes the form of 
tariffs. Because of the rather significant scale economies associated with 
obtaining information, this means that new and small exporters of manufac-
tures - like most developing countries - are ~laced at a substantial disadvan-
tage relative to large established producers".1 
Another barrier to exporting processed products arises through 
disequilibrium rates of exchanges supported by import duties etc. in agri-
cultural exporting countries. In such a situation, of course, the return to 
exporters is less than it "should" be and the cost of imported inputs is 
greater than it "should" be, because the average import duty etc. must 
exceed the "devaluation equivalent" effect on the price of imports. Even 
supposing that exporters can secure refunds of import duty paid on inputs 
into exports, the disequilibrium exchange rate may still discourage a progres-
sion from exporting the raw material to exporting the processed product: 
the changing comparative advantage will take longer to "reveal itself" when 
the return on exported value added is maintained below its optimum level by 
an inappropriate rate of exchange. 
Finally there are barriers to exporting processed products which 
are related to information - the costs of obtaining it and the ability to 
respond to it. These include "the uncertainties, high costs and long time 
periods associated with the international movements of goods, ... the 
ignorance of entrepreneurs in the less-advanced areas regarding the market 
conditions for manufactured products abroad; and the reciprocal ignorance 
of entrepreneurs in the advanced countries of conditions in little-known and 
distant areas overseas" .13 Such barriers are not likely to be so important in 
the early stages of processing as in the later. And, of course, the more a 
country tailors its products to suit a particular export market and invests in 
the provision of information from that market, the greater the loss it will 
incur if that market disappears. As Vernon points out, the possibility of 
greater gain may not compensate for this risk of loss: "the entrepreneur who 
decides that he is unwilling to risk the game of Russian roulette that may be 
involved in investing in the penetration of a large and potentially profitable 
export market may be making a rational decision after all" .14 Private and 
social interest probably diverge here: thus some sort of risk-pooling by several 
potential exporters, either voluntarily or through a government scheme, may 
be appropriate. Vernon considers some schemes of this nature as well as 
policies that may be adopted to overcome other barriers arising from lack of 
information etc . 
Greater awareness in developed countries of the external disecono-
mies associated with some processing activities may be a factor inducing the 
relocation of processing activities from importing to exporting countries. 
Whether this is good for the exporting countries or not is another matter. 
One can argue that the marginal external cost of certain activities is an 
increasing function of the size of the industrial centres - e.g. external costs 
arising from production of smoke. So there may be cases where shifting an 
12 Robert E. Baldwin, "Discussion", American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings, 
May 1971, p. 210. 
13 Raymond Vernon, "Problems and Prospects in the Export of Manufactured Goods from 
14 
the Less-Developed Countries", in Proceedings of UNCTAD 1964, Vol. IV, p . 201. 
Ibid. , p. 204. 
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activity from an industrial centre to a non-industrial (in this case an inter-
national shift) may be beneficial to both. A concrete example of a likely shift 
due to pollution is in wool scouring. It has been reported that pressures have 
come from Japan for scouring to be located in Australia because of the pollu-
tion caused by the chemicals employed. (I am not suggesting that the shift 
would be beneficial to the exporting country in this case.) 
2. Sugar 
The world sugar industry provides examples of barriers to trade in 
two processed products - raw and refined sugar. Sugar can be produced from 
a variety of plants, but in particular from sugar cane and sugar beet. There 
are few countries of the world in which neither is grown, while some coun-
tries grow both. The world sugar industry is rather unique in that there is 
direct competition between a tropical and a temperate zone agricultural 
product. 
Little, if any, international trade occurs in sugar beet or sugar cane, 
for in both products the sugar forms a small proportion of the weight of the 
harvested crop, and in both cases the sugar content declines if the sugar is 
not extracted soon after harvesting. Thus there is a strong transport factor 
favouring the location of the first stage of processing close to the growing 
of beet and cane. 
Cane sugar passes through two distinct phases of processing -
extraction of raw sugar from cane, and the refining of the raw sugar. In the 
second process sugar generally loses about eight per cent of its weight, but 
much of this loss comprises saleable by-products . While the processing of 
beet sugar can also be stopped at the raw stage, it is more common for beet 
to pass through a continuous transformation to be refined product.15 As 
may be deduced from the geographical distribution of exports of raw and 
refined (Table 5 ), relatively little cane sugar is exported from the growing 
countries in a refined state, while little beet sugar is exported raw . 
It has been indicated already that cane sugar refining, in terms of 
its factor requirements, probably is not a particularly suitable processing 
activity for the less developed countries (see Table 1). Partly for this reason, 
refining during the colonial period was located in the developed rather than 
the less developed countries. Additionally, there was an advantage in locating 
refining near major markets - at the junction of trade routes - so that various 
sources of supply could support refining on a large scale throughout the year. 
However even if cane sugar producers - despite their factor endowments -
wished to export refined sugar, imports of refined by the major markets are 
now so heavily restricted that there would be very little return from the 
refining activity. 
Average prices on world "free"16 markets are shown in Table 6 . 
Two points may be noted : 
l5In the U.K. in 1963, there were eighteen beet sugar factories, fourteen of which pro-
duced white sugar and four (all more than thirty years old) produced raw sugar. In 
addition there were nine sugar refineries. (International Sugar Council, The World 
Sugar Economy: Structure and Policies (London, 1963) Vol. I, p. 84). 
1 6The "free" or open market embraces less than half of total international trade - the 
balance is sold under preferential trading arrangements, in particular under the United 
States Sugar Act, the British Commonwealth Sugar Agreement and within the Commu-
nist Bloc (including Cuba). 
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(i) The small difference between the prices paid for raw and refined sugar 
sold on the open market. The margin for refining cane sugar in many devel-
oped countries (including loss of weight allowance) appears to be around 
lVi-2 cents/lb.17 The last two columns indicate that there has been little 
incentive to exporters to refine sugar for export to the open world market: 
in the years shown the average raw/refined margin did not exceed 1.1 c/lb. 
and was as low as 0.5 c/lb. This lack of incentive is further indicated by a 
comparison of the International Sugar Council daily price (f.o.b. Caribbean) 
for raw sugar and the spot price (f.o.b. European ports) quoted for refined 
sugar by the Paris sugar market over a period of two years during 1964-1966. 
The refined price was at all times higher, but never by more than about 
114 c/lb., and more generally by about 3,4 c/lb.18 The latter figure would 
barely cover transport across the Atlantic and loss of weight in refining. On 
occasions refined sugar has in fact sold for less on the world market than the 
then current price of raw - a real case of negative value added at world prices. 
(ii) The variation in the average annual price paid for refined is very little 
different from that of raw over the period. Thus moving into refined would 
not provide much of an escape from price variation. Additionally, as import 
demand for refined probably is more price-inelastic than for raw, any price 
stability achieved (and this in itself is very doubtful) would be bought at a 
high cost. 
The high protection of the refining activity19 in developed coun-
tries is not, in the main, directed at cane exporters. Rather it is aimed at 
protecting the domestic beet farmers, factories and cane sugar refineries 
against exports of refined from other developed countries. Ubiquitous 
subsidization of production has generated (in years when harvests do not 
fail) ubiquitous exportable surpluses. 
Thus under the present structure of the world sugar market, there 
is little purpose in sugar exporting countries of the Pacific Region moving 
out of raw and into refined for the world market.20 Nor is there any pay-off 
from moving into refined from the protected markets under the British 
Commonwealth Sugar Agreement (Fiji and Australia) or the United States 
Sugar Act (Philippines, Mexico, Peru, Fiji, Mexico, China (Taiwan), Colombia 
and Australia), for both of these preferential arrangements apply to raw sugar. 
In relation to the United States Act, (which is to be renewed this year) 
Professor Donald Horton says : "The former Cuban 'white sugar' quota was 
not distributed to other suppliers when the Act was amended in 1962. This 
was a concession to the domestic sugar refiners who depended mainly on 
foreign raw sugar. Department of State representatives objected strongly to 
this and urged that a white sugar component of the foreign quota be 
available to be allocated to countries interested in and capable of developing 
a sugar refining industry, but their view was not accepted by the White House. 
A concensus within the domestic sugar industry .. . took precedence over 
1 7This is calculated from data contained in International Sugar Council, op. cit. 
1 8M. G. W. Hallmans and A. S. Ivanov, A Review of Recent Developments in the World 
Sugar Market, 1960-65 (International Sugar Council, London, June 1966; mimeo. ), 
pp. 58 and 61. 
19Calculation of the extent of effective protection for the refining activity is difficult in 
that much protection for refined sugar may be passed back to beet growers and extrac-
tion of raw where integrated beet sugar factories producing refined sugar are operating. 
Also if any substantial sugar importer changed from imports of raw to refined, this 
action would increase considerably the actual raw/refined margin on world markets. 
20Total exports are limited under the provisions of the International Sugar Agreement. 
what appeared to be a promising approach to industrialization in the devel-
oping countries".21 It may be noted that the Western World is not alone in 
such actions - the agreement by the U.S.S.R . to buy Cuban sugar at favour-
able prices relates to raw sugar only ,22 much of this being re-exported by 
the U.S.S.R. as refined . 
Table 5 contains data relating to exports of raw and refined sugar 
for the Pacific Region and other countries for a number of years, while 
Table 7 shows the direction of exports, and average prices received, by the 
major Pacific Region exporters. It can be seen that what growth occurred in 
the quantity of sugar exported during the 1960s23 was in raw sugar, and that 
little refined sugar was exported by Pacific Region countries.24 Also it can 
be seen that all Pacific Region exporters have access to preferential markets 
and receive average prices well in excess of the average price quoted for the 
world free market (1.9 c/lb. f .o.b . Caribbean Ports in 1968). Average receipts 
for Mexico, Peru and the Philippines also exceeded those for all (world) 
exporters as a whole , due to the substantial access of these countries to 
the U.S.A. market. 
I have estimated elsewhere25 the effects on export receipts of a 
complete removal of all protection (national and international) of sugar 
production and of taxation of sugar consumption. Using 1959-1961 as a 
base - and the present situation would differ little - it was estimated that 
on "universal free trade" assumptions and a world raw price of 414 c/lb. f.o.b . 
Caribbean, exports could be increased to the E.E .C., Japan, U.S.A. and U.K. 
by perhaps seventy-three per cent. This would imply additional export 
revenue (mainly to cane sugar exporters) of about $480 million per annum 
if the additional exports were all of raw sugar, or $780 million if they were 
refined ; if the same proportionate increase in trade occurred in the rest of 
the world then the additional exports would have been $820 million or 
$1,350 million per annum, respectively . It can be seen that this estimated 
" universal free trade" export price of 414 c/lb. raw for 1968, would have 
implied a lower average export price for the Philippines, Peru and Mexico, 
but higher for China (Taiwan), Colombia, Fiji and Australia. For all there 
would have been the opportunity of substantially increased sales - though 
these would not have compensated for the reduced price for the Philippines, 
Peru and Mexico. Many countries may feel they would be subjected to 
reduced external political pressures if they could substitute a buoyant free 
market for dependence on the United States Sugar Act. 
3. Other Tropical Products 
We now consider trends in the exports of three other processed 
products of importance to tropical countries of the Pacific Region. First, 
wood and processed wood. 
21 Donald C. Horton, "Policy Directions for the United States Sugar Program", American 
Journal of Agricultural Economics, May 1970, p . 193. 22 Hallmans and Ivanov, op. cit. , p . 47 . 23 The total quantity exported (net , raw and refined) for the last four years of the 1960s 
exceeded that exported for the first four years of 19 50s by about 40 per cent; however 
the last four years of the 1960s exceeded the first four years of the 1960s by only two 
per cent - a considerable reduction in 1969 being due to the imposition of export 
quotas under the International Sugar Agreement . (Calculated from data in International 
Sugar Council , Sugar Year Book). 
24The division into raw and refined is not available prior to 1963. 25 R . H. Snape, " Sugar: Costs of Protection and Taxation", Economica, February 1969, 
pp. 29-41. 
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As can be seen from Table 8, wood is an important export for 
many countries of the region.26 In most of the countries there has been a 
substantial increase in exports, but this growth has been mainly in round-
wood. Data in Tables 1 and 2 suggest that all relevant stages of timber 
processing are labour intensive , so that wood processing should be a suitable 
activity for developing countries. Table 3 indicates that processed wood prod. 
ucts are discriminated against by major importers, as compared with the raw 
product, but Balassa states that " tariff differentials between sawnwood and 
round wood are generally offset by differences in transportation costs. "27 
If this is so (though it is doubtful whether it is in the case of Japan), there 
appears to be good prospects for exporters to move increasingly into sawn-
wood. Data in Table 9 show that during 1967 and 1968 almost five-sixths of 
the world 's exports of coniferous logs and sawnwood occurred in sawnwood 
while less than a third of non-coniferous timber in these forms was exported 
as sawnwood.28 As is shown by this table , the non-coniferous wood is of 
export importance to the less developed market economies whereas conifer-
ous is mainly exported by developed market, and centrally planned, econo-
mies. Table 8 shows that while Europe and the United States, and particularly 
the latter, import a considerable proportion of wood in sawnwood form, 
Japan - whose imports of timbers have been growing very rapidly - takes 
nearly all its supplies as roundwood. 
Japan's imports of non-coniferous timber are drawn largely from 
the Pacific Region, which region in turn directs most of its roundwood 
exports to Japan. Thus, as trade flows exist at the present time, a movement 
out of roundwood and into sawnwood by Pacific Region exporters will 
depend on Japan changing the composition of its imports . Balassa has 
calculated29 that Japan , under the Kennedy-Round tariff reductions, is 
lowering the effective rate of protection on the sawing activity from 13.3% 
to 8.5%, the latter figure being that given in Table 3 : it remains to be seen 
whether this reduction will be sufficient to increase its imports of sawnwood 
significantly . 
European countries and the U.S .A. have provided, relatively, a 
better market for non-coniferous sawnwood. Western Malaysia and Sabah, 
the largest sawnwood exporters of the Region (excluding Japan) , have 
obtained markets throughout the western world: if Japan does not change 
the pattern of its imports, these other markets should provide outlets for 
expanded exports of sawnwood. The additional return on such exports is 
indicated in Table 8: in terms of roundwood equivalent , the price received 
for non-coniferous sawnwood during 1967 and 1968 exceeded that for logs 
by about a third . 
Table 8 also shows that the return on exports of veneer sheets or 
plywood is substantially greater than for roundwood or sawnwood; however 
the tariffs on veneer and plywood imposed by the countries that comprise 
the major potential markets are significantly greater than on roundwood or 
sawnwood. Despite these tariffs , four countries in the region (China (Taiwan), 
South Korea, Philippines and Japan) have built up worthwhile export mar-
kets in plywood and one (Philippines) exports veneer. All these exports 
depend heavily on one market - the United States. In the case of the 
Philippines, preferential treatment is accorded by U.S.A., but the other 
26 All data in Tables 8-11 are two-year averages. 
i~Balassa, op. cit. , Ch. III, para. 38; see also ibid. , Ch. I , footnote 12. 
The ratios are calculated on a roundwood basis. 
29 Balassa, op. cit. , Appendix Table A. 
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exporters have surmounted the tariff barrier . In each case (except the 
Philippines) the export of plywood is based on imported roundwood, so 
it might be expected that this processing activity will develop in other coun-
tries of the region. It has been argued that new techniques in plywood and 
veneer manufacture should aid the establishment of these processing activi-
ties in the less developed countries: briefly , they permit the utilisation of 
smaller girth and lower quality logs.30 
In summary it would seem that the prospects for increased exports 
of processed non-coniferous wood are bright and that import demand for 
both raw and processed products should continue to expand rapidly. 
Data regarding exports of coconut and oil palm products, for the 
major exporters of the Region, are contained in Tables 10 and 11. In palm 
oil, international trade occurs only in the oil and not in the product from 
which it is extracted (the outer pulp) , as the oil must be extracted soon after 
harvesting. With palm kernels and copra, however, there is a choice for the 
location of oil extraction and the main part of international trade occurs in 
oilseeds rather than oil. Western Malaysia and Singapore (who are now net 
importers of copra) have increased coconut oil exports considerably over the 
period covered in Table 10. The Philippines is easily the world's largest 
exporter of both copra (mainly to Western Europe) and coconut oil (mainly 
to the United States, where it has, subject to a quota, duty-free entry31 ) and 
while exports of the former have declined, exports of the latter have increased . 
For palm kernels, the proportion of world exports taking the form of kernel 
oil has increased, though this development has not spread to the Pacific 
Region to any extent. 
The processing of these oilseeds, unlike that of timber, is not 
clearly suited to the less developed countries . Tables 1 and 2 suggest that 
vegetable oil mills use a substantial quantity of physical capital per employee . 
Also, if oil cake , as well as oil , is exported there is little loss of weight in 
processing so that transport costs do not favour location in the exporting 
countries. (One may wonder why, in these circumstances, effective rates of 
protection of the crushing activities are so high in importing countries -
Table 3. It may perhaps be relevant that these high effective rates are 
generated by low nominal rates, together with low value added in the crushing 
activity. They were not decreased in the Kennedy-Round.32 ) The paper sub-
mitted by the F.A.O. to UNCTAD I also contains doubts, based on grounds 
other than capital intensity, as to the wisdom of locating this processing activ-
ity in the exporting countries : "The decisive factor [in the profitability of 
crushing firms in developed countries] was success in buying and blending of 
materials, and in these operations crushers in developed countries have very 
marked advantages" .33 Further, advantages in the use of oil and cake in sub-
sequent manufacturing processes appeared to lie with crushers in the devel-
oped countries. In short, processing of tropical oilseeds does not look a 
particularly desirable avenue of development for the major oilseed exporters. 
3°F.A.0., The State of Food and Agriculture, 1969, p. 112. 
31 This quota will decline to zero by 1974. (B. Natapermadi, "The Plantation Crop Plant-
ing Industry in the ADB Region" in Asian Development Bank, Asian Agricultural Survey 
3 
(University of Tokyo Press, 1969), p. 303.) 
2 Balassa, op. cit. 
33 0p. cit., p. 167. 
129 
TABLE 1 
Indexes of Value Added per Employee by Processing 
Industries - U.S .A. 1963 
Value Added Payroll per 
Other Value 
Added per 
Industry per Employee Employee Employee 
Percentage of Average for All Manufacturing 
2013 Meat processing 102 101 104 
2031 Canned and cured Seafoods 89 65 115 
2033 Canned fruits and vegetables 89 63 116 
2036 Fresh or frozen packaged fish 52 48 57 
2041 Flour mills 147 104 193 
2042 Prepared animal feeds 159 87 237 
2043 Cereal preparations 284 112 470 
2044 Rice milling 167 81 260 
2061 Raw cane sugar 145 80 216 
2062 Cane sugar refining 181 124 242 
2091 Cottonseed oil mills 106 77 138 
2092 Soybean oil mills 207 105 319 
2093 Vegetable oil mills n.e.c. 193 100 294 
2094 Animal and marine fats and oils 120 93 148 
2095 Roasted coffee 317 110 541 
2096 Shortening and cooking oils 173 111 240 
2111 Cigarettes 325 87 583 
2121 Cigars 82 56 111 
2281 Yarn mills except wool 52 57 46 
2282 Throwing and winding mills 61 59 63 
2297 Scouring and combing plants 69 72 66 
2298 Cordage and twine 57 66 48 
2411 Logging camps and contractors 63 65 60 
242 Sawmills and planing mills 57 65 48 
2431 Millwork plants 71 83 57 
2432 Veneer and plywood plants 75 83 65 
2433 Prefabricated wood products 87 87 88 
2611 Pulp mills 173 121 23 
2621 Paper mills except building 126 115 139 
2631 Paperboard mills 165 115 220 
2661 Building paper and board mills 114 100 129 
3111 Leather tanning and finishing 76 88 64 
Source: United States Bureau of the Census, Census of Manufacturers 1963, Vol. IL 
130 
... w ... 
T
A
B
L
E
 2
 
In
d
ex
es
 o
f 
V
al
u
e 
A
d
d
ed
 p
er
 E
m
p
lo
y
ee
 b
y
 P
ro
ce
ss
in
g 
In
d
u
st
ri
es
 -
A
u
st
ra
li
a 
1
9
6
7
-6
8
 
V
al
u
e 
A
d
d
ed
 
P
ay
ro
ll
 p
er
 
In
d
u
st
ry
 
P
er
 E
m
p
lo
y
ee
 
E
m
p
lo
y
ee
 
O
th
er
 V
al
u
e 
A
d
d
ed
 p
er
 
E
m
p
lo
y
ee
 
P
er
ce
n
ta
g
e 
o
f 
A
ve
ra
ge
 f
o
r 
A
ll
 M
an
u
fa
ct
u
ri
n
g
 
M
ea
t 
an
d
 f
is
h 
p
re
se
rv
in
g 
1
0
3
 
9
6
 
1
1
0
 
Ja
m
, 
fr
u
it
 a
n
d
 v
eg
et
ab
le
 c
an
n
in
g
 
1
0
0
 
9
6
 
1
0
4
 
F
lo
u
r 
m
il
li
ng
 
1
5
7
 
1
0
4
 
21
1 
A
n
im
al
 a
n
d
 b
ir
d
 f
o
o
d
s 
1
6
7
 
1
0
2
 
2
3
4
 
C
er
ea
l 
fo
o
d
s 
an
d
 s
ta
rc
h
 
1
3
3
 
9
7
 
1
7
0
 
O
il
s,
 v
eg
et
ab
le
 
1
8
2
 
1
1
3
 
2
5
3
 
B
oi
li
ng
 d
o
w
n
, 
ta
ll
o
w
 r
ef
in
in
g
 
1
2
3
 
1
0
4
 
1
4
3
 
T
o
b
ac
co
, 
ci
ga
rs
, 
ci
g
ar
et
te
s 
et
c.
 
6
0
7
 
1
0
1
 
1
,1
3
1
 
C
o
tt
o
n
 g
in
ni
ng
 
3
5
8
 
1
5
8
 
S
aw
m
il
ls
 
79
 
8
9
 
P
ly
w
o
o
d
 m
il
ls
 (
in
cl
ud
in
g 
v
en
ee
rs
) 
81
 
8
9
 
T
an
n
in
g
, 
cu
rr
y
in
g
 a
n
d
 l
ea
th
er
 d
re
ss
in
g 
8
1
 
9
8
 
S
o
u
rc
e
: 
C
o
m
m
o
n
w
ea
lt
h
 B
u
re
au
 o
f 
C
en
su
s 
an
d
 S
ta
ti
st
ic
s,
 M
a
n
u
fa
ct
u
ri
n
g
 I
n
d
u
st
ry
, 
B
u
ll
et
in
 N
o.
 5
, 
1
9
6
7
-6
8
. 
5
6
4
 
7
2
 
7
4
 
6
4
 
_.
 
w
 
N
 
C
o
m
m
o
d
it
y
 
M
ea
t F
re
sh
 a
n
d
 F
ro
ze
n
 
P
re
p
ar
at
io
n
s 
F
is
h F
re
sh
 a
n
d
 F
ro
ze
n
 
P
re
p
ar
at
io
n
s 
F
ru
it
 
F
re
sh
 
P
re
se
rv
ed
 
C
o
co
a 
B
ea
ns
 
P
o
w
d
er
 a
n
d
 B
u
tt
er
 
C
h
o
co
la
te
 
L
ea
th
er
 
H
id
es
 a
n
d
 S
ki
ns
 
L
ea
th
er
 
L
ea
th
er
 g
o
o
d
s 
ex
. 
sh
o
es
 
S
h
o
es
 
C
o
p
ra
 
C
o
pr
a 
C
o
co
n
u
t 
oi
l 
(c
ru
d
e 
an
d
 C
ak
e)
 
C
o
co
n
u
t 
oi
l,
 r
ef
in
ed
 
P
al
m
 K
er
ne
l 
P
al
m
 K
er
n
el
 
O
il
 (
c
ru
d
e
 a
n
d
 c
a
k
e
) 
_
_
 Qj
_J
._
.,
_x
~
"
Q
_
~
9,
_
 -
·
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
T
A
B
L
E
 3
 
N
o
m
in
al
 a
n
d
 E
ff
ec
ti
v
e 
T
ar
if
fs
 i
n 
S
el
ec
te
d
 C
o
u
n
tr
ie
s 
A
ft
er
 K
en
n
ed
y
-R
o
u
n
d
 R
ed
u
ct
io
n
s 
.' 
P
er
 c
en
t 
U
.S
.A
. 
U
.K
.a
 
E
.C
.C
. 
N
or
n.
 
E
ff
. 
N
or
n
. 
E
ff
. 
N
or
n
. 
E
ff
. 
4
.6
 
4
.2
 
1
7
.8
 
4
.7
 
5
.6
 
8
.3
 
1
0
.4
 
1
9
.5
 
4
4
.3
 
1
.3
 
6
.0
 
1
4
.9
 
1
4
.9
 
4
.9
 
1
1
.0
 
8
.8
 
1
3
.1
 
1
8
.7
 
3
5
.8
 
5
.6
 
8
.4
 
1
3
.9
 
5
.0
 
-4
.9
 
5
.3
 
2
.9
 
2
0
.6
 
2
8
.9
 
0 
0 
3
.2
 
1
.6
 
1
1
.6
 
0 
-2
.5
 
1
8
.2
 
1
2
6
.6
 
4
.8
 
1
.3
 
1
0
.0
 
2
8
.6
 
1
8
.0
 
1
9
.3
 
1
.1
 
0 
0 
4
.7
 
1
2
.0
 
1
1
.4
 
3
0
.3
 
4
.8
 
1
2
.3
 
7
.7
 
1
1
.4
 
9
.3
 
8
.1
 
7
.3
 
1
0
.4
 
1
4
.9
 
26
.3
 
2
0
.4
 
3
2
.7
 
1
1
.9
 
1
9
.3
 
0 
1
0
.0
 
0 
5
.5
 
4
7
.2
 
1
4
.0
 
5
0
.0
 
1
0
.0
 
8
5
.4
 
3
0
.0
 
3
0
.0
 
1
5
.0
 
1
5
.0
 
1
5
.0
 
1
8
6
.3
 
0 
1
0
.0
 
0 
0 
3
.2
 
3
8
.7
 
1
0
.0
 
1
1
.2
 
8
.0
 
9
7
.5
 
-
_
_
 _g
_'.:
-_4
 _
_ 
-
2
.-
4
 -
-
1
0
-
9
 
1
0
_0
 
1
5
.0
 
1
8
6
.3
 
J 
S
w
ed
en
 
Ja
p
an
 
N
or
n
. 
E
ff
. 
N
or
n.
 
E
ff
. 
0 
6
.2
 
0 
-5
.7
 
1
6
.4
 
4
7
.3
 
0 
5
.3
 
3
.7
 
8
.6
 
1
2
.0
 
2
7
.5
 
2
.5
 
1
4
.0
 
1
0
.3
 
2
1
.8
 
3
1
.8
 
5
6
.7
 
3
.6
 
3
.0
 
3
.9
 
3
1
.6
 
1
2
.2
 
9
8
.3
 
1
1
.3
 
27
.0
 
3
5
.0
 
6
8
.6
 
0 
0 
1
.7
 
4
.3
 
1
1
.6
 
3
4
.7
 
1
0
.4
 
2
2
.1
 
1
1
.8
 
1
5
.0
 
1
1
.9
 
2
2
.8
 
2
2
.9
 
3
6
.5
 
0 
0 
0 
-1
.0
 
1
0
.0
 
8
5
.4
 
0 
0 
1
0
.0
 
1
0
.0
 
0 
0 
0 
0 
6
.6
 
8
0
.0
 
0 
0 
.J
J-
n
 
R
.O
 
P
a
lm
 O
il
 
C
ru
d
e 
I 
0 
I 1
0
.0
 
I 
9
.0
 
I 
0 
' 8
.0
 
R
ef
in
ed
 
0 
0 
1
0
.0
 
1
0
.0
 
1
4
.0
 
1
8
0
.0
 
0 
0 
8
.0
 
8
.0
 
R
u
b
b
er
 
N
at
u
ra
l 
I 
0 
I 
0 
I 
0 
I 
0 
I 
0 
R
u
b
b
er
 p
ro
d
u
ct
s 
4
.6
 
6
.6
 
1
0
.9
 
2
2
.5
 
7
.9
 
1
6
.3
 
6
.6
 
1
6
.l
 
6
.4
 
1
0
.3
 
W
o
o
d
 
R
o
u
g
h
 
0 
L
4
 
L
O
 
0 
0 
S
im
p
ly
 w
o
rk
ed
 
0
.3
 
0 
6
.3
 
1
8
.8
 
L
6
 
4
.0
 
0 
0 
2
.9
 
8
.5
 
P
ly
w
o
o
d
 
8
.5
 
1
3
.8
 
8
.7
 
1
2
.7
 
1
L
3
 
1
9
.6
 
3
.5
 
2
.9
 
1
4
.0
 
2
5
.4
 
M
an
u
fa
ct
u
re
s 
6
.7
 
1
3
.6
 
8
.1
 
1
3
.2
 
8
.7
 
1
6
.3
 
6
.9
 
1
5
.0
 
1
L
5
 
2
3
.2
 
P
u
lp
 a
n
d
 P
ap
er
 
P
u
lp
w
o
o
d
 
I 
0 
I 
0 
I 
0 
I 
0 
I 
0 
W
o
o
d
 p
u
lp
 
0 
-
L
l 
0 
-2
.4
 
3
.3
 
-5
.0
 
0 
-0
.5
 
5
.0
 
7
.5
 
P
ap
er
 
2
.5
 
5
.0
 
5
.8
 
1
2
.7
 
6.
1 
1
3
.0
 
L
O
 
2
.0
 
7
.7
 
1
7
 .2
 
C
o
tt
o
n
 
R
aw
 
6
.2
 
0 
0 
0 
0 
Y
ar
n
 a
n
d
 T
h
re
ad
 
1
0
.5
 
2
5
.0
 
6.
1 
1
9
.3
 
1
0
.0
 
3
2
.9
 
8
.7
 
3
0
.4
 
2
.8
 
6
.8
 
W
ov
en
 F
ab
ri
cs
 
1
3
.8
 
2
4
.6
 
1
8
.7
 
4
6
.6
 
1
2
.0
 
1
9
.1
 
1
0
.5
 
1
8
.1
 
7
.9
 
1
7
.8
 
.... 
C
lo
th
in
g
 
2
0
.0
 
3
5
.4
 
2
0
.0
 
2
8
.6
 
1
4
.0
 
2
0
.8
 
1
2
.4
 
1
9
.7
 
1
4
.7
 
2
7
.5
 
w
 
w
 
K
n
it
te
d
 A
cc
es
so
ri
es
 
1
7
.9
 
3
5
.2
 
2
L
l 
4
7
.l
 
1
2
.1
 
2
7
.6
 
1
5
.0
 
3
7
.l
 
1
9
.5
 
4
7
.1
 
Ju
te
 
R
aw
 
I 
0 
I 
0 
I 
0 
I 
0 
I 
0 
W
ov
en
 F
ab
ri
cs
 
0 
-0
.6
 
2
0
.0
 
5
4
.7
 
1
9
.6
 
5
3
.3
 
7
.9
 
2
L
6
 
2
0
.0
 
5
4
.4
 
S
ac
k
s 
an
d
 b
ag
s 
3
.6
 
1
0
.7
 
2
0
.0
 
2
8
.0
 
1
5
.5
 
1
4
.0
 
8
.8
 
1
4
.3
 
1
2
.5
 
2.
7 
S
is
al
, 
h
en
eq
u
en
 
S
is
al
 a
n
d
 h
en
eq
u
en
 
I 
0 
I 
1
0
.0
 
I 
0 
I 
0 
I 
0 
C
o
rd
ag
e 
3
.6
 
1
0
.3
 
1
0
.5
 
2
L
9
 
1
0
.3
 
3
0
.6
 
1
0
.4
 
3
2
.2
 
9
.6
 
2
8
.1
 
a 
T
ar
if
fs
 o
n
 N
o
n
-C
o
m
m
o
n
w
ea
lt
h
 i
m
p
o
rt
s.
 
S
o
u
rc
e
: 
B
el
a 
B
al
as
sa
, 
"T
h
e 
S
tr
u
ct
u
re
 o
f 
P
ro
te
ct
io
n
 i
n 
In
d
u
st
ri
al
 C
o
u
n
tr
ie
s 
an
d
 i
ts
 E
ff
ec
ts
 o
n
 t
h
e 
E
"J
io
rt
s 
o
f 
P
ro
ce
ss
ed
 G
o
o
d
s 
fr
o
m
 
D
ev
el
o
p
in
g
 C
o
u
n
tr
ie
s"
 (
P
ap
er
 p
re
p
ar
ed
 a
t 
th
e 
W
o
rl
d
 B
an
k
 f
o
r 
U
N
C
T
A
D
 I
I,
 1
9
6
8
),
 A
p
p
en
 
ix
 T
ab
le
 A
. 
TABLE 4 
Nominal Tariffs on Selected Commodities 
United Kingdoma 
Coffee; unmixed 
(i) Roasted or ground 
(ii) Other 
Coffee and chicory, roasted 
and ground, mixed 
Sugar : Raw 
Refined 
E.E.C.b 
Coffee: Unroasted 
Roasted 
per cwt . 
per cwt. 
per cwt . 
per cwt . 
per cwt. 
Tea: In containers of 3kg. or less 
Other 
Cinnamon: neither crushed or ground 
: crushed or ground 
Cloves: neither crushed nor ground 
: crushed or ground 
Nutmeg: neither crushed nor ground 
: crushed or ground 
Cotton yarn: not prepared for retail sale 
: prepared for retail sale 
Silk cocoons 
Raw silk (unworked) 
Silk yarn: not prepared for retail sale 
: prepared for retail sale 
Silk fabrics 
Japanc 
-----coffee: unroaster 
: other 
Pepper : unground and unmixed 
: ground or mixed 
: put up for retail sale 
Sugar : Raw 
refined 
Cube, loaf etc. 
a Duties as at September 1969. 
Full 
6sh. 3 .6d 
4sh . 8.4d 
14sh. 
2sh . 0.7d-3sh.ll.3d 
6sh. 10.8d 
9.6-16 .2% 
19-22.8% 
11.5% 
9% 
10% 
17.8% 
15% 
20.8% 
15% 
18% 
8% 
12% 
1% 
5% 
7% 
10% 
8-14% 
Free 
35% 
Free - 5% 
11% 
19% 
41.5 yen per kg. 
51.5 yen per kg. 
63.5 yen per kg . 
Commonwealth 
4sh. 8.4d 
Free 
12sh. 6d 
Free 
lsh. 0.8d 
bCoffee, Tea, Cinnamon, Cloves and Nutmeg duties as at September 1969; others from 
January 1972. 
c Duties during 1969. 
Sources: Commonwealth Secretariat, Industrial Fib res No. 19 (1970) and Plantation 
Crops No. 13 (1970). 
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TABLE 5 
Exports of Raw and Refined Sugar by Regions, 1963-1968 
Thousand Metric Tons 
Exported by: 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 
Raw Sugar 
Pacific Region* 
Mexico 351 514 522 467 550 641 
Colombia 42 31 102 114 176 237 
Peru 493 425 362 430 475 467 
China (Taiwan) 576 595 636 661 456 539 
Indonesia 106 104 65 27 
Philippines 1,048 1,082 1,017 929 926 886 
Australia 1,148 1,124 1,279 1,258 1,647 1,601 
Fiji 276 316 310 243 323 347 
Other Central and North America 4,738 5,202 6,199 5,556 6,679 5,622 
Other South America 884 552 1,152 1,406 1,444 1,549 
Other Asia 259 242 340 518 220 171 
Africa 1,639 1,659 1,555 1 ,822 1,878 2,114 
Europe 599 478 694 595 422 507 
World Total 12,159 12,324 14,231 14,028 15 ,196 14,680 
Value ($U.S. million) 1,613 1,750 1,493 1,449 1,537 1,484 
Refined Sugar 
Pacific Region 
China (Taiwan) 98 204 164 179 107 105 
Central and North America 790 810 818 574 830 863 
South America 334 47 63 24 39 66 
China (Mainland) 200 330 367 442 338 211 
Other Asia 610 460 331 277 198 188 
Africa 70 74 48 51 108 121 
U.S.S.R. 802 348 604 993 1,032 1,300 
Other Europe 2,133 2,125 2,027 1,635 1,866 2,232 
World Total 5,056 4,409 4,434 4 ,190 4,537 5,108 
Value ($U.S. million) 800 759 405 323 348 391 
*Countries are listed only if exports exceed 100,000 metric tons; Ryukyu Islands - Japan 
trade is treated as internal. 
Source: F.A.0. Trade Yearbook, 1969. 
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TABLE 9 
Exports of Logs and Sawnwood 
(Thousand Cubic Meters) 
Logs 
Coniferous Non-Conif. 
Exports by: Year (SITC 242.2) (SITC 242.3) 
Developed Average 1959-60 2,330 1,223 
Market Average 1967-68 13,170 1,713 
Economies 
Developing Average 1959-60 90 11,281 
Market Average 1967-68 225 24,722 
Economies 
Centrally Average 1959-60 1,329 52 
Planned Average 1967-68 2,553 214 
World Average 1959-60 3,749 12,556 
Approx. Roundwood equivalent 3,749 12,556 
Average 1967-68 15,949 26,650 
Approx. Roundwood equivalent 15,949 26,650 
Source: F.A.O., Yearbook of Forest Products, 1969. 
TABLE 10 
Exports of Coconut Products 
(Thousand Long Tons) 
Copra 
Av . 1958- Av. 1968-
1959 1969 
West Malaysia and Singapore 78 2ob 
Commonwealth Pacific Islands 92 89 
Papua-New Guinea 67 89 
Indonesia 168 230 
Philippines 756 599 
World Total 1,329 1,166 
a The average extraction rate is 64%. 
bl969 . 
Sawnwood 
Coniferous Non-Conif 
(SITC 243.2) (SITC 243.3) 
26,626 1,918 
32,406 2,335 
1 ,283 2,680 
1,834 2,939 
6,429 705 
10 ,920 1,657 
34,338 5,302 
57 ,300 9,600 
45,160 6,930 
75,400 12,600 
Coconut Oila 
Av. 1958- Av. 1968-
1959 1969 
54 
19 
24 
60 
17 
22 
12 
73 239 
291 511 
Sources: Commonwealth Economic Committee (Commonwealth Secretariat), Vegetable 
Oils and Oilseeds and Tropical Products Quarterly, and F.A.O., Coconut Situa-
tion. 
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TWO COMMENTS BY A CANADIAN GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL 
WHO WAS UNABLE TO ATTEND 
First, although there was a significant price decline in sugar during 
the 1960s, market conditions have changed somewhat since then. Secondly, 
many countries probably would not want to substitute a buoyant free mar-
ket for dependence on the U.S. Sugar Act, contrary to Professor Snape, as 
long as the price in the U.S. was as good as any likely option. 
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DISCUSSION OF THE PAPERS 
of 
Dr. H. Vandendreissche and Professor R. H. Snape 
Professor Snape, replying to the first comment on his paper, said 
that the annual average prices he quoted for recent years indicate that the 
refined/raw sugar margin has not changed. Secondly, although sugar-
producing countries get higher prices under the U.S. Sugar Act than on the 
world market, he was upset by the 'imperialistic' provision (under the new 
U.S. Sugar Act) for reducing the price of sugar, or the receipts of the less 
developed countries, by a fixed amount (at the President's discretion) if any 
country seizes any property belonging to the U.S . and pays what the President 
regards as an unsatisfactory price. While granting that the sugar producers 
themselves suggested the new act, as one U.S. participant pointed out, 
Professor Snape emphasized that he was comparing the situation under the 
Sugar Act to a "buoyant" free market, not the present world market. 
The complexities of analysing specific processing industries were 
emphasized throughout the discussion and in the case of sugar it was pointed 
out that the bulk of sugar is not traded on the European market but rather 
at long-term contract prices. Consequently, the prices for both raw and 
refined sugar that Professor Snape used were said to be marginal prices 
reflecting the dumping in many cases of East European and Cuban sugar on 
the West European market. This would partly explain why sometimes the 
refined sugar price was less than the raw sugar price. 
With respect to Dr. Vandendreissche's theoretical discussion, one 
participant (from an international institution) pointed out that, on one hand 
while classical economic theory does say that firms will locate generally where 
it is most profitable, on the other hand it requires the assumption that capital 
markets be perfect. In developing countries this would imply that low per 
capita income and low capital accumulation would mean that capital is not 
available generally for specific processing activities. However, it was said that 
capital markets are not at all perfect, if they even exist, in these countries and 
a great deal of processing activity is linked to capital markets through the 
marketing organization. Thus the real issue was said to be whether the 
companies which process palm oil or timber, etc. decide to do it in the devel-
oped or the less developed country, for the technology and capital are linked 
to decisions about where the comparative advantage lies in a more basic sense 
related to ease of processing, transport and so on. It seems that there is ample 
capital available, for example, for oil or timber processing that simply would 
not be available for other types of activities, so that the opportunity costs of 
this capital are not those of capital for other activities in the economy. Along 
with Professor Safarian, many participants emphasized the importance of 
industry structure in affecting the location of processing. 
The large, oligopolistic, multi-national corporations, which domi-
nate many of the extractive and processing industries, tend to locate process-
ing industries, tend to locate processing where it is most profitable and the 
most profitable location, dictated to an important extent by the framework 
of trade barriers, is now generally in Europe, the United States or Japan. In 
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the case of palm oil and copra it was mentioned that preferential access to 
the U.S. market for the Philippines has led to oil production in the Philip-
pines and oil exports rather than copra to the U.S. whereas other Southeast 
Asian countries export mostly copra to be processed in the U.S. because they 
do not have preferential access. It was emphasized that the vertical integration 
of processing from growing or extracting to find processing and often mar-
keting within the multi-national corporation results in a tendency to shift 
profits to the parent in the developed country by the corporations ability 
to fix raw material prices in a monopolistic way. This cuts into the element 
of economic rent that belongs to the less developed country by virtue of its 
owning the raw resources or tropical land. Thus the less developed country 
loses not only the advantages, whatever they are, of having the processing 
located there, but also some of its economic rent. This was said to be true of 
the edible oils industry and an example from the petroleum industry was 
described. A participant from the U.S. suggested it might be possible for the 
suppliers in less developed countries to cooperate as a cartel to counter these 
oligopolistic practices and force the developed countries to lower tariff 
barriers or discriminatory taxes . It was agreed that this would be relatively 
easy for extractive industries like petroleum, but it would be extremely 
difficult in processing industries. 
There was little discussion of the interrelation between tariff distor-
tions of trade and distortions due to oligopolistic industry structure. However, 
one participant from Canada said that because value-added by processing is 
in most cases very small it does not matter very much where the processing is 
located in terms of jobs or income. Then, since the processors in the devel-
oped country have a concentrated interest in protecting their business while 
consumers are relatively uninterested due to the small element of value-added, 
it is relatively easy for the processors to exert political pressure to institute or 
maintain tariffs, which themselves only need to be small to give high effective 
protection. This led to the view of this participant that, because of the 
monetarily small size of the value-added involved, the question of the location 
of processing was not a very important part of the problem of development. 
This participant agreed that the tariff policies of the advanced countries ought 
to be changed, but did not feel that this was a major element in economic 
development policy. Other Canadian and American participants disagreed 
with this view, however, and suggested that at least in some products there 
was considerable leverage involved in locating processing in less developed 
countries and that consequently the reduction of tariff barriers in both the 
developed and the less developed countries was an important element of 
economic development policy. 
From the latter point of view, the participant from Singapore and 
a Canadian participant emphasized the importance to the developing countries 
of trying to fill in the structure of production, in terms of the cells of an input/ 
output matrix and of developing the linkage and spillover effects of estab-
lishing processing activities and technological innovations in several key 
industries. The Canadian participant suggested that integrated development 
by planning several sectors at once is important, for example, by making use 
of by-products, such as molasses and alcohol in the case of sugar refining, 
that would otherwise be wasted. Other participants however mentioned that 
one of the problems with integrated planning in less developed countries is 
to find markets for all these by-products whereas the developed countries 
are rich enough to have markets for everything. It was also suggested that 
the location of processing activities in developing countries provides linkages 
through which external economies of scale may be transmitted or generated 
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and the establishment of a palm kernel crushing industry in Malaysia was 
cited as an example. Furthermore, the Singapore participant noted that with 
much un- and underemployment in many Pacific tropical countries, the 
opportunity costs of unemployed labour may be very low or zero so that 
processing would tend to be more profitable than otherwise. Finally, the 
Canadian participant felt that if processing activities are becoming foot-loose 
as suggested by Dr. Vandendreissche and if the cost economics expected 
from this are due to 'learning-from-doing' or a kind of Myndal 'backwash 
effect' of established locations, then the location of processing becomes a 
subject of international negotiation and in such negotiation the benefits of 
the infant industry argument should go to the less developed countries. 
All participants agreed with the view that if the real rates of 
exchange, tariffs and export taxes and subsidies were correctly calculated, 
the less developed countries would clearly have a cost advantage in the loca-
tion of processing activities. It was also clear that the tariff barriers of the 
developed countries are designed precisely to divert processing and manufac-
turing away from the less developed countries. Several countries have intro-
duced preferential tariff schemes supposedly for the benefit of the less 
developed countries, however, the Japanese scheme affects only 3 to 4 per 
cent of total Japanese imports, the Australian scheme less than one per cent 
and the European. Economic Community has a scheme involving tariff 
quotas that ensure few benefits, especially to East and Southeast Asian 
countries. Moreover, it was explained that the commodities affected by the 
preferences are not the agricultural processed goods, but rather manufactured 
goods, although even here labour-intensive processed goods and sensitive 
goods like textiles are excluded. Thus, as one participant observed, in com-
modities where there might be some benefits from preferences, preferences 
were not given. A tJ.S. participant said that, at the time the U.S. decided to 
accept general preferences, it proposed, in the face of much internal political 
pressure, that processed agricultural goods be included, but the European 
Economic Community and Japan said that there was no possibility at all of 
this in the next decade. Later in the Conference the disadvantages of the U.S. 
scheme were also pointed out. 
Another question asked was concerned with the degree of effective 
protection actually used by producers in terms of their pricing policies. The 
only evidence on this question was an aggregate study of the Australian 
manufacturing industry as a whole which had effective protection of 47% on 
average, but of this only about one-half was used, although this figure was 
probably biased downwards. 
While the participants as a group thought tariffs to be a very 
important factor in distorting trade patterns and thought they ought to be 
removed, it was difficult to answer the question whether they are by far the 
most important distorting factor. One participant from Canada answered that 
while tariff policies do distort the location of industry in ways which are 
harmful to the less developed countries, there are other aspects of economic 
policy and economic organization which might well survive the tariffs and 
give the same effect . For example, once a country begins by having a corpo-
rate income tax, an element of irrationality is thrown into the location of 
industry right away. Consequently, the problem of rationalizing the location 
of industry is not one that can be simply solved by taking down tariff protec-
tion. It was said that the structure of wages and costs adjusts to the tariff 
system. It is easy enough to look at one industry such as sugar refining, 
calculate that it has effective protection of so much and then predict that if 
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the tariff were taken off that industry only , it would disappear. However, 
besides questions of tax and non-tariff barriers and industry structure , it 
would be difficult to predict the results if all tariffs were taken off simulta-
neously . Partly because of the fixed capital and labour to some extent is 
protected industries, it was said that, if tariffs were removed simultaneously, 
it is possible that the exchange rate adjustment that would have to be made 
to match it would leave the country with much the same industrial structure 
as before the change , although there would be some reshuffling of resources. 
At the end of the session Dr. Vandendreissche commented that 
the whole discussion seemed to have begged two questions. First, what in 
fact is the cost of all these elements, of protection that have been discussed? 
These he tried to discuss in his paper. Secondly, what are the rich nations 
within the region willing to do to help bring about a new international 
division of labour, at least within the region. For example , he suggested that 
some long-term purchasing agreements, such as some Japanese firms have 
made, along with aid to developing countries, would be a large contribution 
to solving some of the problems created by tariff barriers . 
A REVIEW OF SOME BASIC PROBLEMS OF THE 
KENAF FIBER INDUSTRY IN THA ILAND* 
Introduction 
by 
VICHITVONG N. POMBHEJARA 
Ministry of Industry 
Government of Thailand 
Kenaf, or "Thai Jute" is the common name of two closely related 
species of the family Malvacaeae, Hibiscus cannabibus and Hibiscus sab-
dariffa. Thailai'ld and India are the two major producers of this agricultural 
fiber, although the former is by far the largest exporter of the product. 
Almost all of the kenaf grown in Thailand is Hibiscus sabdariffa 
var. altissima, and essentially tropical crop. The species withstands drought 
and can be grown where there is little rainfall. However, there should be 
sufficient moisture at planting time so that germination is not impeded. For 
this reason, the planting of kenaf begins early in the rainy season, i.e. between 
May and June, and some 140 - 160 days later, in September and October, 
when the plant grows to a height of 4 to 12 feet or more, depending upon 
climatic conditions, soil fertility and time of planting, it is harvested. Kenaf, 
as an upland crop, is grown abundantly in the Northeast region. 
Botanically, kenaf is different from jute (Corchorus capsularis and 
Corchorus olitorius). Although the soft fiber contained in the bast of the 
stalks has properties very similar to those of jute fiber and could be used as 
a jute substitute, jute fiber is inherently finer than that from kenaf and can 
be used to make finer yarns. Because of this inferior natural quality, kenaf 
if much cheaper than jute in the market . 
Before 1950, the commodity was of little commercial significance , 
but since then production increased steadily, reaching its peak in 1966 when 
the total output amounted to 661,000 metric tons of fiber, and earned for 
Thailand$ US 80 million from exports . In that year, kenaf came third, after 
rice and rubber, on the country's export account. In recent years, both pro-
duction and exports have substantially declined to an average of 250,000 -
350,000 metric tons. Nevertheless, Thailand still manages to maintain her 
position as the world's largest producer and exporter. 
In view of the fact that kenaf not only contributes significantly 
to the growth of the Thai economy, but also serves as a major Thai contri-
bution to world supply of industrial raw materials, the present paper aims 
at reviewing some basic problems confronting the kenaf fiber industry and, 
as far as possible, suggesting a broad approach for future policy formulation. 
In many ways, the author is indebted to various publications and 
memoranda written on the same subject, such as UNIDO 's "Report on the 
Kenaf Industry in Thailand", Erwin J . Sholton 's "Kenaf in Thailand", and 
Eldon D. Smith's "Government Policies for the Thai Kenaf Industry and 
Economic Analysis, which have enlightened him on several technical points. 
A selected bibliography is attached. 
*This paper has been prepared for the Fourth Pacific Trade and Development Conference, 
held in Ottawa, Canada, on October 7 - 10, 1971. 
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The General Problem 
Kenaf is of considerable importance to the economy of Thailand ; 
past, present, and future. Its importance derives from the following elements. 
First, kenaf is the major cash crop of the farmers in Northeast 
Thailand where rice is cultivated mainly for family consumption. Being an 
upland crop, kenaf could be grown in the areas which are not suitable for 
rice cultivation . It is also a more profitable crop than rice. The total annual 
income derived from kenaf cultivation at the level of 400,000 metric tons 
per season could be as high as$ US 40 million (or about Bht. 800 million) 
which obviously helps raise the average income of those poor farmers above 
its subsistance level. This is a significant consideration in view of the need to 
improve the Northeast income which is at present much lower than the 
national average. 
Secondly, the development of the kenaf industry in the Northeast 
has generated employment within the regionso that not only is the utilization 
of manpower between rice crops improved but also new jobs have been 
created for the rapidly increasing agricultural population. Additional employ-
ment generated by the industry consists of activities in about 200 baling 
plants (over 30,000 jobs) and those in the ten jute mills (over 15,000 jobs) 
located mainly in the same region. Kenaf baling and processing are the only 
major industrial activities in Thailand's Northeast which together contribute 
between$ US 10 - 15 million or about Bht. 200 - 300 million to the GNP. 
Finally, Kenaf fiber is one of the major export items of Thailand. 
At its peak in 1966, kenaf came third after rice and rubber, earning for 
Thailand$ US 80 million or Bht . 1,614 million, or about 11 % of the total 
export value of the same year. Today , after a decline in both output and 
export, kenaf fiber still ranks high among individual export products, with a 
contribution of over 5% in value. In addition to that , exports of finished 
products made of kenaf such as gunny bags and hessian cloths are also rising, 
earning for Thailand additional foreign exchange to pay for her rapidly in-
creasing imports of capital goods and other industrial raw materials necessary 
for the country's industrialization program. 
Economically important as it is, the development of kenaf industry 
in Thailand is still far from being satisfactory . The industry has been encoun-
tering many serious problems which impede its further growth . 
The kenaf problems, regardless of their derivatives, focus on a 
single factor, namely, an extremely unstable price. 
The extreme instability in prices is responsible for wide fluctuations 
in the fiber's output, for uncertainty in the kenaf processing activities, and 
to a great extent, for the lack of quality improvements. The fluctuation in 
the fiber 's output of some 100,000 metric tons or more from year to year 
not only affects the stability of income, employment and foreign exchange 
earnings, it also creates further price uncertainty for the raw material and so 
upsets the production programming of the related processing industries both 
to meet the requirements of the domestic market and export commitments. 
The problem of price instability undoubtedly originates from the 
characteristics of the fiber's international market itself. 
The demand for kenaf is primarily international. Domestic con-
sumption, though growing, accounts for less than 100,000 metric tons per 
year, which is the amount required to meet the needs of local jute manufac-
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turing, a primarily import-substitution industry with surplus capacity for 
export. Under these circumstances, fiber output above 100,000 tons for any 
given year will have to find a market abroad. This excess of output has ranged 
from 100,000 tons to 500,000 tons, depending on the size of the crop in any 
particular season. 
It should be pointed out that kenaf forms only a relatively small 
part in the total world supply of coarse fibers, more or less about 20 per cent. 
Therefore, in the international market, kenaf has to compete with jute which 
is not only regarded as a superior product, but in fact occupies the remaining 
80 per cent of the total world supply. It must also be noted that the role of 
kenaf is only that of a limited substitute of jute. In many uses, jute and kenaf 
fibers are mixed or blended, the proportion varying with use and local prac-
tice, mainly for the purpose of lowering the cost of production. Nevertheless, 
experts have contended that despite some natural inferiority, kenaf fiber of 
uniform quality can be substituted almost completely in some of the major 
uses for jute of the lower grades. Gunny bag manufacturing is a clear example 
of complete substitution. 
The toughness of competition in the world market become clearer 
when account is taken of the fact that Thailand is not the sole supplier of 
kenaf, although it is by far the largest. 
Competition with jute is however, only a part of the story. In 
reality, both jute and kenaf, together with the other natural coarse fibers, 
have also been facing competition from a group of potential substitutes, 
consisting of paper synthetic fiber, sheet plastics, and to some extent cotton, 
under certain conditions, which have already captured part of the market. 
In this connection, the role of kenaf is rather unique, for its relatively low 
price has helped meet the threat of these potential substitutes as the supply 
of kenaf at low prices has enabled the spinners to use it in admixture with 
jute and thus lower their raw material cost. 
With the characteristics of the international market as described 
above, it is apparent that price instability is hardly avoidable. Year-to-year 
changes in average wholesale prices of kenaf have averaged some 28 per cent 
during 1951 - 1956, and the range of monthly average prices between 1963 -
1968 has been more or less on the same scale. In 1970, a relatively normal 
year, the price of Grade A kenaf fluctuated between £ 78.0.0 and£ 93.10.0, 
a ton Grade B between£ 73.0.0 and£ 89.10.0, and Grade C between£ 
65.0.0 and£ 83 .0.0 respectively, all quoted in the London market. 
The fact that kenaf prices are low relative to those of jute does not 
present itself as a real problem to the kenaf industry, although higher prices 
would encourage expansion in production and help improve income and 
employment as well as export earning. As already stated above, the crux of 
the problem lies in the fact that the existing low prices fluctuate widely from 
year to year, from month to month, and from week to week. In other words, 
whereas low prices can be taken for granted if price stablility exists, and 
fluctuations, on the other hand, are acceptable if risks could be compensated 
by higher prices, the combination of low and extremely unstable prices is 
absolutely intolerable under any circumstances. 
The general problem, therefore, seems to be how to remove at 
least one of the adverse factors from the scene, so that '.Thailand could con-
fidently continue to supply kenaf fiber to the world, and in return, acquire 
growth and stability for her own economy. 
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Production of Fiber 
Kenaf is mainly grown in an area bound by the Provinces of Udorn, 
Korat, Ubold, and Chaiyaphum in Northeast Thailand. The soil in the region 
is sandy, well-drained, and particularly suitable to the plant. During the 
1970/71 season, the area devoted to kenaf cultivation is estimated at approx-
imately 2.4 million rai or 960,000 acres, with some 400,000 rai or 160,000 
acres increase over the last season. Although the yields obtained tend to vary 
from one specific location to another, with 500 kilograms per rai as highest, 
they have in recent years averaged between 150 - 200 kilograms per rai in 
most of the areas under cultivation. The relatively low yields on the average 
is due to many factors including the use of seed with poor germination rates, 
insufficient preparation of the soil, and the lack of line sowing and consequent 
improper spacing. 
Thai kenaf is considered to be of inferior quality and to lack uni-
formity. One of the reasons for poor quality is that whenever labor is required 
for rice and kenaf operations at the same time, rice, being the food crop, is 
given preference. Kenaf is therefore often left unharvested past its maturity, 
thus producing poor quality fiber. There is also a problem of shortage of 
clean water for retting and washing the fiber after harvesting. This problem 
can become acute particularly when plants are harvested later than they 
should be. In Northeast Thailand, kenaf is retted wherever water is available 
for the purpose, such as swamps, ponds, road-side ditches and streams. The 
lack of suitable retting facilities and of water at the time it is required, experts 
have agreed, constitutes the single most serious problem as far as the improve-
ment of the quality of Thai kenaf is concerned. 
Other factors contributing to the poor quality of Thai kenaf include 
too early removal of the stalks from the water at the end of the retting process 
which leads to barky runners and an excessive amount of unretted butt-ends 
to be left on the fiber, too late removal which causes over-retting and weak-
ening of the fiber , improper washing after stripping, and careless spreading 
and alignment of the fiber on the drying lines. All these shortcomings could 
be removed, if the farmers had an economic incentive in the form of price 
differential between grades to do so. 
Between 1956 - 1966, kenaf output grew steadily from 17,000 
metric tons to 661,000 metric tons, but since then it has declined to a level 
of around 350,000 - 400,000 metric tons. Table 2 below gives details on 
kenaf and jute outputs since 1950. 
Fiber Grading 
In practice, the farmer does not grade his fiber. As the fiber is sold 
in "mixed grade" , the farmer not only has no incentive to exert an extra 
effort to produce superior quality fiber, but it is also to his own interest to 
try to deliver as low quality fiber as he possibly can. Pre-grading on the part 
of the farmer, no matter how necessary for the improvement of the quality, 
is practically ruled out because of the lack of economic incentive in terms 
of price differential between grades . 
The first actual grading of the fiber is therefore carried out by the 
baling plants which at present number more than 200 and are mostly located 
in the kenaf areas of the Northeast. The average size plant is capable of han-
dling some 4,000 - 6,000 tons of fiber per season. After grading according to 
quality, the under-retted butt-ends are removed, and the remaining fibers 
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TABLE 2 
Thailand's Production of Jute & Kenaf, 1950 -1970 
Jute 
(Thousand Metric Tons) 
1950 4.7 2.5 
1951 20.0 3.0 
1952 13 .1 1.0 
1953 14.0 1.8 
1954 8.2 1.3 
1955 9.8 1.3 
1956 17.0 2.5 
1957 21.0 2.8 
1958 29.6 2.9 
1959 50.0 3 .9 
1960 181.3 6.2 
1961 239.0 11.6 
1962 134.0 6.7 
1963 211.7 6.9 
1964 303.1 6.5 
1965 528.6 8.7 
1966 661.4 10.9 
1967 421.4 7.4 
1968 316.8 4.4 
1969 350 .0 10.0 (estimated) 
1970 370.0 10.0 (estimated) 
Source : Ministry of Agriculture. 
are compressed into 180 kilogram export bales by high-density presses. As 
the primary responsibility for grading rests with the baling plants, after which 
the fiber will be sent to the jute mills for manufacturing or to Bangkok for 
export, the activities of these plants are of paramount importance. Unfortu-
nately, partly owing to lack of experience or neglicence and partly to fraud-
ulent practices, some balers do not adhere to the official grading standards . 
For this reason, much of the fiber, reaching exporters and the mills is of 
poor-uniform quality, with consequent harm to the reputation of Thai kenaf 
in the international market. 
The importance of serious grading is however not overlooked by 
the Government, and , in fact, serious efforts have been made to overcome 
the poor quality problem. Before shipments, inspections are carried out by 
the Office of Commodity Standards to determine whether the quality and 
packing of the fiber conform to the standards laid down by the Government. 
According to the official standards, kenaf is classified into four 
grades, namely, Super, A, B, and C, each of which must be strong with a 
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maximum limit of moisture content of 14 per cent by weight. Fiber of super 
grade must be sheeny white in color and very soft with a minimum length, 
i.e. 1.00 meter, but Grade A is whiter and softer. In addition to that, fibers 
of Super Grade and Grade A, must contain no hard root and top ends, where-
as for Grade B, the hard root, if any, must not be longer than 10 centimeters. 
Grade C fiber is , of course , of inferior quality. Standards inspection is made 
on the minimum basis of 5 per cent of the total number of bales to be cer-
tified. The work of the Standards Office is supported and assisted by the 
Thai Jute Association which recently has amalgamated with the Thai Jute 
Balers Association, both of which represent the private sector. 
The grading problem therefore lies more on the practical side , i.e. 
how to make the actual practice conform to the official standards require-
ment. It has been suggested that perhaps the most logical approach is to pay 
attention to grading from the beginning of the process until the end of the 
line, i.e . from the farmer to the exporter. Whereas some economic incentives 
have to be provided for the farmer to pre-grade his fiber, it is the baling 
plants in the up-country that have to be placed under strict control and su-
pervision. 
Fiber Manufacturing 
Part of the kenaf fiber produced is consumed within the country. 
The annual demand for 100,000 metric tons comes directly from the ten 
jute mills, most of which are located also in the Northeast , and three of 
which are government owned and operated . These mills were primarily es-
tablished to manufacture gunny bags to substitute for imports which prior 
to 1952, when the first mill was set up, amounted to 30 million units . The 
local jute mills vary in size and capacity , but all together are capable of 
producing some 80 million units of gunny bags per year. Since local con-
sumption amounts to only 40 - 45 million units annually , the gunny bag 
industry has in recent years been facing a serious problem of over-production. 
In 1968 when the total output of gunny bags was as high as 60 million units, 
over-production led to a sharp fall in prices. For months, the price of the 
standard rice bag (size 29" x 43") averaged as low as Bht . 4.50 per unit which 
was somewhat lower than the average cost of most, if not all, of the jute mills. 
The problem of over-production and depressed prices made it necessary for 
the mills, both private and government alike, to come together and form a 
" Jute Mill Group" with the purpose of regulating the production of each of 
the mills within the limit of the current domestic requirements, as well as the 
prices. Since the formation of the "Group", the industry has been able to 
gradually raise the domestic prices of its products to a profitable level. The 
gain derived from domestic sale is intended to serve as a compensation for 
the loss incurred from export. Since July 1971, supported by a stronger 
export demand partly as a result of the recent Pakistan political crisis, the 
domestic price for gunny bags has been maintained at a high level at Bht. 
8.30 per unit . At this price, an average mill could make a profit between Bht. 
1.50 - 2.50 per unit, depending on the mill's efficiency and , of course, the 
prevailing prices of kenaf. At the same t ime, export prices have also gone up 
considerably, from a normal level of about Bht. 5 .00 - 5 .50 per unit on the 
average to that between Bht. 8 .00 - 8 .50. For the time being, the industry is 
definitely enjoying a rare moment of comfort. 
Apparently, Thailand's gunny bag industry's fundamental problems 
are excess capacity and consequently, over-production; both factors tend to 
keep the cost per unit higher than otherwise . Considering the fact that the 
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average Thai jute mill is of relatively small size, excess capacity for each in-
dividual mill and over-production for the whole industry together, present 
no easy problem. The only realistic solution is therefore to be found in an 
adequate export program. 
Given the annual domestic requirement of gunny bags at 40 
million units, the industry has at its disposal between 30 - 35 million units 
which can be offered for sale in the international market. With full capacity 
production, the cost per unit is likely to be more competitive, and product 
diversification on the part of the industry itself could further widen the 
market. In other words, export expansion of kenaf products is still a strong 
possibility. The only difficulty, however, is the extremely unstable price of, 
the raw material, kenaf. 
Price instability which renders export programming ineffective and 
longpterm commitments impractical is illustrated in the following tables. It 
can be seen that not only have fluctuations occurred from year to year, but 
even from month to month (or from week to week); wide fluctuations in the 
kenaf prices are regarded as a normal phenomenon. These fluctuations make 
it almost impossible for the jute mill to quote any price which is effective 
over a few weeks. Recently, many Thai jute mills have incurred heavy losses 
despite specially strong export demand. The losses are due to the fact that 
export contracts were signed early in the year when the average price of kenaf 
was still around Bht. 3.00 per kilogram and the price of the finished product 
was quoted and agreed to accordingly. But at the time of manufacturing and 
delivery, the kenaf price has already gone up by almost Bht. 1.00. 
TABLE 3a 
Average Monthly Ex Godown Prices of Baled Thai Kenaf, 1963 - 1971 * 
Grade A 
1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1969 1970 1971 
January 4.05 3.42 3 .65 4.17 3 .67 3.75 3.00 3.30 
February 3 .77 3.50 3.60 4 .30 3.55 3.70 3.10 3.05 
March 3.37 3.45 3 .50 4.50 3 .32 3.55 2.90 3.05 
April 3.20 3.42 3.77 4.62 3.05 3.35 2.85 3.75 
May 3.32 3 .30 3.87 4.77 2.80 3.10 2.90 
June 3.42 3.22 4.15 4.60 2.65 2.75 3 .15 
July 3.45 3 .12 4.12 4.40 2.70 2.75 3 .00 
August 3.30 3.77 3.97 4.12 2.80 2.70 2.75 
September 3.07 4.10 3.97 3.55 2.65 2.70 2.85 
October 2.97 3.85 3.75 3.40 2.62 2.35 3.15 
November 3.10 3.67 3.85 3.55 2.55 2.50 3.35 
December 3 .22 3.65 4.00 3.60 2.52 2.75 3 .35 
*Bht. per kilogram. 
Source: Thai Jute Association. 
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TABLE 3b 
Average Monthly Ex Godown Prices of Baled Thai Kenaf, 1963 - 1971 * 
Grade B 
1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1969 1970 1971 
January 3.75 2.95 3.37 3 .77 3 .25 3.55 2.75 3.10 
February 3 .55 3 .02 3 .30 3.92 3 .15 3.50 2.90 2.85 
March 3.10 3.02 3.05 4 .17 3.42 3.30 2.65 2.75 
April 2.87 3.02 3 .25 4.42 2.65 3 .05 2.50 3.35 
May 3.10 3.02 3.42 4 .62 2.40 2.85 2.55 
June 3.27 3.00 3.80 4.45 2.10 2.55 2.80 
July 3.32 2.97 3.82 4 .12 2.10 2.55 2.65 
August 3 .20 3.60 3.72 3 .90 2.20 2.50 2.45 
September 2.92 3.82 3.70 3.40 2.05 2.45 2.55 
October 2.80 3.57 3 .52 3.15 2.17 2.20 2.85 
November 2.80 3.42 3 .52 3.25 1.92 2.30 3.15 
December 2.77 3.35 3.57 3.25 1.75 2.50 3.15 
*Bht. per kilogram. 
Source: Thai Jute Association. 
TABLE 3c 
Average Monthly Ex Godown Prices of Baled Thai Kenaf, 1963 - 1971 * 
Grade C 
1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1969 1970 1971 
January 3.20 2.55 3.05 3.20 2.80 3 .15 2.25 2.80 
February 3.10 2.80 2.92 3 .12 2.67 2.65 2.45 2.45 
March 2.67 2.85 2.67 3 .25 2.35 2.65 2.30 2.25 
April 2 .75 2.82 2.80 3.62 2.07 2.30 2.00 2.75 
May 2.92 2.85 3.05 3.82 1.80 2.20 2 .00 
June 3.05 2.75 3 .50 3 .50 1.70 1.90 2.35 
July 3.02 2.62 3 .60 3.20 i.7o 1.90 2.20 
August 2.92 3.22 3.52 3.00 1.70 1.90 1.95 
September 2.67 3.52 3.52 2.77 1.55 1.90 2.05 
October 2.52 3.27 3 .25 2.70 1.60 1.65 2.40 
November 2.45 3 .10 3.05 2.82 1.30 1.80 2.80 
December 2.42 3.07 3 .05 2.82 . 1.10 2.00 2.90 
*Bht. per kilogram. 
Source : Thai Jute Association. 
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Following the development of the kenaf fiber industry, the output 
of gunny bags climbed steadily during the 1960's, reaching its peak of 55.2 
million units in 1968. The bags themselves are manufactured in various sizes 
according to market demand, but the most common is the 100 kg. rice sack 
of 29" x 43". Apart from bags, some mills also produce hessian cloth and 
twine which, despite a relatively limited market, are more profitable than 
bags. Table 4 below gives the annual output of gunny bags between 1961 -
1970. 
Export of Fiber 
TABLE 4 
Production of Gunny Bags, 1961 - 1970 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
Source: Bank of Thailand. 
Output 
(Units) 
8,842,091 
10,815,942 
23,128,987 
33,511,424 
40,360,865 
46,807,019 
54,661,099 
55,284,099 
44,893,638 
52,733,326 
Thailand began her export of kenaf fiber in the 1959's, but it was 
not until the early 1960's that the product come to be considered one of the 
major export items of the country. Table 5 shows export quantity and value 
between 1958 - 1970. 
In addition to kenaf, there has also been a small export trade in 
jute. In 1970, for example, jute exports amounted to 3,595 metric tons 
valued at Bht. 9 million. 
Kenaf fibers exported from Thailand are of several grades, namely, 
Grade Super, Grade A, Grade B, Grade C, and Cuttings and Tangles. Table 6 
provides data on exports by grades during 1966 - 1971. 
It should also be noted that owing to the practical problems of 
control and supervision already referred to, Thai kenaf of Grade Super and 
Grade A may not be consistent with international standards . However, most 
of the exports consist of relatively high grade fibers which serve as substitutes 
for jute, whereas gunny bag manufacturing normally requires a higher pro-
portion of fibers of lower Grades. 
Thailand's customers are distributed all over the world. From 
Western Europe, there are Belgium, Italy, France, Federal Republic of 
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TABLE 5 
Kenaf Exports of Thailand, 1958 - 1970 
Year Quantity Value 
(1,000 Metric Tons) (Millions of Baht) 
1958 27.5 69 
1959 36.5 86 
1960 60.8 227 
1961 142.4 623 
1962 236.7 575 
1963 124.9 356 
1964 161.8 494 
1965 316.8 1,102 
1966 473.0 1,613 
1967 316 .8 865 
1968 289.2 674 
1969 254 .6 776 
1970 251.3 677 
Source: Department of Customs. 
TABLE 6 
Exports of Thai Kenaf by Grades 1966 -1971 
Year Super Grade A Grade B Grade C Others 
(Metric Tons) 
1966 2,751 157,706 146,953 115,716 62,156 
% of total (0 .57) (32.50) (30 .28) (23.85) (12.80) 
1967 2,378 119,077 91,332 67 ,234 44,205 
% of total (0 .73) (36.73) (28.17) (20 .74) (13.63) 
1969-1970 2,920 143,24 7 69,102 27,150 39,492 
% of total (1.04) (50.81) (24 .51) (9 .63) (14.01) 
1970-1971 
(to April 1971) 1,088 86,462 41,237 19,221 23,930 
Source : Thai Jute Association. 
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Germany, United Kingdom, Portugal, Spain, the Netherlands, and Rumania 
represent Eastern Europe among the customers. In addition to that, the fiber 
is also exported to the United States, Guatemala, South Africa, Kenya and 
many other countries. Among these customers, however, Japan and India are 
by far the largest, together sharing approximately one half of the total exports 
for any given year. Table 7 below shows the quantities exported to some in-
dividual countries between 1966 - 1969. 
TABLE 7 
Thailand's Jute & Kenaf Exports, 1966 - 1969 
(by Countries) 
Countries 1966 1967 1968 1969 
(1,000 Metric Tons) 
Japan 64.89 91.28 79.06 73.38 
India 272 .29 51.64 20 .67 51.25 
Belgium 22 .62 27.90 35.94 14.60 
Italy 20.22 19.90 15.94 10.29 
France 11.25 15.90 19.14 12.53 
Germany (W.) 10.28 10.62 12.38 7.44 
U.K. 8 .39 14.24 19.27 13.19 
Portugal 8.04 10.34 13.43 6.81 
U.S.A. 6 .20 10.29 8 .50 8.83 
Spain 13.33 7.89 2.56 13.70 
Source: Department of Customs. 
The aggregate demand for Thai kenaf reflects primarily supply and 
demand conditions on the international markets. Therefore, changes in prices 
in London market are reflected in generally similar changes in farm prices in 
Thailand. Table 8 demonstrates the extent of price fluctuations on the 
monthly basis for Thai kenaf in London market between 1966 - 1970. 
The prices of Thai kenaf as quoted above are also low when com-
pared with those of Pakistan jute; on the average, Pakistan jute enjoys prices 
which are well above these for Grade A Thai kenaf, in addition to being more 
stable. Table 9 gives the representative export prices of Pakistan jute in the 
seasons 1968/69 to 1970/71. 
Conclusions 
The above discussion has revealed some basic problems inherent 
in the development and trade of the kenaf fiber industry in Thailand. These 
factors apparently have acted as the major obstacles to further development 
of the Industry and continued trade expansion. 
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TABLE 9 
Representative Export Prices of Pakistan Jute 1968/69 -1970/71 
1968/69 1969/70 1970/71 
(prices in £ per long ton) 
July 109 113 115 
Au~ust 114 113 116 
September 114 113 113 
October 127 113 113 
November 130 115 113 
December 130 115 113 
July-December Average 
121 114 114 
January 130 115 113 
February 130 115 
March 130 116 
April 130 118 
May 127 118 
June 122 120 
January-June Average 
128 117 
Seasonal Average 124.5 115.5 
Source: FAO (OCP: JU/CC 71/3). 
In concluding the discussion a few points deserve special emphasis 
on the ground of their relevance to future policy consideration. 
1. Despite its gloomy future in view of the increasing competition 
from synthetic products and other substitutes as well as the extremely un-
stable prices in the international markets, kenaf remains a product of con-
siderable significance to the economy of Thailand. Its actual and potential 
ability to generate income and employment and to create an important 
source of foreign exchange earnings cannot be overestimated. For this reason, 
careful attention should be given to the development of this industry, and 
such an attention must cover all stages of activities with a view to identifying 
specific problems and overcoming them promptly with pragmatic measures. 
2. In general, the problems of the kenaf fiber industry centre on 
an extreme instibility of the price originating from demand and supply con-
ditions in the world market. As it has only a relatively small share in the 
. total world supply of coarse fibers, it is not possible for Thailand to exercise 
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any effective control of the price level. Given that fluctuations in world 
prices will continue, Thailand should attempt to neutralize their effects on 
domestic supply conditions with the following measures: 
2.1 The Government to guarantee a minimum price for the 
Grade A fiber provided that conditions on quality and the delivery deadline 
of the products for export are met. 
2.2 The Government to arrange on behalf of the local jute mills, 
for forward purchases of the fiber at the quantity and grades as required by 
the mills. 
3. It must be recognized that one of the factors which contribute 
to price fluctuation as well as low prices for the kenaf fiber in the inter-
national market is the poor and unreliable quality of the product itself. A 
solution to this problem which would help raise and stabilize prices would 
be for the Government in cooperation with the Thai Jute Association to 
undertake to increase the effectiveness of the quality grading system which 
extends backwards to the baling operations in the provinces . 
4. For the development of the industry in the long run, there is 
need for serious investgetion new uses of kenaf. Having regard to the reality 
of the threat from synthetic products and other substitutes, further delay 
in the discovery of significant new uses will tend to aggravate the situation 
of low and unstable prices in the international markets. In Thailand, research 
work has been carried out on the use of kenaf fiber and of the woody stems 
for the manufacture of pulp for paper. Much of the future prospects of the 
kenaf industry depends, as far as we can see, a great deal upon the success 
of pioneering research projects such as this.* 
*As Mr. N. Pombhejara was unable to attend the Conference, there was no specific 
discussion of his paper. 
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Trade in Manufactured Products (I) 
HONG KONG TEXTILE EXPORTS 
A CASE STUDY OF VO LUNTAR Y RESTRAINTS* 
by 
RONALD HSIA 
University of Hong Kong 
Voluntary export restraints (VER), as used in this paper, take the 
form of a commodity trade agreement between an exporting and an import-
ing country.1 VER can be construed as voluntary only in the sense that any 
such agreement reached must have the consent of the exporting country 
regarding the restrictions to be imposed on its exports. It can thus be 
regarded as a strategic move on the part of the exporting country in order 
to have some say at the bargaining table, when unilateral action by the 
importing country appears to be inevitable . 
As long as the exporting country has some leverage in the nego-
tiations regarding the specifics of the restraints, it is most probable that the 
terms of the agreement tend to be less restrictive from the standpoint of the 
export industry concerned. For example , the allowance for the initial quota 
and its subsequent increases can be more liberal. In addition, the categoriza-
tion can be broader so as to shape the growth pattern of the export industry 
in accordance with the prevailing comparative advantage or priority scale. 
Owing to Hong Kong 's prominence in the VER scheme regarding 
textiles, this paper intends to look closely into the various aspects of this 
scheme as exemplified in the textile exports of Hong Kong. More specifically, 
it (1) examines the trade restraint agreements reached between Hong Kong 
and various high-wage countries; (2) scans the modus operandi of the system 
of VER in Hong Kong; (3) analyses the effects of VER on textile exports in 
terms of growth , product diversification and sophistication, and the direction 
of trade; and ( 4) appraises its impact on the industrial structure. Finally, on 
the basis of Hong Kong's experience in implementing the VER system, some 
policy suggestions are made . 
Trade Restraint Agreements 
Notwithstanding the stipulation in Article XI of GATT that no 
quantitative restrictions were allowed, the United Kingdom had Hong Kong 
agree in February 1959 to a "voluntary" restraint of its cotton textile exports 
under the Lancashire Pact. This Pact , in fact, can be considered as the fore-
runner of the Geneva Short-Term Cotton Textiles Agreement of 1961 and 
the Long-Term Agreement of 1962. 
*This paper will be presented at the 4th Pacific Trade and Development Conference to 
be held in Ottawa, Canada, October 7-10, 1971. I am grateful to Edward Chen for his 
assistance. 
1 Thus this paper is not concerned with, for example, the restraints self-imposed by export 
cartels in Japan. Nor is it concerned with the recent restraints of textile exports to USA 
self-imposed by Japan and by Hong Kong, which were however at considerable variance 
with the subsequent agreements signed in October 1971. 
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That GATT considered quantitative restrictions on the export of 
cotton textiles2 as an exceptional case can be attributed to their importance 
in the trade between low-wage and high-wage countries, together with the 
dimension of industrial readjustment problems they are likely to pose in the 
high-wage countries. Thus in July 1961 under the auspices of GATT, nego-
tiations were under way towards a short-term arrangement on cotton textiles 
and the setting up of a Cotton Textiles Committee. This Committee drew up 
the Long-Term Arrangement regarding International Trade in Cotton Textiles 
which went into effect on October 1, 1962, for an initial period of five years ' 
and with two extensions has remained in force. 
The document provided the basis for Hong Kong's trade restraint 
agreements with the following countries: USA, Canada, EEC members, 
Norway, Sweden and Australia. Accordingly all these agreements have been 
reached largely in compliance with the stipulations of the Long-Term 
Arrangement. The initial ceiling figures are calculated on the basis of Hong 
Kong's actual exports to these countries during the 12-month period ending 
three months prior to the request for export restraint. In all the agreements, 
allowance is made for annual increases in ceiling figures. In almost all the 
agreements,3 market disruption constitutes the raison d'etre for requesting 
consultation. All the agreements allow for the swing scheme4 and provide for 
periodic reviews. They also permit carry-over of unused quota to the fol-
lowing year and over-fulfillment in anticipation of under-fulfillment in the 
ensuing year. On the other hand, the trade restraint agreements with Norway 
and Sweden have departed from the specification of the Long-Term Arrange-
ment in their inclusion of synthetic products.5 
It may be of interest to contrast these agreements with the 
Lancashire Pact which lies outside the jurisdiction of the Long-Term Agree-
ment. They differ essentially in the allowance for annual increases of ceiling 
figures. While the Lancashire Pact (1959-1965) made no stipulation at all for 
annual increases of ceiling figures, 6 an allowance of annual growth varying 
from 5-10 per cent is stipulated in Hong Kong's other trade restraint agree-
ments. Even after UK replaced the Lancashire Pact with the Global Quota 
Scheme in 1966,7 the growth allowance amounted to a mere gesture (1 per 
cent per year). 
The trend towards more elaborate categorization in trade restraint 
agreements is worth noting. In the trade restraint agreements (i.e. the 
Lancashire Pact and the Global Scheme) between Honk Kong and UK, for 
example, the number of categories increased from four in 1959 to thirty-four 
in 1964 when the Categorization Arrangement was arrived at. Similarly the 
trade restraint agreement between Hong Kong and USA started with eight 
2Cotton textiles, as defined in the Long-Term Arrangement, include yarn, piece-goods, 
made-up articles, garments and other textile manufactured products, in which cotton 
represents more than 50% (by weight) of the fibre content, with the exception of hand-
loom fibre of the cottage industry. 
3 In the agreement with Norway, no reference to market disruption has been made. 
4 Where restraint is exercised for more than one product, the agreed level for any product 
may be exceeded by 5 per cent provided that the total exports subject to restraint do 
not exceed the aggregate level. 
5 K. Sung and P.H. M. Jones (ed.), Asian Textile Survey: 1969-1970, Hong Kong, 1970, 
p. 98. 
6 The increase of ceiling figure in 1961 should not be construed as growth allowance, as 
it was the result of a new agreement. 
7 The period covered under the Global Quota Scheme was initially from 1966-1970. It 
was extended to the end of 1971 when it will be replaced by tariffs. 
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categories in 1961 and has increased to sixty-four categories since 1965. In 
this trend towards more elaborate categorization, UK and USA have taken 
the lead. Hong Kong's agreements with them now cover practically all 
categories of cotton textiles from yarn and cloth to made-up articles and 
garments, while the coverage of Hong Kong's agreements with the other coun-
tries has not yet extended beyond shirts and a few items of made-up articles. 
System of Restraints 
The Department of Commerce and Industry of the Hong Kong 
Government is responsible for all matters pertaining to trade restraint agree-
ments. Externally it represents Hong Kong in negotiations and consultations 
with high-wage cotton textile importing countries. Internally it is the decision-
making body in respect of quota allocation among textile manufacturers and 
exporters. In order to better represent the interests of Hong Kong's textile 
industry, a Cotton Advisory Board was set up in 1961 to advise the Director 
of Commerce and Industry especially on the conduct of negotiations and the 
implementation of trade restraint agreements. Its scope was widened in 1969 
to cover garment producers. Concomitantly its name was changed to the 
Textiles Advisory Board (TAB). 
The present membership of TAB consists of the Director of 
Commerce and Industry as Chairman, thirteen prominent producers from the 
various sectors of the textile industry, 8 two exporters of textiles, and four 
noted figures of the Hong Kong business community . All the members are 
nominated by the Director of Commerce and Industry to serve as individuals 
rather than representatives of their firms . 
Since the primary function of TAB, as pointed out above, is to 
advise the Director of Commerce and Industry with respect to trade restraint 
agreements, the Director upon receipt of a request for consultation from an 
importing country normally calls a Board meeting to seek its advice. During 
negotiations taking place either in Hong Kong or abroad, while the Depart-
ment of Commerce and Industry represents Hong Kong at the conference 
table, some TAB members (particularly those from the textile industry) are 
asked to serve as technical advisors. Although in this capacity they do not 
actually take part in any negotiation sessions, their views can well guide the 
outcome of the negotiations. 
The core of the system of restraints lies in the allocation of quotas 
among manufacturers and exporters.9 Whereas the final decision on quota 
allocations rests with the Director of Commerce and Industry, he normally 
consults TAB on the criteria governing quota allocations. It is these criteria 
which will affect the development of the textile industry in the long run. 
The over-riding principle governing quota allocation is to maximize 
the utilization of the ceiling figures of a given importing country. With this 
principle as the major consideration, a few criteria have been adopted in 
Hong Kong with respect to quota allocation. By far the most important 
criterion is past performance which constitutes the basis of the Quota Control 
Scheme.10 Such a criterion though intended to achieve maximum utilisation 
8 Four from garment, three weaving, three spinning, two knitting and one finishing. 
9 The exporters will, in turn, allocate their quotas among the producers working through 
them. 
lOUnder this scheme, firms with 95 per cent fulfillment of the past year's quotas are 
allocated the same quotas plus a 1 per cent increase; firms fulfilling 50-95 per cent of 
the past year's quotas are given the same quotas; and for firms fulfilling less than 50 per 
cent of the past year's quota, no allocation is made. 
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of given ceiling figures tends to favour the established firms and makes the 
entry of new firms more difficult. The economic rationale behind this 
criterion is that the established firms have attained a more efficient scale of 
production. Moreover, there are two practical considerations: first, these 
firms have already established links with foreign buyers and second, it is 
administratively simpler to base allocations on past export records. 
For the benefit of those textile producers who cannot qualify on 
the ground of past performance, the criterion of high Hong Kong cost con-
tent has been adopted. These producers accordingly can qualify for quota 
allocation if their products meet the minimum requirement of HK$2.10 
worth of Hong Kong content per square yard of cotton fabrics equivalent. 
As they are competing for the unfilled quotas under the Quota Co_ntrol 
Scheme,11 the higher the Hong Kong cost content in their products, the 
better their chances of obtaining quota allocation. 
In the event that some producers to whom quotas have been 
allocated for one reason or another12 cannot make full use of their quotas 
in the given period, such unused quotas13 can then be re-allocated on the 
basis of "first come first serve" under the Special Shipment Scheme. However, 
this scheme also requires that the minimum Hong Kong cost content is 
satisfied. 
Since the principle underlying the system of restraints in Hong 
Kong is to maximize the utilization of the ceiling figures, it would be of 
interest to see the extent to which the quotas have actually been utilized . 
The extent of utilization should constitute a basis for appraising the opera-
tion of the system of restraints. Data on the degree to which the VER quotas 
have been fulfilled are presented in Table 1. On the whole, quota fulfillment 
has been highly satisfactory. The fulfillment records are particularly good in 
the three major markets for Hong Kong cotton textile exports (USA, UK 
and West Germany) . For the period 1962-1969, quota fulfillment came to 
99.9 per cent for USA, 96.8 per cent for UK and 95.7 per cent for West 
Germany. 
Inasmuch as the system of restraints in Hong Kong appears to 
favour the large firm, it would also be of interest to find out whether there 
has been any indication of increasing concentration in the textile industry . 
For this purpose, changes in the size distribution of firms during 1962-1970 
have been examined. The prevailing size of firm in the spinning and garment 
sectors, according to the Florence criteria, shows no noticeable change.14 For 
the spinning sector where data on production capacity of individual firms 
are obtainable, the traditional " big four" concentration ratio has been 
calculated. Here again, the concentration ratio shows no increase over time .15 
It therefore appears that there is no tendency towards higher concentration 
llThe unfilled quotas consist of those previously allocated to firms which fulfilled less 
than 50 per cent of their allocations, and the excess of the increase in ceiling figures 
allowed m trade restraint agreements over the 1 per cent increase allowed in the Quota 
Control Scheme. . 
12 Such as unforeseen cancellations of orders, or an unexpected rise in production cost 
which makes it unprofitable to fulfill the quota. 
13Except the portion of the unused quotas which has been sold to interested producers 
within a specified period of time and with the approval of the Department of Commerce 
and Industry. 
14For data showin~ changes in the size distribution of firms from 1962-1970, see Table 
A in the Appendix. For the Florence criteria, see P.S. Florence, Logic of British and 
American Industry, London, 1961, p. 27. 
15see Table Bin the Appendix. 
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in the spinning and garment sectors. In the weaving sector, however, some 
tendency towards higher concentration has been detected, as the percentage 
of employment in firms in the top two classes employing 500 workers or 
more has increased from 1962-1970.16 
Growth of Textile Exports 
The instituting of VER and the operational set-up it called for have 
inevitably affected the growth and the pattern of textile exports. One of the 
noticeable effects was the slowing down of the growth rate in the exports of 
yarn, fabrics and made-up articles. To show this effect, two time periods are 
selected for comparison: 1956-1961 and 1962-1970.17 As can be seen from 
Column 2 of Table 2, the annual growth rates of the exports of yarn, fabrics 
and made-up articles averages 19.3 per cent during 1956-1961, but merely 
7 .8 per cent during 1962-1970. The dwindling of growth rates resulted in 
the declining relative importance of these exports in the overall (domestic) 
exports of Hong Kong. Their percentage share decreased from 22.8 in1961 
to 10.3 in 1970 (See Column 3 of Table 2). 
The decline in the rate of export growth was not accompanied by 
a rise in domestic consumption, as the rate of increase in output concomitant-
ly slowed down. Table 3 shows that the annual average growth rate of the 
output of yarn and that of fabrics and made-up articles declined from 16.0 
and 20.9 per cent during 1956-1961 to 7 .0 and 5.6 per cent respectively 
during 1962-1970. 
The garment sector, on the other hand, was not as much affected 
by VER. In fact, the annual average growth rate of its exports increased from 
18.8 per cent during 1956-1961 to 19.9 per cent during 1962-1970 (See 
Column 2 of Table 4) . Concomitantly its percentage share in overall (domestic)! 
exports rose from 34 .8 per cent in 1959 to 35.1 in 1970 (See Column 3 of 
Table 4) . The performance of garment exports reflects the capability of the 
garment sector in adapting itself to the new situation brought about by VER. 
From this contrast, however, one should not hastily draw the inference that 
the entrepreneurs in the spinning and weaving sectors are less capable of 
adjusting to the changing situation, for they are confronted with specific 
problems and difficulties which do not arise in the garment sector.18 
Diversification of Products 
In addition to slowing down the growth rate of cotton textile 
exports, VER has perhaps hastened to some extent the shift from cotton to 
non-cotton textile exports, particularly the exports of garments. For the 
period from 1962-1970 there was, on the basis of value data, a gradual decline 
in the relative importance of cotton garments and a rapid rise in that of non-
cotton garments. Data on export value, however, may not reflect accurately 
changes in physical quantity because of price-change differentials and the 
elasticity of demand for the two categories of garments. It is, therefore, 
necessary to see the relative changes in their export quantities. 
16 See Table A in the Appendix. 
17 This division of time periods coincides with the Geneva Arrangements Regarding 
International Trade in Cotton Textiles. Such a division understandably overlooks the 
early effects of the Lancashire Pact. 18The adjusting process will be discussed in the ensuing section on product diversification 
and sophistication. 
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TABLE 2 
Exports of Textile Yarn, Fabrics and Made-up Articles, 1956-70 
Export Value Increase over Share in Total 
Year (HK$ million) Preceding Year Domestic Exports 
(per cent) (per cent) 
(1) (2) (3) 
1956 295.9 
1957 367 .2 24 .l * 
1958 351.3 -4.3 * 
1959 413 .9 17 .8 18.1 
1960 554 .2 33 .9 19.3 
1961 669.0 20.7 22 .8 
1956·61 19.3 (average) 
1962 590 .3 -11.8 17 .8 
1963 648.3 9 .8 16 .9 
1964 706.7 9.0 16.0 
1965 834.5 18.1 16.6 
1966 921.3 10.4 16.1 
1967 935 .5 1.6 14.0 
1968 1,035.1 10.6 12.3 
1969 1,126.2 8 .8 10 .7 
1970 1,276.7 13.4 10.3 
1962·70 7 .8 (average) 
*It is not possible to calculate this share prior to 1959, as export statistics were not 
classified separately as re-exports and domestic exports. While the negligible re-exports 
of textile products permit us to treat given data as a close approximation of domestic 
exports; the importance of re-export trade as a whole prevents a similar treatment for 
overall domestic exports. 
Source : Hong Kong Trade Statistics. 
TABLE 3 
Production of Textile Yarn , Fabrics and Made-up Articles, 1956-1970 
Annual Growth 
Output of 
Fabrics and Annual Growth 
Year Yarn Output Rate Made-up Articles Rate 
(lb.) (per cent) ('000 sq . yd .) (per cent) 
1956 104,857 195,144 
1957 112,434 7.2 264,481 35.5 
1958 129,571 15.2 279,759 5.8 
1959 143,135 10.5 365,843 30.8 
1960 177,464 24.0 467,964 27 .9 
1961 218,578 23 .2 488,511 4.4 
1956-61 16.0 20.9 (average) 
1962 243,809 11.5 512 ,118 4.8 
1963 252,374 3.5 568,146 10.9 
1964 274,140 8.6 577,748 1.7 
1965 308,421 12.5 646,040 11.8 
1966 321,567 4.3 682,612 5.7 
1967 332,811 3.5 738,025 8.1 
1968 365,464 9.8 798,550 8.2 
1969 371,203 1.6 782,704 -2.0 
1970 398,130 7.3 794,821 1.6 
1962-70 7 .0 5.6 (average) 
Source: Census and Statistics Department, Hong Kong Monthly Digest of Statistics, Hong 
Kong: Government Printer, March, 1971. 
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TABLE 4 
Exports of Clothing, 1956-1970 
ExRort Value Increase over Share in Total 
Year (H $million) Preceding Year Domestic Exports 
(per cent) (per cent) 
(1) (2) (3) 
1956 398.4 
1957 437.0 9.7 * 
1958 520.4 19.l * 
1959 793.2 52.4 34.8 
1960 1,010.4 27.4 35.2 
1961 862 .1 -14.5** 29.3 
1956-61 18.8 (average) 
1962 1,147.4 33.1 34.6 
1963 1,382.9 20.5 36.1 
1964 1,619.7 17.1 36.6 
1965 1,772.6 9.4 35.3 
1966 2,035.5 14.8 35.5 
1967 2,316.6 13.8 34.6 
1968 3,013.9 30.1 35.8 
1969 3,827.6 27.0 36.4 
1970 4,336.6 13.3 35.1 
1962-70 19.9 (average) 
*It is not possible to calculate this share prior to 1959, as export statistics were not 
classified separately as re-exports and domestic exports. While the negligible re-exports 
of textile products permit us to treat given data as a close approximation of domestic 
exports; the importance of re-export trade as a whole prevents a similar treatment for 
overall domestic exports. · 
**This drastic reduction was attributable primarily to the over-stocking of Hong Kong 
clothin!( during 1959-1960 in the U.S. market in anticipation of imposition of 
restrict10ns fol1owing the UK practice. 
Source: Hong Kong Trade Statistics. 
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For this purpose, the ratios of cotton to non-cotton garment 
exports have been worked out on the basis of export quantities for the same 
period. Consistent with the findings based on value data, these ratios are also 
found to be declining. As can be seen from Table 5, the ratio of cotton to 
non-cotton shirts and trousers dwindled from 12.4 in 1962 to 1.4 in 1970. 
Correspondingly the percentage share of cotton shirts and trousers on value 
basis dropped from 25 .9 in 1962 to 13.0 in 1970 whereas that of non-cotton 
shirts and trousers rose from 3.5 in 1962 to 13.1in1970. 
Similar shifts are discernible in both weaving and spinning. On the 
basis of export quantities, percentage shares of cotton and non-cotton fabrics 
and made-up articles in the overall exports of the weaving sector have been 
calculated and are presented in Table 6. While the share of cotton fabrics and 
made-up articles decreased from 98.5 in 1962 to 91.3 in 1970, the non-cotton 
share increased from 0.6 in 1962 to 7.5 in 1970.19 
The change-over from cotton to non-cotton yarn exports involved 
woolen as well as synthetic yarn . As shown in Table 7, the percentage share 
of cotton yarn in the overall yarn exports (also based on physical quantities) 
dropped from 97 .1 in 1962 to 81.7 in 1970 . On the other hand , the share of 
synthetic yarn rose from 0.5 in 1962 to 14.0 in 1970, and the corresponding 
increase for woolen yarn was from 0.2 to 4.1. 
The findings in respect of the shift from cotton to non-cotton 
textile exports are consistent with the earlier findings on the relative growth 
of the garment sector on the one hand, and spinning and weaving sectors on 
the other in that both in terms of the rate of growth in exports and of the 
export ratio of cotton to non-cotton products, garment producers appear to 
have been more adaptable to the new situation brought about by VER. 
This observation, however, has not taken into account the fact that 
spinners and weavers are confronted with specific difficulties not shared by 
the garment producers. One such difficulty is that the shift to synthetic yarn 
and fabrics requires substantial re-investment on the part of the spinners and 
weavers, inasmuch as the machinery and equipment used in manufacturing 
cotton yarn and fabrics are unsuitable for synthetic products. Such a heavy 
investment necessitated by the shift to synthetics tends to inhibit the rate of 
technology diffusion in the spinning and weaving sectors.20 In the garment 
sector, on the other hand, the existing machinery and equipment can be used 
for processing synthetic inputs with minor modifications. Thus no sizeable 
re-investment in connection with the shift to synthetic products is called for 
in the garment sector. 
Another difficulty is the lack of supporting industries in Hong 
Kong for the development of synthetic spinning and weaving . In the absence 
of chemical industries, Hong Kong has to rely entirely on overseas supply of 
synthetic fibres. The situation was further complicated by the cartelization 
of synthetic fibre in international trade, under which Hong Kong had to 
accept monopoly prices from the designated source of supply . Consequently 
the development of synthetic spinning and weaving was delayed until the 
mid-1960s when the enforcement of the cartel agreement was sufficiently 
relaxed so that Japan was able to supply Hong Kong with the much needed 
raw material at substantially lower prices. 
19The percentage shares of other non-cotton fabrics and made-up articles including 
notably silk and woolen remained more or less unchanged. 
20 see E. Mansfield, Industrial Research and Technological Change, New York, 1969, 
p. 136-144. 
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Year 
1962 
1964 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
TABLE 5 
Proportions of Cotton and Non-cotton Shirts and Trousers 
to Overall Clothing Exports, 1962, 1964 and 1966-1970 
Proportion of Cotton 
Shirts and Trousers 
Pro~ortion of Non-cotton 
hirts and Trousers 
Export Ratio of Cotton 
to Non-cotton Shirts 
(per cent) (per cent) and Trousers 
(1) (2) (3) 
25.9 3.5 12.4 
23.8 4.1 9.8 
20.0 7.3 4.2 
18.8 9.9 2.6 
19.l 9.6 2.8 
15.5 8.4 2.4 
13.0 13.1 1.4 
Note: Columns (1) and (2) are based on value data and column (3) on physical quantities. 
Hence the export ratios are independent of the percentage figures given in columns 
(1) and (2). 
Source : Based on data given in Hong Kong Trade Statistics. 
TABLE 6 
Relative Importance of Cotton and Non-cotton Products in the Exports 
of Textile Fabrics and Made-up Articles, 1962, 1964 and 1966-1970 
(per cent) 
Cotton Fabrics and Non-cotton Fabrics and 
Year Made-up Articles Made-up Articles 
1962 98.5 0.6 
1964 98.3 0.7 
1966 94.3 4.8 
1967 95.8 3.1 
1968 95.9 2.8 
1969 93.4 5.2 
1970 91.3 7.5 
Source: Based on export data in physical quantities given in Hong 
Kong Trade Statistics. 
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Year 
1962 
1964 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
TABLE 7 
Relative Importance of Cotton, Synthetic and Woolen 
Yarn in Total Yarn Exports, 1962, 1964 and 1966-1970 
(per cent) 
Cotton Yarn Synthetic Yarn 
97 .l 0 .5 
97 .8 1.7 
95.0 3 .5 
92.4 5.6 
90.2 6 .2 
85 .0 9.2 
81.7 14.0 
Woolen Yarn 
0.2 
0 .6 
1.3 
1.9 
3.4 
5.7 
4 .1 
Source: Based on export data in physical quantities given in Hong Kong Trade Statistics. 
TABLE 8 
Average Export Prices of Cotton Fabrics and 
Cotton Shirts, 1962, 1964 and 1966-1970 
Cotton Fabrics Cotton Shirts 
Year (HK$/sq. yd.) (HK$/dozen) 
1962 1.05 * 
1964 1.18 23 .73 
1966 1.13 26.08 
1967 1.15 27.56 
1968 1.23 32.76 
1969 1.29 38 .15 
1970 1.31 44 .74 
*The classification of shirts in 1962 was different and 
not comparable . 
Source: Based on data given in Hong Kong Trade 
Statistics. 
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Product Sophisticat ion 
With cotton textile exports, there has been a shift from products 
with less processing and sophistication to those with more. Such a shift can 
be attributed partly to the fact that VER is expressed in quantity rather 
than value terms. Moreover, it is re-enforced by the above-mentioned High 
Hong Kong Cost Content Scheme. The shift from less to more processing 
can be seen from the faster growth of non-grey yarn exports relative to grey 
yarn exports. The latter increased from HK$85.2 million in 1964 to $92.0 
million in 1970, whereas the former from $1.7 million in 1964 to $9.4 
million in 1970.21 
There is also a shift from less to more sophisticated products in 
textile exports . Such a shift can be detected , to some extent, in the changing 
unit value of weaving and garment exports under VER . The average export 
price of cotton fabrics per square yard amounted to HK$1.05 in 1962 and 
HK$1.31 in 1970. Similarly the average export price of cotton shirts 
increased from HK$23.73 per dozen in 1962 to HK$44 .74 per dozen in 
197022 (see Table 8) . 
Direction of Trade 
With the instituting of VER, one would have expected some trade 
diversion from VER countries23 to non-VER countries. To determine whether 
such a change has taken place, it is necessary to classify export data into these 
two groups of countries. The percentage distribution of cotton textile exports 
between these two groups on the basis of data in both physical quantities and 
value terms is given in Table 9 . In the case of yarn and fabrics for which 
quantity data are not available, value data constitute the sole basis. 
Contrary to expectation, the percentage distribution for all cate-
gories of cotton textile exports except one is quite constant over time, as no 
statistically significant trend lines can be fitted to the changes over time for 
the period 1964-1970. The only evidence of trade diversion is found in the 
exports of cotton dress shirts. 24 In this case, however , trade diversion turns 
out to be in favour of VER countries . 
For this unexpected export behaviour, some explanations are 
called for. Since the bulk of Hong Kong 's exports has always been going to 
VER countries, there have developed some built-in institutional factors 
governing the direction of trade. Moreover, these factors tend to have 
cumulative effects over t ime. 
Secondly, the line dividing VER and non-VER countries also 
divides the developing and developed economies, and the two groups of coun-
tries have divergent consumption patterns. Hong Kong's exports to the devel-
oped countries consist preponderantly of higher-priced and more sophisticated 
commodities . As an illustration, let us refer to Table 9 which shows that the 
market share of VER countries is invariably larger in value terms than in 
physical quantities. Any trade diversion in favour of non-VER countries 
21 Hong Kong Trade Statistics. 
22Price increases not reflecting higher sophistication are believed to be negligible, in view 
of the keen competition and productivity increases. 
23 The term "VER countries" refers to those countries with which Hong Kong has VER 
arrangements, viz., UK, USA, Canada, West Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, 
Luxemburg, France, Italy, Sweden, Norway and Australia. 
24 The trend line in this case is positive and statistically significant at the 0 .01 level. 
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would entail a change in the industrial output structure contrary to the very 
process of development . 
Thirdly, in the developing countries the purchasing power is gener-
ally limited. Their capacity to import varies according to foreign exchange 
earnings and foreign exchange availability. Thus Hong Kong's textile exports 
to Ceylon, for example, fluctuate considerably from year to year . In view of 
this uncertainty and the limited effective demand , Hong Kong entrepreneurs 
perhaps consider it inadvisable to shift their focus to the developing countries. 
Finally , in their industrialization scheme most developing countries 
start with cotton textiles . Thus this industry is among the first to be protected. 
Consequently many non-VER countries have imposed tariffs on textile imports. 
Changes in Industrial Structure 
A significant development in Hong Kong's manufacture exports in 
response to VER is, perhaps, the pursuance of new lines of manufacture out-
side the textile field . The Hong Kong economy being export-oriented cannot 
afford to rely heavily on any single industry . This is particularly true because 
of its free trade policy . Th us the economy's need for diversification is 
painfully brought to the fore by the instituting of VER . This exogenous 
shock has undoubtedly hastened the diversification process . 
Changes in the relative importance of the exports of various 
industries from 1959-1970 are shown in Table 10. The rapidly rising relative 
importance of electronics and wigs is particularly noteworthy . In 1960, there 
was hardly any electronics industry in Hong Kong. By 1970, however, this 
new industry accounted for 8 .7 per cent of Hong Kong's overall (domestic) 
exports. The rise of the wig industry was even more spectacular . As late as 
1964, this industry was insignificant. Within six years, it became the fourth 
largest export industry. In addition, the percentage share of plastic toys and 
dolls doubled between 1959 and 1968. 
For such speedy adjustment in Hong Kong 's industrial structure, 
credit should be given to the ingenious entrepreneurs . The ingenuity with 
which they responded to VER has turned a harmful exogenous force into 
an impetus for further development . 
Conclud ing Remarks 
The findings reveal that the system of restraints in Hong Kong has 
worked reasonably well in terms of (1) quota fulfillment, (2 ) raising the 
manufacture content of commodities under VER, and (3) increasing the 
sophistication of certain textile products. Remarkably these attainments are 
not accompanied by unhealthy tendency towards excess concentration. 
The instituting of VER has slowed down the growth of cotton 
textile exports, but has probably hastened the shift from cotton to non-cotton 
textile exports and from products with less processing and sophistication to 
those with more. The development of new products and the increase in manu-
facture content and sophistication are the very ingredients indispensable in 
the process of industrial development. They are instrumental in generating 
income and employment and in promoting technological change. Seen in this 
light, perhaps VER may not have been as harmful to Hong Kong 's industrial 
development as one would have expected. 
In spite of VER, there has been no noticeable trade diversion. This 
can be attributed chiefly to the built-in institutional factors favouring trade 
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with VER countries, and the limited import capacity and protectionist policy 
of non-VER countries. To some extent can the lack of trade diversion be 
accounted for by the quantitative nature of the restraints and the allowance 
for regular increases in ceiling figures . Thus the export value can be increased 
by raising the manufacture content of the restrained commodities, by shifting 
to higher-priced varieties within the same category under VER, and by 
developing new products . 
On the basis of the experience of Hong Kong, the implementation 
of VER needs more explicit rules and effective control by an international 
organization. For example, according to the Long-Term Arrangement, any 
request for consultation must be based on market disruption and that it must 
be substantiated by detailed factual statements. Granted the intrinsic difficul-
ty in substantiating market disruption by factual statements, the degree of 
substantiation has been subject to a wide range of variation. Consequently it 
is often debased to the level of relative bargaining strength. Hong Kong 
unfortunately being a firm believer in free trade and therefore lacking the 
power of retaliation, is often at the mercy of the requesting country with 
superior bargaining strength . Such disparity in bargaining strength can be 
eliminated, to a large extent, by more explicit rules preferably with quanti-
tative stipulations and by setting up an international organization whose sole 
job would be to keep the VER system under regular surveillance. 
Hong Kong's experience regarding VER also suggests the need for 
greater flexibility in its implementation. For example , the increasing 
categorization of restraints tends to inhibit specialization required for attain-
ing the optimum scale of production. Although provisions have been made 
for a maximum of 5 per cent " swing scheme," this is far too restrictive to 
permit a growth pattern compatible with comparative advantage. 
VER may not be altogether an objectionable system if restraints 
can be confined to a limited number of broad categories with a reasonably 
wide range of "swing" between them and if a liberal annual growth rate can 
be allowed. With these constraints, perhaps VER can be expected to promote 
a steady and smooth growth of the textile industry without undue interference 
with its pattern of growth . 
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APPENDIX 
TABLE A 
Size Distribution of Firms in the Textile Industry, 1962-1970 
(per cent) 
Number of 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 
Workers 
Spinning 
1,000 and over 59.5 54.8 55.0 49.9 56.l 56.3 62.6 56.8 
500 - 999 26.6 26.l 23.4 29.6 18.7 22.4 13.3 18.6 
200 - 499 11.9 17 .2 20.6 19 .6 24.5 20.7 21.9 22 .l 
100 - 199 1.3 1.8 0.6 0 .6 0 .0 0.0 1.9 2.1 
50 - 99 0 .3 0.0 0.4 0 .3 0.7 0.6 0.3 0 .4 
1 - 49 0.4 0 .1 0.0 0 .0 0.0 0.0 0 .0 0 .0 
Weaving 
1,000 and over 0.0 4.7 4.6 4 .3 5.3 17.0 18.2 18 .3 
500 - 999 15.8 10.5 10.6 10 .5 16.9 10.2 10 .0 7.3 
200 - 499 36.4 41.7 44 .3 45.8 40 .0 36.2 37.4 41.1 
100 - 199 23.9 20.4 22.2 19.6 22 .6 21.1 16 .5 15. l 
50 - 99 12.5 11.6 10.l 11.3 7.6 8 .0 9.2 8.5 
1 - 49 11.4 11.1 8.2 8 .5 7.6 7.5 8.7 9.7 
Clothing 
1 ,000 and over 0 .0 2.1 4.5 11.7 15 .8 15.5 14.2 14.7 
500 - 999 21.8 22.5 22.7 19.6 16 .l 10 .5 16.6 14.3 
200 - 499 27.6 27.8 27.5 24 .9 26.7 30 .7 24.9 23.7 
100 - 199 18.1 16.4 18.4 18:7 16.6 16.7 16.2 17.5 
50 - 99 14.7 14.5 12.4 11.5 11.3 11.4 11.5 12.8 
1 - 49 17.8 16.7 14.5 13 .6 13 .5 15.2 16.6 17 .0 
1970 
60 .8 
20.6 
16.7 
1.1 
0.8 
0.0 
17.7 
10.6 
36.8 
16.2 
9.9 
8.8 
13 .6 
12.9 
23.6 
18.7 
13.8 
17.4 
Source: Labour Department, Statistics on Registered and Recorded Industrial Undertakings Classified 
by IndustrU!s and Number of Employees. 
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Year 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
APPENDIX 
TABLE B 
Concentration in the Spinning Sector 
Concentration Ratio 
0.38 
0.34 
0.35 
0.34 
0.37 
0 .36 
0 .35 
0 .34 
0 .32 
0.31 
0 .31 
Size Ratio 
0 .025 
0.026 
0.024 
0 .025 
0.024 
0 .024 
0 .024 
0 .024 
0.024 
0 .024 
0.022 
Concentration Ratio = Production capacity of the 4 largest firms 
Production capacity of all firms 
Size Ratio = Production capacity of the sector excluding the 4 largest firms 
Total number of firms - 4 
Source : Computed from data supplied by the Hong Kong Cotton Spinners 
Association. 
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TRADE RESTRICTIONS AND TEXTILE EXPORTS 
OF SINGAPORE - A CASE STUDY 
by 
LIM CHONG-YAH 
University of Singapore 
Introduction 
Section 1 deals with the textile industry of Singapore during the 
period 1964-70. It is meant to serve as a perspective and background for 
discussion and analysis of the following two sections . The importance of the 
textile industry relative to Singapore's total external trade and its contribu-
tion in terms of export, value added, and employment to the total manufac-
turing and quarrying sector are highlighted. 
Section 2 analyses the terms of the Long-Term Arrangement regarding 
trade in cotton textiles1 and the impact of non-tariff restrictions on cotton 
textile exports from low-wage countries (including Singapore) to the United 
States, the United Kingdom, and Canada. An evaluation of the restrictive 
effects of the LTA is made . 
Finally, Section 3 deals with some of the measures that could be 
adopted to liberalize textile trade in general and cotton textile trade in 
particular. 
1. Singapore's Textile Industry 
The establishment of a textile industry based on cotton has been 
the starting point in the industrialization of many of the industrially advanced 
countries. This development approach has also been adopted on a wide scale 
by many of the developing countries undertaking a program of industrializa-
tion. "In India, China, Mexico, the development of modern cotton textile 
industries marked the pre-take-off period." 2 The rationale of developing the 
textile industry as the spearhead of industrialization is that the demand for 
clothing as a basic need has a mass market. Secondly, the capital requirement 
is low, whilst its labour-absorptive power is relatively high , so that the 
mechanization of the spinning, weaving, and garmenting processes which were 
previously carried out on a cottage-scale would enable production on a large 
scale. 
As a part of her industrialization policy , Singapore established a 
textile industry in the early 1960s. In fact, the textile industry was a priority 
program to help remedy the high level of unemployment then. 
The term 'textiles' is generally taken to mean the manufacture of 
fabrics and garments or wearing apparel of every kind of fibre blending. In 
this paper, the term is restricted to mean groups 65 and 84 of the Standard 
International Trade Classification (SITC). Group 65 comprises textile yarn, 
fabrics, and made-up articles and related products, except clothing; Group 84 
is made up of clothing or wearing apparel. 
It is to be noted that no attempt is made to distinguish between 
cotton and non-cotton textile trade in Section 1 simply because no breakdown 
data are published in Singapore. 
1 Hereafter referred to as the LT A. 
2W. W. Rostow, Process of Economic Growth, Oxford (1960), p. 300 . 
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The period of study of the textile industry as defined above is 
limited to 1964-70, basically because the industry (in the modern sense of 
assembly-line factories producing for export as well as for import-substitution) 
only began in the early 1960s. The year 1964 was chosen as the base year to 
enable us to analyze the effects on Singapore's textile exports arising from the 
imposition of quotas by the United Kingdom, the United States, and Canada. 
As a first approximation of the importance of the textile industry in Singapore 
we could consider Table 1, where a comparison is made between the textile ' 
trade and the total external trade of Singapore from 1964 to 1970. The out-
standing feature of the textile trade is the widening gap between textile imports 
and textile exports. Table la sets out the value of textile exports as a per-
centage of total exports, whilst Table lb shows the annual percentage growth 
in the vall!e of textile imports and exports. 
This growing deficit in the textile trade of Singapore could be 
attributed to two reasons: (i) on the export side , the growth of textile exports 
was stunted by the LT A and the various bilateral textile trade agreements 
arising therefrom (this will be discussed in more detail in Section 2); (ii) on 
the imports side, the rising home or domestic consumption of textiles. This 
could be verified from Table 2, which shows that retained imports in 1969 
was about four-fold that of 1964. It may be argued that the rise in retained 
imports of textiles results more from the retention of imported textile fabrics 
for use in the local textile industry rather than from the retention of imported 
textile for final consumption. This line of argument is quite consistent with 
the fact that the first and only fully-integrated textile mill was established in 
Singapore in 1968. Therefore the bulk of intermediate inputs for the garment-
ing factories must have come from imports. Official statistics show that the 
total value of imports of Group 65 rose from about $250 million in 1964 to 
$810 million in 1970. Imports of Group 84, however, fell from about $88 
million in 1964 to approximately $71 million in 1970. 
Another relevant feature of the trade in textiles in Singapore is the 
indications of a change in the direction of exports. Table 3 sets out the prin-
cipal countries with which Singapore imports and exports textile goods in 
1964 and 1970. Table 3a shows that, although textile imports from these 
principal sources form about 89 percent by value of total textile imports, 
textile exports to these principal sources have declined from 90 percent of 
total textile exports to 77 .7 percent in 1970. This could bear evidence to the 
drive by local exporters to diversity their markets, mainly due to the now-
restricted access of the traditional markets in the United Kingdom, United 
States, Canada, and other developed countries that have imposed import 
quotas. 
A better perspective of the textile industry may be provided if one 
looks at the importance of this industry vis-a-vis the total manufacturing and 
quarrying sector in Singapore. Although Singapore has for a long period of 
its economic history been regarded as an entrepot port, and re-exports of 
goods and services have played an important role in her over-all development, 
this view of things must be changed in the light of the government's increasing 
emphasis on further economic development through industrialization. 
The number of establishments in the domestic textile industry, as 
seen in Table 4, is over-valued in 1964 and 1965 because of the non-exclusion 
of footwear manufacturing establishments. In 1966, the number stood at 99 
establishments in production. The small increase over the previous year could 
be indicative of the general uncertainties with the United States and U .K. 
attitudes on the imposition of quota restrictions: 1967 was a year of 
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'recession' for the textile industry in the sense of the adverse impact of the 
quota restrictions placed by the United Kingdom and United States. However, 
the industry recovered and recorded a 57 percent increase in the number of 
establishments in 1968. The increase in the following year was by nine estab-
lishments, but the number of establishments in shirt manufacturing decreased 
by six. This could have resulted from the Canadian imposition of quotas on 
wearing apparel exports by Singapore in July , 1968. 
Table 5 focusses attention on the value and direction of the 
domestic textile exports of Singapore . Exports of textiles to overseas coun-
tries (i.e., excluding East and West Malaysia) more than doubled in value in 
1968 compared to 1967. This seems to be in line with the recovery of the 
industry as seen in the above paragraph. 
Table 6 also records a similar picture of the textile industry in 
terms of the number of workers employed. The year 1968 recorded the 
highest percentage increase in the number of new jobs created by the industry . 
Apart from 1964 and 1968, employment in the textile industry forms about 
11 percent of total employment in the manufacturing and quarrying sector. 
Table 7 shows that value added in the textile industry hovers around 
3 to 4 percent that of total value added generated by the manufacturing sector. 
Therefore , the industry is more important as a source of employment creation 
than as a source of income generation in the process of industrialization. 
2. The Long-term Arrangement Regarding 
Trade in Cotton Textiles 
The LT A was the culmination of attempts by some developed coun-
tries to find a 'solution' to the problem created by the intrusion of Japanese 
manufactured goods into their markets during the 1950s. In her efforts to 
obtain full membership of GATT (and therefore enjoyment of the most-
favoured-nation tariff treatment in her international trade with GATT mem-
bers), Japan employed 'voluntary restraints' on her exports of certain 
'sensitive' goods like cotton textiles, china, transistor radios, and other light 
manufactured goods. Under this so-called orderly marketing system, Japan 
"agreed, subject to frequent changes, to limit to agreed amounts, to minimum 
prices, to minimum standards of quality , or to some combination of all these, 
their exports of specified goods to specified markets . In return they asked 
that the importing countries desist from any other discriminatory practices 
against these exports and in general , otherwise extend most-favoured-nation 
treatment to Japan."3 
But this 'voluntary restraint' approach had several shortcomings, 
the most serious of which arose from the fact that it was used only by Japan. 
Therefore, any cutback of exports of the sensitive goods resulting from the 
application of export restraint was often filled by exports from other low-
wage countries. Consequently , no relief was brought to domestic producers 
in the importing countries . 
Secondly, the voluntary export restraints violated the general 
liberal trade commitments of all parties involved by introducing quantitative 
restrictions on international trade , a feature which in fact contravenes the 
rationale of GATT. 
3 G. Patterson, Discrimination in International Trade , the Policy Issues, 1945-1965, 
Princeton (1966 ), p. 297. 
189 
The U.S. government, prodded by its interest for an expansion and 
liberalization of world trade and also in GATT accepting Japan as a full mem. 
ber, but faced with a great upsurge in protectionist sentiment in the United 
States itself, because of the rapid rise in U.S. imports of Japanese goods, 
proposed in 1959 that GATT undertake a study to find an acceptable multi-
lateral solution to the problem of "sharp increases in imports, over a brief 
period of time and in a narrow range of commodities (which) can have serious 
economic, political and social repercussions in the importing countries. " 4 
The study led to GATT adopting what Verbit termed "a definition 
of a new kind of economic evil, 'market disruption' ." 5 Market disruptions 
were deemed to occur or to threaten to occur, where (i) a sharp and sub-
stantial increase or potential increase of imports of particular products from 
particular sources; (ii) these products are offered at prices which are sub-
stantially below those prevailing for similar goods of comparable quality in 
the market of the importing country; (iii) there is serious damage to domestic 
producers or threat thereof; (iv) the price differentials referred to in (ii) above 
do not arise from governmental intervention in the fixing or formation of 
prices or from dumping practices.6 
Following the attempts made by various industrialized countries 
like the United Kingdom, the EEC countries, Austria, and Switzerland to 
negotiate bilateral agreements with Japan, Hong Kong, India, and Pakistan, 
and other low-wage producers of cotton textiles in the late 1950s and the 
GATT adoption of the 'market disruption' principle, the U.S. government 
put forth its proposal that the whole problem of trade in cotton textiles be 
considered in the GA TT "with a view to reaching agreement on arrangements 
for the orderly development of the trade in such products, so as progressively 
to increase the export possibilities of the less-developed countries and 
territories and of Ja~an, while at the same time avoiding disruptive conditions 
in import markets." This gave rise to the LTA signed by nineteen countries 
and wlich was made effective from October, 1962, for a five-year period. The 
important feature of this arrangement was the specific incorporation of the 
concept and definition of 'market disruption' as discussed in the above 
paragraph. 
The two main operating provisions of the LT A are : 
a. Article II: That participating countries which still maintain import restric-
tions other than duties undertook to relax them and thereby expand the 
access to their markets. More importantly, the arrangement also provides the 
method by which to accomplish this elimination of import restrictions. It 
specified that not less than the following percentage increases over 1962 
would be reached by 1967 by the following countries: Austria - 95 percent; 
Denmark - 15 percent; EEC - 88 percent; Sweden - 15 percent. 
b. Article III: Authorizes participating importing countries which have not 
imposed restrictions to limit imports of specified cotton textile goods when 
these imports were found to be disrupting or threatening to disrupt their 
domestic textile markets. The importing countries are obliged to call for 
consultation with the exporting country (or countries) and in that consulta-
4 G. Verbit, Trade Agreements for Developing Countries, Columbia (1969), p. 59. 
5 Ibid., p. 58. 
6 GATT, Basic Instruments and Selected Documents, Geneva (1961 ). 
7 GATT, The Activities ofGATT, 1961/62, Geneva (1962), p. 29. 
190 
tion, request the exporting country to impose export restraints on the prod-
ucts causing disruption . Failing agreement on export restraints, the importing 
countries could impose import restraints, the level being determined by the 
provision made in Annex B of the Arrangement. 
What underlies the basic acceptance of the LT A by the cotton 
textile exporting countries when it was first ratified in 1962? The generally 
agreed reason was their hope that it might result in "an appreciable increase 
in their access to European markets . " 8 The European countries, especially 
members of the EEC, have consistently resorted to high tariff barriers against 
cotton textile exports from Japan and other low-wage exporters. Another 
reason was that the exporting countries "feared that unless something was 
worked out in an international forum, the United States and others might 
unilaterally impose even more stringent import quotas on their exports. They 
also hoped that by insisting on provisions for periodic reviews under GATT 
auspices they could introduce a liberalizing influence."9 
A third and more important reason must lie in the exporting 
countries ' hope that the importing countries would undertake the structural 
adjustments which would make the LT A unnecessary. That is, the LT A was 
viewed as a makeshift measure by which the importing countries like the 
United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, and the EEC countries could 
smooth the so-called disruption of their domestic markets so as to enable 
them to undertake the necessary steps to transfer resources out of their non-
competitive cotton textile industries into other lines of production where 
they enjoy a comparative advantage. 
The United Kingdom, the United States, Canada, and West Germany 
have concluded bilateral agreements with various cotton textile exporting 
countries since the LTA came into force. 
What are the effects of the LT A and the various bilateral quota 
agreements ensuing from it on the exports of cotton textiles from the devel-
oping countries and Japan? 
Firstly, it could be said that the LT A in fact provided a virtual 
charter of restrictions against the exports of manufactured cotton textile 
articles from the developing countries and Japan. This is derived from the 
way the term 'market disruption' has been defined in the Arrangement. What 
amount constitutes a sharp increase in imports of cotton textiles and at which 
price are the imported cotton textiles considered to be substantially below 
those prevailing for similar goods in the domestic markets of the importing 
countries? Also, what is the criterion of ' serious damage' suffered by the 
domestic producers when imports of cotton textiles increase? 
An official in the Trade Division of the Ministry of Finance in 
Singapore illustrated this difficulty of interpretation when one of the 
Scandinavian countries 'warned' Singapore against further increases in textile 
exports to that country because imports into that country of textiles from 
Singapore recorded a rise by 200 percent over the preceding year, but in 
absolute terms, the increase was a matter of only S$2 million or so . 
Secondly, and related to the first criticism, the Arrangement 
implicitly accorded a unilateral right to the importing country to determine 
when market disruption occurs or worse still, when the threat of a market 
disruption arises. 
8 G. Patterson, op. cit.mp. 310. 
9 Jbid. 
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Thirdly, as correctly pointed out by Patterson, the import quotas 
existing in the EEC countries at the time the LT A was ratified were so low 
that even the commitment to double them by 1967 was considered by the 
exporting countries "as bordering on fraud."10 
Fourthly, as Verbit points out, the LTA has eroded "a cardinal 
principle of international trade theory, that low labour costs are not a 
legitimate ground for restricting imports. They could not be if the theory of 
comparative advantage is to have any real meaning, for an excess of labour 
and the resulting low labour costs are a factor of production, which are 
crucial in determining comparative advantage ." 11 
Finally, as could be implied from the renewal of the LT A for a 
further three-year period up to 1970 and subsequently the renewal took on 
an annual basis, the concept of 'structural adjustments' may not necessarily 
be the one hoped for by the exporting countries . It could very well mean that 
the importing countries hope to gain sufficient time to enable their domestic 
cotton textile industries to get on their feet by increasing productivity through 
higher capital intensity. As Patterson sees it, "if this results in either such low 
costs as to make the current special restraints unnecessary even from the 
producers' point of view, or so increases productive capacity as to strengthen 
the demands for continued protection, perhaps at levels somewhat below 
those now prevailing, the less-developed countries will conclude that the 
textile arrangement has been a cruel hoax ." 12 
The recent U.K. announcement in July, 1969, bears testimony to 
the reservation made by G. Patterson that the LTA may prove to be a 'cruel 
hoax.' The quotas on cotton textile exports by Commonwealth countries to 
the United Kingdom will be replaced by a new tariff system : 6.5 percent on 
yarn, 15 percent on fabrics, and 17 percent on most garments, thus placing 
cotton textiles on par with the tariffs on synthetic textiles. These new tariffs 
will in fact extinguish the present system of Commonwealth preferences in 
respect of cotton textiles. Mr. Anthony Crosland (the then President of the 
British Board of Trade) was quoted to have said: "The tariffs will provide a 
margin of protection that is both stable and predictable, so enabling the indus-
try to plan ahead with confidence."13 This could be read as an attempt to buy 
time for the Lancashire industry to rationalize itself and to overcome some 
of its major problems - obsolete equipment, low productivity, and fragmented 
organization. 
The unfavourable aspect of their new tariff system so far as 
Commonwealth countries like Hong Kong, Singapore, Malaysia, India, and 
Pakistan are concerned, is that these tariffs will not be applied to Britain's 
partners in the EFT A. This will give a decisive advantage to countries like 
Portugal over the Asian textile producers. The remarks of a textile producer 
in Hong Kong serve to illustrate the intense feelings of Asian textile producers: 
"We are all too well aware of how Portugal, a country which has no ties with 
the United Kingdom beyond those provided by EFT A membership and which 
has labour costs lower than ours, has gained an extra-favourable position in 
the U.K. textile market, largely at our expense. The ten-year period of 
sacrifice on our part in accepting quantitative restrictions on our textile 
exports to the United Kingdom has benefited not the U .K. textile industry, 
lOG. Patterson, op. cit., p. 311. 
llG. Verbit, op. cit., p. 61. 
12 G. Patterson, op. cit. , p. 31 7. 
13"Textile Exporters in a Spin," in Asian Industry, September 1969, Far East Trade Press 
Limited, p. 39. 
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but Portugal, which will be able, under EFT A agreements, to continue to 
export to the United Kingdom duty free." 14 
How has the LTA affected the textile industry in Singapore? So 
far, Singapore has entered into bilateral agreements on restraints, on cotton 
textile exports with the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada. 
United States 
The first agreement was made effective from 1 April, 1966, until 
31 March, 1969. Under this, "for the first limitation year, constituting the 
twelve-month period beginning April 1, 1966, the aggregate limit shall be 
30,000,000 square yards."15 Of this aggregate, 20 million square yards were 
to be filled by the increasing apparel category and 10 million square yards 
by the non-wearing apparel category (the specific breakdown is given by 
Clause (4) of the Schedule). 
Clause (7) provides for a 5 percent increase in the subsequent 
twelve-month periods. 
However, the first Agreement was superseded by a second Agree-
ment which was made effective from 1January,1968, until 31 December, 
1970. This new agreement provided for the first limitation year an aggregate 
limit of 36 million square yards (24 million in wearing apparel category and 
12 million non-wearing apparel category). An annual 5 percent growth of 
quota levels was also provided for. 
The third and latest Agreement was signed on January 19, 1971, 
and is to be effective from 1 January, 1971 until 31 December, 197 4. For 
the first limitation year, the aggregate limit is 44 ,850,000 square yards (of 
which 29 ,900,000 square yards are for the wearing apparel category and 
14,950,000 square yards for the non-wearing apparel category) . 
As the number of items in the wearing apparel and the non-wearing 
apparel categories have progressively increased with each new agreement, it 
means that more and more specific items have come under quota restrictions . 
An analysis of the share of the U.S. total quota level enjoyed by 
the different countries could be fruitful in the sense that it could provide us 
with the rationale with which the U.S. government allocates quota levels -
whether the levels are tied to past performance of each recipient country or 
whether non-economic considerations did play a part for certain countries 
like South Korea and Taiwan. But this has not been attempted because of 
two limitations: (a) data and information are not complete; (b) the first and 
subsequent Agreements between the United States and the various exporting 
countries were signed at different time periods. 
However, an attempt is made to measure the performances to quota 
granted ratio in the case of Singapore - to provide an insight into the restric-
tive effects of the quota restrictions in terms of the fulfillment of these 
quota levels. 
Apart from the first period , the exports of cotton textiles (quota. 
items only) to the United States have consistently been below the actual 
quotas granted. Such under-utilization of quota levels could be attributed to: 16 
14Jbid. 
15 First Quota Agreement : The Singapore Cotton Textile Industry Restraint Schedule, 
Clause (2). 
16 H. S. Narulla, "Singapore's Textile Trade and Industry (Manufacturing)" An Academic 
Exercise Submitted to Dept. of Econ., U. of Singapore, October 1969, p. 39-40. 
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i. The absence of domestic production of certain items in the quota agree-
ments -for example, items 42 (other T-shirts), 48 (raincoats of 3/4 length 
or over), 49 (other coats), and items 18/19 (rain cloth shirting carded). 
ii. The low production in certain other specific items (like items 45, 46, and 
52) which is caused by: (a) the lack of adequate modern machinery to 
produce, for example, permanent press apparels; (b) the classification of 
such items being too general, such that differences in sizes and shapes, 
cuttings, etc., result in rejection of the product or overshipment of some 
products and undershipment in others . A specific example is that of 'work 
shirts,' which have almost similar cuttings as 'sports shirts' except that the 
latter have a tail end whilst the former have a covered tail end; (c) shifts 
in tastes for certain items - this results in a decline in these exports, 
whilst the quota items remain unchanged: a case at hand is that of the 
shift in tastes from cotton to permanent press pants; (d) the general lack 
of marketing strategies and the reluctance of local producers to establish 
or employ marketing agencies in the United States. This led to inadequate 
orders being obtained. 
As regards the total U.S. textile quota granted to Singapore, it is 
perhaps fair to say that the over-all level seems substantial relative to 
Singapore's young textile industry . However, there seems to be a need to 
change some of the specific items under quota restrictions. 
United Kingdom 
Britain imposed import quota restrictions on cotton textiles in 
1966, and the scheme was divided into two sections: 
i. Country quota: which is allocated to individual countries; 
ii. Global quota: which is world-wide and British importers are given 
restricted licences for obtaining cotton textile goods from any country 
but a specific limit is assigned to the amount obtainable from any one 
country. 
This quota scheme was intended to last until 1970 and will be 
replaced by a 15 percent tariff duty on imports in 1972. 
Singapore was granted a quota level of 3.8 million square yards 
(3.3 million square yards country quota plus 0.5 million square yards special 
country quota) with an annual growth rate of 1 percent. 
From the above table, it could be seen that again, like the case of 
exports to the United States, there is underutilization of the quota levels 
granted, except that the degree of underutilization is much higher, especially 
in 1966, 1967, and 1970. Very much the same reasons could be put forth to 
explain such underutilization of quota levels here as with the United States. 
An additional factor may be found in the U .K. government announcement in 
1969 that "import deposits have to be made for textiles. The new rule requires 
that half of the cost of the goods to be deposited with the British customs 
before they could be collected. The deposits will be returned only after 
180 days."17 
17 Reported in Singapore Trade and Industry, Straits Times Press, January 1969 p. 31. 
194 
Canada 
Quota restrictions on 100 percent cotton and polyester (and cotton-
polyesters, whatever the degree of blending) garments - shirts and trousers -
were initiated on 16 July, 1968 on Singapore's exports to Canada. The first 
Agreement or Memorandum of Understanding was made effective for the 
three twelve-month periods ending on December 31, 1968, 1969, and 1970. 
This has subsequently been renewed to cover the twelve-month period ending 
31December,1971. 
The quota levels granted are specific with no growth swing provi-
sions like the United Kingdom and U.S. quota agreements with Singapore . 
The first Agreement specified a restraint annual level of 22,000 dozen shirts 
and 60,000 dozen trousers (including slacks, shorts, and jeans) , whilst the 
new agreement specified corresponding levels of 28,000 dozen shirts and 
62,500 dozen trousers. This second Agreement also included an extra item 
under quota restraint - that of cotton towels and towelling other than terry 
towelling with a restraint level of 64,000 pounds. 
Performance in terms of fulfillment of the Canadian textile quota 
levels is better than that for the United States and United Kingdom, for the 
first two years at least , where a more than 90 percent fulfillment was recorded 
in 1968 and 1969. However, the 1970 exports fell short of the quota level by 
nearly 9 ,000 dozens. This could have resulted from the fact that local pro-
ducers in Singapore " still face marketing problems since the shift in tastes to 
more advanced fabrics, which the local producers are as yet unable to 
produce." 18 
The major criticism of the Canadian quota system is that it only 
provides a 5 percent growth swing for Japan and Hong Kong, whilst the rest 
of the countries with which Canada has bilateral agreements do not enjoy 
such a provision . Not only does it contravene the terms of the LTA (where 
Annex B provides for a 5 percent annual growth swing),19 but it also will 
eventually lead to a distortion of the market shares enjoyed by the exporting 
countries. Japan and Hong Kong will undoubtedly carve out a larger share of 
the Canadian textile market over time vis-a-vis the rest of the exporting coun-
tires, like Singapore or India. 
3.1 Liberalization of Cotton Textile Imports 
by Developed Countries 
The restrictive effects of the LT A have been discussed in Section 
2. It seems rather obvious that one important way by which cotton textile 
trade could be liberalized is the accelerated relaxation of import quotas 
placed on cotton textiles fromthe so-called low-wage producing countries 
like Japan, Hong Kong, South Korea, India, Pakistan, Malaysia, and Singapore. 
One of the basic objectives of the LT A is to bring about an expansion of the 
less-developed countries' export trade in cotton textiles. The 5 percent growth 
swing provision in the LT A has not been observed by some of the importing 
countries in the bilateral agreements with the exporting countries. Moreover, 
no time limit has been imposed on the life of the LT A . It was originally 
18H. S. Narulla, op. cit., p. 48. 
19 In this respect, the U.K. agreements also contravene the terms of the LTA as they 
provide for a 1 percent growth swing. 
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intended to be a five-year agreement to prevent cotton textile market dis-
ruption, but it has been renewed subsequently, at first for a further three-
year period until 1970, after which the LTA became renewable on an annual 
basis. What was originally intended to be ephemeral appears to have become 
a permanent feature of the textile trade . 
The latest turns of events have not been very encouraging for trade 
in textiles as a whole. Firstly, there was the imposition of a 10 percent sur-
charge on all imports into the United States by the Nixon administration. 
Although the surcharge does not affect those cotton textile items already under 
quota restraint, it may have restrictive effects on cotton textile items which do 
come under quota restraints. Secondly, the United States has unilaterally asked 
for restraints on exports of man-made textiles and apparels by Japan, Hong Kong 
and South Korea. Japan acceded to the U.S . demand by announcing voluntary' 
export restraints of these items at the beginning of this year. Hong Kong fol-
lowed suit but her restraint level was not acceptable to the United States.20 
This second development could very well lead to a long-term arrangement to 
regulate the trade in synthetic textiles. 
Although much emphasis has been given to the inhibitive effects 
of the LTA on cotton textile trade, there are also other commercial policies 
used by the developed countries to obstruct free trade in cotton textiles, the 
most important of which is the use of tariff barriers. Many excellent theoreti-
cal analyses have been made by Harry Johnson, Bela Balassa, G . Basevi, W. M. 
Corden, and others to show that not only are nominal tariff rates imposed on 
imports of importance, but that in terms of protective power, effective tariff 
rates are much more important . Effective rates are related to value added by 
manufacture after taking into account duties paid on material inputs. Table 
11 shows the nominal and effective rates of protection for cotton textiles 
imposed by the United States, EEC countries, and Japan. 
Therefore, another frequently discussed means by which the trade 
flow in the cotton textiles from the developing countries to the industrialized 
countries could be increased is a reduction in tariffs on the manufactured 
cotton textiles products like woven cotton fabrics and cotton clothing. It is 
to be noted that during the Kennedy-Round on tariff reductions, " because 
of the import sensitivity of textiles in general here (the United States) and 
abroad, the cuts made by the U.S . and other importing countries averaged 
less than 25 percent .. . and many textile products were excluded 
altogether. " 21 
3.2 Liberalization of Trade Among Developing Countries 
As seen, the actual turn of events in the developed countries' com-
mercial policies may not be encouraging for trade liberalization - the LT A 
has been extended on an annual basis for an indefinite period, the United 
Kingdom will possibly enter the European Common Market, and the United 
States has undertaken some rather drastic steps to solve her balance of pay-
ments difficulties. 
"It is clear that the development of an export trade in manufactures 
from developing countries depends primarily upon the efforts of these coun-
tries themselves. "22 
20Reported in the Straits Times, 16 and 17 September, 1971. 
21 H. Lary, Imports of Manufactures from Less Developed Countries, NBER (1968), p . 125, 
footnote 14. 
22 UNCTAD, Towards a New Trade Policy for Development, U.N. (1964), p. 75. 
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One way in which the low-wage countries could expand the mar-
kets for their cotton textile manufactures is to reduce their protective tariffs 
not only on such products, but also on all the other manufactured goods 
produced by the developing countries as a whole. As UNCTAD rightly states, 
"In order to improve substantially the allocation of resources among devel-
oping countries, measures for the reduction of trade barriers should have the 
broadest possible scope, if trade were conducted in water-tight compartments, 
there would be a tendency to divert resources into inefficient channels. " 23 
In other words, liberalization of cotton textile trade can more easily come 
about if there is a multilateral reduction in tariffs on all manufactured goods 
produced by the developing countries themselves as a measure of self-help. 
Table 12 shows the level of nominal tariffs imposed by some of 
the developing countries against the imports of cotton textiles. Although the 
coverage of countries in the surveys undertaken by the International Trade 
Centre is not complete, nor is the range of cotton textile exhaustive, the 
Table does indicate a common practice among the developing countries to 
impose high tariff barriers against cotton textile imports, mainly for import-
substitution and employment-creation reasons. 
High tariff barriers are also put up against the import of other 
manufactured goods24 by the developing countries. Presumably a multilateral 
reduction of tariff rates among developing countries on the whole range of 
manufactured goods would enable individual country specialization in certain 
manufactured products according to comparative advantage vis-a-vis the other 
developing countries. The scaling down of protective tariff barriers against 
manufactured products may need to be made applicable only for imports 
from developing countries (and thereby maintaining a discriminatory tariff 
structure against the imports of manufactured goods from the developed 
industrial countries), especially in the transitional period. This is tantamount 
to the 'infant industry' argument for tariffs, but applicable to the developing 
countries only . 
In more concrete terms, as is often suggested, multilateral tariff 
reductions could take place on a regional basis; for example, through the 
formation of an Asian or South-East Asian Common Market or Free Trade 
Area akin to the European Common Market or EFT A. However, political, 
sociological, and other non-economic differences may prove insurmountable 
for such a sweeping economic change . Bilateral agreements between devel-
oping nations should not be ruled out in respect of textiles and other 
commodities. 
Another method of trade liberalization among developing countries 
which may prove less problematic is a unilateral adjustment of investment 
criteria by individual textile producing countries. For instance, Japan has 
moved away from the production of less-sophisticated textile items like low-
and medium-grade garments, thus releasing a substantial market for exporters 
from other textile-producing countries to TAP.25 Singapore has now dropped 
the textile industry as a priority industry, presumably because of the tight 
labour market, and the granting of licences for investment in textiles has 
23 UNCTAD, Trade Expansion and Economic Expansion Among Developing Countries, 
U.N. (1966), p. 5. 
24See International Trade Centre country surveys, Market for Manufactured Products 
from Developing Countries, GATT-UNCTAD . 
25 "Dark Clouds over Textiles," Asian Industry, May 1969, p. 41-5, Far East Trade Press 
Limited. 
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become more selective. To maximize the backward and forward linkage effects 
of investment in textiles, licences are now granted for fully integrated mills 
and for the production of texturized synthetics.26 This policy is in line with 
the government 's objective of encouraging the growth of more capital-
intensive industries . 
If the developing countries make serious attempts to align their 
investment policies according to the principle of comparative advantage, 
instead of putting up tariff walls for almost all lines of manufactures, the 
trade in cotton textiles and in all other types of manufactured products 
among the developing countries could expand and, in the long run , such a 
policy would be advantageous to trade and development to the developing 
as well as the developed nations in a more closely knit world economy. 
However, what seems obvious may seem idealistic in the face of the stark 
realities of the world , but that does not mean that men should not " still 
pursuing, still achieving, learn to labour and to wait ." 
Year 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
TABLE 1 
Singapore Total Trade1 and Textile Trade2 , 1964-70 
($million) 
Total Trade Textile Trade 
M x Total M x Total 
3,478.7 2,771 .9 6,250.6 338.0 195.1 533 .1 
3,807.2 3,004 .l 6,811.3 330.4 190.9 521.3 
4,065.7 3,373.6 7 ,439 .3 363.3 179.6 542.9 
4,406.5 3,490.6 7,897.1 483.3 173.1 656.4 
5,083 .8 3,890.7 8,974.5 685.0 204.6 889.6 
6,243 .6 4,740 .7 10,994.4 799.1 259.0 1,058.l 
7,533.8 4,755.8 12,289.6 881.0 259.l 1,140.1 
Source: Singapore's External Trade Statistics, Department of Statistics, various annual 
issues. 
Note : 1 Excluding trade with Indonesia. 
2 Textile here refers to only Group 65 (textile manufactures or fabrics of all sorts) 
and Group 84 (clothing or wearing apparel) of the Standard International Trade 
Classification. 
26 According to Mr. Wan Ming Seng, Projects Analyst, Economic Development Board, 
Ministry of Finance, Singapore. 
198 
TABLE la 
Singapore: Value of Textile Exports as a Percentage of Value 
of Total Exports, 1964-70 
Year Value (percent) 
1964 7.0 
1965 6.4 
1966 5.3 
1967 5 .0 
1968 5.3 
1969 5.5 
1970 5.4 
Source: Derived from Table 1. 
TABLE lb 
Singapore: Annual Change in Value of Textile Imports 
and Textile Exports (percentage terms), 1964-70 
Year Textile Imports Textile Exports 
1964-65 -2.2% -2 .1% 
1965-66 9.9 -5.9 
1966-67 33. -3 .6 
1967-68 41. 18.1 
1968-69 16. 26 .5 
1969-70 10.2 0.03 
Source : Derived from Table 1. 
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TABLE 3a 
Singapore: Textile Imports and Exports to the Selected Countries 
as a Percentage of Total Textile Imports and Exports, 1964-70 
Textile Textile 
Year Imports Exports 
(%) (%) 
1964 79.9 90.l 
1965 86.6 88.0 
1966 89.l 85.4 
1967 90.2 82.4 
1968 89.6 79 .6 
1969 90 .9 79.7 
1970 89 .6 77.7 
Source : Derived from Tables 1 and 3 and other statistics. 
TABLE 4 
Total Number of Establishments1 in the Textile Industry of 
Singapore, 1964 - 1969 
No. of Establishments 
Textile Items 1964* 1965* 1966 1967 1968 
1. Manufacture of Textiles 6 11 21 
2. Tailoring and Dressmaking 27 31 43 
3. Manufacture of Clothing 
(excluding shirts) 28 27 45 
4. Manufacture of shirts 
65 83 
20 22 40 
5. Manufacture of other 
Undergarments 11 13 15 
6. Other Manufacture of 
Made-up Textile Goods 5 6 9 
Total Textile Establishments 65 83 99 110 173 
Total no. of establishments 
in manufacturing and 
quarrying sector 965 1,036 1,159 1,236 l,626 
1969 
27 
41 
53 
34 
17 
10 
182 
l,753 
Source: Report of the Census of Industrial Production, Chief Statistician, Department of 
Statistics, Singapore, Various years. 
Note : 1 Only those Establishments employing 10 or more workers are included. 
*Establishments manufacturing footwear, (except rubber footwear) are included in Total 
Textile Establishments in l 964 and l 965. 
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1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
TABLE 6 
Number of Workers Employed in the Textile Industry1 of 
Singapore 1964 -1969 
(as at June of each year) 
1964* 1965* 1966 1967 
Manufacture of Textiles 666 1,027 
Tailoring and Dressmaking 508 623 
Manufacturing of Clothing 
(excluding shirts) 3,512 5,965 1,696 1 ,835 
Manufacture of Shirts 2,346 2 ,499 
Manufacture of other 
Undergarments 290 355 
Other Manufacture of 
Made-up Textile Goods 107 298 
Total Employment in 
Textile Industry 3,512 5,965 5,713 6,637 
Total Employment in 
Manufacturing and 
Quarrying Sector 46,284 51,959 57,521 63,195 
1968 1969 
2,832 3,674 
888 772 
3,072 3,732 
2,972 2,893 
387 379 
392 595 
10 ,543 12,045 
80,533 107,235 
Source : Report on the Census of Industrial Production, Chief Statistician, Dept. of Statistics, 
Singapore, Various years. 
Note : 1 Only those textile establishments employing 10 or more workers are included in the 
textile industry. 
*Workers employed in firms manufacturing footwear (except rubber footwear) are included 
in figure on employment in Textile Industry in 1964 and 1965 . 
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TABLE 8 
Singapore's Exports of Cotton Textiles (Quota Items) to the United States 
1966-70 (million square yards) 
Period Quota Level Granted Exports of Quota Items 
1/4/66-31 /3/67 30,000,000 30 ,248,217 
1/4/67-31/3/68 31,500,000 28,174,626 
1J4/68-31 /12/68 27 ,000,000* 24 ,674 ,747 
1/1/69-31/12/69 37,500,000 35,920 ,100 
1/1/70-31/12/70 39,375,000 34,774,986 
Source: l. Various Agreements with U.S. government. 
2. Trade Division, Ministry of Finance, Singapore, unpublished data. 
*Taken as 3/4 of first limitation year of Second Agreement (3/4 of 36,000,000). 
TABLE 9 
Singapore's Exports of Cotton Textiles 
(Quota Items) to the United Kingdom, 1966-70 (million square yards) 
Year Quota Granted Exports of Quota Items 
1966 3.8 million 1,126,000 
1967 square yards 1,969,000 
1968 with a 1 percent 3,551,424 
1969 growth per 3,746,875 
1970 annum. 1,889,855 
Source : Trade Division, Ministry of Finance, Singapore, unpublished data. 
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TABLE 10 
Singapore's Exports of Textiles (Quota Items) to Canada, 1968-70 
(in dozens) 
Period Quota Levels* Exports of Quota Items 
16 July-31 Dec. 1968 
1 Jan.- 31 Dec. 1969 
46,000 
46,000 
46,000 
45,304 
45,993 
37,381 1 Jan.-31Dec.1970 
Source: Trade Division, Ministry of Finance, Singapore, unpublished data. 
Note: Recalculated to account for the exports of Singapore before the middle of May, 
1968. A total deduction of 12,000 dozen shirts and 96,000 dozen trousers was 
made. This worked out to an annual deduction of 4,000 dozen shirts and 32,000 
dozen trousers for the three-year period. 
SITC No. 
6513 
652 
841 
TABLE 111 
Nominal Tariff Rates and Estimated Effective Rates 
on Imports of Cotton Textiles (by Stage of Manufacture) 
by the United States, EEC, and Japan 
(%) 
Estimated Effective 
Nominal Tariff Rates Rates on Value Added 
Product2 U.S. EEC Japan U.S. EEC Japan 
Intermediate 
product - cotton 13 .1 10.0 5.6 32.8 31.4 13.9 
yarn and thread 
Finished 
manufactures - 17 .5 15.0 10 .5 31.2 27.5 20.0 
cotton fabrics, 
woven 
Finished 
manufactures - 26 .6 18.5 26.0 48.l 28.l 40.3 
cotton clothing 
Source: H. Lary, Imports of Manufactures from Less Developed Countries, NBER (1968), p. 120-1. 
Notes: 1. Rates relate to tariff structure prior to completion of Kennedy-Round of GATT 
negotiations. 
2. Raw inputs for the cotton textile industry are usually imported free of duty. 
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TABLE 12 
Nominal Tariff Rates on Imports of Cotton Fabrics and Undergarments by 
Certain Developing Countries 
Country 
Thailand 
Malaysia 
Philippines 
Qatar 
Ivory Coast* 
Cameroon* 
Liberia 
Kuwait 
Ghana 
Saudi Arabia 
Taiwan 
Cotton Fabrics 
(%) 
40 
25 
Grey 50 
Bleached 75 
Other 100 
2.5 
71.1 
94 
20 
4 
40 
20 
cotton piece goods, grey 
ditto, dyed 
ditto, printed 
ditto, yarn-dyed 
41.5 
45 
45 
45 
Women's and Children's 
Undergarments 
(%) 
40 
25 
2.5 
71.1 
94 
34 
4 
40 
25 
knitted cotton underwear 
55 
other knitted cotton 
70 
cotton underwear, not knitted 
70 
Source: Market for Manufactured Products from Developing Countries, International 
Trade Centre, GATT-UNCTAD, Country surveys, 1969 (except Taiwan, 1970). 
Notes: *These countries have lower tariff rates on imports of the above items from the 
Franc Area and the EEC. 
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COMM ENTS BY PRO FESSOR G. HA INSWORTH 
Professor Hainsworth questioned whether the explanations, that 
were primarily concerned with the effects of the Long Term Agreement on 
Cotton Textiles (LTA) and that were offered for the disappointing perform-
ance of the textile industry, were in fact complete. He first took note of the 
development of the industry. 
Historical precedent is not a good enough reason at this time for 
choosing the textile industry as a leading sector in a development programme. 
It was introduced into Singapore in the 1960s largely for its labour-absorptive 
capacity as indicated by Professor Lim's figures that it accounts for 11 per 
cent of employment but only 4 per cent of value-added . Unless it can increase 
its contributions to value-added, it is not pulling its weight in the economy. 
The reasons why textiles seem to be an obvious sector to start with are , first , 
related to the high income elasticities of textiles, particularly with high fashion 
turnovers. Since a high percentage of textiles are imported, it is seen as a good 
area for import substitution. Since there is a wide range of capital intensities 
in the industry, a less developed country hopes to enter the industry and 
move around in areas of the industry with different capital intensities, as 
Hong Kong has, and gradually move toward the high technology end of the 
industry . This explains why the industry is easy to enter, why it is difficult 
to move into other countries' markets, and since the high productivity end 
of the spectrum is very competitive, why it is difficult to move into this area. 
Singapore went into the textile industry very late and faced 
competition from Hong Kong, Japan, Taiwan, India, Pakistan, China and 
Australia. The Asian Development Bank gave loans of questionable value to 
Singapore, especially since it should have been obvious that Singapore plants 
would be extensions of Hong Kong firms and would thus plow little in terms 
of profits or investments back into Singapore . Singapore's textile industry 
has a lot of idle, excess plant; it works only one shift; and highly monopolized 
control by Hong Kong parents has led the lethargy and a lack of aggressive 
production, selling and management techniques, especially since it plays 
second string to Hong Kong. 
Professor Lim's three complaints about the constraints under which 
the Singapore textile industry must operate seem selective conjecture. Evidence 
that the LTA holds up exports seems unsubstantiated by Singapore 's failure to 
fulfill quotas by large margins, especially as the European Economic Commu-
nity has allowed quotas to double . Ex ante, Singapore and others should not 
have expected the developed countries to use the LT A to phase out their 
textile industries rather than to rationalize them to secure the high produc-
tivity end of the spectrum for domestic industry . Moreover, if Singapore-
produced textiles cannot retain a hold on their own domestic markets with 
buoyant demand, it is unlikely that they will be able to make large inroads in 
the developed countries' markets. Singapore is a massive importer from all its 
textile rivals - from China, Japan, Pakistan and Taiwan - while those of 
Hong Kong grew only slowly because of interlocking ownership. Singapore's 
exports to Hong Kong and Taiwan fell to one-third the 1964 level by 1970 
and although exports to Japan and Pakistan grew, it maintained a heavy trade 
deficit. Furthermore, Singapore did better by the LT A than others like Hong 
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Kong. Therefore, in this case it is not adequate to blame external constraints 
for poor performance. It is necessary to prove that external constraints 
operate no matter what the level of performance and that they increase with 
a better performance, which in the Singapore case cannot be proven. 
The less developed countries need imaginative entrepreneurship 
and aggressive selling if they are going to get sustained growth and, for that, 
they need an on-going process of technological change while avoiding dead-
end industries where chances of moving around the labour-capital isoquants 
are restricted and where more established rivals have economies of scale and 
research and development. These countries, especially those with a highly 
educated labour force, for some leading sectors must find a part of the tech-
nological frontier and become the world centre for specific products. This 
will lead to technological spillovers and an expectation of technological change 
and will avoid the second-best mentality that goes along with taking worn-out 
industries from more developed economies . Otherwise industrial development 
is a lost cause. 
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COMMENTS BY DR. HELEN HUGHES 
Dr. Hughes said these two papers illustrate a number of important 
issues in trade from the point of view of the less developed countries and how 
these issues relate to the reactions of the developed countries. 
The less developed countries are not a homogeneous commodity. 
They range from those just entering the development process and exporting 
activities, such as Hong Kong twenty years ago, to the level of Hong Kong 
today. Singapore shows that not all developing countries have to go through 
the whole proces~ of development. They may enter manufacturing and export-
ing at different stages or levels of technological and managerial ability and 
capital accumulation. Many enter exporting when they have already built up 
an export structure. Hong Kong has been free trade from the beginning, 
whereas Singapore was one of the most protectionist countries in the early 
1960s when it was concerned with the development of the Malaysian market . 
When it separated from Malaysia in 1965, it overnight became an ardent free-
trader, but at that time, its earlier protectionist policies had not yet distorted 
the economy so the shift was made fairly easily . However, this shift will be 
much more difficult for many less developed countries in Latin America and 
Asia which have had import-replacement policies for a long time and now 
want to shift out into world trade. 
The textile industry illustrates the problems of how these countries 
get into international trade. Hong Kong has moved into high grade textile 
products from the garment industries requiring high labour-intensity and low 
levels of organization and skills. One of the interesting ways Hong Kong has 
got around restrictions and quotas on its products has been by investing in 
textile production in other countries, notably Singapore, thus keeping up its 
profits. There are important economies of scale in the garments industries, so 
Hong Kong keeps the best orders and longest runs while giving the odds and 
ends of runs to its subsidiaries in Singapore. This explains why, in spite of 
the increased categorization of quotas, Hong Kong can fill its quotas and 
Singapore cannot. Moreover, since Hong Kong's corporate tax rate is 15 per-
cent while Singapore's is 4 7 percent the parent firms shift profits from 
Singapore to Hong Kong . Thus Hong Kong has introduced new textile indus-
tries into a number of Asian and other countries and now Singapore is doing 
likewise. 
Hong Kong and Singapore have a comparative advantage over the 
developed countries in many products. They have similar or more advanced 
technology, good management and commercial services, experienced labour 
and low wage levels. In items in which value-added is significant, they can 
jump over any tariff barriers, that look at all reasonable , that the developed 
countries can put up and this is why the developed countries have moved 
from tariff barriers to quantitative restrictions. Both Hong Kong and Singapore 
also have a comparative advantage over other less developed countries which 
are just beginning and do not have the know-hew. Having to compete with 
these countries as well as the developed countries makes life difficult for the 
least developed countries although they are moving into the lower productiv-
ity, labour-intensive goods like textiles, furniture and electronic assemblying 
and forcing Hong Kong and Singapore into more capital-intensive industries. 
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This movement of less developed countries into high technology areas, despite 
tariff barriers, is what is really going to hurt the developed countries in coming 
years. This will likely lead to a proliferation of voluntary restraint agreements. 
The danger with stressing the creation of too much labour-intensive 
industry is oversupply of these goods - banana republics become pyjama 
republics, although for countries like Indonesia there may be no alternative. 
But the lesson of Hong Kong and Singapore is to use the income, both 
private and social, from these labour-intensive exports to diversify into higher 
productivity capital intensive products. This, of course, has implications for 
expenditures on education, incentives to manufacturing and so on. The World 
Bank has made projections of a 15 per cent per annum growth rate in exports 
of manufactures by the less developed countries because this represents rough-
ly the demand ceiling for this type of goods. The actual potential growth rate 
is closer to 20 or 25 per cent. The Hong Kong and Singapore experiences 
indicate that while the overall impact of the less developed countries exports 
on the developed countries' markets is small - about 3 per cent in the EEC 
and 5 per cent in the U.S. for textiles in general-, for specific products it is 
often high - for example, cotton knit shirts take up 20 per cent of these 
markets. However, at this point the developed countries will simply cut the 
market short and the less developed countries will have to get around this 
problem by changing their export structures. When nations like India or 
Brazil, capable of very large quantities of exports, get moving, Dr. Hughes 
foresees the saturation point of 5 per cent for general markets and 20 per 
cent for specific ones coming up very quickly and there will be a strong 
effect by developed countries to stop imports at that level. 
If the less developed countries as a whole are going to be able to 
trade with the developed countries on an effective scale, there must be a new 
stress on adjustment assistance in developed countries to allow such changes 
in trade to take place. The marginal productivity of workers in Hong Kong 
and Singapore is higher today than the marginal productivity of workers in 
the U.S.A., Australia and many European countries. It is easier to retain the 
Singapore and Hong Kong workers who are, on the whole, better educated 
than the workers who will be displaced in the garment industry in the 
Southern U.S. Consequently, adjustment assistance needs to be a much 
broader policy than the training of a few thousand workers here or there, 
so that in fifteen years time, when this question becomes acute, there will be 
a new basis for world trade rather than the economic confrontation that could 
lead to very serious political consequences. 
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COMMENTS BY PROFESSOR D. SHER K 
Professor Sherk said the subject of industrial development has 
been looked too much from the upper end of the product cycle and these 
two studies looking from the bottom end of the product cycle are very 
welcome. 
It was said in the first session that adjustment assistance will be 
the most important question facing the developed countries in the 1970s. 
Professor Sherk was very pessimistic that the U.S.A. and other developed 
countries would be able to cope with adjustment assistance adequately. The 
experience of adjustment assistance in the U.S. under the Trade Expansion 
Act has been dismal. From 1962 to 1969, the U .S. Tariff Commission 
received twenty-six applications for adjustment assistance and all were turned 
down. From 1969 to 1971 only nine firms have been assisted and about the 
same number of labour groups. In all, no more than ten thousand workers 
have been helped by this programme. 
From the U.S. experience in the 1960s there is evidence that the 
1970s will be truly bleak in this area. During the 1960s the U.S . was under-
going expansion of employment in defence and space programmes and this 
expansion was directed to low capital intensive areas, such as Massachussetts 
and the Southern U.S . that were having trouble with textile and shoe produc-
tion and permitted these areas to shift into higher technology industries. 
But, there are no such large government programmes on the horizon for the 
1970s. Moreover, there is considerable pressure in the U.S. for protecting 
labour by means of either "voluntary export restraints" or quotas. The 
AFL-CIO is pushing for very tough legislation to limit imports of products 
from less developed countries. Finally, the institutions that are needed to 
deal with the adjustment assistance problem on a large scale do not exist; 
GATT cannot deal with it. 
In discussing these problems, it is important to keep a notion of 
the product cycle in mind . For example, the multinational corporation can 
short-circuit the product cycle or, even more importantly, can provide the 
political clout to help the less developed countries by pressing the developed 
countries to keep their markets open, since the multinational corporations 
are operating in the less developed countries. This seems to be related to the 
textile industry which is very non-oligopolistic and in which the most prob-
lems are arising. In oligopolistic industries, the effects of protection can to 
some extent be offset through the political influence the multinational 
corporations have in Congress and in the political processes of other devel-
oped countries. 
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D ISCUSSION 
The trade policies of the less developed countries toward each 
other were said to be the result of a post-war reaction to the prewar division 
of labour. This reaction led to import substitution policies and very high 
tariffs among the less developed countries which make it difficult for these 
countries to trade with each other and are difficult to remove . The less devel-
oped countries have maintained mutual tariffs on textiles and all other prod-
ucts, but unfortunately much of the advice of development experts has been to 
develop common markets to exploit complementarity. Their mistake has been 
that it is when resources are competitive, not complementary that common mar-
kets are needed. A common market with complementary resources only 
increases the size of uneconomic units, such as in the Central American 
Common Market. The more difficult question of reducing tariffs has not 
been tackled because, while reduction of tariffs in rich countries with good 
social security at a period of high growth is not a serious problem, it is very 
serious in countries with huge employment problems, lower standards of 
living and so on. 
In his reply, Professor Lim noted that ECAFE is now beginning to 
look for commodities that can tie nations together in a competitive rather 
than a complementary way . He thanked Professor Hainsworth for putting 
some doubt in his mind about the general restrictive effects of the Long 
Term Agreement and Dr. Hughes for her valuable insights. He said that the 
Long Term Agreement is a good instrument to faster short-term adjustment, 
although this applies to many policies, but that his fear was that the Long 
Term Agreement would become part of the long-term international trade 
scene and this would be most inappropriate. 
A Japanese participant observed that it is difficult to distinguish 
'Voluntary Export Restraints' (VERs) from export cartels in a comment on 
Professor Hsia's paper . The U.S . exempts export cartels from anti-trust 
legislation under certain conditions and many export cartels exist around 
the world. For example, he said in Japan there are roughly two hundred of 
which 30 percent were established to avoid foreign import restrictions, 30 
percent to avoid excessive competition among exporters and 30 percent for 
both reasons. He said export cartels are as important a factor in restraining 
trade as VERs or quotas. He also agreed with Professor Hsia that the detailed 
classification of exports in VER agreements combined with the low swing 
allowances make it very difficult for exporters to respond quickly to changes 
in demand. This is an especially important problem in textiles where rapid 
changes in demand are common and was one of the main reasons for the 
breakdown of the U.S. - Japan textile agreement. 
Professor Hsia replied to one comment on his paper that he did 
not say that without VERs, the diversification of industry and technological 
advances would not have taken place in the Hong Kong textile industry , but 
rather that it might have taken longer than without the pressure generated 
by VERs. He also gave an example of monopolistic practices interfering with 
the development of international trade. The development of spinning and 
weaving in Hong Kong was delayed for five years because of the cartelization 
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of synthetic fibre under a cartel agreement between iCI, Dupont and others 
which forced Hong Kong to accept monopoly prices from the designated 
supply source. 
One participant from Australia emphasized Professor Sherk's point 
that the multinational corporations might be more sensible than many coun-
tries in the location of processing. However, another participant suggested 
that the multinational corporations have a role to play, but they do not 
always play the game acc<;>rding to competitive rules. ~he ~racti~e of giving 
tax concessions and creatmg tax havens causes such d1stort1ons m markets 
that one begins to wonder what the multinational corporations are actually 
trying to maximize and also to wonder who is benefitting from what. In their 
current term legislation to AFL-CIO have shifted their attack from textiles 
to the multinational corporations to end their double taxation privileges. 
When the trade unions hear that a multinational corporation is preparing to 
shift its production units to a less developed country, they threaten to strike 
all its plants in the U .S. This reinforced another participant's view below that 
adjustment assistance cannot be a part of a piecemeal approach to solving 
these problems but rather attempts to rethink the rules of the capitalist game 
are needed. 
The problem of adjustment assistance to declining industries in the 
developed countries was a major topic of discussion . Another U.S. participant 
said that he was not quite as pessimistic as Professor Sherk about the future 
of adjustment assistance in the U.S., however, he agreed that the proposals of 
the AFL-CIO were indeed frightening. He also agreed that the U.S . Tariff 
Commission has tended to administer the adjustment assistance programmes 
badly, but emphasized that economists must do something very rapidly, 
using public relations methods, to promote acceptance of adjustment 
assistance programmes in the U.S . Also he suggested there is a greater tend-
ency to use quotas against the imports of the less developed countries 
because the problem in the developed country is an employment and produc-
tion problem which is affected mainly by quantities of imports but it is not 
a balance of payments problem which is more affected by value of imports. 
Moreover the less developed countries may prefer quotas to tariffs since they 
can raise their prices to just below developed country prices. Another U.S. 
participant suggested that better criteria were needed for adjustment assist-
ance. 
One U.S. participant suggested on one hand that there is a strong 
ideological bias in the U.S . against adjustment assistance. It is viewed as 
government interference with the free play of market forces while tariffs 
and quotas are not and are desirable . Business is reluctant to support 
legislation for adjustment assistance on these grounds while officials are 
reluctant because of the high budgetary cost although they have not done 
any cost benefit analyses nor considered the opportunity costs. On the other 
hand, he said Japan does have an effective industrial policy that shifts 
resources out of inefficient areas and pushes them into industries that have 
high future productivity. The U.S. claims it does not have an industrial 
policy, but in reality it does have such a policy made up of a number of ad 
hoc measures which end up protesting inefficient industry . The U.S. has 
rejected the Japanese approach as being government interference and 
direction of industry, but the Japanese approach is by far the more sensible. 
A Canadian participant commented that, in federal countries, very 
strong provincial or state authorities compound the political reaction to this 
problem. Adjustment assistance in Canada is usually a matter of regional 
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development involving heavy capital and labour subsidies, but he said these 
subsidies may be just a new form of protection. While they are (one-time ) 
subsidies, they are so large that they may have to be continued and they are 
often given to the very industries which the developing countries will want 
to develop in the next decade . His concern that what is intended to be an 
adjustment assistance programme will be soon turned into a new protection 
programme by businessmen was illustrated by Australia 's 'devaluation 
compensation' programme which was rapidly built into something more 
permanent that intended . 
Finally, another Canadian participant emphasized that the concept 
of adjustment assistance is not an easy set of policies that a government could 
adopt readily and it will not necessarily meet the problems, such as a better 
labour force in Hong Kong than in the Southern U.S. Solving problems such 
as this requires changes in the U.S. economy, in its education system, man-
power training programmes and so on. It is not just trade that is a problem 
but rather that a more efficient capitalism is needed. This is again illustrated 
by the ideological problem mentioned above . Both the U .S. government 
policy of free education through to university and its policy of major support 
to research and development are indirectly aspects of U.S . industrial policy . 
They are not thought of as industrial policy , but they have far-ranging effects 
in turning out manpower and supplying large amounts of technology that 
contribute to the U.S.' comparative advantage in high technology industry . 
This type of broad government interference may have to be multiplied 
throughout all areas that affect industrial life . 
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Trade in Manufactured Products ( 11) 
JAPAN'S NON-TAR IFF BARR IERS TO T RADE 
IN MANU FACT URED PRODUCTS* 
by 
RYUTARO KOMIYA 
University of Tokyo 
1. Introduct ion: What are Non-Tariff Barriers? 
Although the significance of Non-Tariff Barriers (NTB) to trade 
has been attracting increasing attention since the successful conclusion of 
the Kennedy Round, the concept of NTB has rarely been defined precisely. 
Very often descriptions of major types of NTB, rather than a definition of 
the term itself, are given to indicate what is meant by NTB. In view of the 
confusion in this area, I shall begin by stating my view on what is meant by 
NTB. 
The phase NTB was coined by those who wish to promote free, 
multilateral international trade by reducing NTB, and thereby increase the 
real income of participating countries and to enhance mutual understanding 
and friendship. Thus interest in NTB originates from a pragmatic or policy 
point of view: the possibility of enhancing gains from international trade. 
Therefore, as a first approximation, NTB may be defined as "measures other 
than tariffs intervening in international trade , which distort the resource 
allocation of countries participating in world trade and thereby reduce their 
real income". 
Authority to Negotiate 
Although various customs, institutions or human organizations 
affect the pattern and volume of international trade , NTB covers only those 
regulatory measures which are taken by: (1) a central government ; (2) local 
governments; and (3) non-governmental organizations such as trade associa-
tions, export or import cartels, or labor unions. Thus, the Japanese language 
or Japanese customs are sometimes held by foreign businessmen to be the most 
serious barriers to trade with Japan. They are not NTB. They are simply given 
data from an economic point of view. 
Restrictive activities of business organizations are primarily the 
subject of anti-trust policies and are thus not considered to be NTB. However, 
when a non-governmental organization is empowered by the government or 
undertakes with the tacit consent of the government to impose restrictive 
measures on traders, such measures may be considered to be NTB. An example 
in Japan is the Japan Laver (seeweeds) Wholesalers Association's levying of 
*A paper presented at the Fourth Pacific Trade and Development Conference, held in 
Ottawa in October 1971. 
Members of a resear.ch project on Japan's NTB sponsored by the Japan Economic 
Research Center made available to the author information underlying this paper and 
made useful comments on an earlier manuscript. The author is very much indebted 
to them. 
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import charges on imported laver from Korea to protect domestic laver pro-
ducers and traders. The problem arose in the bilateral monopoly laver trade 
between Korea and Japan several years ago. Restrictive activities of export 
or import cartels often pose difficult problems. 
For NTB to be established by local governments is unknown in 
Japan where the power of the central government vis-a-vis local governments 
is nearly omnipotent. NTB established by local governments sometimes 
present special difficulties in federal countries. For example, some U.S. states 
prohibit tangerine imports from Japan because of regulations imposing quar-
antines on imports of plants. Whether the prohibition is warranted or not, it 
is difficult for a foreign country to negotiate with each local government 
responsible for NTB. 
Another problem concerning negotiations arises in situations where 
the Legislature and the Administration may favour different policies, and 
particularly when the Legislature tends to take international commitments 
lightly. Again this is no problem in Japan, where so far the Cabinet has been 
in a strong position vis-a-vis the Diet . 
Legal Status 
Whether a certain regulatory measure constitutes an NTB or not 
should be judged from an economic, rather than a legal point of view. We 
economists seek opportunities to increase economic welfare and gains from 
trade by reducing NTB. Whether NTB are legal international or not is a 
problem for lawyers not for economists. For example, most of Japan's 
import quotas on agricultural products are Residual Import Restrictions 
(RIR) which are in conflict with GATT, whereas U.S. import restrictions on 
agricultural products, which are also quite extensive, are not, as the U.S. 
obtained a waiver on these restrictions. But when the problem is to identify 
an NTB and to assess its welfare costs from an economic point of view, its 
legal status is a different matter. 
Direct and Indirect NTB 
Some NTB interfere with imports and some with exports. Let us 
first consider NTB on imports. Here we shall distinguish between "direct" 
and "indirect" NTB. In the case of a "direct" NTB, the regulating authorities 
(mostly the central government) take measures which discriminate against 
international transactions (imports) in favour of domestic transactions (do-
mestic products) in order to promote domestic production and to suppress 
imports substantially. Tariffs and tariff quotas in themselves are not included 
in NTB by definition, but customs procedures or assessment systems con-
taining special trade-barriers in addition to the tariff rates, are to be consid-
ered NTB. 
Typical examples of "direct" NTB are: import quotas, the import 
deposit system, state trading enterprises, buy-national policies, discriminatory 
export or import financing, and so on. 
An "indirect" NTB is a measure which is supposedly necessary to 
attain a certain desirable policy objective, and does not directly discriminate 
between domestic products and imports, but contains a substantial (some-
times prohibitive) trade-barrier element as a secondary effect. In intergovern-
mental discussions of NTB, very often the following situation arises: foreign 
countries charge that a country's use of indirect NTB is detrimental to inter-
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national trade, while the government of the country in question argues that 
its instrument is not an NTB, because its purpose is not to reduce imports 
but to achieve a certain other desirable objective. 
The problem here is whether the other objective is really desirable , 
and whether it cannot be achieved by alternative measures which do not 
seriously affect international trade . 
For example, the purpose of quarantine regulations on animals and 
plants is not ~o reduce inte~nati~nal trade, butt<;> prot~ct the country from 
diseases and msects. Sometimes imports of certam agricultural products from 
infected areas is totally prohibited. Very often, no alternative is available , 
besides the effort of exporting countries to exterminate the diseases or to 
invent treatments which prevent contagion. It must be pointed out, however, 
that the use of quarantine is sometimes abused . 
NTB on Exports 
In any country, we observe a striking asymmetry between policies 
regarding exports and imports. Almost every government tries to promote 
exports and restrict imports . Why this asymmetry obtains is an interesting 
socio-political question . The asymmetry is reflected in the GATT, which is 
much stricter on export subsidies and dumping than on import tariffs , and 
is lenient on export taxes or export cartels. From a national welfare point of 
view, for example , dumping by foreign countries in the domestic market may 
well be welcome, unless its purpose is predatory (which is impossible in most 
cases) . But here as in many other situations the government and the public 
confuse the interest of particular industries or firms with the national interest. 
On the other hand, dumping abroad and subsidizing exports are generally 
detrimental to national economic welfare , although there are several excep-
tions. 
We are concerned with NTB, because we think by reducing them 
world real income can be increased through improvement in the pattern of 
world trade and resource allocation . We should be concerned, therefore, not 
only with those measures which reduce international trade below an optimal 
level, but also with those which artificially increase trade beyond it. For this 
reason, non-tariff " distortions" may be a better word than " barriers" or 
" obstacles". 
Quantitative restrictions on exports and minimum price systems 
for exports, introduced either by the government or by trade associations, 
are typical NTB aimed at reducing export. Examples of distortions which 
artificially promote trade are: subsidies of various forms on exports or on 
domestic production of exports, favorable tax treatment of incomes from 
export, and governmental financing of exports (and imports). 
The primary purpose of most NTB measures is not to block trade 
but to achieve some other economically or socially desirable objective . Even 
in the case of the most direct NTB measures, such as import quotas, the 
purpose may be, to help small producers who are suffering hardship or to 
establish a promising infant industry . The problem here is how to separate 
necessary, unavoidable or justifiable measures from those that are not. 
Free market mechanisms do not always lead to optimal resource 
allocation. Welfare economists enumerate cases of market failure to promote 
welfare. NTB are relevant to this problem. Non-economic policy objectives 
and intervention to achieve them cannot be dismissed by economic arguments. 
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Therefore whether a measure resulting in restrictive effects on trade is an 
NTB to be abolished or at least modified, depends on how one answers the 
following three questions : ( 1) whether the measure contributes to better 
world resource allocation in the long run: (2) whether the policy objective 
of the measure is "reasonable": and if the answer to the previous question 
is yes, (3) whether better alternatives are available. If investigation of these 
three questions leads to a conclusion that there is some possibility for improve-
ment, the measure in question constitutes an NTB to be removed or modified . 
If there is no immediate alternative it should not be considered as an NTB. 
A judgement concerning the above questions depends on one's 
general outlook on economic policy, so that it is very often difficult even for 
disinterested economists to reach agreement on what are NTB and what 
are not. 
2. Import Quota and Trade Liberalization 
Quantitative restrictions on imports, or import quotas , are a most 
explicit form of direct NTB and it was perhaps the most important NTB restrict-
ing Japan's manufacturing trade until recently. 
Quantitative restrictions on imports may be classified in two 
categories according to whether they are legally admitted under the GATT or 
not. Those which are in conflict with the GATT are called Residual Import 
Restrictions (RIR), and the Japanese government's Trade (Import) Liberaliza-
tion Policy in recent years is aimed primarily at reducing the number of 
items under RIR. 
Japan's efforts at import liberalization began somewhat later than 
those of European countries. The government announced the "General 
Program" for liberalization in 1960, and adopted the "negative-list" system 
in 1962 in place of a "positive-list" system. The latter enumerated 
import items free of quantitative restrictions, whereas the former lists those 
for which quota restrictions are enforced . 
Table 1 gives the liberalization rate for 1958-70, the ratio of liberal-
ized imports to the total value of imports. Table 2 gives a summary picture 
of the liberalization process since 1962, before which comparable data are 
not available. From Tables 1 and 2, it will be seen that the liberalization 
policy has been eagerly pursued between 1960 and 1963, during which the 
liberalization rate jumped from 44% to 92% . From 1964 to 1969, only a few 
items were liberalized and the number of BTN 4-digit items under Residual 
Import Restrictions remained around 120. This was a period during which 
the Japanese government's efforts at liberalization were nearly suspended. 
As the basic trend in Japan's balance of payments changed towards continued 
surpluses after 1968, and foreign countries put more and more pressure on 
Japan to liberalize import restrictions, the government renewed and acceler-
ated its liberalization effort with the cabinet's decision to continue import 
liberalization in December 1968. 
Several factors influenced this policy change: the balance of pay-
ment surplus, the rapid and continuing rise in consumers' prices amounting 
to 6 to 7% per year, and pressure especially from the U.S. as well as other 
foreign countries. But the most important factor in this decision was the 
growing protectionist tendency in the U.S. Before the Japanese-American 
textile negotiations, and several anti-dumping cases from 1969 to 1970 in the 
U.S., in which imports from Japan were attached, neither the Japanese Govern-
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ment nor the general public seriously recognized the fact that the very exist-
ence of the Japanese economy depends upon free, multinational world trade . 
Although government officials and leading businessmen paid lip 
service to free international trade , there prevailed in Japan a belief that free 
world trade mainly benefits the most advanced, most "powerful" countries 
such as England in the 19th century, or the U.S . today , and is not necessarily 
beneficial to much less advanced countries such as Germany in 19th century , 
or Japan (and other less advanced countries) today . A corollary to this theory 
was for Japan to sabotage its obligations as a member of GATT or OECD to 
liberalize trade until foreign pressure became too strong and necessitated 
Japan 's policy change . Now that the U.S . is beginning to turn towards 
protectionism many Japanese for the first time realize that Japan benefits a 
great deal from free world trade, and that it is to Japan's own advantage to 
establish and maintain free, harmonious, multilateral trade relations. In my 
opinion this realization is the most important factor behind the renewed 
liberalization effort in recent years . 
The Present State of RI R 
In 1968 when the number of RIR was 125 in terms of BTN 4-digit 
items, agricultural products (BTN Chapters 1 to 24) accounted for 69, 
minerals (25-28) for 8 , and manufactures (29 to 99) for 48 . By the end 
of 1971 at the latest, the number of RIR will have been reduced to at most 
40, of which 9 items are manufactures. The process of import liberal-
ization of manufactures since 1969 is given in Table 3. The reasons why 
RIR on each item listed in Table 3 was maintained until recently are 
various, but are generally the same as the reasons for high tariff rates in 
any country: the weak competitive power of a declining domestic 
industry , an infant industry situation (real or imaginary ), the existence 
of strong foreign firms dominating the world market , and so forth . But, 
although I do not have the detailed information on individual items, my 
general impression is that the reasons for protection seem unwarranted in 
most cases and that the effort towards liberalization began too late. 
When the number of RIR on manufactures is reduced to 9 at the 
end of this year, 4 will be related to leather, another 4 to electronic computers, 
and the remaining one is integrated circuits (IC) . 
The leather industry embraces very small producers from a special, 
low-income, socially discriminated group, and in view of their low mobility 
to other sectors, the government judges that liberalization of these four items 
is socially undesirable for the time being. 
The Japanese domestic market for electronic computors is about 
equally divided by foreign and domestic producers (counting Japan IBM as 
foreign). The four leading Japanese computor makers have a market-share of 
about 10% each , but they are still substantially behind IBM especially in 
larger scale computors. At present, under strong pressure from the U.S., t he 
Japanese government is considering further liberalization in this field perhaps 
for terminal and accessory units, and smaller computors. 
I am no expert on the computor industry, but I am sceptical of the 
merit of early liberalization in this field . Here IBM occupies a dominant, near-
monopoly position in the world market . I fear that too early liberalization 
may simply lead to IBM's dominance and monopoly of the market. In an 
industry where technological progress is rapid and the economies of scale 
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are important, and where few very large firms dominate the world market, a 
country's protective policy to bring up viable competitors may lead to 
improvement in world resource allocation rather than the other way round . 
Liberalization of a certain item is sometimes accompanied by a 
raise in the tariff rate on that item or the introduction of a tariff quota 
system, provided that the item is not covered by the GATT rate so far . This 
has occurred, however, mainly for agricultural products, minerals and 
primary metals , rather than for manufactures . Secondly, such substitution of 
tariff barriers for NTB took place mostly before 1964. The fact that one 
cannot simply raise tariffs as a substitute for NTB is another achievement 
of the Kennedy-Round. 
Import Restrictions Other than RI R 
There are 48 items (BTN 4-digit) on which quantitative import 
restrictions other than RIR are imposed by the Japanese government. Namely , 
11 items under GATT Article 17 (the state trading enterprise), 10 items 
under Article 20 (b) (protection of human, animal and plant life , and health) , 
3 items under Article 20 (c) (gold and silver) , and 27 items under Article (b) 
(national security) are under direct import restrictions.1 Some of these 
"lawful" non-liberalized items are essentially the same as RIR from an 
economic point of view . Especially government trading in rice, wheat, butter, 
milk and other dairy products achieves the same result as RIR. Therefore, if 
one is concerned only with conformity with the GATT provisions, simply 
turn RIR into state trading, and the problem will be "solved". 
Among manufactures covered by these lawful quantitative restric-
tions, the following items appear to have a substantial NTB element: vaccine, 
blood serum, airplanes, aeronautic radio eguipment , gunpowder, and hunting 
guns. To consider light airplanes, gliders, any airplane engines and radar 
equipment as "military weapons" endangering national security is obviously 
far fetched . The Japanese government is now considering liberalizing light 
airplanes, radar and aeronautic radio equipment. 
The Relative Importance of Quantitative Restrictions 
It is difficult to assess to what extent these RIR and other quanti-
tative restrictions hinder Japan 's import trade . Although the number of RIR 
has been declining, quantitative restrictions still cover a substantial part of 
imports, as seen from Table 4 . For every half-year period, the government 
announces the total size of the import quota and its breakdown into four 
categories: foods, mineral fuel , machinery and others. The last two columns 
of Table 4 give the ratio of import quotas to the value of actual imports for 
the overall import total and for machinery . It shows that the liberalization 
rate given in Table 1 , which is computed with fixed 1959 weights means very 
little for recent years . This is because the composition of imports has changed 
very much since 1959. RIR have covered certain income-elastic imports such 
as meat, prepared foods, coking coal, refined petroleum, machine tools and 
computors . Also , apparently, the government has been increasing the size 
of quotas for these items under the quota system as a move towards freer 
1 Since one 4-digit item includes several items which are under restrictions for different 
reasons, the summing the numbers of items for individual reasons do not add up to 48. 
Also of these 48 items, 5 overlap RIR, so that the net addition to the total of non-
liberalized items is 43 . 
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trade. The ratio will decline in 1971, as a result of the extensive liberalization 
put into effect in 1970 and 1971. 
3. Non-Tariffs Barriers on Imports Other than Quotas 
In Japan, although there are numerous NTB other than import 
quotas, none of them, according to my impression, is comparable in its 
relative importance. In the following we shall briefly describe some of the 
more important ones . 
Subsidies and Excise Taxes 
Both subsidies on domestic production and excise taxes on domestic 
consumption reduce imports and unless there are justifiable reasons for them, 
they constitute NTB . 
An example of such a subsidy in Japan , and perhaps about the only 
important example in the field of manufactures, is an interest subsidy on 
ocean-going ships owned by Japanese shipping companies and built by domes-
tic shipbuilders under the government shipbuilding program. In my view, this 
is an unnecessary subsidy which cannot be justified for economic (and perhaps 
other) reasons. It constitutes an NTB. In this case, the barrier or obstacle is 
likely to be only nominal, since the Japanese shipbuilders build nearly one 
half of the world annual shipbuilding tonnage and are very strong exporters. 
To obviate the NTB, beginning from this year the government does not 
require companies to build ships in Japan in order to receive subsidization. 
But it is unlikely that Japanese shipping companies will build their subsidized 
ships abroad . 
Examples of Japanese excise taxes which are called NTB by foreign 
countries (U.S. , Canada, and U.K.) are the excise tax on larger passenger cars 
and the liquor tax on whisky . The scale of the ad valorem excise tax on 
passenger cars is based upon the cylinder capacity , and 15% is levied on cars 
below 2000 cubic centimeters, 30% on 2000-3000cc and 40% for those 
above 3000cc. The liquor tax on whisky cheaper than 700 yen per litre is a 
specific rate of 929,000 yen per kilolitre, while the rate for more expensive 
whisky is 150% for whisky worth 700 to 1000 yen, and 220% for whisky 
over 1000 yen per litre . 
In both cases the formal reason is to restrain consumption of 
luxuries, and the excise rates apply whether home produced or imported . 
But passenger cars and whisky brands on which these luxury rates apply 
are produced in Japan only on a very limited scale , and these high rates are 
mainly for imports . 
It would be difficult to justify the difference between these 
luxury rates and the rates for less expensive categories. Moreover, the tariff 
rate on whisky is very high: about 35 to 40% when converted to the ad 
valorem rate . Therefore the luxury in this case is not due to high costs of 
production but to tariffs. The reason for this high liquor tax appears to me 
to be protection for domestic producers. The protective effects of the liquor 
tax are in addition to those of tariffs on liquor which are generally very high. 
The NTB aspect of these high excise tax rates has been recently 
challenged and the reduction in the rate on larger passenger cars will 
materialize in the near future. 
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Import Procedures 
Foreign businessmen often complain of complicated import or 
exchange procedures and cumbersome formalities in Japan. This may be 
generally true, perhaps as compared with most other advanced countries. 
But I would like to point out two aspects of Japanese red-tape. 
First, complicated formalities which require many forms and 
documents are not confined to international trade or foreign exchange 
procedures. 
Among the various procedures concerning imports, I shall take up 
two which appear to constitute NTB: the AIQ system and the system of 
standard methods of settlement. 
(i) Automatic Import Quota (AIQ) 
In Japan in order to import any goods one must obtain an "import 
approval" certificate . All goods are classified into three groups: Import 
Quota, AIQ, and Automatic Approval (AA) groups. For goods in the AA group, _ 
one can receive the approval at any authorized foreign exchange bank (most 
commercial banks), which simply confirms that the goods in question are 
in the AA category. This procedure is useful for statistical reasons: the 
government and public can learn of the trend in imports much earlier than 
in other countries. 
To import goods under the Import Quota one must obtain a quota 
permit which are allotted from time to time. 
The AIQ category is an intermediate one, and when an IQ item is 
liberalized, it is shifted to AIQ before going on to AA. For goods in AIQ, 
MITI (Ministry of International Trade and Industry) is responsible for 
issuing the import approval, but in practice this is issued automatically 
within 3 or 4 days after applying to MITI. The name AIQ is misleading since 
there is no quantitatively limited "quota" 
The formal reason for AIQ is to observe closely the trend in 
imports after liberalization, and also to calm down opposition to liberalization. 
But at least in recent years there has been no case in which an item is returned 
from AIQ to IQ after liberalization, or the approval of AIQ import has been 
delayed. Therefore, the system has, in fact, almost no practical merits. In 
view of the pressure from foreign governments, which is based mostly upon 
misunderstanding, the Japanese government is now considering abolishing 
the AIQ category and shifting the liberalized item from IQ directly to AA. 
(ii) The Standard Methods of Settlement 
Under Japan's exchange control system, only certain standard 
methods (terms, means of payment, period, etc.) of settling export and 
import accounts are automatically approved, and when one wishes to use 
settlement methods other than those prescribed as standard methods, one 
must apply to MITI for an individual approval. The system tends to be 
stricter on imports than on exports: for example, payment must be made 
within 4 months for imports and within six months (one year until recently) 
for exports. A large part of import transactions, perhaps more than 95%, 
are settled by standard methods. Thus, in principle, the system is to the 
advantage of a domestic machine tool maker vis-a-vis a foreign one, for 
example, in extending medium-term credit to buyers. Advance payment is 
not within the standard method. 
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Japan's exchange control system is highly complicated and almost 
every businessman, not only foreign but also Japanese, is highly critical of its 
cumbersomeness. In the recent speculative attack on the yen, however, the 
rush on short-term capital was limited mainly to the "leads" effect on the 
export side ~nd investment in b<;>r:ds. Almost no "lags" effect took place on 
the import side because of the ngid, 4-month standard method of settlement.2 
If a country sticks to the adjustable (or almost unadjustable) peg 
system, and wants to I?ursue an ind~pendent monetar)'.' policy and/or to 
avoid a heavy speculative attack on its currency, certain exchange controls 
to check short-term capital movement are in order. Restrictions on export 
and import settlement may be necessary for this purpose. A better solution 
would be to adopt a crawling peg with a wider band. 
Government Procurement 
There are no Buy National law such as the Buy American or Ship 
American laws in the U.S. There is a provision in a cabinet order stating that 
for a few stipulated articles the government may buy domestic products in 
preference to imports when the prices tendered are exactly the same. This 
provision, however, has never been applied in practice. In fact a wide range 
of imports such as printing machines, accounting machines, computors, 
typewriters are commonly used within the government (especially in the 
national universities, as professors like to have novel, foreign-made apparati). 
Thus there is no formal discrimination in government procurement 
against imports or foreign suppliers, but in practice there is an inherent bias 
towards Japanese suppliers . This is because the government rarely invites an 
open, public tender, but receives tenders only from those nominated by the 
government. This is common not only with the central government but also 
with local governments and government enterprises such as the Japan 
National Railroad, Japan Telegram and Telephone Corporation, and the 
Japan Highway Corporation. Therefore, there are often complaints even 
among Japanese businessmen who feel that the government or government 
enterprises favor a particular firm or group of firms. Again, the problem here 
is not only the problem of fairness towards foreigners but also of fairness 
within Japan. But this is a difficult problem, since it is a custom in Japan 
to esteem and enjoy close and confidential personal relationships. It is 
difficult for ordinary Japanese to change suppliers from time to time simply 
because of prices. 
The solution to the problem may lie in working out an internation-
al code on government procurement policies. 
Administrative Guidance 
"Administrative Guidance" (Gyosei Shido) is a vague word for 
discretionary advice, wishes, requests or sometime threatening orders by 
government officials given to private firms which are not based upon any 
clear-cut, well-defined stipulation in laws and ordinances . It must not be 
thought that in giving administrative guidance the government officials are 
doing something illegal. There is usually a vague, comprehensive stipulation 
in the law that a certain government agency is responsible for the orderly 
condition of a certain field and may take appropriate measures for maintain-
2 For export settlement, the standard terms are less restrictive, and for example, advance 
payments are allowed. 
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ing it . For foreigners it might appear strange that Japanese firms accept such 
government officials meddling with private business affairs , but in a society 
in which the central government has traditionally such wide powers over 
citizens, it does not pay in the long run to be openly opposed to the govern-
ment, or so most people think. 
What kind of " administrative guidance" constitutes an NTB is 
difficult to ascertain, since such direction usually takes subtle forms and 
is not made public. 
An example of the Japanese government 's "administrative 
guidance" and perhaps the only clear-cut case pointed out by foreign govern-
ments, is concerned with large-capacity steam-power generators, turbines 
and boilers . Steam-power generating equipment of a size larger than a certain 
prescribed limit (200 thousand KW since 1962, and 400 thousand KW since 
1964) were under quantitative restrictions until recently. When an electric 
power company built a power station and installed several units of generators, 
the government requested the power company, as a condition of the issue of 
an import license for the first unit, to ask the exporting American maker of 
that unit to make available a patent to some Japanese maker to produce the 
second and following units. This policy of " the first unit imported but the 
following units home-produced" has been severely criticized by the U .S. as 
a most obvious NTB. Now that the import of all steam-power equipment is 
liberalized, there is room no longer for such administrative guidance. 
Such direct intervention into private business dealings is certainly 
contrary to the principle of free enterprise and is therefore generally undesir-
able . But from an economic point of view, there is an element of rationality 
in such a policy . Japan is technologically much less advanced than the U.S ., 
and U.S. firms often have a monopoly position in the world in technologically 
strategic fields, based upon patents and know-how. To purchase advanced 
technology helps the propagation of new technology and increases the 
competitiveness of the market. The problem here is how to harmonize the 
conflict between technological propagation and increasing competition on 
the one hand , and a fair return and incentives to technological innovators 
on the other. 
4. Non-Tariff Distortions on Manufactured Exports 
On the export side there are three major kinds of non-tariff barriers 
or distortions to be described here briefly . 
( 1) Self Restraints on Export 
Several laws exempt export cartels from anti-trust prosecution, and 
there are various types of cartels. Also, the Government does not approve 
the export of certain kinds of goods, unless certain conditions are met. These 
cartels and regulations are generally called " self-restraint on export" 
(Yushutsu Jishu Kisei) . Apparently not all such cartels and regulations are 
NTB: for example , when exporting cameras, the exporter must show that 
he can offer a repair service to overseas users. Such restrictions may be 
justified to ensure certain standards for exports. 
Typical reasons for cartels, however, are twofold: first , to avoid 
import restrictions from the importing country , such as an import quota, a 
raise in the tariff rate, a tariff quota or an anti-dumping measure: and, second, 
to lessen "excessive competition" among Japanese exporters and to establish 
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an "orderly condition" in the export trade. These two reasons overlap each 
other and are in practice difficult to separate. A cartel of this type regulates 
quantity and/or prices, and is often given either an exclusive right to export 
the goods in question to the export market under the cartelization, or is 
allowed to regulate outsiders (in the case of restrictions on price ). Otherwise 
outsiders would nullify the very point of the cartel. 
Much of such "self-restraint on exports" is called for either by the 
governments or industries of importing countries, and accepted unwillingly 
by Japanese exporters. They think self-restraint is better than higher tariffs 
or quantitative restrictions enforced by the government of the importing 
country. For cotton textiles which are under the Long Term Agreement, 
the export restriction is compulsory . 
The self-restraint on export is an obvious NTB. It benefits foreign 
firms competing with Japanese exports and hurts consumers and the general 
economic welfare .3 For example, the U.S. Government which is eager to 
pursue anti-trust policies for maintaining competition and is supposedly 
trying hard to stabilize the price level, has arranged a semi-official self-restraint 
on Japanese iron and steel exports, under which the annual rate of growth of 
Japan's iron and steel exports to the U.S . is limited to a mere 2 .5% . 
What percentage of Japanese export is covered by such restraints 
is not known to my knowledge, but my guess is that about one quarter to 
one third of all exports are under some quantitative and/or price restriction. 
(2) Measures for Promoting Exports 
There are several provisions in the tax laws the sole purpose of 
which is to encourage exports. A certain part of income from (0 .5 to 2.3%, 
depending upon the size of the firm and upon whether it is a trading com-
pany or manufacturer) may be deducted from income and accumulated as 
a special reserve,4 thereby reducing the taxable income of exporters. Also, 
exporters may apply a higher, accelerated rate of depreciation than ordinary 
firms. These two provisions are a remnant of the more extensive tax incentives 
given to exporters when Japan 's balance of payments tended to turn into a 
deficit . 
The government has two measures to promote exports through 
making low-interest credit available to exporters. First, a governmental 
financial institution, the Japan Export Import Bank , extends long and 
medium-term credit to exporters of machinery of all kinds including ships 
and tankers, at lower interests than available through commercial banks . 
Although the name of the Bank includes "Import", financing of imports 
amounts to only about 10% of the Bank's outstanding loans. The rest finance 
exports. Second, the Bank of Japan has rediscounted export bills at substan-
tially favorable interest rates until very recently. 
To achieve optimal resource allocation through the international 
division of labor, exports should neither be promoted nor discouraged, 
therefore these tax provisions and financial measures cannot be justified on 
purely economic grounds. In the beginning these measures were introduced 
for balance of payment reasons, and once introduced any such measure has 
3 In some cases Japanese exporters who receive export quotas also gain because of higher 
prices. 
4 Entitled as the Overseas Market Development Reserve. 
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a strong tendency to persist, since vested interests are formed and oppose 
abolition. 
Recently, Japan's balance of payments has turned into heavy 
surpluses. Most of these export-promoting measures have lost meaning 
entirely and have been losing public support. The government is now 
considering either abolishing or at least narrowing the range of these 
measures . 
Discrim ination against Japanese Exports 
When Japan joined the GATT in 1955 a large number of countries, 
including most European members of GATT, invoked Article 35 against 
Japan: that is, they refused to enter into GATT relations with Japan. Many 
new states in Africa and Asia which were previously British or French 
colonies also invoked Article 35 against Japan when joining the GATT. At 
present, 22 countries, mostly in Africa, out of the 78 members of GATT, 
still invoke Article 35 against Japan, although some of them give Most 
Favored Nation (GATT) treatment to Japan. 
A more serious case of discrimination against Japan at present is 
the so-called "negative-list" import restriction applied to imports from Japan 
by some European countries . Between 1963 and 1964 most European coun-
tries withdrew the application of Article 35 and entered into GA TT relations 
with Japan.5 But although most European countries now officially have 
GATT relations with Japan, many of them still maintain a negative-list 
against Japan (or against only a few countries, including Japan), in addition 
to non-discriminatory, global RIR . For items in the negative-list, these coun-
tries maintain quantitative restrictions on imports from Japan. The number 
of items on which each country maintains discriminatory import restrictions 
is difficult to ascertain, but according to a recent Japanese government 
source, it is as follows (in terms of BTN 4-digit items) : Sweden 52, Italy 45, 
France 38, Norway 25, Benelux 22, West Germany 14, and Denmark 8 . 
Most of the items in the negative-list are manufactures such as 
various textiles (other than cotton, which is under the LTA), tires and tubes, 
belt conveyors, footwear, ceramic tiles, umbrellas, silverware, sewing 
machines, ball and roller bearings, radio and TV sets, porcelain insulators, 
automobiles (Italy), motorcycles, microscopes (France) and toys. 
From Japan's point of view, these discriminatory measures which 
violate the GATT are the most difficult NTB to cope with. A third country 
pays little attention to the problem as its exports are not affected, while in 
the case of overall, non-discriminatory NTB several countries are directly 
involved and protest. 
It must also be pointed out that the "self-restraint" on exports 
forced upon Japan by importing countries are very similar to the negative-
list discrimination . Although generally self-restraint is slightly more flexible, 
and the premiums arising out of restrictions accrue to Japanese exporters 
somewhat more certainly under self-restraint, the overall effect of self-
restraint and import restrictions against Japan by European countries are 
quite similar. 
5 Austria, Ireland, Portugal, and Spain are still invoking Article 35 against Japan. 
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5. Concluding Remarks 
The extent to which these NTB reduce below (or in the case of 
export promoting measures increase beyond) the optimum level the volume 
of import to and export from Japan and thereby hurt economic welfare is 
impossible to assess . Therefore the following remarks are based upon my 
general impression rather than a careful assessment of each item of NTB . 
(1) It seems that after considerable efforts at liberalization by 
the Japanese government since 1969, Japan's NTB on manufactured imports 
are of minor importance. Although there still remains much room for further 
reducing NTB, their overall effect on Japan 's imports are much less than the 
tariff-barriers to trade . This is certainly true for manufactures, but perhaps 
also true for non-manufactures if the staple foods (rice, wheat and barley) 
are not taken into account. It must be recalled that according to the recent 
tariff study by the GATT secretariat, Japan's average tariff level on manu-
factures was the second highest (next only to Australia's) among the eleven 
countries under examination. Also , the number of items (manufactures) to 
which a tariff rate higher than 10% or 12.6% was applied was the largest 
for Japan. Also Japan has quite a few tariff-quotas (mostly on agricultural 
products and minerals) , which constitute fairly rigid trade-barriers. 
(2) It seems that by now the trade-impeding effect of Japan's 
NTB on manufactured imports is much less than that of some other countries . 
In Japan there is no substantial NTB comparable to, for example, "Buy 
American" practices, the system of American selling prices , abuses of anti-
dumping measures,6 or variable surcharges on agricultural products as in 
Germany . 
(3) Quantitative restrictions are the most important of Japan's 
NTB on the import side . But as far as manufactures are concerned, Residual 
Import Restrictions are by now limited to a few items. Electronic computors 
are one of the items under RIR , but it may not be advisable to abolish import 
quotas on computors immediately, in view of a monopolistic market structure 
in this field. Whether a policy measure constitutes an NTB should be judged 
from an economic point of view, not from its international legal status. 
(4) Other countries' NTB measures against Japanese exports, 
including "self-restraint" forced upon Japan, seem to have much larger effects 
upon international trade than Japan's NTB, as far as manufactures are con-
cerned. This may be so, even if non-manufactures are included with the 
exception of rice. If major trading countries agree to abolish all kinds of NTB 
on imports which are not justifiable on economic grounds, Japan's exports 
will likely increase more than her imports . 
(5) Japan should make serious efforts to abolish or reduce any 
remaining NTB as well as tariff and tariff-quota barriers . Perhaps the reduc-
tion in tariff rates would have greater beneficial effects for Japan . Such an 
effort should be accompanied by policies to make the mobility of resources 
(especially labor) easier, and to compensate somehow for those unfavorably 
affected. 
But to argue that such a policy of freer trade is desirable and that 
the government should adopt such a policy is similar to rats talking about 
6 The anti-dumping policy is another difficult subject concerning international trade 
policy, but my general view is that except against obvious predatory dumping and 
others having undesirable welfare effects, anti-dumping measures cannot be justified 
on economic grounds, and hence constitute NTB. 
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putting a bell on a cat. There are always vested interests associated with an 
NTB, and they oppose change in the status quo. Usually the adoption of 
individual NTB measures affects a small number of people favorably and a 
large number of consumers and the general public unfavorably. The favorable 
effects are densely concentrated upon the small group while the unfavorable 
effects upon the general public is thinly spread over a large number of people. 
Therefore, the political power which can be summoned by small interest 
groups seriously affected by any change in NTB or tariffs is usually greater 
than the counteracting power. The analysis of the political power of various 
groups in the process of economic policy making is, however, a subject of 
political science rather than economics. We economists are not well trained 
to deal with such a problem. 
(6) There is no need, however, to be too pessimistic as far as 
Japan's NTB are concerned. Among Japanese policy makers and businessmen 
there has been a remarkable turn in thinking on this in the last one or two 
years. Although there still remain strong protectionist tendencies here and 
there, Japan's international trade policy will be moving towards lower trade 
barriers and freer trade, provided that world trade continues to expand and 
that other countries cooperate in the effort for freer trade, or at least do not 
move towards the opposite . 
TABLE 1 
Trade Liberalization Ratea: 1958-70 
End of Fiscal Year 
1958 
1959 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
33% 
37 
44 
70 
88 
92 
92 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
93% 
93 
93 
93 
94 
94 
Source: Ministry of Finance, Monthly Statistical Bulletin, various 
issues. 
a Liberalization Rate is the ratio of the value (in 1959) of imports 
for which quantitative restrictions are removed . Imports under 
quantitative restrictions other than IRI are excluded both from 
the denominator and numerator. 
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TABLE 2 
The Process of Import Liberalization: 1962-71 
Completely Non· 
Date Major Items Liberalizeda (manufactures only) Liberalized Liberalizedb 
(month) (RIR) 
1962. 1 195 900 
4 Alloy steel*, petroleum coke, chemical pulp, 
fork-lift trucks, FM radios, electric welding 
machinery* 603 492 
10 Pulp for paper making, machine-tools* (middle 
size), toilet soap, fountain-pens 833 262 
11 Yarn of sheep's wool, knitted fabrics, crocheted 
fabrics, bed linens, synthetic fibres, carpets, 
power-shovels (mechanical-shovels) 841 254 
1963. 4 Copper and articles thereof 866 229 
6 Accordions, felt hats 868 227 
8 Yarn of synthetic fibers, woven fabrics of flax, 
glass ware, pumps including motor pumps and 
turbo pumps, electric accumulators 903 192 
1964. 1 Lauan wood and plywood, antibiotics* 906 189 (152) 
2 Unwrought zinc, unwrought lead, etc . 913 182 (145) 
4 Boilers, electric generators*, colour television 
receivers 921 174(136) 
10 Bulldozers, tractors, colour photographic plates, etc . 933 162 (123) 
1965. 10 Imitation precious stones, motor vehicles 934 161 (122) 
1966. 4 Streptomycin, yarn of synthetic fibres 936 159 (120) 
5 928 168 (126f 
10 Unwrought tantalum and articles thereof, 
penicillin, outboard motors* (within 20-25 
horsepowers) 929 167 (124) 
1968. 4 Tulle, lace, perfumed water, Eau de Cologne, 
toilet powder, perfumed cream, lipsticks, 
foundation water 931 165 (122) 
10 Alloy tool steel*, high speed steel* 932 164 (121) 
1969. 4 Cast, rolled, drawn or blown glass, beet-pulp 
pellet, colour film for cinema, outboard motors 933 163 (120) 
10 Automatic/irinting machines, industrial sewing 
machines, hermionic valves and tubes 935 161 (118) 
1970. 2 Straw and products thereof, basketwork, woven 
fabrics of sheep's wool, automatic vehicles, 
152 (109) chassis with motors 944 
4 Preparations of penicillin and streptomycin, 
fruits flavor, photographic film narrower than 
35mm., boilers, machine tools, cranks, electric 
generators 955 141 (98) 
9 Ramie, synthetic precious or semi precious stones, 
Diesel engines, typewriters, digital type-electronic 
computers,* integrated circuits* 963 133 (90) 
1971. 1 Color film for photographs, tool-tips and plates, 
sticks and the like for tool-tips, antibiotics 
( cycloserine, tetracycline etc . ), embroidery 
(including motifs) 973 123 (80) 
6 Sodium glutamate, preparations with a basis of 
antibiotics; patent leather, articles of apparel 
of leather, wood charcoal, parts of footwear of 
leather, engines for motor vehicles 993 103 (60) 
(Cont'd on p. 236) 
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9 
(Planned) 
TABLE 2 (cont'd) 
Menthol, peppermint oil, dextrin, soluble or 
roasted starch, starch glues, prepared mordants, 
steam turbines (over 400 thousand KW), input 
units and output units designed to work in electrical 
connection with digital type electronic computers, 
telephone switchboards and exchange of electronic 
types, controller for system exchange 1.013 
Source: Ministry of Finance, Monthly Statistical Bulletin, various issues. 
a Asterisk ( *) indicates partial liberalization. 
blncludes partially liberalized items. 
83 (40) 
c Due to a technical change in the Tariff Table, as Japan joined the BTN Agreement. 
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TABLE 3 
Reduction in RIR on Manufactures: 1969-71 
Date BTN number Items 
1. 1969 Oct. (3 items) 84.35 Automatic printing machines 
84.41 Industrial sewing machines 
85.21 * Thermionic valves and tubes 
2. 1970 Feb. (5 items) 46.02 Straw and ~roducts thereof 
46.03 Basketwor 
53.11 Woven fabrics of sheep's wool 
87.02 Second·hand motor vehicles 
87.04 Chassis with motors 
3. 1970 Apr. (8 items) 29.43 Chemically pure su!{ars 
30.03* Preparations of penicillin and 
of streptomycin 
33.04 Fruits flavor 
37.02* Photographic film narrower 
than 35mm. 
84.01 Boilers 
84.45 Machine tools 
84.63 Crank shafts 
85.01 Electric generators (over 
400 thousand KW) 
4. 1970 Sept. (7 items) 54.02 Ramie 
71.03 Synthetic precious or semi-
84.06* 
precious stones 
Water-cooled Diesel engine 
84.51 Typewriters 
84.52* Digital type electronic 
84.53* computers under a certain size* 
85.21 * Integrated circuits 
5. 1971 Jan. ( 4 items) 29.44 Antibiotics 
37.02 Color film for photograph 
58.10 Embroidery (including motifs) 
82.07 Tool-tips and plates, sticks 
and the like for tool-tips 
6. 1971 June (7 items) 29.23 Sodium ~lutamate 
30.03 Preparations with a basis of 
antibiotics 
41.08 Patent leather etc. 
42.03 Articles of apparel of leather 
44.02 Wood charcoal 
64.05 Parts of footwear of leather 
84.06 Engines for motor vehicles 
7. 1971 S1't. (8 items) 29.05 Menthol 
(Planne ) 33.01 Peppermint oil 
35.05 Dextrin, soluble or roasted 
35.05 Dextrin, soluble or roasted 
starch, starch J:lues, etc. 
38.12 Prepared mor ants 
84.54 Input units, out~ut units 
designed to wor in electrical 
connection with digital-type 
electronic computers* 
85.13 Telephone switchboards and 
exchann_es of electronic types 
85.22 Contro ers for system 
exchange 
8. RIR at the End of 41.02 Bovine cattle leather and 
September 1971 equine leather 
(9 items) 41.03 Sheep and lamb skin leather 
(Cont'd on p. 238) 
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TABLE 3 (cont'd) 
41.04 
64.02 
84.52* 
84.53* 
84.54* 
84.55 
85.21 * 
Goat and kid skin leather 
Footwear with outer soles of 
leather 
Digital-type electronic 
computers 
The terminal machines for 
digital-type electronic 
computers 
Parts of the digital-type 
electronic computers 
Integrated circuits 
Source: Ministry of Finance, Monthly Statistical Bulletin, various issues. 
*Partial liberalization of a BTN 4-digit item. 
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COMMENTS BY PROFESSOR H. E. ENGLISH 
Professor English commented that Professor Komiya's paper 
concerns one of the key issues in the present controversy between the U.S. 
and Japan, yet Professor Kamiya states that the facts of the matter are not 
nearly as strident as some people believe. A great deal more precision is 
needed in this area if the conflict this issue has generated is to be defused. 
In neglecting to deal with the issue of export cartels and taxes, 
real problems of allocation of resources between primary and secondary 
industries are ignored. It is very doubtful if there is anything to be gained 
in the long-term allocation of resources by preserving the monopolistic 
practices of exports cartels. This issue never gets seriously discussed. 
It is clear from page 8 of the paper that in Japan as in so many 
other countries what happens to the short-term balance of payments governs 
the pace of trade liberalization. When are these two areas going to be 
separated and when will the former be prevented from getting in the way 
of long-term efficiency? 
Professor Komiya implies that the present U.S. government 
practices are the best means to get trade liberalization in Japan. Professor 
English wondered if Professor Kamiya really agreed with this implication. 
Professor English was very suspicious about whether, in an 
industry like computers, the traditional types of protection are going to be 
effective in enabling domestic industry to catch up to the U.S. especially if 
the industry is producing non-specialized types of computer and when it 
appears the Japanese market is already inefficiently divided up among four 
different companies . 
Professor Komiya's comment about the maintenance of protection 
in primary metal industries by substituting tariff for non-tariff barriers raised 
questions in Professor English's mind about Japanese policy and attitudes. 
Professor English then asked if this reflected the view of the Japanese govern-
ment and industry that it is always important to have vertical integration in 
mineral-based industries. 
Professor English wondered if it was just a simple matter to turn 
Residual Import Restrictions into state trading to solve the problem of 
consistency with GATT. 
Professor English asked for more specific comments on the 
relative importance of NTB's such as AIQ, the standard method of settle-
ment, government procurement policies and administration guidance. He 
noted however that if Professor Komiya was correct and this whole category 
was not important, this request was also not important. 
Finally, Professor English concluded that he was not yet convinced 
that these Japanese practices are as insignificant as Professor Kamiya claimed, 
partly because of the number of complaints heard about these practices. He 
suggested that international companies need greater incentives and opportu-
nities to operate in Japan so that they can afford to set up their own 
information-gathering facilities to gather the information required for doing 
business in Japan. He said that if Professor Komiya's conclusion, that tariff 
barriers really are still the most important obstacle to developing trade with 
Japan, is valid, then the U.S . tactics at present are even more inappropriate. 
He said that it is up to all concerned to give a better indication of the real 
importance of non-tariff barriers. 
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GOVERNMENT PURCHASING POLICIES, OTHER NTB'S, 
AND THE INTERNATI ONAL MONETARY CR ISIS 
by 
ROBERT E. BALDW IN and J. DAVID RICHARDSON 
University of Wisconsin 
The purpose of this paper is to make some broad recommendations 
concerning non-tariff barriers generally , and to examine in detail a specific 
non-tariff barrier: U.S . government purchasing policy toward foreigners. 
Given the dramatic events since August 15, 1971 , one might consider such an 
essay to be of secondary importance, if not distinctly mal apropos. Our own 
view is, however, exactly the contrary. The present state of exchange-rate 
flexibility and the contemplated future state of exchange-rate realignment 
provide an ideal opportunity , if not an invitation, for all countries to eliminate 
non-tarrif barriers - to break the shackles of these myriad administrative 
impediments to the unrestricted movement of commodities and capital. 
Part 1 below makes the case for the integral role which removal of 
non-tariff barriers should play in any package of reforms emerging from the 
present crisis. Part 2 describes U.S . government procurement policy as a 
particular example of a non-tariff barrier, and summarizes the results of the 
Appendix, in which the effects of this U.S. policy are measured both qualita-
tively in the framework of a theoretical model. 
1. New Opportunity for Reducing Non-tariff T rade Distortions 
One important potential benefit from the current floating exchange 
rate condition that has not been sufficiently stressed is the opportunity it 
provides for significantly reducing certain types of non-tariff distortions to 
international trade. To better understand the nature of this opportunity 
consider the three main reasons for the imposition of the non-tariff distor-
tions that plague world trade. Sometimes all three reasons lie behind the 
introduction of a particular trade barrier, but usually one of the three is the 
major cause for a specific trade-distorting measure. 
A first objective in introducing non-tariff trade-distorting measures 
is to provide aid to particular industries or sectors that either are under severe 
competitive pressures or are regarded as essential for a country's development 
or defense goals. Quantitative restrictions on selected imports and domestic 
aids to specific industries are common methods of implementing this objec-
tive. For example, the quotas on cotton textile imports into the U.S. and 
on coal imports into several European countries and Japan illustrate the use 
of non-tariff barriers as a means of furnishing assistance to relatively 
depressed sectors. The coal industry in Europe, Japan and Canada also 
receive direct subsidies from the government. Similarly, the use of quotas 
(allegedly) for defense reasons is illustrated by the quantitative restrictions 
on oil imports into the U.S. , whereas aids for development purposes are 
exemplified by the subsidies to the electronics industry in France and 
Germany. In the developing world, of course, quantitative limitations on 
imports and subsidies on exports are the major instruments for promoting 
industrialization. 
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A second purpose for using non-tariff trade-distorting measures, 
which fortunately has not been too important in recent years, is to stimulate 
aggregate demand and domestic employment . A regrettable example of this 
rationale seems to be the recent proposal in the U.S. that the 10% investment 
tax credit be limited to investment goods produced in the United States. 
The initial objective of the "Buy America" act passed in 1933 was also 
designed primarily to stimulate domestic employment. 
The third and final main objective of non-tariff trade-distorting 
measures is to improve a country's balance of payments. The recent imposi-
tion of a 10 percent surcharge on imports by the U.S. as well as the use of 
selective surcharges by Canada in 1962, a uniform import levy by the U.K. 
in 1967 and selective quotas by the French in 1968 illustrate this reason. 
Export subsidies, prior import deposit schemes, and outright exchange 
controls are also widely used in both developed and developing countries for 
balance-of-payments purposes. The tying of foreign aid, the strengthening of 
buy-national measures, and controls over foreign investment further illustrate 
this category. All three of these latter measures have, for example, been 
employed by the U.S. in recent years . 
Clearly it is the third category of distorting policies (and to some 
extent even the first two) that should and can be promptly eliminated now 
that rates of exchange for some of the key currencies in the world are 
floating and, hopefully, moving toward equilibrium positions . The exchange 
rate mechanism can be relied upon to handle the balance-of-payments prob-
lem these measures were designed to help - and to do it in a manner that 
tends to raise world income. However, while this latter achievement, i.e., 
raising world income, is almost universally accepted as a desirable goal, in 
practice it is often difficult to implement because of resultant economic 
hardships to particular groups. But measures designed to improve a country's 
balance of payments usually do not focus on any particular group and 
thus can be eliminated without causing any significant redistribution of 
income. The impact of a uniform import surcharge or export subsidy tends, 
for example, to be so widely diffused that no industry or income group is 
greatly affected. This is a main reason why special uniform (or nearly uniform) 
import levies and export aids generally are politically relatively easy to 
remove after an exchange adjustment has been made. It is less obvious to the 
general public, however, that such measures as investment controls, prefer-
ential government purchasing policies, broadly based export subsidies and 
even such domestic aids as special investment grants or special depreciation 
allowances fall within the same category . A good case can be made that they 
should be eliminated, or perhaps in some cases, moderated, at the time of 
currency realignments. The income effects of these measures are also widely 
diffused and though their removal causes the loss of easy profits to some 
firms, these firms generally are able to adjust without suffering undue hard-
ship. However, in those cases where there is a significant impact on particular 
firms and income groups, we must employ the other policy measure needed 
(in addition to greater exchange rate flexibility), if non-tariff trade barriers 
are to be significantly reduced , namely, an effective domestic adjustment 
assistance program. 
Although non-tariff trade-distorting measures aimed at improving 
a country's balance of payments are the most obvious candidates for 
elimination, the reduction of non-tariff trade barriers should not stop there, 
especially in countries whose currencies depreciate . Measures directed at 
assisting particular industries and at stimulating aggregate employment can 
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also be eased , since the currency depreciation itself promotes these goals by 
stimulating exports and reducing imports generally. Indeed , it is imperative 
that such an easing of those NTBs directed at relatively depressed sectors be 
made. Otherwise the period of painful adjustment simply drags out longer. 
What may happen in the absence of a reduction in artificial import barriers 
is that employment actually expands temporarily because of the depreciation 
and a new generation of workers is made to endure the hardship and humilia-
tion of spending a lifetime in a marginal industry. 
In countries whose currencies tend to appreciate, the problem is 
somewhat different. Usually these countries have already eased their general 
surplus-generating trade barriers as well as those directed is stimulating 
aggregate demand. They may even have eased some of their trade distortions 
that benefit special sectors. However, when foreign goods become cheaper 
as their currencies appreciate, competitive forces operating on these sectors 
intensify so that political pressures tend to arise for an increase in the use 
of trade-distorting measures as a means of providing greater aid . This is a 
tendency that these countries and the world community generally must 
strongly resist. we· must treat a period of currency realignment as an oppor-
tunity to meet legitimate adjustment needs by means that solve basic prob-
lems rather than merely postponing them. It means, in other words, that we 
must use the occasion to substitute realistic domestic adjustment programs 
for income-distorting international barriers to trade. Adjustment on 
dislocation assistance has been ignored too long, when in fact it is the least-
cost means of aiding injured sectors of the economy. 
The question is frequently asked: What " contribution" should the 
United States make in the process of realigning world currencies? Some 
argue that the U.S. should raise the price of gold . This, of course, provides a 
windfall gain in dollars to gold holders and tends to offset the capital loss 
on the dollar holdings of foreigners as the dollar depreciates. While such a 
change is perhaps not harmful to any country on either economic .efficiency 
or absolute equity grounds, it is difficult to see how such a "contribution" 
is very helpful. Moreover, it tends to perpetuate a system whose drawbacks 
have just been dramatically illustrated. 
A truly meaningful contribution on the part of the U.S. in terms of 
raising income levels both abroad and within the U.S. would be to remove 
promptly not only the import surcharges but the controls over foreign invest-
ment, foreign aid, and government purchasing policy that have been 
introduced in the last decade for balance of payments purposes. In this way 
the U.S. could emphatically reaffirm its commitment to a liberal trade 
policy , while still solving its international monetary problems by exchange 
rate realignment .. Moreover, the U.S. should not just stop with removing 
these controls. It should also seize the opportunity to seek international 
agreement for undertaking a vigorous effort to reduce other trade-distorting 
measures based on employment or protectionist grounds. 
It is to be particularly hoped that the Japanese will also use this 
period of currency realignment to remove most of their remaining quantita-
tive and administrative restrictions on imports. Many have appeared to be 
designed primarily for maintaining an undervalued yen rather than for 
protecting particular sectors that face severe difficulties in adjusting to 
greater import competition . Unless these controls are greatly eased at this 
time, the yen will tend to appreciate beyond its true equilibrium level and 
possibly cause long-run export problems for basically strong industries. Thus , 
by lifting these controls and making a contribution to the better use of world 
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resources, the Japanese can also moderate the appreciation pressures on 
the yen. 
Of course, some difficult problems do arise for Japan, Canada, 
and others whose currencies are appreciating with respect to truly depressed 
industries in which real adjustment difficulties exist. Currency appreciation 
puts further competitive pressures on these sectors by making foreign goods 
cheaper and thus raises the demands for even more protection. As previously 
mentioned the answer to these demands should be greater domestic adjust-
ment efforts rather than the greater use of adjustment means that pass part 
of the burden on to foreigners and merely perpetuate the underlying domes-
tic problem. But we must be realistic and realize that the prospects for 
substantial progress in this area are much less favorable than in the area of 
trade barriers which have been raised primarily for balance of payments 
purposes. 
2. Government Procurement Policy 
That non-tariff restrictions for balance of payments reasons are 
extensive and significant, yet can be removed or greatly eased at this time, 
can be no better illustrated than with reference to government purchasing 
policies. When purchasing goods and services all governments seem to give 
preference - either formally or informally - to domestic producers 
compared to foreign suppliers . Moreover, when unfavorable balance-of-
payments pressures build up, increasing the degree of these preferences is 
one of the first offsetting actions governments take. 
The country against whom the most criticism has been voiced in 
the area of government purchasing policy is the U.S. Purchases by the federal 
government are covered by the so-called Buy American Act of 1933. This 
requires the procurement of domestic materials by U.S. government agencies 
unless : (a) the head of the agency determines this would be inconsistent with 
the public interest; {b) the agency head determines their cost would be 
unreasonable or (c) the materials are not available in the U.S. in satisfactory 
quantity or quality. In 1954 an executive order set forth implementing 
guidelines that defined materials to be of foreign origin if foreign products 
account for more than 50 percent of the cost of all products used in making 
the materials and that specified a domestic price as unreasonable if it 
exceeded the foreign price (including any tariff) by more than 6 percent 
(12 percent for small and depressed-area firms .) 
Criticism of the U.S. increased sharply when in 1962 the Defense 
Department, because of the deteriorating balance-of-payments, raised the 
preference rate to 50 percent. The Defense Department also established a 
50 percent preference rate for purchases of goods for use overseas, although 
the Buy American Act covered only items to be used domestically. AID and 
other federal agencies also adopted this figure. Beside these various federal 
restrictions on importing, a number of states and smaller governmental units 
have passed Buy American laws . 
The laws of most other countries appear on the surface to be much 
more liberal than the U.S. Buy American Act. The U.K. permits preferential 
treatment of domestic producers under "special circumstances" but there is 
no general requirement for such treatment. Firms in depressed areas come 
under the "special circumstances" qualification. Certain nationalized indus-
tries also purchase abroad only if substantially better quality and lower 
prices are offered than from U .K. suppliers. French authorities contend that 
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foreigners are not treated differently than domestic producers except in a 
few limited cases. One is the electronics industry where the government has 
agreed to make a certain part of its purchases from domestic producers . 
Certain social groups, e.g., agricultural producer societies also are favored 
somewhat by the government. Such important trading nations as Germany, 
Japan and Australia also do not legally require government agencies to grant 
preferences to domestic suppliers except in a few limited circumstances, e.g. 
to medium-sized firms or firms in depressed areas. 
When one examines purchasing practices and procedures more care-
fully, it becomes obvious that discrimination against foreigners is not simply 
a matter of buy-national laws that openly specify the preferential treatment 
of domestic firms. Consider the matter of bidding procedures . The U.S . 
favors the use of public tender. Under this procedure invitations to submit 
bids are advertised to the public at large and an unlimited number of 
suppliers can submit bids . Most other countries use selective bidding in which 
invitations are offered to only a limited number of potential suppliers on a 
list approved by the government. American producers argue that they find 
it difficult to get on the approved list and often fail to hear about a 
potentially profitable opportunity . Under public tender, on the other hand, 
the advertising of the forthcoming government purchases is likely to be 
more extensive and thus the chances for discrimination - either deliberate 
or inadvertent - are reduced. 
The failure of such countries as the U .K ., Germany and France to 
open bids in public so that the price and terms offered by the successful 
bidder are known to all is also listed by American firms as a factor that 
discourages their bidding for government contracts abroad. The companies 
claim they would gain more experience about how to prepare successful 
bids if this knowledge were available. Moreover, their fears of favoritism 
would be mitigated. However, these governments counter with the argument 
that collusion among suppliers would soon develop if all bids were disclosed . 
Still another obstacle that some governments introduce is a residency require-
ment on foreign suppliers. 
In the actual analysis and evaluation of non-tariff barriers, a 
common complaint is that they are not susceptible to rigorous theoretical 
analysis . This is not true , however, in the case of discriminatory government 
purchasing policy, as we demonstrate at length in the appendix. To summa-
rize just one of the conclusions presented there , consider the possible price 
and trade effects of a preference system, assuming that the commodity 
supplied by foreigners is identical to that produced domestically and that 
the government 's demand is insensitive to price. Under these conditions, the 
price effect of granting preferences to domestic producers on government 
contracts can vary from none at all to a rise in price equal to the full 
amount of the preference. In the absence of a preference system, the 
domestic price of a particular product equals its export value from a 
foreign port plus insurance , freight, and duty charges on its entry into 
the domestic economy. A preference system imposed on top of tariffs 
diverts government purchases from foreign to domestic producers. As the 
preference causes the domestic price to rise above the foreign price, it also 
encourages diversion of private purchases from domestic to foreign producers. 
If in the absence of a preference system, domestic production exceeds govern-
ment purchases of an item at its equilibrium price, the preferential treatment 
given to domestic producers will have no effect on the price of the product. 
Competition among producers will keep the price that the government pays 
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domestic producers the same as private purchasers pay. On the ?~her hand, if 
domestic supply falls short of ~overnment demand, the competitive system 
will bring about a rise in the pnce that the go"'.ernmentyays. !fowever, should 
the supply of impor~s not be completely elastic, the pnce of imports to 
private consumers will fall. 
The trade and domestic production effects also depend upon the 
relation between domestic supply at the pre-preference equilibrium price 
and the government's demand . If domestic supply is equal to or greater than 
government demand at the pre-preference price, no change in imports or 
domestic production takes place. If domestic supply is less than government 
demand as the pre-preference price, the output of domestic producers will 
rise, and imports will in this case fall. 
A more realistic assumption than that import and domestic goods 
are identical is that they are imperfect substitutes . The appendix sets out an 
algebraic model capable of analysing this case, and the model is then applied 
to the problem of measuring just what have been the actual effects of govern-
ment purchasing policy in the U.S. on imports - by no means a simple task. 
We will only summarize this analysis here. 
On the basis of comparatively crude data available for a few coun-
tries, it seems clear that for comparable commodities the government's 
import ratio is much less than the private sector's. For example, in 1963 the 
total expenditure by the U.S. government on goods that move in international 1 
trade (excluding agricultural commodities, minerals, and armaments) was 
almost $25 billion. However, the direct imports of these goods by the govern-
ment was only $61 million, or 1/4 of one percent of these expentitures. As 
has been shown elsewhere, these U.S . figures do not seem to be much out of 
line with those in other countries. 
Using the model set out in the appendix, together with reasonably 
satisfactory estimates of the various parameters underlying it, we estimate 
that the "Buy American" program in government purchases reduced total 
U.S. imports in 1963 by between $76 million and $110 million, as compared 
to what total imports would have been in the absence of any government 
discrimination at all. Moreover, the potential for reducing U.S. imports by 
these means, by which we mean the maximum reduction in imports which 
could have been achieved by a total ban on U.S. government imports was 
only between $112 million and $164 million. Whether these import "savings" 
are substantial when compared to total U.S. imports in 1963 of just under 
$20 billion is questionable. At best, somewhat less than one percent of total 
imports could have been stemmed by discrimination against imports in govern-
ment purchases, and the actual figure seems more like half of one percent. 
Whatever gain is attributed to the policy must then be offset against the 
costs in terms of higher tax burdens and reductions in the gains from trade. 
3. Policy Proposals 
As noted in the first section, the United States could make a major 
contribution in the world trading community by lifting the discriminatory 
margins against foreign purchases by the government that were established in 
the early sixties. However, in order to improve the purchasing practices of 
other governments as well as to prevent the tightening of the discrimination 
each time a country gets enmeshed in balance-of-payments problems, we 
must also adopt a code of fair practices on government purchases. The key 
principle is that government purchasing policies should - subject to certain 
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derogations - be based on non-discrimination against foreign products and 
suppliers of foreign products. In order to implement this general principle, 
governments must agree to a number of reforms in their purchasing proce-
dures and practices. Public bidding should be employed to a much greater 
extent. Whenever selective tendering is used, vigorous efforts should be 
made to insure that all interested foreign suppliers have an opportunity to 
apply for inclusion on the list of potential bidders. Procurement notices 
should be more widely distributed, and time limits or technical requirements 
in these notices should not discriminate unnecessarily against foreign firms. 
Residence requirements for bidding should be liberalized. All bids under 
public and selective bidding procedures should be made public except where 
such action would clearly make subsequent collusion possible, would result 
in the disclosure of confidential information, or would result in significant 
administrative difficulties. Furthermore, rejected bidders should be given 
more information concerning the reasons why their bids were turned down 
than they presently are in many countries. 
Discrimination against foreign producers for reasons of national 
security or public health should not be greater than necessary to imple-
ment those objectives. Discriminatory purchasing as a means of meeting 
balance-of-payments problems, of fostering economic development in 
depressed regions, and of assisting new or ailing firms should be discouraged. 
There are also better ways of providing regional assistance or aid 
to new and depressed firms than by discriminatory government purchasing 
policies. Experience suggests, however, that the total volume of regional aid 
would decline, if this form were discontinued . Therefore, it seems appropriate 
to permit such assistance provided it is temporary and conforms with the 
rules established for government aids. Any preferences granted for these 
purposes or for balance-of-payments reasons should take the form of a 
uniform percentage price differential. 
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APPENDIX 
This appendix sets out a formal model for analyzing the effects of 
discriminatory government purchasing policy, first for the case in which an 
imported good is essentially identical to its domestic counterpart, and second 
for the case in which imports and their domestic competitors are imperfectly 
substitutable. The procedures underlying an attempt to estimate the actual 
effects of U.S. government procurement policy from 1963 data are outlined 
in greater detail than in the text of this paper. 
A1. Introduction: Two Types of Discrimination in 
Government Purchasing 
The United States is unique in so far as it has systematically spelled 
out a set of price differentials for government purchasing agents to use in 
determining whether a foreign or domestic source of supply is preferable. It 
is only when the domestic price exceeds the foreign price by more than the 
differential that the agent can turn to imports. · 
A much more prevalent and universal sort of discrimination, 
however, has nothing to do with prices. It ranges from tacit admission on the 
part of governments that "unofficial policy is to discourage use of foreign 
goods," through selective and single-tender bidding schemes, through 
residence requirement, technical and financial specifications, and foreign-
content ceilings on successful bids, and ultimately to a simple ban on foreign 
purchases of any kind.1 Among its other effects, this type of discrimination 
undoubtedly reduces the purchasing agent's responsiveness to the price of 
foreign goods . It may also make foreign goods appear less substitutable for 
domestic goods than they appear to the private sector. And, finally, this 
indirect form of discrimination is strengthened by the subtle implication 
that it is unpatriotic for a government to buy from a foreign country. 
In what follows, we will consider both discrimination on the basis 
of price (price favoritism) and the more informal discrimination through 
other means (general favoritism). 
A2. Discriminatory Government Procurement When Imported Goods Are 
Identical to Domestically-Produced Goods 
When imported goods are highly substitutable for domestically-
produced goods, and competitive conditions prevail, their prices will tend 
to converge . Any wide divergence would lead to an almost universal prefer-
ence for the good whose price is lower, since their other characteristics are 
very similar. If the goods are identical in every way, then their prices will 
necessarily be equal. Under these conditions, imports of a commodity take 
place only when the domestic supply is insufficient to meet the total demand. 
1 See Robert E. Baldwin, Non-tariff Distortions of International Trade (Washington: 
Brookings Institution, 1970), pp. 58-70 for an outline of bidding procedures in a 
number of countries. See Norman S. Fieleke, "The Buy-American Policy of the 
United States Government : Its Balance-of-Payments and Welfare Effects," New England 
Economic Review (Federal Reserve Bank of Boston), July/August 1969, p. 7, for a 
~eneral list of discrimination of this general kind practiced by state purchasing agencies 
m the U.S. 
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Thus imports would be equal to the excess demand for the good over domes. 
tic supply . This can be summarized graphically, as in Figure Al , where 
Dg total government demand for the good (assumed unresponsive to price); . 
Dg + Dp or Dg + Dp ' = total government and private demand for the good· , 
Sa = domestic supply of the good; 
Sm = supply of imports; 
Sa + Sm = total supply. 
Figure Al 
The Effects of a Ban on Government Imports When Domestically-
Produced Goods and Imports Are Identical 
Price 
Dg + Dp' 
s 
T 
0 M G QN 
Quantity 
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When Dg. + Dp is the appropr~ate ~otal demand curve, the equilibrium price 
is determmed to be OP. At this pnce, total demand (OQ) exceeds domestic 
supply (OM) by the distance MQ. This excess demand is satisfied by imports. 
Let us now impose a discriminatory government purchasing 
policy. Initially, because it is easier to work with, let us assume that the 
policy is one of general (non-price) favoritism, and that discrimination is 
total. That is, imports of the government are banned. 
The important conclusion from this case is that under the most 
likely set of assumptions, absolutely nothing will change as a result of the 
discriminatory policy - neither total imports, nor prices, nor total govern-
ment expenditure will be affected. The explanation for this paradoxical 
conclusion highlights an important feature of government discrimination in 
purchasing even under much weaker assumptions than those of identical 
foreign and domestic goods: the application of this policy always produces 
exactly opposite results in the private sector to those it produces for the 
government. Specifically, for imports, although government imports fall to 
zero, the private sector's imports rise. To see this, consider the implications 
of the assumption of identical goods and its corollary that prices of imports 
and domestically-produced goods cannot diverge. The effort by the govern-
ment to ban government imports tends to bid down the price of imports, 
as the supplies formerly bought by the government are thrust onto the 
private market. At the same time, the price of domestic substitutes will 
tend to be bid up as the government shifts entirely to domestic suppliers in 
its purchasing. But the tendency of price movements leads the private 
sector to exactly the opposite changes to the government - it will substitute 
imports for domestic goods, and will do so to exactly the extent necessary 
to restore equality between the two prices. In fact, under these assumptions, 
the government succeeds only in bidding away domestically-produced goods 
from the private sector, and stimulating the private sector to increase its 
purchases of imports by exactly the same amount as the government reduces 
its own purchases. The final result is that nothing happens to total imports, 
or to prices. 
There is, however, one case in which these conclusions do not 
follow. In particular, if at the price ruling prior to the ban on government 
imports, total government demand exceeds total domestic supply, then there 
are both import, price, and expenditure effects of a government ban on its 
own imports. In this case, the additional government demand for domestically-
produced goods cannot be satisfied by bidding them away from the private 
sector at an unchanged price - the private sector does not purchase enough 
domestically-produced goods to make this possible. Thus the additional 
government demand can only be satisfied by an expansion of domestic 
supply, induced by a rise in the price of domestically produced goods. Total 
imports will in this case fall, since the former amount of government imports 
must exceed the private sector's former purchases of domestic goods under 
these assumptions. Thus at the old prices, the government's ban effectively 
generates excess supply of imports to the private sector, which can only be 
absorbed when the import price falls . Total economy-wide imports will fall 
since the lower import price discourages some foreign suppliers. It should be 
pointed out, however, that total imports still fall by less than the amount by 
which government imports fall. There is still an offsetting effect in the 
private sector of the market. Under these assumptions, we also find that the 
government's total expenditures and the incomes of domestic producers are 
increased by th.e discrimination policy. 
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The latter case, in which a ban on government imports does in fact 
lead to a decline in total imports, can be depicted in Figure Al. Suppose 
equilibrium before the ban on government imports is determined by the 
intersection of the total demand curve Dg + Dp and the total supply curve 
Sa +Sm at point X. At the ruling price (OP), domestic supply (OM) is insuffi. 
cient to satisfy total government demand (OG). When a ban on government 
imports is imposed, this characteristic will cause the price of the domestic 
good to be bid up to the point where, finally, domestic supply is sufficient 
to meet government demand, at the price OR. The implication is that at 
prices below OR the private sector is supplied entirely by imports. To find 
the import supply (and hence the total supply) to the private sector in the 
presence of discrimination, we must add to the old import supply curve what 
the government would have imported at prices lower than OR. Foregone 
government imports are indicated by distances such as ab, cd, and ST, and 
these must be added horizontally to the old import supply curve (SVSm) in 
order to generate the new one (STUVSm). (Note that ab= a'b' and 
cd = c'd'.) Since the new import supply curve represents total supply to the 
private sector, and the old domestic supply curve represents total supply to 
the government sector, the two curves can be horizontally summed to 
determine the new total supply curve. This new total supply curve is 
STUYWZ. Its intersection with the total demand curve at Y determines the 
new import price in the presence of discrimination (NY) , which is lower than 
the import price in the absence of discrimination (QX or OP). Imports will 
have therefore fallen (from MQ to GN). Domestic price will be higher (OR), 
and the government's demand will be satisfied solely by domestic supply. 
Any total demand curve such as Dg + Dp , which begins at A and 
falls within the lightly shaded area labelled case 2, will imply a successful 
discrimination policy via a ban on government imports. This is because the 
equilibrium prices determined by all curves in this area are such that govern-
ment demand exceeds the available domestic supply. For any total demand 
curve such as Dg + Dp ', which begins as A and falls within the darkly-shaded 
area labelled case 1, domestic supply is sufficient to satisfy government 
demand at the price ruling prior to discrimination. In this case, a ban on 
government imports will be a failure in reducing total imports of the economy, 
as outlined above. This conclusion is demonstrated graphically in Figure Al 
by the fact that the intersection of the total demand and total supply curves 
at Z is invariant to any of the shifts in the curves as a result of the policy, 
all which shifts take place to the southwest of Z. 
Now let us assume that the discriminatory government purchasing 
policy takes the form of granting a statutory price preference (price favorit-
ism) to domestic producers . Imports in this case are not entirely banned, but 
our conclusions are very similar to those for the more extreme policy. In 
particular, the same rule applies in determining whether or not the price 
preference policy will be to any degree successful: if total government demand 
falls short of total domestic supply at the price ruling prior to discrimination , 
the policy will have no effects on any aggregate quantity or price. It is only 
when government demand exceeds total domestic supply at the non-
discrimination price that the policy will reduce imports and the price of 
imports, and raise price and output of domestic goods. Even here, however, 
the policy reduces total imports to a smaller degree than it reduces govern-
ment imports, so that if policymakers do not take into account the stimulus 
the policy gives to private imports, they overstate its effectiveness. 
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These points can be demonstrated in Figure A2. Before the price 
preference policy is introduced, suppose equilibrium is determined by the 
intersection of the total demand curve Dg + Dp and the total supply curve 
Sa + Sm at point X. At the ruling price (OP), domestic supply (OM) is insuf-
ficient to satisfy total government demand (OG ). Suppose now that the 
price preference toward domestic suppliers is introduced in government 
purchasing. Specifically, unless domestic price exceeds the import price by 
more than 100 (JI /OI) percent, the government is prohibited from importing 
the good . Government demand will obviously be shifted toward domestically-
produced goods, and this can be depicted by observirg that the perceived 
domestic supply curve facing the government is shifted down over a portion 
of the curve by the amount of the preference. The perceived domestic 
supply curve facing the government thus shifts from ISa to JKLSa. Under 
this policy, the government will again appropriate all domestic production 
for itself, and finding it insufficient for its total demand, there will be 
upward pressure on the price of domestic goods. The private sector will be 
left entirely dependent on imports, but it will be aided by the fact that all 
of the government's former purchases of imports become supply to the 
private sector. Foregone government imports are indicated by distances such 
as ab and cd, and these must be added horizontally to the old import supply 
curve (SVSm) to generate the new one (STUEVSm). (Again ab = a 'b' and 
cd = c 'd '). Since the new import supply curve represents total supply to the 
private sector, and the old domestic supply curve represents actual (as 
opposed to perceived) domestic supply to the government sector, the two 
curves can be horizontally summed to determine the new total supply curve. 
This new total supply curve is STUYFWZ. Its intersection with the total 
demand curve at Y determines the new import price in the presence of 
discrimination (NY), which is lower than the import price in the absence of 
discrimination (QX or OP). Imports will have therefore fallen (from MQ to 
GN). Domestic price will be higher than the new import price by the exact 
amount of the preference, and the government will continue to import a 
certain quantity of goods despite the discrimination. 2 
Any total demand such as Dg + Dp, which begins as A and falls 
within the lightly shaded area labelled case 2, will imply a successful govern-
ment discrimination policy via price preference. By contrast, for any total 
demand curve such as Dg + Dp ', which begins at A and falls within the darkly 
shaded area labelled case 1, domestic supply is sufficient to satisfy govern-
ment demand at the price ruling prior to discrimination. In this case, price 
preference for domestic producers in government purchasing will be a 
failure in its aim to reduce total imports of the economy. This conclusion is 
demonstrated graphically in Figure A2 by the fact that the intersection of 
the total demand and total supply curves at Z is invariant to any of the shifts 
in the curves as a result of policy, all such shifts taking place to the south-
west of Z. 
For discrimination via price preference, however, there is one 
intermediate case which has all the characteristics of case 2 - total imports 
2 If the domestic price were higher than the new import price by more than the preference, 
the government would import more and buy less from domestic producers, thus bidding 
it back again. If the domestic price were higher than the new import price by less than 
the preference, as long as the government's demand is not fully satisfied by domestic 
producers, there will be an incentive for the government to buy more from domestic 
producers and less from importers. This will again restore the price differential to the 
policy differential. 
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fall, prices change, etc. - but which differs in so far as government imports 
do go to zero, and the domestic price after the price preference is imposed 
exceeds the new import price by something less than the full amount of the 
preference. This case arises for total demand curves such as Dg + Dp" , which 
begin at A and fall within the medium-shaded area labelled case 3. 
Price 
0 
Figure A2 
The Effects of a Price Preference Granted to Domestic 
Producers in Government Purchasing When 
Domestically-Produced Goods and Imports Are Identical 
Dg +Dp 
Quantity 
M G QN 
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A3. Discriminatory Government Procurement when Imported and 
Domestically-Produced Goods Are Imperfectly Substitutable 
When imports and domestically-produced goods are imperfectly 
substitutable, it is notable that many of the firm conclusions derived for the 
case of identical goods are still true as tendencies. To the extent that there 
is any degree of substitutability, prices (and therefore quantities) are inter-
dependent. And it will still be true that government discrimination in the 
form of either general or price favoritism tends to lead to offsetting effects 
in the private sector. Import prices tend to fall, and private imports tend to 
expand. Discrimination in government procurement policy is never as 
favorable to the aggregates as it may seem in a simple analysis. 
The approach in this section will be algebraic as opposed to 
graphical, and only general favoritism, not price favoritism, will be considered. 
The reason is that the latter is extremely hard to work with in analytic fashion. 
(Since prices can differ for imperfectly substitutable goods, it requires knowl-
edge of when and whether the import and domestic prices do in fact differ 
by more than the statutory differential.) 
We postulate the following model: 
(Al) Di = f(p, pm), 
(A2) 
(A3) 
(A4). 
(A5) 
(A6) 
(A7) 
(A8) 
(A9) 
(AlO) 
where 
m Di = fID(p, pill), 
Dz= g(p,pID) + apmgm(p,pID)/p, 
D~= (1-a) . gm(p,pm) 
s = h(p), 
m S = hffi(pID), 
D =Di+ Dz, 
Dm =DT +D~, 
D = S, 
Dm =Sm, 
Di ,DT = the private sector's (l's) demand for domestically-
produced goods and imports, respectively. 
Dz,DW =the government's (2's) demand for domestically-
produced goods and imports, respectively; 
S,Sm = total supplies of domestically-produced goods and imports, 
respectively; 
D,Dm = total demand for domestically-produced goods and 
imports, respectively; 
p,pm =prices of domestically-produced goods and imports, 
respectively; 
a = a discrimination parameter defined below. 
Equations (Al) and (A2) are the private sector's demand functions 
for the two goods in the system. Since the goods are substitutes, both prices 
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appear in each equation. Equations (A3) and (A4) are the government's 
demand equations. The term a represents a discrimination parameter for the 
sort of discrimination described above as "general favoritism". Specifically, 
in equation (A4) above, if a= 1, government imports are banned and are, 
consequently, zero . If a =.50 , discrimination is such as to reduce government 
imports in the absence of discrimination by one half. There is also a discrimi-
nation effect on equation (A3 ), wh,ere it is assumed that whatever the decline 
in expenditure on imports because of discrimination (= $ap m gm( ) ), it is 
reapplied to the purchase of domestic substitutes: $apmgm( ) will buy 
apmgm ( ) /p units of the domestic good. This type of interdependence between 
equations (A3) and (A4) is believed to be consistent with the observation 
that, given a set of prices, the government has a certain budgeted expenditure 
which cannot be exceeded, and which will not be left unspent, given the 
dynamics of administration. Equations (A5) and (AG) represent supply 
equations. It is notable that all the supply and demand equations are specific 
to a particular good, and all are partial-equilibrium. Equations (A 7) and (A8) 
are definitions, and equations (A9) and (AlO) are equilibrium conditions. 
It is a straightforward, although tedious, exercise to determine the 
effects of a change in the degree of total discrimination (a) on total imports 
(PmDm) and other variables in the system . To be specific, in the case of 
imports,3 
Rmz mDm 
(All) ~-) = (1 - Nml Rml Nm Rm) m ( m Rm + m Rm) ( ) - z z dp + "! 1 1 "! z z dp - - cta, 
Pm Dm 1-a 
where 
1 R~ { ctpm = (- -) (-) (E + N1R1 
/\ 1 -a 
aV 2 
+ NzRz (1 - - ) ] 
1 -a 
m m m R~ } -V('Y 1 R 1 +("1 2 -a) (- )] cta, 1 -a 
and where 
and where 
aVz m aVR~ 
6 =(E+N1 R 1 +N2R2(l- --)+(l~2 )( )]. 1-a i-a 
3 In the derivation of equation (All) , quantity units have been assumed to be defined in 
such a way that the initial value of both prices equals one. This in no way affects the 
generality of the results. 
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aV 2 
. [Em +N';'R';' + N~R~] - b1R1 + 'Y2R2(l-~) 
aVRm 
+ (1-N~) ( i -a 2 ) ] . ['Yi;' R';' + 'Y~ R~ ], 
and where the variables are defined as follows: 
m 
dp, dp 
m 
E, E 
the proportional change in total imports as a result of 
the change in discrimination policy ( cta); 
the change in the prices of domestic goods and imports, 
respectively, as a result of the change in discrimination 
policy (cta ); 
supply elasticities of domestically-produced goods 
and imports, respectively; 
direct demand elasticities of the private 
sector (subscript 1) and the government 
(subscript 2) for domestically-produced goods 
and imports, respectively (defined positively); 
m m 
'Y1, 'Y1, 'Y2, 'Y2 cross-price elasticities of the private sector 
(subscript 1) and the government (subscript 2) 
for domestically-produced goods and imports, 
respectively; 
R's represent ratios of each sector's demand to total demand, 
meaning R1 = D1 /D, R';' = Di;' /Dm, R2 = D2/D, R~ = D~/Dm ; 
V's represent value ratios of import demand to domestic-good 
demand, meaning V = pmDm /PD, V2 = pmD2 /pD2. 
Although little else can be said about the very complex equation 
(All), choices of reasonable values for the parameters assure a decline in 
imports. The expression does, however, provide a useful beginning for the 
estimation of the actual effects of U.S. discrimination in government procure-
ment. Although the elasticity parameters are not directly observable, the 
share ratios (R's and V's) are. And the available data can also be used to 
approximate an initial value for a, the discrimination parameter, which is 
not directly observable either. These procedures are outlines in the next 
section. 
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A4. The Quantitative Effects of Discrimination in U.S. Government 
Purchasing on Total U.S. Imports 
This section outlines the methods and detailed results from a 
simulation study of the effects of U.S. government procurement policy on 
imports. 
The study was based on equation (All) above, and utilized data 
from the 1963 Input-Output table, broken down into broad commodity 
classes.4 For each commodity class, the data consisted of the 1963 values 
of the private sector's domestic purchases and imports, and the government's 
domestic purchases and imports (PD1 , PmDi, PDz,pmD~, respectively).5 
These four numbers alone were judged capable of yielding an initial level of 
the unobserved discrimination parameter a, and were used for that purpose.s 
4 U.S. Department of Commerce, Input-Output Structure of the U.S. Economy: 1963. 
The breakdown of actual government imports by commodity class was, however, 
furnished directly by the Department of Commerce. The commodity groupings were 
restricted to manufactures in the Standard Industrial Classification, since most other 
types of goods (agricultural and mineral) are not subject to government discrimination 
in purchasing. On the same grounds, petroleum (S.I.C . 29) was excluded from other 
manufactures. The commodity groups are listed below, where the first set of brackets 
enclose the input-output industry designations entering the group and the second set 
of brackets enclose the S.I.C. industry designations: 
ordnance and accessories (13) (19), 
non-durable manufactures (14-19, 24-29, 31-34) (20-23, 26-28, 30-31), 
lumber, wood, stone, clay, glass products (20-23, 35-36) (24-25, 32), 
primary and fabricated metal products (37-42) (33-34) 
non-electrical machinery ( 43-52) ( 35) 
electrical machinery (53-58) (36) 
transportation equipment (59-61) (37), 
instruments and miscellaneous (62-64) (38-39). 
5 In each commodity group, the figure for government imports was entered directly as 
D~. Dz consisted of federal government purchases from the column with that label in 
the input-output table, less D~. Di consisted of transferred imports from row SOB of 
the input-output table less D~. And finally, D1 consisted of the sum of intermediate 
output, personal consumption expenditure, gross private fixed capital formation and 
net inventory change from the input-output table, less Di. 
6 The estimate of a was obtained by the following reasoning : in the absence of discrimina-
tion, it seems a reasonable hypothesis that the government would import about the same 
proportion of a selected commodity as the private sector. That is to say, on a commodity-
by-commodity basis, the government's average propensity to import would be identical 
to that of the private sector when a = 0. Admission of this hypothesis can be used in the 
following way to obtain an estimate of the initial or present degree of discrimination. 
Equation (A4) above expresses a proportional relation between actual government 
imports, D~, and hypothetical government imports in the absence of discrimination, 
gm ( ). Multiplying through equation (A4) by pm yields a relation between the actual 
and hypothetical values of these transactions (say actual value= X~ and hypothetical 
value= X~ ). This relation appears below as equation (A12). Similarly, equation (A3) 
above expresses a proportional relation between actual government purchases from the 
domestic sector, Dz, and hypothetical purchases in the absence of discrimination, g ( ). 
Similarly, multiplying through equation (A3) by p yields a relation between actual and 
hypothetical values of these transactions. This relation appears below as equation (A13). 
(cont'd on p. 261) 
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The data for D1 , DT , D2 , and D2 were by definition sufficient to yield 
values for the ratios R 1 , RT , R 2, R2, V, and V 2 . Thus in terms of equation 
(All), the only parameters remaining to be specified were the supply and 
demand elasticities. These were arbitrarily chosen on the basis of a priori 
expectations about reasonable values for each particular commodity 
classification. 
Having established an initial level of discrimination and knowing 
the value of total imports at that particular level, it is a comparatively 
simple matter to plug the actual and assumed values of variables into 
equation (All), and read out the changes in total imports which would take 
place given a change in a. In fact, the procedure followed was to determine 
the changes in D1, DT, D2 , and D2 which would come about from a 0.10 
increase or decrease in a from its original value, then to use these changes to 
establish new values of Di, DT, D 2, and D2, and therefore also new values 
for all the share ratios (R's and V's). These new values, in addition to the 
increased or decreased value of a then provided the new raw data to plug 
into equation (All) a second time . With the resultant second set of changes, 
(Cont 'd from p, 260) 
(A12) X2 = (1 - a)X~ 
(Al3) 
Returning to the hypothesized equality between average propensities to import in the 
absence of discrimination, it implies algebraically , that 
However, for a country like the U.S., the hypothetical ratio of private imports to domes-
tic purchases is sure to be approximated by the actual ratio, because of the very large 
size of domestic production compared to imports, and the comparatively large private 
sector compared to the government sector. This suggests the approximate equality of 
equation (A14): 
(A14) 
Equations (A12), (A13), and (A14) are then a system of three equations in three 
unknowns (the two hypothetical values X~ and X2 , and the actual degree of discrimina-
tion a). Thus a solution for the present level of discrimination is obtainable by solving 
the three-equation system . a becomes a function of known quantities: 
X2/X2 - X1 /X1 
a= 
Use of the approximate equality (A14) assures that this is a slight over-estimate of a, 
and in the actual estimation reported above, the estimated a was rounded off in a 
downward direction to the nearest O.Z5, where the digit Z varied between 0 and 9. 
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the levels could be revised a second time for a new value of the discrimina-
tion parameter, and the whole process repeated. In addition , at each 
iteration, the values of the assumed elasticities of demand of the government 
were raised when a was being decreased, and lowered when a was being 
increased. This was consistent with the notion that increasing general 
favoritism to domestic producers also lowers the price sensitivity of the 
government purchasing agent. 
What emerges from this procedure is a "hypothetical history" of 
government discrimination against imports for each commodity class - what 
the value of total imports in 1963 would have been if the government had 
engaged in any degree of discrimination from none at all to total exclusion 
of imports in government purchases. On the basis of one observation on 
actual data, the values of all variables in the system were calculated for 
a= 0, a = 1, and a = 0.05 to a = 0.95 by 0.10 intervals. The process described 
is essentially a numerical approximation to the result obtained from integra-
tion of the right hand side of equation (All) from a = 0 to a =1. 
Table Al records the findings of the simulation with respect to 
total imports for (i) the initial value of a (columns (2) and (4) ), (ii) no 
discrimination (a= 0, column (5) ), and (iii) a ban on government imports 
(a= l, column (6) ). 7 
Two sets of hypothetical figures are given in Table Al, the first 
for relatively short-run (low) values of supply elasticities, and the second for 
relatively long-run (high) values. From the totals row it can be determined 
that the discriminatory U.S . procurement policy of 1963 actually "saved" 
$76 million dollars of imports under the short-run assumptions, (8169 -
8093 = 76), or $110 million dollars of imports under the long-run assump-
tions (8203 - 8093). The long-run figure would be appropriate if it were 
believed that both foreign and domestic suppliers had had sufficient time 
to adjust to the program of discrimination, and if it was known that there 
had been no recent substantial changes in the program's implementation. 
The extent to which 1963 imports were decreased as a result of 
discrimination in government purchasing is notably small under any assump-
tions. And Table Al also demonstrates that there is little to be gained from 
further discrimination. An outright ban on all government imports would 
reduce total imports only another $36 million in the short-run (8093 - 8057), 
or $54 million in the long-run (8093 - 8039). In either case, it is notable that 
banning the remaining $61 million (from column (3) ) of government imports 
does not reduce total imports by this full amount. As has been discussed at 
length above, a policy of discrimination against imports in government 
purchasing actually discriminates in favor of imports to the private sector 
by lowering the price of imports. 
The small magnitude of actual 1963 government imports ($61 
million) may seem surprising. But it is due in part to the exclusions of certain 
commodities and types of purchases in Table Al, and it is due in great part 
to the substantial degree of actual discrimination against imports which 
reduces their importance in government purchases. The high levels of actual 
government discrimination are clear from column ( 4 ). 
7 More detailed results for other variables than total imports and for intermediate degrees 
of discrimination (values of a) are available from the authors on request, as are the 
assumed values of various elasticity parameters underlying Table Al. 
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COMMENTS BY PROFESSOR H. T. PATRICK 
In regard to Professor Baldwin and Richardson's statement that 
NTBs should be removed or moderated with exchange rate realignment, 
Professor Patrick wondered whether there were criteria or circumstances 
when NTBs are beneficial or necessary . He noted that NTBs are a second-
best way of solving some domestic industrial problems, retarding structural 
adjustment and perpetuating the situation of a new generation of workers 
spending their lives in marginal industries. For example, protecting black 
industry in the U.S. this way would be very inefficient. Similarly , although 
Professor Kamiya said that Japan merely wishes to use NTBs to buy time 
for adjustment in the leather industry, Professor Patrick suggested the 
Japanese government is simply using this as an excuse to keep these workers 
as second-class citizens in the leather industry and to avoid integrating them 
into the fuller aspects of Japanese society. 
Professor Patrick wondered how important Professors Baldwin and 
Richardson's estimates of 100 million dollars difference due to government 
procurement policies would be for specific industries. He was concerned 
about their method of using existing imports by the private sector as a 
measure of what could occur, for it might well be that many government-
used goods, such as military ordinance, are not used privately at all. He 
suggested using this model for Canada, Australia and Japan where the 
imports of military equipment may be much more important and where it 
would be useful to know the opportunity cost of producing military equip-
ment domestically. 
Professor Patrick agreed that their policy proposals including a 
code of fair practices and public bidding were good ideas. He noted that 
Japan buys almost nothing from abroad and even with respect to domestic 
producers the government maintains a selected list . 
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DISCUSSION OF BOTH PAPERS 
In reply to comments on his paper, Professor Komiya said he had 
used unpublished, non-official government sources. One group of sources 
was the complaints by GATT members, presented to GATT, against Japan's 
non-tariff barriers. A second group was the special talks between the U.S. 
and Japan on these special problems and for these talks, complaints and 
information were collected from American businessmen. With regard to 
administrative guidance, he said there were genuine complaints from the 
U.S. side, but the only concrete case he could identify in the manufacturing 
sector was the power generator case. He did note that in agriculture non-
tariff barriers were much more important than in manufacturing. He also 
mentioned that the U.S. was very eager to initiate the above U.S.-Japan talks 
on these matters, but the U.S . requested the talks be stopped after two or 
three meetings because it was soon discovered that trade barriers were much 
greater on the U.S. side than the Japanese. 
Professor Komiya said that although the quantitative importance 
of NTBs is a very difficult subject, a Japanese government official has made 
some estimates of trade reduction due to these trade barriers. Although 
these estimates would naturally be minimized, NTBs accounted for a reduc-
tion of about 1.5 - 2.0 billion dollars per year and tariffs accounted for a 
reduction of about 2 .5 - 3.0 billion dollars. 
With regard to the computer industry, Professor Komiya said it 
produced general types of computers and that, besides residual import 
restrictions, the government provided low interest credit and financing for 
Rand D projects. While it might be more efficient to have just one company, 
in Japan it is difficult to merge four companies and even though this is not 
the best policy, he said at least the industry was growing. With respect to 
tariffs and quotas on primary metals, he said that this was not a progressive 
policy at all and that it served only to protect inefficient industry. 
A participant from an international institution said that GATT 
permits a certain amount of state trading because of the provisional character 
of part 2 of GATT which permits other than GATT provisions in trade arrange-
ments if they have been part of the country's legislation prior to agreement in 
1948. Most countries had state trading arrangements in agriculture before 
1948. Professor Komiya replied that his information was different and that 
quite a few of the state trading arrangements were instituted after 1948. Thus, 
if the above participant is correct, then the Japanese arrangements are in 
conflict with GATT. The above participant also emphasized that people 
ought to get away from the idea that anything not conforming to GATT is 
bad because, while it is a good forum for discussion, many of its regulations 
need revision. 
A U.S . participant regretted that there were no substantial estimates 
of the quantitative effects of NTBs. In reference to the U .S.-Japan talks 
mentioned, he said his impression was that the U.S. government had not 
done any study of the subject beforehand, but rather collected ad hoc com-
plaints and then relied upon Japan and the GATT for further information. 
An example of such complaints was given by a member of the Canadian 
business community who was present at this session. He said in regard to 
the Japanese list of items which are not liberalized that there are many 
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examples of items not on the list which cannot be sold in Japan even though 
such items are competitive in price, delivery and so on. The U.S. participant 
continued that he was concerned about the conflict between reality and 
image concerning administrative guidance. He said Japan is getting the Japan, 
Inc. image that there is such government-business cooperation that a special 
set of rules are needed to deal with Japan, just as with the Soviet Union. 
Hard data are needed to evaluate the many individual stories supporting the 
image because saying things like there are many foreign trading firms does 
not resolve these issues when 60 per cent of Japan's imports are handled by 
ten firms and the remaining firms handle highly specialized imports. The 
Ministry of Trade and Industry, which is very specialized itself, can talk to 
the ten small firms that import a particular machine just as easily as to the 
ten large firms. One way to get data is by surveying American exporters and 
foreign chambers of commerce in Japan about their problems at both the 
importing and selling levels. 
A participant from an international institution drew a moral from 
these discussions. Upon first entering the exporting of manufactures in the 
1920s and 1930s Japan encountered the types of restrictions that have been 
discussed on the part of the then developed countries. Australia was one of 
the first to pass legislation - in 1931 - which aimed at the diversion of 
imports away from Japan. Moreover, all colonial countries took steps to 
keep Japanese imports out of their colonies. These were not inconsiderable 
factors in Japan's entry into World War II, and thus, from these examples, 
it is not surprising Japan got into the frame of mind of strictly regulating 
imports. This participant said that, on the whole, this policy has worked very 
well for Japan. Similarly, it can be argued, for several of the developing coun-
tries with a population of more than 40 million and a reasonably large 
domestic market and in a world of trade barriers, that the way to develop is 
to follow the Japanese pattern and play the game by the protectionist rules 
set by the developed countries and Japan. However, if the developing country 
plays the game badly, it will get into a terrible mess since it will not know 
where its resources are going. Also, the Japanese problem is not only that it 
is difficult to dismantle barriers but also that it is difficult to dismantle the 
protectionist frame of mind which is now counter-productive for Japan. 
Another participant commented that many countries do not have the social 
structure or administrative capacity to play the protectionist game without 
losing. 
One of the assumptions on which Professor Baldwin and 
Richardson's analysis rested was that, for individual commodities, if there 
were no discrimination, the average propensity of the government to import 
would be the same as the private sector's propensity. Professor Richardson 
agreed with Professor Patrick's criticism of this assumption that at a high 
level of aggregation the distribution of the government's is not known and 
thus that this is a strong assumption. Different results would be obtained 
with different levels of aggregation, however, experiments with higher levels 
of aggregation than the 8 or 9 categories in the paper did not give substantial-
ly different results, thus the results of the paper are likely ballpark figures. 
One participant was interested in the analogy between the small 
price tag on government procurement policies and the small price the 
Japanese put on some of their practices and wondered why there was so 
much concern about apparently small problems. Professor Richardson said 
he was not sure, perhaps it was a matter of psychology in the way small 
cases get blown out of proportion. 
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A Japanese participant wondered if exchange rate realignment 
would cure all the problems with the United States' balance of payments. 
He suggested that some types of structural problems, such as the U.S. auto-
motive industry being 15 to 20 years obsolete compared to the Japanese or 
West German industries, could not be remedied by exchange rate adjustment. 
He said this type of problem required instead new investment which was 
why Japan was able to catch up in these industries. However, it was replied 
that during the Kennedy-Round, the U.S. wanted to lower all trade barriers 
and that the demand for trade barriers had only grown very much in the last 
three or four years. It was suggested that this was due to the U.S. currency 
being out of line, and to the fact that structural problems are much more 
difficult to solve when a country's currency is out of line. 
Finally, Professor Richardson emphasized that the longer the 
surcharge stays, the more people think that it is part of normal affairs. A 
further problem is that part of the ultimate bargain is a resetting of parities, 
but when the surcharge comes off, the exchange rates will be back into 
disequilibrium, even if the correct equilibrium exchange rates were guessed 
with the surcharge. 
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Policy Approaches to the Liberalization 
of Pacific Trade 
TRADE LIBERALIZATION AND THE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
OF THE PACIFIC BASIN: THE NEED FOR COOPERATION 
by 
HARALD B. MALMGREN 
Overseas Development Council 
There are many proposals for bringing about trade liberalization, 
within the Pacific Basin, and in the world trading system as a whole. One 
could analyze each of these in terms of their likely technical economic effects, 
and make recommendations based upon their relative economic efficiency as 
instruments of liberalization. Such an approach would lean heavily on some 
basic theoretical propositions, and some kind of complex model. Another 
way in which to contemplate alternatives is to consider the major economic 
and political trends, and the restructuring of trade, investment, and produc-
tion patterns which might result from them. Methods of liberalizing trade 
could then be evaluated in terms of their practicality, and the degree to 
which they cope with the underlying forces. The latter approach is used in 
this paper. 
The Pacific Basin countries are undergoing a structural transforma-
tion in their relations with each other, and with the rest of the world. The 
forces at work are numerous. 
Trade policies in Europe and in the United States have a major 
effect on the outlook for trade and investment in all of the countries of the 
region. In Europe, the enlargement of the Community will give further 
impetus to the reorientation of the economies of Australia, New Zealand, 
Canada, and others . At first, the impact of enlargement will be limited to 
further consolidation of the European Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) 
with major consequences for cereals and dairy exports. The CAP operates to 
stimulate production and encourage aggressive export subsidization, in addi-
tion to restricting imports rather severely. There will be years in which 
European Community imports are relatively high, as they were in 1970-71, 
when Community crop conditions were poor. On the whole, however, imports 
of products covered by the CAP will not perform well, and are likely to 
continue to decrease. The degree of European self-sufficiency is likely to rise, 
and the upshot is very likely to be increased exportation of surpluses. While 
there will be good years and bad, the EC potential for exportation of most 
of the basic temperate commodities will act as a disruptive and price-
depressing influence on markets throughout the world. 
The enlargement of the European Community will require special 
arrangements for the EFT A countries which do not become full members of 
the European Community. These arrangements will probably take the form 
of free trade for industrial products between the Community and non-member 
EFT A countries. There will also be further proliferation of discriminatory 
Community preferential arrangements in order to accommodate the British-
related Caribbean countries, Mauritius, and possibly even India and Pakistan. 
This will blur the limits of the Community's special preference network, 
which up to now has been limited to the Mediterranean and most of Africa. 
The new economic bloc centered on the Community will encompass about 
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a half of present world trade, and will have the combined political voting 
strength of about fifty nations in the international economic institutions. The 
sheer size of this Eurobloc will change the modes of operation of international 
institutions and rules, and affect the planning and the policies of all other 
countries, whether they ~e developed or in early stages of development. 
In the United States, there is a strong resurgence of protectionism, 
and even a tendency towards a kind of neomercantilism. This manifests itself 
in ad hoc trade restrictions, usually in the form of so-called "voluntary" 
export quotas, the inability to obtain authority from Congress for trade 
negotiations, and the near-passage of generally restrictive trade legislation on 
more than one occasion, since the end of the Kennedy-Round in 1967. The 
shift of the American labor movement from its traditional support of liberal 
trade policies to its new position of favoring both controls on imports and 
on direct investment outflows has caused a major change in political align-
ments in the direction of neo-isolationism. This trend was highlighted by the 
unilateral character of the President's actions in August 1971 to shock the 
rest of the world into recognition of the need for a change in the monetary 
and trade mechanisms. 
These developments have been building for several years. For 
example, the beef import quota legislation which now acts as a restraint on 
Australian and New Zealand exports was enacted in 1964. The pressures for 
textile import restrictions began even before President Kennedy took office 
in 1961. These pressures have continued and intensified, and have always 
been primarily aimed at curtailing imports from eastern Asia, as opposed to 
other sources from around the world. The pressures to control stainless steel 
flatware, or shoes, or other labor-intensive products began in the mid-60s. 
Frustrations with European Community policies, intensified compe-
tition from Japan, the weak state of the domestic economy, and the chronic 
balance of payments deficits were added to the political frustrations over 
the Vietnam War, and the distribution of the economic burden of defense 
among the Western countries. This turning inwards has left up in the air a 
number of initiatives the U.S. itself had taken, or been party to . Among the 
recent casualties are the funding of the international development institutions 
such as the IDA affiliate of the World Bank and the proposed soft-loan 
facility of the Asian Development Bank; the multilateral untying of aid; the 
implementation of general tariff preferences by the U.S.; and the UN devel-
opment target for development assistance at one percent of GNP, or the 
Pearson Commission target for official aid at 0.70 percent of GNP. As regards 
the latter point, even the requests for foreign aid appropriations by the 
Executive Branch have been going down. 
The outlook for the developing countries of East and Southeast 
Asia, and even of South Asia, has been adversely affected by these develop-
ments. A major element in the 1970 and 1971 American policies on trade 
was a collision with Japan, both officially, and on the level of private business 
activities in the Pacific. A mood of hostility in the United States has grown 
rapidly, among certain important segments of the American political and 
economic system. The recent sharp rise in protectionist sentiment on specific 
trade matters is a reaction to these developments. First, the export successes 
of Japan, Korea, Taiwan and Hong Kong have generated strong reactions to 
the consequent import penetration. Second, some American companies have 
built processing or assembly facilities in this area, to bring in products former-
ly produced in the United States. The major examples are in the electrical 
and electronics industry, especially in the recent shift of all radios and much 
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of the television production to Eastern Asia . Third , American manufacturers 
discovered that European countries have maintained a number of formal and 
informal controls on imports from Eastern Asia on what is essentially a 
discriminatory basis . This is interpreted as a major cause of the concentration 
on the U.S . market for the exports of manufactures from Eastern Asia. 
Perhaps it is worth adding that the economic consequences of the 
winding down of the Vietnam war, and the shift in the American role implied 
in the Guam Doctrine, have not been given much attention in planning for 
the future. The idea of providing military assistance, particularly in the form 
of equipment and arms, has been subject to discussion. This is what has so far 
been meant by "supporting the initiatives of other nations." The notion that 
there should be an economic design in place of the military role, which would 
provide development assistance and promote trade and investment in the area, 
has not been given serious consideration, at least thus far . What I have called 
elsewhere " the other half of the Guam Doctrine" is missing .1 
Also at work are a number of other forces which will bring about 
structural change. Most important among these is the growth and evolution 
of the Japanese economy, and its relations with the rest of the world . As the 
other papers in this and past Pacific Trade and Development conferences 
make clear, the Japanese demand for exports of the region has a strong effect 
on the trade and production pattern of the area. This area is a large market, 
second only to the U.S. More important in the long run, however, is the labor, 
raw materials, and plant sites which the region provides. On the labor side, the 
shortage of manpower in Japan in relation to the size and growth of the 
Japanese economy dictates expansion of the Japanese industrialization base 
by location of plants outside Japan, in labor surplus countries . The demand 
for raw materials from various parts of the Pacific Basin, and from other 
parts of the world, will continue to rise. This will tend to cause movement of 
Japanese investment into supply areas. The pollution problem in Japan, in 
combination with the scarcity and cost of new sites for industrialization in 
Japan, at least in presently suitable locations, creates an additional incentive 
to move abroad, at least with the expansion of industries beyond their 
present size . 
In the past, while the share of Japan's total world exports going to 
this area has held steady, the share of Japan's total imports from this area 
has been going down in recent years (in spite of the fact that the absolute level 
has more than doubled, e .g., from $718 million in 1960 to $1.5 billion in 
1968). 
THE EASTERN ASIAN SHARE OF JAPAN'S TRADE 
(Eastern Asian Developing Countries from Burma Eastwards) 
Japan's Exports 
Japan's Imports 
Percentage of Japan's Total Trade 
1960 
24 .7 
16.0 
1968 
24.5 
12.6 
1 "Coming Trade Wars? Neomercantilism and Foreign Policy," Foreign Policy, winter, 
1970-71. 
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Viewed from the vantage point of the developing countries of Eastern Asia, 
the picture varies from country to country. Indonesia, Philippines, and 
Thailand are becoming increasingly dependent upon the Japanese market for 
their exports; while Taiwan, Korea, and Malaysia show signs of becoming less 
dependent upon Japan in terms of the share of exports of that destination. 
For the group as a whole, over one-fifth of their total exports went to Japan 
in 1968. 
The composition of Japan's trade with this area is well known: 
Southeast Asia primarily supplies raw materials and takes finished goods; 
while Taiwan, Korea, and Hong Kong are moving into manufactures and 
semi-manufactures for the Japanese market . These latter three countries now 
import more machinery from Japan than they export light industrial goods 
to Japan, but this balance is likely to shift fairly soon. 
What lies ahead cannot be assessed without reference to the chang-
ing priorities in the Japanese economy, towards social overhead, services, and 
pollution control, and to the outcome of the exchange rate realignments in 
1971 and subsequently. There has always been controversy about how fast 
Japan was likely to grow with continuing forecasts of a slowdown. This has 
not happened, except for brief intervals . The exchange rate change could be 
a new retarding.factor, as might be more restrictive Western trade policies. 
However, the shift to construction, services, and clean-up activities will 
probably mean declining import requirements as a proportion of total eco-
nomic activity in Japan. Japan's so-called dependence on imports could very 
well decrease, except for energy sources. 
On the export side, Japan can be expected to continue to enjoy 
high rates of growth, perhaps a little less than past expansion of double the 
global export growth rate, but nonetheless high . This, however, is not a 
crucial element in Japan's high GNP growth rate, since exports in recent years 
appear to have followed domestic expansion, rather than led it. 
Japan's liberalization of import restrictions and direct investment 
outflows, and the growth of Japan's foreign aid programs, are likely to have 
a major impact on the Pacific, whatever the home growth rate or new 
exchange rate situation. Particularly in agriculture, import liberalization could 
have an enormous effect on the outlook for all of the producing countries of 
the Pacific, including the developing countries. 
In agriculture, in the region, there are two major forces which are 
transforming the traditional pattern. The hybrid seeds of the Green Revolu-
tion and technological progress generally have enabled South Asia and parts 
of Southeast and East Asia to become self-sufficient, and have allowed hopes 
of export potential to rise. The second major force at work is the virtual self-
sufficiency in rice of Japan, and Japan's potential to dump its surpluses of 
rice through food aid programs. This progress in production is based in many 
cases on inefficient farm programs. The support prices for rice in Japan are 
the equivalent of treble the world market price for comparable qualities. 
Japan thus has to follow a highly protectionist trade policy in agriculture. 
The support prices for grains in the developing countries is also generally 
high, contributing to the recent improvements in their production. The up-
shot is that the opportunity for selling grains to each other, or to the rest of 
the world, is small. The international future of rice, like all other grains, will 
likely be a future of high production and low prices, with exportation made 
difficult by self-sufficiency in other countries, by protectionist policies in 
the major potential markets, and by the competition of export subsidization 
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by some of the exporting countries. Hopes for the evolution of Southeast 
Asia as the "rice bowl" for the rest of Asia are probably misguided, and the 
real potential, so far as there is one, is higher up the protein ladder, in feed 
supplies at first and in ultimately the sale of meat as incomes grow. 
There is a major change underway in the performance and growth 
of the manufacturing sector in some of the countries. The export perform-
ance of Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Korea provides a model for others. There 
seems to be a clear pattern of international adjustment into labor-intensive 
manufactures and food processing, and eventually into light engineering and 
consumer goods, and componentry and assembly. The latter developments 
are to a considerable extent tied up with the so-called internationalization of 
production of larger corporations in Japan and North America. 
Finally, the population problem in the developing countries is 
increasingly manifesting itself in unemployment. The rising unemployment 
problem is coming at a time when labor requirements for agriculture appear 
to be declining, thus putting a premium on the generation of jobs by the 
marufacturing sectors. 
This overview of the major changes underway may be too general 
and too simplified to provide guidance in very specific cases, but it is helpful 
in making broad judgments about what the trade problem is, and how we go 
about improving the conditions of trade. This overview also sets aside the 
potential role of Eastern Europe, and especially the People's Republic of 
China. The potential impact of these can only be matters of speculation at 
this juncture. China will sooner or later have the ability to export a wide 
range of labor-intensive manufactures. At present its capabilities are limited 
to such products as textiles where international competition is already keen. 
However, China for some time yet is mainly a matter of potential. 
Against this background of structural changes we can consider the 
possibilities for liberalizing trade pragmatically. Perhaps the first question that 
might be asked is whether the introduction of generalized tariff preferences 
by the developed countries will open a variety of new trade opportunities 
and reduce the need for other forms of liberalization in the near term. My 
answer to this is pessimistic. The United States scheme of general preferences 
has not even been sent up to Congress in the form of proposed legislation, 
because the Executive rightly fears transformation of any trade legislation 
into protectionist legislation of a different character altogether. If implemented, 
the U.S. scheme would have safeguards against market disruption, in the form 
of exceptions made for "sensitive" labor-intensive products and an escape clause 
procedure. The latter escape procedure would probably be sought by U.S. 
manufacturers and workers fairly frequently, and the Tariff Commission if it 
followed its other recent practices would probably support snap-backs to the 
MFN rate often. The uncertainty generated would be high. The U.S. will 
probably not offer preferences to any developing country giving so-called 
"reverse preferences" to one or more developed countries under discrimina-
tory preferential arrangements of the European type. This is intended to 
provide a long-term incentive to phase out a substantial element of the 
special preference arrangements, and it would in theory reduce American 
Congressional opposition by withholding preferences from any country which 
discriminated against U.S. exports. In practice, ironically, this position will 
probably result in perpetuation of the special preferences with the Community. 
The African and Mediterranean countries do benefit from the aid flows tied 
to their preferences, and some gain marginal benefit from the preferences 
themselves, whereas giving these bilateral arrangements up for the sake of 
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preferential access to the U.S . would not be attractive. What, after all, would 
they sell in the U.S.? In the long run, the U.S. may alter its position quite 
possibly in the direction of asking for reverse preferences on certain products 
for itself. 
The Community general preference scheme offers certain theoreti-
cal advantages over the American scheme, looking at the whole of the devel-
oping world together. The Community would first of all not invoke a safe-
guard (snap-back to MFN rates) unless imports from preferred countries had 
reached a certain trigger level. The trigger would be observable, in theory, 
and therefore countries could plan more effectively. Second, the Community 
would place imports of a certain product from a given country back into the 
MFN category if that country's exports of the item exceeded one-half of the 
total volume allowed under the ceiling, or trigger level. This would mean that 
countries which became relatively strong competitors would be moved into 
normal competition with the developed countries, making room for the lesser 
developed countries to use preferences to develop a capability to export. This 
system in its original conception had much to say for it, and I earlier advocated 
that the U.S. adopt a similar system rather than face the uncertainties and 
diplomatic strife implicit in the American escape-clause procedure .2 
As matters turned out, the Community went ahead with implemen-
tation of a general preference scheme in the summer of 1971 even though the 
U.S. was not yet ready, nor was there indication of when the U.S. might be 
able to take action. This apparently courageous step by the Community is not 
all that it seems. Based upon analysis of the specific mechanics, Professor 
Richard Cooper has concluded that the Community scheme as now imple-
mented will offer almost no additional incentive to developing countries to 
export.3 The tariff-quotas have been set on a base of 1968, with a low add-on 
allowance . The rate of growth of successful exporters is such that they will 
end up exceeding the tariff quotas in the initial period, or shortly thereafter. 
The actual mechanics will in particular block preferential access for East 
Asia. In defense of the new system, Community officials have stated that the 
quantitative threshold levels would in practice only be used as an indicator 
of what was taking place . Official action to invoke the safeguards would be 
rare, usually only in the case of the more sensitive products. This however 
means that there will be great uncertainty as to when the triggers might be 
invoked. No predictable, continuing assurance of market access would be 
provided. Experience has shown that complaints are made in the developed 
countries when imports actually make significant progress in the market. A 
number of complaints already suffice to bring about requests for "voluntary" 
restraint of exports; it will be all the more likely that complaints under a 
preference scheme would result in a snap-back to the MFN rate. 
Since the new members of the Community , including Britain, will 
adopt the same scheme, and since the Japanese have initiated it as well, the 
result has been the creation of a complex, technically ingenious trade mecha-
nism which gives rise to false hopes and few benefits - and which probably 
discriminates against East Asia. It is probably fair to say that the general 
preference mechanism as instituted by the Community will thus do little to 
end the privileged position of Africa and the Mediterranean, and other asso-
ciated countries . Added to this is the fact that the "sensitive" items excluded 
2 See my discussion of general preference schemes in my monograph, Trade for Develop-
ment, Overseas Development Council, Washington, D.C., 1971. 
3"The European Community's System of Generalized Tariff Preferences," unpublished 
paper, summer 1971. 
276 
by the U.S. proposal, and the "sensitive" items in the Community framework, 
will normally be labor-intensive products from East Asia. 
Any form of liberalization through the device of general preferences 
thus has to take into account these practical problems of safeguards, of 
providing opportunity for the least developed while restraining the most 
competitive from taking the lion's share, and at the same time ensuring some 
improvement of the opportunities of exports of manufactures from Asia to 
Europe. Reconciling these problems in one scheme is very difficult, and too 
much hope cannot therefore be placed on such a scheme. 
Regional preferences are a possible, but difficult alternative. The 
U.S. could fairly easily offer preferences to Latin America alone, partly 
because of the historical ties and partly because much of the trade is already 
entering duty-free or nearly so (raw materials). There would be a problem 
with Mexico because of the so-called "runaway plant" from the U.S . For 
Canada or the U.S. to give preferences to East Asia would be very difficult, 
in view of all the recent pressures to moderate importation of manufactures 
from this area. Such an action would be seen to be locking the American 
economy into a "deadly embrace" with the source of most of its import 
difficulties. 
The problem of how to deal with the Eurobloc, and the protection-
ism of the U.S. and Europe, thus remains a central question, regardless of 
what happens to the question of general or special tariff preferences. The 
international politics of any new liberalization effort are a crucial element in 
assessing its practicality. For example, if Japan were to reverse its practice of 
passivity or defensiveness in broad international trade policy, and embark on 
an effort to initiate new thinking around the world, this would certainly have 
an impact on the U.S. and the European Community. Japan would have to 
pay something for leadership; she would have to offer trade and investment 
concessions in return for leading in the achievement of a more equitable 
international system. Japan could diplomatically help to organize the 
sentiments and positions of the Asian countries in one or another of the 
Asian or Pacific discussion forums. This in turn would help to counterbalance 
the heavy negative influence of the Eurobloc affiliates in the Mediterranean 
and Africa. 
It is my judgment that the developed countries have been able to 
succeed so easily in restraining Japan and individual East Asian countries 
because it has been possible to divide them up. As in labor negotiations, 
concessions gained from one could then be wrung from another. The effec-
tiveness of quantitative import restrictions lies in the way in which they are 
administered - the category definitions, the licensing procedures, and the 
degree of administrative discretion. The countries of Eastern Asia have done 
nothing to try to gain international agreement on rules for imposing quotas 
on administrative guidelines. Japan could help organize such an effort. While 
Japan has import problems of her own, even in textiles now, in the long run 
Japan will most of all want liberal conditions of access for her exports and 
continuing import pressure to help the process of restructuring industry and 
moving labor to higher productivity industries. 
Alternative forms of regional cooperation are much discussed, and 
analyzed. One may talk about alternatives ranging from regional cooperation 
or liberalization among a few of the developing countries, on the one end of 
the spectrum, to broad schemes of liberalization, such as Professor Kojima's 
PAFT A proposal, at the other end of the spectrum. 
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The questions of trade liberalization, and payments arrangements 
to support regional economic development, or at least development of 
groupings such as ASEAN, have been thoroughly discussed in various papers. 
I have nothing to add to the technical discussion, except perhaps to stress 
that the complementarity question is even more serious now, in the face of 
the technological changes in agriculture and the consequent self-sufficiency 
of many countries. 
The basic questi~n, as emphasized in the Asian Development Bank 
study of the Asian-Pacific in the 1970s, is the pattern of industrialization 
which takes place. This in turn raises the question of how to introduce some 
modest form of industrial planning which might lead to greater specialization 
and complementarity. In the light of the various economic and political 
forces at work, discussed earlier, especially the unemployment pressure which 
can be expected to rise in the developing countries of the area, this matter 
should take precedence over simplified trade liberalization 'and payments 
pooling schemes. 
From the point of view of the developed countries of the area, 
some further cooperation on specific problems could be undertaken. For 
example, as regards Australian-Japanese cooperation, Sir John Crawford 
recently remarked: 
"There is sense , however, in widening the scope of our trade treaty with Japan 
to provide for full consultation about Japanese investment in Australia (at 
present relatively small), about shipping, about non-tariff trade measure, and 
about economic aid to Asia, including joint investment proposals in less devel-
oped areas. Initiatives already taken in these matters by Australian and Japanese 
business interests are to be welcomed and, indeed, are in marked and pleasant 
contrast to the atmosphere which prevailed in 1957 when the first Trade Treaty 
was signed. These will be more effective in their outcome if the two governments 
talk about the relevant policies."4 
Cooperation between Canada, the U.S., Australia, New Zealand and Japan in 
aid, trade and investment could be encouraged, to provide an incentive to 
give shape or design to theeconomic evolution of their relations with the 
developing countries of the region, and to consider how best the group as a 
whole might deal with the implications of the Eurobloc and its affiliations. 
Discussions along these lines, even if they only led to a few specific ideas, 
would be better than the present policy vacuum .. Moreover, it would serve as 
a vehicle for developing the outlines of the economic elements of the "Guam 
Doctrine," which is best done by the initiation of ideas from other countries 
in the Pacific. The concept implied in the Guam Doctrine is, after all, 
American support of Asian efforts and initiatives, as opposed to American 
initiatives. 
Despite the existence of ECAFE, something could be created along 
the lines of the OECD, for the Pacific Basin, with the objective of providing 
a better basis for trade and investment liberalization, and coordination of 
development assistance efforts, in the area. Such a body could also serve 
as a coordination group for preparing positions vis-a-vis the Eurobloc, and 
perhaps even with regard to the North American market (even though the 
U.S. and Canada would be members). 
There is one task, which would be an important form of trade 
liberalization, which the developing countries could undertake in concert. 
This would be to review with each other their respective protection, and 
4"Economic Prospects for Australia and Its Neighbors," UMBC Economic Review, United 
Malayan Banking Corp., Vol. VI, No. 2, 1970. 
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export subsidy, policies, to compare notes on experience and to formulate 
ways in which the mechanisms used might be simplified and made more 
effective in development policy. The debate over "inward-looking" and 
"outward-looking" policies ought really now to be carried on between 
planners and administrators in the various governments concerned. On the 
question of non-tariff barriers and other sophisticated or complex trade-
distorting measures, it would be useful to undertake a review of each other's 
measures to determine ways in which the measures and their administration 
might be simplified and put under a general framework of principles. The 
sheer complexity of dealing with each other is often a deterrent to trade, 
especially to smaller exporters, and it confuses the assessment of appropriate 
location of investment. 
The broader and more bold conception of a P AFT A as a means of 
trade liberalization is a different type of proposition altogether. First of all, 
the internal politics of the key countries in such a group would not allow 
free trade among the group at this time . Japan, for example, is simply not 
ready to eliminate all its agricultural protection, nor to align its farm price 
policies with those of other countries in the next few years. Nor is Japan 
politically prepared to commit herself to completely free conditions of trade 
and investment. Australia and Canada are in essentially the same position. 
The U.S. position would be even more difficult, because of the present 
troubles with manufactures from Eastern Asia. The only free trade area 
notion that has been given serious, though limited, thought in Washington is 
an industrial free trade area with the Western European economic complex. 
The PAFT A idea poses basic problems. The EC and EFT A were 
able to accomplish mutual trade liberalization and allow relatively free 
investment because, among other things, the countries concerned were near 
each other in stage of development and their wage structures were similar. 
There already was a high degree of interdependence in trade when the 
Community began to function in 1958. The rate of growth of internal trade 
has been much faster than trade with the rest of the world because of the 
base of mutual interest. The Eurobloc as a whole with its affiliates, is a 
controlled variant of the Community structure. Non-members gain access 
under special, reciprocal conditions. The developing countries with low wage 
conditions get preferred access only on certain products, and in turn give 
selected "reverse preferences." The liberalization is tailored to what is in the 
interest of the Community members, without entailing the costs of adjust-
ment that general free access for these countries would entail. The U.S . 
internal market, again, is a market built around a comparable wage structure 
throughout the country. There is still some modest incentive to move from 
New England to the South, but the differential is small. The accusations 
once made in New England about "runaway mills" moving to the Carolinas 
or Georgia are rarely heard now - instead the issue is one of "runaways" to 
the Far East. 
PAFTA for Canada, New Zealand, Australia, Japan, and the U.S. 
could become politically viable only a little later, when conditions in each 
economy were more similar, especially in wage structure in relation to 
productivity. Even then, there would be a question of how to assimilate the 
Japanese way of business life in the more free system which the U.S. still 
prefers. Professor Kojima's proposals5 ought to be given further study 
5 In their most recent form in Japan and a Pacific Free Trade Area, Macmillan, London, 
1971. 
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nonetheless. The question of how to create a suitable counterbalance to the 
emergence of other economic blocs may give the question a meaning well 
beyond the dimensions of the economic benefits of free trade between four 
or five countries. 
There are of course variants, including on the one side a P AFT A 
with associated preferential countries as appropriate; and on the other side 
the NAFTA concept with Japan and Australia in the group, with North 
America and parts of Europe. The most recent variation is the more 
sophisticated MUFT A idea. A commitment to move towards free trade is 
made by a group of countries, on a fixed time schedule. Any country may 
join which wishes to do so . The schedule can be elongated, and the process 
of negotiating the treaty of commitment would be an important phase of 
the work. A number of issues, particularly in the non-tariff area, could then 
be negotiated piecemeal after the commitment language was agreed to -
something like the EFT A experience. 
While such a process is likely to match up some unlikely partners, 
not necessarily regionally tied to one another, it would provide some leverage 
against the Eurobloc, and it would limit the neomercantilistic tendencies of 
its own larger members, at least in relation to other members. MUFT A is a 
form of "conditional MFN." It would allow extension of benefits to be 
limited to those countries willing to commit themselves to behave toward 
member countries in certain, predictable ways. Other countries which 
discriminate against members could face meaningful discrimination 
against them. 
A MUFT A process would perhaps be very useful to countries like 
Australia and New Zealand. It is less clear what the advantages to Japan and 
North America would be in the short-run. It would be valuable, for example, 
if it forced the Euro bloc to participate in a wider liberalization, but the 
incentive for Europe to do so would not necessarily be great. Two-thirds of 
Western European trade is intra-European trade, and that is the problem all 
the other countries are up against. 
Another approach to liberalization would be through sector 
negotiations and commodity arrangements. Some analysts have mentioned 
the Canadian-American automotive agreement as a prototype. It is a bad 
example . For one thing, it has not worked in a balanced way, because a 
relatively weaker country like Canada cannot really open its industry to a 
relatively powerful one like the U.S. It might have worked if the balance of 
gain and cost on each side had been worked out very specifically, product 
by product, but that would have been a very time-consuming negotiation. 
Moreover, a sectoral agreement in, say, the Pacific, would not easily solve 
problems with competitors elsewhere, while it would intensify the need for 
structural change internally. (What would happen to Detroit if Japan were 
in the group? ) A sector approach is more likely to work within an area for 
a rapidly growing, complex industry which ought to be shaped regionally; 
or for a worldwide problem. A sector discussion with all major trading coun-
tries could result in useful balancing of the conditions of trade and investment, 
by allowing harmonization of non-tariff as well as tariff problems, and long-
range policies. It should not be ruled out, but rather explored with great 
caution. 
Commodity arrangements are possible, and can work, under 
certain conditions. Regional commodity arrangements are not likely to go 
anywhere, unless they can really be used to affect world trading conditions. 
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This is quite impossible in rice or in oilseeds, for example. International 
arrangements must, again, be approached cautiously. Commodity agreements 
can only be effective if they are seen both as a forum for discussion of 
methods of harmonizing national policies and as a method of regulation of 
the conditions of trade, especially prices and export subsidies. The concept 
of a commodity arrangement being a price agreement, as proposed in much 
of the international discussion, is not meaningful. European officials often, 
for example, speak of the need for "order" in world markets through agree-
ments on the regulation of pricing practices. Price benchmarks tend to be 
ambiguous, allowing room for shading freight rates, qualities, and terms. 
Soon after prices are set, production conditions and market demand inevitably 
alter, so that the price differentials previously established turn out to be 
unrelated to market conditions. Thus no matter what prices are set, agree-
ments on production controls and/or market sharing soon become necessary 
to hold prices steady. Alternatively, and in my view preferably, commodity 
arrangements should have the price element flexible, using prices as a trigger 
for consultative procedures on other aspects of production and trade policy. 
The product concerned is also a crucial matter. Tropical oilseeds compete 
with temperate products like soybeans, which in turn, because of their protein 
content, compete at the margin with feedstuffs and are demanded as meat and 
dairy production stimulants. Separating out fats and oils in this context is 
extremely difficult to do . 
On the whole, real progress in agricultural trade will have to come 
on a global basis, but it may be possible to break out basic sectors like all of 
grains (feedgrains, wheat, rice). 
The basic problems in trade, and this is especially true for the 
exports of Japan and Eastern Asia, are the basic conflicts in national policy, 
which often manifest themselves in the form of non-tariff barriers. The GATT 
framework of rules, procedures, rights and obligations is the most suitable 
base from which to work on these problems. It is, of course, true that EFT A 
made great strides on NTB's within a limited group of countries.6 However, 
EFT A left out agriculture altogether; and the progress made on other matters 
was limited to the obvious areas, in which industrial sales would not grow 
under free trade conditions unless certain other conditions were altered (e.g., 
certification of technical standards). 
Tariffs remain an important element of the picture - especially in 
the hard core areas where they remain very high in spite of several multi-
lateral negotiations over the years, and where the effective protection on 
processing is high relatively to protection on raw materials. Non-tariff 
impediments and distortions are the most difficult to deal with, and are now 
probably the most important questions in relation to future trade prospects. 
The question of how and when quantitative restrictions should be applied 
is a critical issue, particularly in the light of recent American pressures and 
actions for quotas on beef, steel, ceramic tiles, shoes, textiles, and assorted 
other products (like canned mushrooms from Taiwan). The restrictions in 
Europe against Eastern Asia, formal and informal, are important both 
because of the limitation on access to Europe and because of the effect on 
American political reaction to imports, in full light of European policies and 
practices. 
6 See for example Gerard and Victoria Curzon, Hidden Barriers to Trade, Thames Essays, 
Trade Policy Research Centre, London, 1970, Chapter 3. 
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In my paper for the President's Commission on International 'l'rade 
and Investment Policy7 I argued for a strategy of setting aside the traditional 
concept of reciprocity, in the sense of horse-trading, and aiming instead at 
new rules, guidelines, and codes of conduct, coupled with consultative proce-
dures for complaints which can be measured in terms of deviations from 
these rules, guidelines, and codes. Reciprocity would then take the form of 
equal commitments by nations, rather than equivalent concessions measured 
in traditional terms. 
This approach sets aside such notions as a "standstill" agreement 
(sometimes proposed by developing nations), and aims at persistent efforts 
at problem solving, perhaps piecemeal, through harmonization of national 
economic policies affecting each sector. Trade liberalization would, following 
this approach, require elimination or harmonization of many other impedi-
ments and distorting policies, so that the conditions for trade and investment 
would be more neutral, apart from tariffs. 
Taking this approach as a basic policy approach, questions like 
textile restrictions should simply not be discussed bilaterally, where export-
ing countries can be picked off one by one, unless there is also a multilateral 
discussion aimed at common principles of imposition and administration of 
restrictions, and at providing information to all countries on the policies and 
practices of each. The hard lesson of the last few years' experience in the use 
of quantitative restrictions, especially "voluntary" restrictions, is that multi-
lateral procedures are sorely needed, to protect exporting countries, and to 
constrain governments of importing countries from taking precipitous actions 
on behalf of special domestic interests. Greater emphasis on domestic adjust-
ment measures in the case of labor-intensive industry, in depressed areas, or 
in agriculture will require greater external pressure. Otherwise, governments 
will naturally prefer to pass on the costs of adjustment to business interests 
in other countries, rather than pay out budget money. For this very reason, it 
is necessary to force these restrictions into a multilateral framework, which 
might require, for example, that a government imposing a restriction also 
implement a domestic program to bring about structural adjustment of the 
industry concerned. 
New restrictions do not only harm the interests of the exporters 
of manufacturers . Australian wool exports do get damaged by the reduction 
of the prosperity of the Japanese textile industry , which in turn is adversely 
affected by American restrictions . 
If the present general breakdown in U.S. relations with Japan were 
to continue on top of trade restrictions and other trade and investment prob-
lems, Japan could very well decide to reduce her dependence on the U.S. and 
build up closer ties in Asia, leading to yet another bloc situation. In the end, 
with India and Pakistan likely to be left out, China restless, and the devel-
oping nations nervous about the concentration of Japanese power, I cannot 
help but feel that this would lead to real political problems. 
My conclusion is that another multilateral effort is needed, which 
is more broadly conceived than past trade negotiations. It is likely to cover 
many national policy questions if NTB's are truly to be tackled; and it is 
likely to involve some review and reform of the international institutions and 
7 "Modes of Negotiating in the 1970s," in United States International Economic Policy in 
an Interdependent World, papers submitted to the Commission on International Trade 
and Investment Policy, U.S. Government Printing Office, July 1971. 
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rules. Some of the change would come about through agreement among the 
major industrialized nations, other changes might take the form of more 
general agreements. 
The shock of the August, 1971, measures may have provided an 
opportunity to go for a broad effort. In fact, a well conceived long-range 
strategy would be to have the Group of Ten on the monetary side negotiate 
some fundamental changes in the monetary system, while the new High Level 
Group of the OECD does a similar fundamental review for trade and invest-
ment. Then, in a year or two, other nations could be brought in to undertake 
major negotiations, involving reform of the trade policies of all countries 
(developed and developing alike) and the formulation of rules and procedures 
which would channel national decisions of the type which affect other countries. 
In the end, as remarked earlier, I believe we will want to keep at least 
those elements of equity and those defenses against predatory behavior which 
the GATT rules already contain. Throwing these away in the present context 
would gain nothing, and with the present political balance in the world the 
negotiation of new rules from a clean slate would be almost impossible to 
achieve. 
In spite of my conclusion that a multilateral effort is needed, and 
that other nations must try to pull the Eurobloc and the U.S. along a path 
they have recently been reluctant to tread, such an effort could fail. There 
are consequently two reasons why some form of regional cooperation and 
policy coordination are needed . First, the countries of the region must 
cooperate in order to provide leverage to alter present trade policy circum-
stances and avoid sliding into a mode of relationship of competitive power 
blocs. Second, they should cooperate so that if the broad, multilateral 
approach breaks down, they are not each then hostages of fortune, highly 
vulnerable to ad hoc policies of the three great Western powers, the U.S., 
Japan, and the Eurobloc. 
Pacific cooperation in my view ought to take several forms -
some of them are noted in passing in this paper. The matters covered include 
aid, trade, and investment. Aid and investment policies are important in the 
development of the area, as well as trade, and the rapid development of the 
area is essential to help build up the strength it needs to support itself in this 
present sea of uncertainty and neomercantilism. 
283 
COMMENTS BY PROFESSOR G. CURZON 
Professor Curzon said that he basically agreed with Dr. Malmgren 
and he wished there were more such negotiating papers. He noted that he 
and Dr. Malmgren had often arrived at similar conclusions because if policy-
makers are assumed to be bloody-minded, anti-free trade and neo-mercantilist, 
then the answers to trade and other questions, must be generated by exam-
ining possible paths of action and not model building. 
Professor Curzon emphasized that Canada, Australia and Japan are 
the arch-protectionist countries and that there would unlikely be a change in 
the trade climate until these three change their attitudes. At the Kennedy-
Round Canada, Australia and Japan got a free ride at it . It will be the last 
free ride they are likely to get and unless they change their attitudes they will 
not be asked again to participate in a world-wide exercise . Also, people should 
not fall into the trap of trying to propose arrangements between these three 
countries, for whatever happens with regard to such partial arrangements 
will be a by-product of the commercial policies of the U.S. and Europe. 
Dr. Malmgren, on page one, stressed the importance of U.S. and 
European agreement as disagreement on policy for the rest of the world and 
especially the relevance ofthe Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) to the 
Pacific area. Professor Curzon thought that the CAP is dying if not yet dead, 
and that it hardly existed with respect to intra-community agricultural pro-
duction. Its main purpose was to discriminate against third countries, 
especially against the United Kingdom for negotiating purposes. Since the 
French-German revaluation and devaluation has been shelved, there are 
four different agricultural customs territories in the union. The German 
Agriculture Minister further said that even if Germany had a chance to return 
to fixed exchange rates, it would not return to the Common Agricultural 
arrangements. 
Professor Curzon suggested the comments on increased protection-
ism in the U.S. can be looked at in two ways. The U.S. can be viewed as 
becoming more protectionist, or it can be said that , as part of the general 
move toward free trade over the past 10 to 15 years, as might be expected 
problems have arisen that perhaps have not been handled in the most 
imaginative way, but which should be little cause for pessimism. 
It was mentioned earlier that the multinational corporations are 
potential movers of capital into the most profitable areas. However, 
Professor Curzon thought they are not as rational as is very often assumed 
and they are especially not combative enough. He wondered what they 
maximize, for they are very lazy and tardy about maximizing profits. He 
said they behave like a chameleon - rather than influencing policy, they look 
at the policy and adapt accordingly. He also suggested , in answer to a previous 
question, that they do not charge lower prices after moving to an area of 
lower costs because they do not know how long conditions will last, for they 
might have to move back to the previous pattern. 
Professor Curzon agreed with the pessimism over general prefer-
ences and thought they might even have the negative effect of making the 
less developed countries bitter. 
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He was less pessimistic in the sphere of agriculture and commodity 
agreements in a regional or longer arrangement because of the success of the 
EFTA agricultural policy which was thought to be non-existent. A forth-
coming paper by V. Curzon shows that in the EFT A context, the countries 
somehow established a "self-sufficiency index" such that when this index is 
less than one, there exists scope for negotiations with other suppliers of 
agricultural products. It is an amazing piece of institutional gadgetry which 
has nothing to do with economic efficiency, but is somehow the price to 
pay if the countries want to get freer trade in other than agricultural goods. 
This would have important implications for countries which require some 
sort of agreements on agricultural products before negotiating about 
other commodities. 
Professor Curzon was rather doubtful about the new principle of 
more global arrangements arising from the evolution of reciprocity in 
international agreements. He said the kind of agreement that comes out of 
international institutions, conferences or negotiations is a framework agree-
ment which specifies minimum concessions, duties and obligations, called 
the "macro-action". Given the framework, bargaining over implementation, 
or "nucro-action" begins and this involves horse-trading and reciprocity . He 
doubted that this process could be avoided. 
Professor Curzon made a number of broad points concerning the 
overall evolution of commercial arrangements and institutions. From an 
egocentric point of view, the arrangement between the community six could 
grow gradually to become an arrangement between some ten countries, for 
example. It is possible non-African countries will ask to be .associated with 
the African countries in their arrangement with the European Economic 
Community . For the negotiations starting next month (November, 1971) 
the European Economic Community has accepted the notion of a free trade 
area arrangement so that many more countries will now be able to talk to 
the Community than before . Another point was that if the Nixon measures 
are dismantled, trade arrangements will not return to what they were 
previously, but rather will move in the direction of freer trade. However, 
there will only be a move toward freer trade in industrial products among 
the industrialized countries whoever they may include. But Japan will be 
in trouble, for Japan wants as close an association with others in trade 
matters as possible, but other countries do not want Japan . Professor Curzon 
was pessimistic that Japan itself would take initiatives since Japan is not yet 
in this mood. Therefore, the global arrangements will be those between the 
U.S . and Europe and he hoped they would include the U.S. and not be 
Eurocentric. 
Professor Curzon mentioned one proposal that Dr. Malmgren had 
not made. He said that if the countries of the Pacific region were to have 
industrial planning, they must engage in some simple forms of trade liberal-
ization. This could be brought about by a preferential trade arrangement 
rather than by a free trade arrangement. Since they are all very high tariff 
countries, they could accept a 50 percent preference between themselves 
and still leave a certain amount of protection in regard to their partners. 
Such an arrangement would lead to the evolution of a rather natural pattern 
of specialization and could also be reconciled with GATT. It might be a 
first step for countries which are basically protectionist-minded, but need to 
do something jointly . This might also get them some kind of bargaining 
position in a world which is going to be very tough. 
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DISCUSSION OF DR. H. MALMGREN'S PAPER 
A U.S. participant took note of the emphasis in the paper, 
comments and previous discussion that the European Economic Community 
is quite restrictive toward the U.S. and others and will likely be joined by a 
50-country bloc approximately, that competition from the less developed 
countries will become increasingly threatening to the developed countries 
and that this threat can be most constructively met by appropriate adjust-
ment schemes. He said that if the developed countries do manage to devise 
positive and fairly comprehensive adjustment schemes, then a Pacific Area 
Free Trade Agreement (PAFT A) begins to look much more attractive as a 
second best solution to trade distortions . At the first Pacific Trade and 
Development Conference, P AFT A was criticized on the grounds that a 
global approach was better. But, if the European Economic Community is 
not willing to take a global approach, then there is no reason to reject 
American-Japanese cooperation in building a P AFT A that would include the 
other 50 non-communist nations. He said the alternative implication is that 
the U.S. cannot get along with Japan because Japan is too competitive. But 
that means that the U.S. cannot get along with any highly developed coun-
try and thus tl}at the U.S. might as well close its doors to the rest of the 
world, to the great harm of both the U.S . and the rest of the world. 
Another U.S . participant emphasized that concerned people must 
think very hard about what can be done in the U .S. and Canada to bring 
about the miraculous possibility of freer or free trade in the Pacific at least. 
Professor Curzon said that current problems are a counterpart of the move-
ment toward free trade. This participant said the means to solve these prob-
lems are known, but how to implement these means is not known. He 
emphasized that there is no hope now in the U.S . for reinforcing the freer 
commercial policies achieved, for there is unquestionably a retreat from 
these. The interest groups that had previously supported the moves toward 
free trade - the government executive and the labour unions to some 
extent - have now joined the protectionist camp. The executive has political 
commitments to the textile workers in the South and the labour unions have 
become extremely intransigent against liberal policy. He challenged the 
people at the Conference to make practical suggestions of how to reverse 
this trend before it is too late. 
A Canadian participant emphasized that the current situation is a 
disastrous one into which the United States dragged everyone. He was very 
surprised at Professor Curzon's remarks, for he said there is no question that 
the failure of U.S. policy in the last few years to take essential actions, 
particularly on the balance of payments question, but also on other questions 
related to Pacific relations more directly, has caused very difficult problems 
in Pacific relationships. The balance of payments problem is not due purely 
to the U.S. inaction but also to European inaction. However, the U.S. 
continually talked about the desirability of the status quo, fixed exchange 
rates, and so on and then, all of a sudden it accepted the notion that the 
exchange rates were not correct, and needed realignment and consequently 
took the extreme action that put everyone in the mess that exists today. The 
U.S . was the only one that could have created the change since the European 
and central bank attitudes must be accepted as given. 
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Also, this participant said, it is necessary to be clear about the 
lack of relation between the balance of payments problem and trade prob-
lems in the Pacific. A case has not been made on non-tariff barriers, although 
it undoubtedly exists, but until it is made , it is not possible to expect Japan 
or any other country to be susceptible to tough bargaining. Thus a threat 
that' overhangs all Pacific relations is arising out of what could be a myth, or 
if not a myth, a doubtful proposition that there has been a relative increase 
in non-tariff barriers in recent years . Therefore, he called on the U.S. to 
form its own action committee to study and propose solutions to this 
formidable array of protection. He said the U.S. must take the responsibility 
for this, since it at least sees some of the light. 
Since Japan, Canada and Australia have more protection than 
other developed countries, the Canadian participant said they of course 
should not be proud of it, however, people should recall that they regarded 
the GA TT mechanism, to some extent, as inappropriate to their needs, if 
only partially free trade were considered. However, contrary to Professor 
Curzon, it is because these countries need more liberalization than anyone 
else that there is a real possibility of initiatives from them. Although some-
what sceptical about what will happen in these matters, he agreed with 
Dr. Malmgren that Japan must take very seriously its role in these matters. 
An Australian participant commented that any agreement between 
Dr. Malmgren and Professor Curzon was very subtle and if it existed, his 
position was far from theirs. He said that Europe and the U.S . largely 
prevented Australia, Canada and Japan from getting involved in trade 
liberalization in the post-war period and that people must think carefully 
about how this situation evolved before pinning the blame on these three 
or four, including New Zealand, for being free riders at the Kennedy-Round. 
They were certainly not free riders in agriculture and if Europe and the U .S. 
continue to try and exclude agricultural products from trade negotiations, 
Australia and the others ought to start, and will start, looking quite closely 
at special arrangements with Japan . The Common Agricultural Policy is not 
dying and if it is, it will take a very long time . 
This Australian participant agreed with Dr . Malmgren's shift in 
his summary of his paper to stressing the need for regional initiatives and 
also agreed with Dr. Malmgren's assessment of the situation regarding 
initiatives from the U.S . He said his optimism was contained in the 
approaches suggested in Sir Crawford's paper and that initiatives to curb 
protectionism in the Pacific must come from Japan and, to a lesser extent, 
Australia. He said there was some basis for his optimism but not a great 
deal, since he was a little more doubtful about Japan's position than 
Australia's. He suggested new levers would be very useful to assist in 
removal of some of the obstacles to trade, instead of the head-on clashes 
that have characterized the textile negotiations and to some extent the 
present negotiations. He wondered why there was an almost pathological 
caution in the U.S. with regard to taking initiatives in the Pacific. He also 
wondered why the Japanese government seems to be retreating to some 
extent from regionalism and opting for bilateralism in relations with the 
U.S . when bilateralism looks utterly disastrous . 
Professor Curzon replied to the Australian participant that he did 
say Australian policy-makers were neo-mercantilist, but that he was not 
trying to place blame. The purpose of the conference was to try and produce 
a framework for nationally self-interested policy action that was better than 
the traditional one. It seems that this is more difficult to do for a group of 
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countries with high levels of protection than for a group which has basically 
accepted the idea that perhaps protection is not the best policy, although 
as the Canadian participant said, perhaps this is exactly why these protectionist 
countries should be more concerned. 
A Japanese participant described Japan's position as being 
pessimistic about global liberalization since only an enlarged European 
Economic Community is on the horizon. The Japanese government would 
take a position on trade policy that was neither progressive nor regressive 
with respect to other countries. In this kind of trade policy in disguise, the 
Japanese government might actually pursue regional integration with 
Australia and the Southeast Asian countries, and Canada would be welcome 
to join. As well, the Japanese government will pursue a policy restructuring 
its economy so that it will be in an advantageous position for global free 
trade around 1980. Japan wishes to go along with the U.S. ultimately, but 
the U.S . is at present too big and too tough. Pacific integration is a good 
strategy. 
Another American participant suggested that the next year would 
be a very opportune time for initiatives by other Pacific countries toward a 
proposed Organization for Pacific Trade, Aid and Development to be put on 
the table by Canada, Japan, Australia and New Zealand. The U.S. would not 
be able to afford not to participate in it. This forum would provide an 
important avenue for Asian less developed countries to coordinate their 
decisions regarding future voluntary export restraints. If they approached 
the U.S. multilaterally or regionally on issues like textiles, as Dr. Malmgren 
said, they would achieve much better results than if they pursued bilateral 
negotiations. He also noted with respect to Professor Curzon's remarks that 
since multinational corporations are oligopolists, they can operate very 
effectively in non-competitive situations, such as a protectionist world. He 
mentioned that Japan is second only to the U.S. in having the largest num-
ber of very large corporations and he hoped their multinational corporations 
would operate in Asia and Europe to more effectively benefit the less 
developed countries. 
In regard to the U.S. policy of response to initiatives on the part 
of Asian countries, another American participant said this should be 
interpreted more as responsiveness to initiatives on the part of developing 
countries rather than Pacific developed countries. The interpretation 
emphasizing the role of the developed countries gives more weight to a 
regional design, for attempts of regional positions on the part of the less 
developed countries have so far not made too much progress, although this 
is something that could be fostered. He also endorsed the pessimism regard-
ing general preferences of both of the commentators; however, he suggested 
that pessimism has already been discounted by the less developed countries 
and they would not count much on preferences. 
This participant also stressed the emerging problems of the 
inability of less developed Asian economies to absorb the immensely 
increasing supply of labour that flows on to the market each year. While 
mentioned in Dr. Malmgren's paper, it was not stressed enough, for in the 
very near future it will overshadow many of the problems discussed at this 
Conference. The problem has been neglected to the extent it has because 
not only is data lacking in many cases, but existing data is also often 
misleading. The data is very little related to reality because the kinds of 
concepts, definitions, questionnaires, and so on, are Western ones which do 
not represent the nature of uaderemployment or even unemployment. The 
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real situation tends only to be observed when crises result from the problem. 
Thus a very important question that must be asked is how trade policy can 
be used to ease this situation and the political mind will respond more to 
these questions and answers than anything discussed so far at the Conference. 
A participant from an international institution said the situation 
regarding general preferences, while difficult, was not impossible. Although 
the effects of the scheme are small, Taiwan has been excluded and Hong 
Kong will not gain much, other Southeast Asian countries - Singapore, 
Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia - are now just trying seriously to get into 
export markets . If they go after products in which they have a comparative 
advantage and which has not yet been closed off by the scheme, they may 
get that certain initial edge. A self-defeating attitude, such as the Prebisch 
line in the 1960s, on these matters is disastrous. 
Also with respect to Dr. Malmgren's comment on pages 277 and 278 
mentioning the usefulness of complementarity and planning, this participant 
emphasized that the Asian Development Bank study mentioned actually 
inveighed against the emphasis on complementarity and rational industrial 
planning. The greatest gains are to be made from competitiveness in trade 
not from complementarity . This participant also, criticized GA TT for 
becoming a kind of sacred cow that people are prepared to drive around 
rather than slaughter because it was based on the most appalling economics. 
The participant from Singapore made two comments, one 
emphasizing the importance of commodity agreements, such as in tin, to the 
less developed countries and one pointing out that the Nixon measures had 
little effect on the Southeast Asian developing economies . 
Finally, Dr. Malmgren replied to the various comments on his 
paper. He suggested that if GATT were discarded, nothing whatever could 
be built in its place, so that it was absolutely necessary to use GATT as a 
foundation on which to build better regulations. He said that if the U.S. 
were prepared to implement an adjustment assistance programme, then 
P AFT A would become a real possibility. However he doubted, because of 
the opposing interest groups, especially labour, already mentioned, that 
adjustment assistance would be realized in the near future. He emphasized 
that it would be completely impossible for the U.S. to go along with any 
liberalization in industry without a major change in agriculture, but this 
means running up against Japan and the Common Agricultural Policy. 
Japan's long-run interests would require buying off all its farmers and their 
cutting back production sharply within two or three years, but that will not 
happen, partly because economists have done a bad job of explaining the 
costs and benefits of agricultural policy. He also noted that the only country 
in which NTB's have increased in the last few years has been the United 
States. 
He suggested U.S . Policy is not concerned with the Pacific area 
because the fundamental thrust of U.S . policy has been oriented to 
European security . European integration was sponsored not on the basis 
of economic reason but rather clearly in order to build up the defence 
capability of Western Europe against what the U.S. saw as the Soviet threat. 
In the Pacific, the U.S. has no conception of a massive threat, whether or not 
it exists. There is also the desire to disengage from Vietnam that shapes the 
feelings of policy-makers . Thus it is difficult to get the policy-makers, who 
are basically not economists, to focus on the evolution of the Pacific as an 
economic problem and what this problem might lead to in terms of stability. 
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The unemployment problem in Asia is the most important of all, and will 
have probably the most important long-term security implications for the 
U.S. The governments of countries like Japan and Australia must simply 
drag uninterested U.S. officials into the area . Moreover, the downward 
protectionist slide in U.S . politics requires a concerted effort by other 
countries to make th is a debaHe in foreign policy terms. 
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